That’s not funny: Instrument validation of the concern for political correctness scale

The transformation of common language toward inclusion of all people is the mechanism by which many aim to alter attitudes and beliefs that stand in the way of more meaningful social change. The term for this motivated concern for language is “political correctness” or “PC.” The current project seeks to introduce a new tool for investigations into this phenomenon, the concern for political correctness (CPC) scale. CPC assesses individual differences in concern for politically correct speech. Exploratory and confirmatory structural equation modeling showed consistent factor structure of the two subscales; an emotion subscale measuring negative emotional response to hearing politically incorrect language, and an activism subscale measuring a willingness to correct others who use politically incorrect language. Correlational analyses suggested that concern for political correctness is associated with more liberal beliefs and ideologies and less right-wing authoritarianism. The emotion subscale was also found to be associated with lower emotional well-being and the activism subscale with more frequent arguments. Laboratory-based criterion validation studies indicated that the two subscales predicted negative reactions to politically incorrect humor.     

Identifying “types” of ideologies and intergroup biases: Advancing a person-centred approach to social psychology

Whether it be those who are “high” on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), or a mixture of “low” on explicit, but “high” on implicit, bias, many social psychological theories predict the existence of distinct “types” of people. These assumptions are, however, untestable using variable-centred analyses. Accordingly, we argue that the time has come to utilise person-centred analyses that enable us to test these key assumptions. We open by demonstrating how to implement – and interpret – latent profile analysis (a type of person-centred analysis), using RWA and SDO as an example. We then discuss the debate over the dimensionality of political ideology to highlight the need for person-centred analyses. Next, we review person-centred approaches to political ideology and highlight recent work using person-centred analyses to assess key assumptions of ambivalent sexism and relative deprivation. We conclude by discussing limitations to person-centred approaches and by providing suggestions for future research.     

What Determines Voting Behaviors of Muslim Minorities in Europe: Muslim Identity or Left-Right Ideology?

Voting is key to political integration of immigrant-background minorities, but what determines their voting preferences remains unclear. Moreover, dual-citizen minorities can vote differently in their country of residence and origin. Using a representative survey of Turkish-Muslim minorities in two cities in Belgium (N = 447, M_age = 36.3), we asked whether left-right ideology or religious identity predicted their voting in their country of residence and origin, besides typical predictors of right-wing voting (i.e., efficacy, deprivation, and authoritarianism). Authoritarianism, low political efficacy, and high deprivation predicted voting for right-wing parties in Turkey, whereas the latter two, surprisingly, predicted voting for the left in Belgium. Latent class analyses of their religious practices distinguished “moderate” versus “strict” Muslims. While “strict” Muslims voted for right-wing parties in Turkey, ideology did not predict their voting. Conversely, in Belgium, while Muslim identity did not predict their voting, ideology did. Analyzing their combined effects, “moderate” Muslims voted based on their ideology—right-leaning voting for the right, whereas “strict” Muslims voted according to their interests as a disadvantaged minority in Belgium—thus voting for the left—or as a devout Muslim in Turkey—thus voting for the right. Our results elucidate processes underlying the voting behaviors of European-Muslim minorities.     

Does “humanization” of the preborn explain why conservatives (vs. liberals) oppose abortion?

Those on the political right (vs. left) generally oppose abortion, with preborn humanness frequently cited as the reason. We test whether differences in preborn humanness perceptions actually underpin left–right differences in abortion support. We examine two types of right-wing ideology in student and community samples, asking whether perceptions of preborn humanness (a) explain conservative (vs. liberal) opposition to abortion; or (b) exert a greater impact on abortion opposition among conservatives (vs. liberals). Without exception, perceptions of preborn humanness explained very little of right–left differences in abortion support, and the association between preborn humanness perceptions and abortion opposition was no stronger for those on the political right (vs. left). These findings suggest that left–right differences on this critical, election-relevant social attitude are not explained by beliefs about “humanness”, contrary to popular belief.     

The Role of Cognitive Style in the Link Between Genes and Political Ideology

There is growing interest in how genes affect political beliefs. To better understand the role of genes in politics, we examine the relationship between cognitive style (the need for cognition, the need for cognitive closure) and various measures of political attitudes (issue‐based ideology, identity‐based ideology, social ideology, economic ideology, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism). We show, for the first time, that the need for cognition and the need for cognitive closure are heritable and are linked to political ideology primarily, perhaps solely, because of shared genetic influences; these links are stronger for social than economic ideology. Although prior research demonstrated that Openness to Experience shares genetic variance with political ideology, we find that these measures of cognitive style account for distinct genetic variance in political ideology. Moreover, the genetic Openness‐ideology link is fully accounted for by the need for cognition. This combination of findings provides a clearer understanding of the role of genes in political beliefs and suggests new directions for research on Big Five personality traits and ideology.     

Beliefs about the social orientations of others: A parametric test of the triangle,false consensus,and cone hypotheses

This study tests a number of hypotheses proposed in the literature concerning the relationship between an actor's social orientation and her beliefs about the social orientations of others. In contrast to the existing literature, this study employs a parametric approach with an innovative methodology. First, the social orientation parameters of actors are estimated: the weights respondents add to (1) the outcomes of Alter and to (2) the absolute difference between the outcomes for Ego and Alter. Then, the mean and the variance of the distribution of beliefs about the social orientation parameters of others are estimated, conditional on the actor's social orientation parameters. The results show that (1) there is a positive association between an actor's social orientation and her belief about the mean of the social orientations of others and (2) those who have approximately zero social orientation parameter values (individualists) expect the variation of others' social orientations to be lower than those with smaller (competitors) or larger (cooperators/egalitarians) social orientation parameter values. These results support the cone model, which models the “false” consensus effect where the “false” consensus is highest for individualists.     

