Seeing what is not seen

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.     

Subliminal Gestalt grouping: Evidence of perceptual grouping by proximity and similarity in absence of conscious perception

Previous studies making use of indirect processing measures have shown that perceptual grouping can occur outside the focus of attention. However, no previous study has examined the possibility of subliminal processing of perceptual grouping. The present work steps forward in the study of perceptual organization, reporting direct evidence of subliminal processing of Gestalt patterns. In two masked priming experiments, Gestalt patterns grouped by proximity or similarity that induced either a horizontal or vertical global orientation of the stimuli were presented as masked primes and followed by visible targets that could be congruent or incongruent with the orientation of the primes. The results showed a reliable priming effect in the complete absence of prime awareness for both proximity and similarity grouping principles. These findings suggest that a phenomenal report of the Gestalt pattern is not mandatory to observe an effect on the response based on the global properties of Gestalt stimuli.     

What are the objects of perceptual consciousness?

Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.     

Object-Based Visual Selection: Evidence From Perceptual Completion

A large body of evidence suggests that visual attention selects objects as well as spatial locations. If attention is to be regarded as truly object based, then it should operate not only on object representations that are explicit in the image, but also on representations that are the result of earlier perceptual completion processes. Reporting the results of two experiments, we show that when attention is directed to part of a perceptual object, other parts of that object enjoy an attentional advantage as well. In particular, we show that this object-specific attentional advantage accrues to partly-occluded objects and to objects defined by subjective contours. The results corroborate the claim that perceptual completion precedes object-based attentional selection.     

The ecological approach to perception: the place of perceptual content

The kind of perceptual systems that human beings possess enables each of us to respond in highly adaptive deliberate ways that take into account the suitability of particular behaviors to what we are aware of ourself as experiencing perceptually here and now. In deciding what to do next under the perceived circumstances, content is the dimension of perceptual experience that we consult. For perceptual content is how whatever the perceiver is now having perceptual experience of is given in or taken by the respective perceptual experience. Perceptual content includes presentational content, which is all the ways that what you are perceptually experiencing may be appearing to you, and intentional content, which is all the ways that your stream of perceptual experience may take to be that of which you have perceptual awareness in the environment or self. Therefore, perceptual content must be distinguished from the intentional object of perceptual awareness, which is that property, event, or entity of which you have perceptual awareness. Gibson proposed that there is no perceptual content independent of the particular intentional objects that one perceptually apprehends, which are always part of the ecological environment. This externalization of perceptual content was due, no doubt, to Gibson's conception of perceptually apprehending anything at all as not mediated by awareness of anything else, such as something immanent in perceptual experience itself. However, perceptual content need not be, theoretically, a replacement for what the perceiver has perceptual awareness of. During straightforward perceiving, the perceiver does not have awareness of perceptual content but of parts of the ecological environment including the perceiver. Perceptual content is how the external intentional object perspectivally appears from moment to moment and how it is perceptually taken to be, veridically or not. Perceptual taking of an ecological property is always in one or another of the latter's instantiations, and perceptual taking of an ecological entity or event is always with properties. The perceptual intentional object's appearing in a particular manner is distinct from perceptually taking the intentional object. For example, an ecological property may be taken quite veridically yet through a flow of varying appearance. And even when the property appears in a constant way, perceptual awareness may take it differently from one moment to the next. For example, a perceiver may have visual awareness of a surface without noticing the surface's color-texture, though the color-texture may appear to the perceiver throughout looking at the surface, before and after he or she stops noticing the color-texture.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

知觉整体优先性的研究及其进展

知觉的性质是整体的还是分析的 ?这是心理学家们长期争论不休的问题。本世纪 70年代以来 ,一些认知心理学家提出知觉加工的整体优先性假设 ,强调整体在知觉加工中的优先地位。这一假设激发了大量整体 /局部范例的研究。本文综述了这方面的研究 ,分析了它们的理论假设 ,指出了这方面研究的局限以及替代的探讨。     

Visual development in human infants: Binding features,surfaces, and objects

The development of visual binding in humans has been investigated with psychophysical tasks assessing the extent to which young infants achieve perceptual completion of partly occluded objects. These experiments lead to two conclusions. First, neonates are capable of figure-ground segregation, but do not perceive the unity of a centre-occluded object; the ability to perceive object unity emerges over the first several postnatal months. Second, by 4 months, infants rely on a range of Gestalt visual information in perceiving unity, including common motion, alignment, and good form. This developmental pattern is thought to be built on the ability to detect, and then utilize, appropriate visual information in support of the binding of features into surfaces and objects. Evidence from changes in infant attention, computational modelling, and developmental neurophysiology is cited that is consistent with this view.     

Facelikeness matters: A parametric multipart object set to understand the role of spatial configuration in visual recognition

There is a view that faces and objects are processed by different brain mechanisms. Different factors may modulate the extent to which face mechanisms are used for objects. To distinguish these factors, we present a new parametric multipart three-dimensional object set that provides researchers with a rich degree of control of important features for visual recognition such as individual parts and the spatial configuration of those parts. All other properties being equal, we demonstrate that perceived facelikeness in terms of spatial configuration facilitated performance at matching individual exemplars of the new object set across viewpoint changes (Experiment 1). Importantly, facelikeness did not affect perceptual discriminability (Experiment 2) or similarity (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that perceptual resemblance to faces based on spatial configuration of parts is important for visual recognition even after equating physical and perceptual similarity. Furthermore, the large parametrically controlled object set and the standardized procedures to generate additional exemplars will provide the research community with invaluable tools to further understand visual recognition and visual learning.     

