Vedāntadeśika’s Systematization of Rāmānuja’s Self-surrender (prapatti): A Study Based on the Nikṣeparakṣā

International Journal of Hindu Studies - This article examines the Śrīvaiṣṇava validation of the doctrine of self-surrender to the Supreme God Viṣṇu (prapatti)....     

A Study on the Concept of ‘Māyā’ in Kashmir Śivādvayavādī Darśan

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Trika philosophy or Kashmir Śaivism is one of the major nondual philosophical systems of India where both esoteric and exoteric practices...     

A Reader’s Guide to al-Shāfiʿī’s Epistle on Legal Theory (al-Risāla)

Al-Shāfi?ī’s famous Epistle on Legal Theory (al-Risāla) has long been hailed as formative for the discipline of Islamic legal theory (u?ūl al-fiqh), but its structure and the wording of some of its most important passages remain a puzzle. This essay is intended as an aide for the study of the Risāla’s Arabic text. It surveys scholarly disagreements about the work’s significance and structure, and argues that it is best understood as a sequence of three distinct compositions, the second and third having been appended to address issues raised by opponents during discussions about the first. Each ‘book’ makes a separate argument, has its own internal structure, and is distinguished by terminological and stylistic features. Most of the article consists of a detailed analytical outline that spells out what point al-Shāfi?ī is trying to make with each of his concrete legal examples, and shows how they fit together into a sequence of three related but separately organized arguments.     

‘Transcendental knowledge’ in Tibetan Mādhyamika Epistemology

At least in as much as it is accessible to ‘transcendental wisdom’, Tsong khapa and Go rampa both maintain that ultimate truth is an object of knowledge. So granting that ultimate truth is an object of knowledge and that transcendental wisdom its knowing subject, this paper attempts to address one key epistemological problem: how does transcendental wisdom know or realise ultimate truth? The responses from the Tibetan Mådhyamikas entail that transcendental wisdom knows ultimate truth in at least two different ways: firstly, ‘by way of not seeing it’ (ma gzigs pa'i tshul gyis gzigs); and, secondly, ‘by way of transcending the conceptual elaborations’ (spros bral gyis sgo nas gzigs tshul), therefore by way of the non-dual engagement (gnyis snang dral ba'i sgo nas gzigs tshul). Although the emphasis is slightly different in each of the two modes of engagement, they are nevertheless alike in that both represent epistemic pathways geared towards the same non-conceptual realisation of ultimate truth. So what does each of these epistemic modes really mean in relation to ultimate truth? This paper addresses this question at issue by means of undertaking a comparative analysis of Tsong khapa's and Go rampa's epistemological traditions regarding the matters at question.     

Theodicy in a Deterministic Universe: God and the Problem of Suffering in Vyāsatīrtha’s Tātparyacandrikā

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The classical traditions of Vedānta in India explored the problem of why an omnipotent being like God would permit sentient beings to suffer in His...     

The nibbāna-parinibbāna controversy

Bahya ben Joseph Ibn Pakuda, The book of directions to the duties of the heart, Introduction, translation and notes by Menahem Mansoor. London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. VIII + 472. £6

Marasinghe, M.M.J., Gods in early Buddhism — a study of their social and mythological milieu as depicted in the Nikāyas of the Pali Canon, Sri Lanka, 1974, pp. xviii + 301. Library ed. RS. 50.00, Popular ed. Rs. 37–50

Conze, Edward, Buddhist wisdom books, The diamond sutra and The heart sutra, London: George Allen &; Unwin, 1975, paperback edition, pp. 110 £1.95

Schloegl, Irmgard (ed.), The wisdom of the Zen masters, London: Sheldon Press, 1975, pp. 80, paperback and cloth (£2.75)

Davies, W.D., The gospel and the land, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974, pp. xiv + 521

Dumery, Henry, Phenomenology and religion. Structures of the Christian institution, Translated by Paul Barrett. Hermeneutics: Vol. V. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, pp. ix + 114 $7.95

Dhavamony, Mariasusai, Phenomenology of religion, Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1973, pp. 385. 4,000 lire

Larson, Gerald James (ed.), Myth in Indo-European antiquity, (co-edited by C. Scott Littleton and Jaan Puhvel), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 197. £5.00

Dumézil, Georges, From myth to fiction; the saga of hadingus, Translated by Derek Coltman, pp. 253, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973

Kinsley, David R., The sword and the flute, Kālī and Krsna: Dark visions of the terrible and the sublime in Hindu mythology, University of California Press, 1975, pp. 159 + bibliography, £7.80

McDermott, Six pillars. Introductions to the major works of Sri Aurobindo, Robert A. (ed.), Chambersburg, Pa.: Wilson Books, 1974, pp. 198

