Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

内隐人格理论的实体论－渐变论维度研究述评

对内隐人格理论的实体论－渐变论维度的研究是近年来社会认知研究的一个新趋势。研究发现,人们对人的特性（如智力、品德和人格特征等）的内隐认知理论,制约调节着他们对人的行为的理解和反应。人们持有的不同内隐人格理论导致他们不同的社会认知模式和行为反应方式。实体论者由于认为人的特性是固定不变的,而倾向于用抽象概括化的和静态的内在特质来理解人的行为;而渐变论者由于认为人的特性是动态可塑的,而倾向于用影响心理动态过程的内外具体调节因素来理解人的行为。作者在综述有关研究的基础上,进而提出一些新的见解。     

Violations of implicit theories and the sense of prediction and control: implications for motivated person perception

Beginning with the assumption that implicit theories of personality are crucial tools for understanding social behavior, the authors tested the hypothesis that perceivers would process person information that violated their predominant theory in a biased manner. Using an attentional probe paradigm (Experiment 1) and a recognition memory paradigm (Experiment 2), the authors presented entity theorists (who believe that human attributes are fixed) and incremental theorists (who believe that human attributes are malleable) with stereotype-relevant information about a target person that supported or violated their respective theory. Both groups of participants showed evidence of motivated, selective processing only with respect to theory-violating information. In Experiment 3, the authors found that after exposure to theory-violating information, participants felt greater anxiety and worked harder to reestablish their sense of prediction and control mastery. The authors discuss the epistemic functions of implicit theories of personality and the impact of violated assumptions.     

Implicit theories about groups and stereotyping: the role of group entitativity

The consequences of holding an entity (i.e., the belief that a group's characteristics are fixed) or incremental (i.e., the belief that a group's characteristics are malleable) implicit theory about groups was examined for stereotyping and perceptions of group entitativity. Two studies showed that implicit theories about groups affect stereotyping by changing perceptions of group entitativity. Study 1 found that entity theorists were more likely to stereotype than incremental theorists and that perception of group entitativity significantly accounted for this relation. In Study 2, implicit theories of groups were manipulated via instruction set and entity theorists stereotyped more and perceived groups as more entitative than incremental theorists. Again, the effect of implicit theory was significantly, although partially, mediated by perceptions of group entitativity. The roles of implicit theories about groups and perceptions of group entitativity are discussed regarding stereotyping.     

Psychological essentialism and attention allocation: preferences for stereotype-consistent versus stereotype-inconsistent information

People who believe that human attributes are immutable (entity theorists) display preferences for stereotype-consistent over stereotype-inconsistent information (J. E. Plaks, S. J. Stroessner, C. S. Dweck, & J. W. Sherman, 2001). In this article, the authors argue that entity theories are components of broader sets of beliefs that represent differences between people in terms of underlying essences. Consistent with expectations, the authors found that measures of essentialist beliefs (i.e., in the biological basis, discreteness, informativeness, and inherence of human attributes) covaried with the presence of entity theories. Essentialist beliefs as a set were related to stronger preferences for stereotype-consistent information, and this effect was not reducible to the effect of entity theories. The authors propose that research on implicit person theories can be placed within an encompassing framework of psychological essentialism.     

Implicit Theories and Their Role in Judgments and Reactions: A Word From Two Perspectives

In this target article, we present evidence for a new model of individual differences in judgments and reactions. The model holds that people's implicit theories about human attributes structure the way they understand and react to human actions and outcomes. We review research showing that when people believe that attributes (such as intelligence or moral character) are fixed, trait-like entities (an entity theory), they tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of these fixed traits ("I failed the test because I am dumb" or "He stole the bread because he is dishonest"). In contrast, when people believe that attributes are more dynamic, malleable, and developable (an incremental theory), they tend to focus less on broad traits and, instead, tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of more specific behavioral or psychological mediators ("I failed the test because of my effort or strategy" or "He stole the bread because he was desperate"). The two frameworks also appear to foster different reactions: helpless versus mastery-oriented responses to personal setbacks and an emphasis on retribution versus education or rehabilitation for transgressions. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for personality, motivation, and social perception.     

Can Implicit Theory Influence Construal Level?

Beliefs about stability and change are captured by individuals’ implicit theories. Incremental‐theorists believe that human traits and world‐dispositions are malleable and can change through effort, whereas entity‐theorists believe that human traits and world‐dispositions are fixed. In this research we find that the implicit theory an individual holds influences an important aspect of the cognitive process, namely, the level of construal at which information is processed. In three studies we demonstrate that, compared to entity‐theorists, incremental‐theorists adopt a more abstract level of information construal, and the increased cognitive flexibility afforded by an incremental‐theory mindset explains this effect.     