A Theory of Perceptual Objects

Objects are central in visual, auditory, and tactual perception. But what counts as a perceptual object? I address this question via a structural unity schema, which specifies how a collection of parts must be arranged to compose an object for perception. On the theory I propose, perceptual objects are composed of parts that participate in causally sustained regularities. I argue that this theory falls out of a compelling account of the function of object perception, and illustrate its applications to multisensory perception. I also argue that the account avoids problems faced by standard views of visual and auditory objects.     

Gurwitsch’s Phenomenal Holism

Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call Phenomenal Holism, the view that all the parts of a total phenomenal state metaphysically depend on it. To illustrate how the ideas developed along the way can be used in advancing work on the phenomenology of particular kinds of experience, I draw on them in defending Husserl’s view that we can be aware of abstract objects against a phenomenological objection.     

Emotion and Full Understanding

Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same object. If an emotional awareness does not have a unique character, then it is unlikely that emotions provide an understanding that is different from unemotional states of awareness: they are perhaps little more than “hot-blooded” instances of the same understanding. If, on the other hand, an emotional state involves a perceptual awareness that is unique to the emotion, then emotions are cognitively significant, providing an understanding of the object of the emotion that is absent in a similar but unemotional episode of awareness. I argue the latter and substantiate the claim that emotions are essential to moral virtue because they can be essential to a full understanding of the situations that they involve. In such cases, emotions are not merely a symptom of the possession of an adequate understanding, but are rather necessary for having an adequate understanding.     

Smaller holistic processing of faces associated with face drawing experience

The type of experience involved with an object category has been regarded as one important factor in shaping of the human object recognition system. Laboratory training studies have shown that different kinds of learning experience with the same set of novel objects resulted in different perceptual and neural changes. Whether this applies to natural real-world objects remains to be seen. We compared two groups of observers who had different learning experiences with faces, using holistic processing as a dependent measure. We found that, while ordinary observers had extensive individuation experience with faces and displayed typical holistic face processing, art students who had acquired additional experience in drawing faces, and thus in attending to parts of a face, showed less holistic processing than did ordinary observers. These results converge with laboratory training studies on the role of type of experience in the development of different perceptual markers for different object categories. It is thus insufficient to categorize expertise simply in terms of object domains (e.g., expertise with faces). Instead, perceptual expertise should be classified in terms of the underlying process or task demand.     

Perceptual organization influences visual working memory

Previous studies have demonstrated that top-down factors can bias the storage of information in visual working memory. However, relatively little is known about the role that bottom-up stimulus characteristics play in visual working memory storage. In the present study, subjects performed a change detection task in which the to-be-remembered objects were organized in accordance with Gestalt grouping principles. When an attention-capturing cue was presented at the location of one object, other objects that were perceptually grouped with the cued object were more likely to be stored in working memory than were objects that were not grouped with the cued object. Thus, objects that are grouped together tend to be stored together, indicating that bottom-up perceptual organization influences the storage of information in visual working memory.     

Trance and confusion in Gestalt therapy

This article introduces hypnotic principles of confusion and trance as fundamental operations in Gestalt therapy. A process is identified which utilizes perceptual shifts of reference as a method of organizing Gestalt techniques. The sequence of operations constituting the confusion process is outlined and developed in a psychotherapy session through the use of implication, dissociation, and embodiment. The development of this organization of Gestalt therapy is intended to enhance the strategic capacities of therapists.     

Has the time come to rehabilitate Gestalt theory?

Summary The distinction is drawn between the metatheoretical commitments of Gestalt theory and their instantiations in explicit theory. It is argued that the metatheoretical commitments of Gestalt theory reflect important insights which might have served as the foundation of a theory of perception that avoids a number of the major difficulties associated with constructivism and the theory of direct perception. For this reason rehabilitation of the reputation of Gestalt theory is urged. In the concluding section certain similarities between the foundational premises of Gestalt theory and parallel distributed processing approaches are noted.The contents of this paper were presented initially at a symposium on perceptual theory in honor of Irvin Rock which convened in Washington, DC, on the occasion of the 1986 meetings of the American Psychological Association     

Autism and the experience of a perceptual object

Sewards and Sewards (2002) argue that while computations necessary for object recognition occur throughout the ventral visual stream, object recognition awareness involves the anterior temporal lobe and the medial orbital prefrontal cortex. The present paper suggests, however, that the medial orbital prefrontal cortex has a unique contribution, namely that of producing a basic experience of a perceptual object. It is further argued that the mechanisms that produce this experience also result in making the object more important than its subparts and features. Finally, it is argued that a reduction in this importance may account for some perceptual difficulties in high-functioning autism. This view is consistent with evidence for early selective abnormalities in other systems involving the medial prefrontal cortex in autism.