Sperber, Dan, Rethinking symbolism, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. £1.90 (paper)

Poliakov, Leon, The history of anti-semitism (The Littman Library of Jewish civilization), London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1974. Vol. I, pp. ix + 340, £4.25; Vol. II, pp. xiii + 400, £4.25     

The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

The Rāga Bhāva in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā: Rectifying an Age-Old Mistake

The last foot of the 23rd verse of the Sā?khya Kārikā (SK)—‘tāmasam asmāt viparyastam’—is in need of reinterpretation. Prevailing interpretations are generally based on the primary meaning of the verse. In that sense, it is understood as a declaration of the four tāmasika bhāva that are contrary to the sāttvika ones. Taking the primary meaning of the verse is problematic because it contradicts the gu?a-bhāva coherence required by the doctrine of satkārya. The doctrine of satkārya is one of the foundational principles of Sā?khya. The avirāga or rāga bhāva shows coherence to rajas rather than tamas. I show that the verse needs to be interpreted by taking the secondary meaning. Accordingly, avirāga or rāga is established as a bhāva of rajas rather than tamas. Further, I also show that the idea of bhāva in the Sā?khya Kārikā and the Bhagavadgītā may be closely related.     

Sankara's doctrine of Māyā

Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of māyā which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by ‘superimposition’. Māyā, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self‐explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy.     

Cārvāka Miscellany II

Materialism in India, very much like materialism in Greece, has to be reconstructed on the basis of fragments. Although the materialist tradition can be traced back to the early Upaniṣads on the one hand and the Buddhist and Jain canonical works on the other, the fragments offer only a glimpse of materialist thought. The same is true of the Presocratic philosophical tradition in Greece. Yet the glimpses we have from other, non-philosophical works are no less illuminating than those found in philosophical works proper. Some instances of the early sources related to pre-Cārvāka materialism have already been offered before (see R. Bhattacharya 2012b). In what follows, I propose to add a few more instances related to (a) the anti-Vedic tradition mentioned by Patañjali, (b) the voice of rationalism found in the Purāṇas, (c) the reception of Jābāli, a proto-materialist thinker as well as (d) the Cārvāka/Lokāyata in modern Indian literature, (e) the representation of Lokāyata in Jain literature and (f) the Rājataraṅgiṇī.

     

Cārvāka Miscellany III

Since all that we know of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata is derived from fragments and allusions, the reconstruction of the materialist system has to depend on new sources and their interpretations. Some such allusions and references have been collected and analyzed here to show how materialism appears in the most unexpected places and how the verses attributed to the materialist are subjected to strange interpretations.

     

‘Nature’ and ‘Elementary Nature’ in Phenomenology and Sāṅkhya

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This is a comparative study. It is in two parts: ‘nature’ and ‘elementary nature’. ‘Nature (of things)’ as...     

From criticism to approval: A reconsideration of Ji’s Yogācāra position on Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are two Mahāyāna schools which have distinct systems. In the seventh century East Asia, the doctrinal distinction between the two schools was received as doctrinal contrast in the polemic circumstance of Emptiness-Existence (C. kongyou 空有) controversy. In this context, Ji 基 (632–682), the putative founder of East Asian Yogācāra school, has been normally considered by scholars to have advocated ‘Existence’ (viz., Yogācāra) in opposition to ‘Emptiness’ (viz., Madhyamaka). It is problematic, however, to brand Ji’s Yogācāra position simply as anti-Madhyamaka. Although Ji evidently expresses evident criticism on such a Madhyamaka exegete as Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570) in some of his works, he also describes Bhāvaviveka in an amicable or even respective way in other works. By analyzing Ji’s extant works, this article argues that Ji’s scholastic attitude toward Madhyamaka changed from criticism to approval.     

Ānando Brahmeti Vyajānāt

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The nature of Self is ever-blissful, yet we feel constant pains and sufferings in the world. Each one of us is forced to face the worldly...     

Reconsidering ‘holy war’ (jihād) in Islam

‘Holy War’ does not exhaust, and often fails to explain, the semantic range of jihād in Arabic/Islamic contexts. A more fruitful approach to the culturally encoded nuances of jihād requires the prior delineation of ideology from religion. Only a few scholars, e.g., Michael Gilsenan, Hamid Enayat, Pierre Bourdieu and Bassam Tibi, have considered the value‐neutral use of ideology in the analysis of Islamic evidence. None has addressed jihād, none has reverted, or tried to revert, contemporary stereotypes derived from an essentialist notion of Islam and Muslims, power and piety clustered around the univocal reading of jihād as ‘holy war’. This essay suggests other interpretive options that merit consideration by all serious students of religion in the modern world.