Against the odds: academic underdogs benefit from incremental theories

An implicit theory of ability approach to motivation argues that students who believe traits to be malleable (incremental theorists), relative to those who believe traits to be fixed (entity theorists), cope more effectively when academic challenges arise. In the current work, we integrated the implicit theory literature with research on top dog and underdog status to predict self-efficacy in an academic context. To examine our predictions, we assessed college students’ (N  =  165) implicit theories of mathematical ability and manipulated their underdog versus top dog status in a math competition. We hypothesized that holding an incremental (vs. entity) theory would interact with competition status (underdog vs. top dog) to predict mathematical self-efficacy. When in an underdog position, incremental (vs. entity) theories boosted students’ mathematical self-efficacy. Moreover, a mediated moderation model revealed that the experience of less helplessness accounted for greater self-efficacy in mathematical ability among academic underdogs with incremental (vs. entity) theories. Implications for teaching practices are discussed.     

Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence

Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self-persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs.     

Implicit theories and motivational focus: Desired future versus present reality

People’s beliefs concerning their abilities differ. Incremental theorists believe their abilities (e.g., intelligence) are malleable; entity theorists believe their abilities are fixed (Dweck in Mindset: the new psychology of success. Random House, New York, 2007). On the basis that incremental theorists should emphasize improving their abilities for the future, whereas entity theorists should emphasize demonstrating their abilities in the present reality, we predicted that, when thinking about their wishes, compared to entity theorists, incremental theorists focus more toward the desired future than the present reality. We assessed participants’ motivational focus using a paradigm that differentiated how much they chose to imagine the desired future versus the present reality regarding an important wish (Kappes et al. in Emotion 11: 1206–1222, 2011). We found the predicted effect by manipulating (Study 1) and measuring implicit theories (Study 2), in the academic (Study 1) and in the sport domain (Study 2).     

Beliefs About Emotion: Links to Emotion Regulation,Well-Being,and Psychological Distress

People differ in their implicit beliefs about emotions. Some believe emotions are fixed (entity theorists), whereas others believe that everyone can learn to change their emotions (incremental theorists). We extend the prior literature by demonstrating (a) entity beliefs are associated with lower well-being and increased psychological distress, (b) people's beliefs about their own emotions explain greater unique variance than their beliefs about emotions in general, and (3) implicit beliefs are linked with well-being/distress via cognitive reappraisal. These results suggest people's implicit beliefs—particularly about their own emotions—may predispose them toward emotion regulation strategies that have important consequences for psychological health.     

Lay Theories of Personality: Cornerstones of Meaning in Social Cognition

Lay theories (or ‘implicit theories’) are cornerstones for social cognition: people use lay theories to help them make sense of complex and ambiguous behavior. In this study, we describe recent research on the entity and incremental theories (the belief that personality is fixed or malleable). In so doing, we demonstrate that each theory does not act alone. Instead, each is associated with a set of allied beliefs, the sum total of which cohere into two distinct meaning systems. We present evidence that these meaning systems produce systematic differences in a range of fundamental social cognition processes, with important implications for the field’s understanding of trait/situation attribution, moral judgment, person memory, and stereotyping. We further argue that because meaning systems serve a central meaning‐making function, people are motivated to believe that the meaning system they are using is effective and accurate. Accordingly, we present evidence that people exhibit processing distortions and compensatory mechanisms to minimize the impact of information that violates their meaning system. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field’s understanding of basic social cognition.     

Psychological essentialism and stereotype endorsement

Research on implicit person theories shows that people who believe that human attributes are immutable (“entity theorists”) are particularly prone to endorse social stereotypes and to explain them with reference to innate factors. We argue that entity theories belong to a broader set of beliefs that represent differences between people in terms of underlying essences. New measures of three essentialist beliefs (i.e., in the biological basis, discreteness, and informativeness of human attributes) were developed in a pilot study. In the main study, these beliefs were found to covary with entity theories, and to predict the endorsement and innate explanation of stereotypes. Essentialist beliefs predicted stereotype endorsement independently of popular stereotyping-related individual difference measures, and in a way that was not reducible to the effect of entity theories. We propose that research on implicit person theories can be placed within an encompassing framework of psychological essentialism.     

Pursuing Academic Interests: The Role of Implicit Theories

Students can believe that their academic interests are fixed (entity theory) or malleable (incremental theory). A measure of implicit theories of academic interests was developed to examine how such theories influence students' decisions to retain or change their majors. As hypothesized, entity theorists who believed that they were not doing well in their majors were more likely to choose a new major than were all other groups. This result is consistent with previous findings that entity theorists tend to give up in the face of adversity.     

Consumers' attributions and brand evaluations in product‐harm crises: The role of implicit theories of personality

This study aims to examine the moderating role of implicit theories of personality in the relationship between corporate recovery strategy (i.e., support versus stonewalling) and consumers' attributions (and brand evaluations). It is suggested that consumers' implicit theories about the fixedness/malleability of personality can affect consumers' attributions and brand evaluations during a product‐harm crisis. In addition, corporate image (i.e., strong versus weak) can moderate the influence of the role of implicit theories of personality. Two experiments were conducted to examine the proposed hypotheses. Results of Experiment 1 show that consumers who endorse entity theory (i.e., entity theorists) are likely to attribute crisis as more internal, stable, and controllable, particularly when they do not have any prior knowledge about the firm. The entity theorists would have more negative brand evaluations than incremental theorists (who endorse incremental theory), when “support” strategy was used by the firm. Results of Experiment 2 show that entity theorists are prone to have more external (internal) and unstable (stable) attributions toward a firm with a strong (weak) corporate image. Furthermore, entity theorists would provide more positive brand evaluations than incremental theorists when “stonewalling” strategy was used by a firm with strong corporate image, but not when “support” strategy was used by a firm with weak corporate image. Managerial implications are provided to managers with regard to product‐harm crisis and recovery strategies. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Unexpected improvement, decline, and stasis: a prediction confidence perspective on achievement success and failure

The authors hypothesized that reactions to performance feedback depend on whether one's lay theory of intelligence is supported or violated. In Study 1, following improvement feedback, all participants generally exhibited positive affect, but entity theorists (who believe that intelligence is fixed) displayed more anxiety and more effort to restore prediction confidence than did incremental theorists (who believe that intelligence is malleable). Similarly, when performance declined, entity theorists displayed more anxiety and compensatory effort than incremental theorists. However, when performance remained rigidly static despite a learning opportunity, incremental theorists evinced more anxiety and compensatory effort than entity theorists. In Study 2, this pattern was replicated when the entity and incremental theories were experimentally manipulated. Study 3 demonstrated that for both groups, theory violation impairs subsequent task performance. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that lay theory violation and damaged prediction confidence have significant and measurable effects on emotion and motivation. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the literature on achievement success and failure.     

Coping with examinations: Exploring relationships between students' coping strategies,implicit theories of ability,and perceived control

Background Relatively little is known about the contribution of students' beliefs regarding the nature of academic ability (i.e. their implicit theories) on strategies used to deal with examinations. Aims This study applied Dweck's socio‐cognitive model of achievement motivation to better understand how students cope with examinations. It was expected that students' implicit theories of academic ability would be related to their use of particular coping strategies to deal with exam‐related stress. Additionally, it was predicted that perceived control over exams acts as a mediator between implicit theories of ability and coping. Sample Four hundred and ten undergraduate students (263 males, 147 females), aged from 17 to 26 years old (M = 19.73, SD = 1.46) were volunteers for the present study. Methods Students completed measures of coping, implicit theories of academic ability, and perception of control over academic examinations during regular classes in the first term of the university year. Results Multiple regression analyses revealed that incremental beliefs of ability significantly and positively predicted active coping, planning, venting of emotions, seeking social support for emotional and instrumental reasons, whereas entity beliefs positively predicted behavioural disengagement and negatively predicted active coping and acceptance. In addition, analyses revealed that entity beliefs of ability were related to coping strategies through students' perception of control over academic examinations. Conclusions These results confirm that exam‐related coping varies as a function of students' beliefs about the nature of academic ability and their perceptions of control when approaching examinations.     

I can do that: the impact of implicit theories on leadership role model effectiveness

This research investigates the role of implicit theories in influencing the effectiveness of successful role models in the leadership domain. Across two studies, the authors test the prediction that incremental theorists ("leaders are made") compared to entity theorists ("leaders are born") will respond more positively to being presented with a role model before undertaking a leadership task. In Study 1, measuring people's naturally occurring implicit theories of leadership, the authors showed that after being primed with a role model, incremental theorists reported greater leadership confidence and less anxious-depressed affect than entity theorists following the leadership task. In Study 2, the authors demonstrated the causal role of implicit theories by manipulating participants' theory of leadership ability. They replicated the findings from Study 1 and demonstrated that identification with the role model mediated the relationship between implicit theories and both confidence and affect. In addition, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists on the leadership task.     

Belief about immutability of moral character and punitiveness toward criminal offenders

The present research examined the association between belief about immutability of moral character and punitiveness toward criminal offenders. Overall, participants who believed that moral character is immutable (entity theorists) were more punitive than those who believed that it is changeable (incremental theorists). More important, the present research identified two mediational paths: Entity theorists made more internal attribution of criminal behavior and held stronger expectation of offenders' recidivism, both of which in turn led to stronger punitiveness. Also, contrary to some researchers' speculation, entity theorists did not perceive less controllability in criminal behavior. Implications for implicit theory research and criminal justice research are discussed.     

Foxhole atheism,revisited: The effects of mortality salience on explicit and implicit religious belief

Although fear of death features prominently in many historical and contemporary theories as a major motivational factor in religious belief, the empirical evidence available is ambivalent, and limited, we argue, by imprecise measures of belief and insufficient attention to the distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of cognition. The present research used both explicit (questionnaire) and implicit (single-target implicit association test; property verification) measurement techniques to examine how thoughts of death influence, specifically, belief in religious supernatural agents. When primed with death, participants explicitly defended their own religious worldview, such that self-described Christians were more confident that supernatural religious entities exist, while non-religious participants were more confident that they do not. However, when belief was measured implicitly, death priming increased all participants' beliefs in religious supernatural entities, regardless of their prior religious commitments. The results are interpreted in terms of a dual-process model of religious cognition, which can be used to resolve conflicting prior data, as well as to help explain the perplexing durability of religious belief.