Relations between risk perceptions and socio-political ideology are domain- and ideology- dependent

Public policy intended to address risks is largely determined by government officials who are typically elected by ‘the people’. Lay people presumably support political figures most likely to tackle the risks perceived as relevant. The present research investigated whether risk perceptions vary by risk domain and socio-political ideology. American community adults (N = 387) recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk completed measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), political conservatism, and perceived domain risks. Risk perceptions of conservatives versus liberals systematically differed by domain: Increases in political conservatism (vs. liberalism) and RWA were associated with perceiving “personal danger” hazards as more risky, whereas increases in SDO were associated with perceiving “competitive” hazards as less risky. A liberal-orientation was associated with heightened risk concerning collective (shared) hazards.     

From left to right: Processing acronyms referring to names of political parties activates spatial associations

In line with previous studies, showing that abstract concepts like “power” or “god” implicitly activate spatial associations, in the present study we hypothesized that spatial associations are coactivated during the processing of acronyms referring to names of political parties as well. In four studies, it was found that the reading of these acronyms was accompanied by the implicit activation of spatial left–right associations. That is, participants responded faster to left-wing parties by means of a left-hand button press and vice versa for right-wing parties (Experiments 1 to 3), and participants responded faster when a political acronym was presented at the side of the screen corresponding to the political orientation of the acronym (Experiment 4). Interestingly, a correlation was observed between the effect size for left-wing parties and participants' political preferences, suggesting that the reaction time effects reflect the perceived distance of a party to one's own political orientation. Together these findings indicate that spatial representations activated in response to political acronyms do not simply reflect lexical–semantic associations or spatial metaphors, but representations of parties' political orientation relative to one's own sociopolitical position.     

Sex role egalitarianism and marital violence

This study explores the link between sex role egalitarianism and marital violence using a sample of men enrolled in either substance abuse treatment programs (N=71) or in anger management programs (N=44). It was found that men in both treatment programs had very similar levels of egalitarianism and violence in their relationships. Using the combined sample, it was found that having attitudes approving of marital violence and using “severe” violence accounted for a significant portion of the variance in sex role egalitarianism, whereas use of “minor” violence did not account for significant variance in egalitarianism. These results suggest that sex role egalitarianism may be a meaningful indicator for spouse abuse.     

Personal Contact with Refugees is Key to Welcoming Them: An Analysis of Politicians' and Citizens' Attitudes Towards Refugee Integration

Politicians are influential both in directing policies about refugees and in framing public discourse about them. However, unlike other host country residents, politicians' attitudes towards refugees and integration are remarkably understudied. We therefore examine similarities and differences between politicians' attitudes towards refugee integration and those held by citizens. Based on the stereotype content model, we expect that political ideology informs stereotypes about refugees, which subsequently shape attitudes towards refugee integration. Based on the Contact Hypothesis, we further argue that personal contact with refugees reduces negative stereotypes about them—in particular for those endorsing a right-wing ideology. We draw on data collected via two surveys with 905 politicians and 8013 citizens in the Netherlands to show that (1) unlike those with a left-wing orientation, residents (i.e., both politicians and citizens) with a right-wing orientation hold more negative stereotypes about refugees, which in turn relate to more negative attitudes towards refugee integration; (2) personal contact with refugees is associated with less negative stereotypes among residents; and (3) politicians, compared to citizens, report less negative stereotypes and more positive attitudes towards refugee integration. The practical implication of fostering residents' contact with refugees as well as the implications for future research are discussed.     

From Dispositions to Goals to Ideology: Toward a Synthesis of Personality and Social Psychological Approaches to Political Orientation

We review existing research on the associations between political orientation and Big Five traits such as Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness. We suggest that analyzing these traits at the aspect level sheds light on motivational mechanisms underlying these links. For example, we present evidence that only one of the two aspects of Conscientiousness (“Orderliness”) reliably predicts conservatism. To account for this relationship, and to more generally describe how traits translate into political orientation, we present a new model, the Disposition‐Goals‐Ideology (DiGI) Model. The DiGI model outlines specific interrelationships among dispositions, goals, and ideological beliefs that help to shape individual differences in political orientation.     

A successive-conditionalization approach to disjunctive and syllogistic reasoning

With p and q each standing for a familiar event, a disjunctive statement, “either p or q”, seems quite different from its material conditional, “if not p then q”. The notions of sufficiency and necessity seem specific to conditional statements. It is surprising, however, to find that perceived sufficiency and necessity affect disjunctive reasoning in the way they affect conditional reasoning. With B and C each standing for a category name, a universal statement, “all B are C”, seems stronger than its logically equivalent conditional statement, “if B then C”. However, the effects of perceived sufficiency or necessity were found to be as pronounced in conditional reasoning as in syllogistic reasoning. Furthermore, two experiments also showed that (a) MP (modus ponens)-comparable disjunctive reasoning was as difficult as MT (modus tollens)-comparable disjunctive reasoning, and that (b) MT-comparable syllogisms were easier to solve than MT problems in conditional reasoning.     

Gender Attitudes and Public Opinion Towards Electoral Gender Quotas in Brazil

Research on public opinion towards affirmative action shows that citizens often support the principle of equality while simultaneously rejecting policies that promote it in a pattern described as the “principle-policy puzzle.” The scholarship also shows that ideology and prejudice towards the targeted group explain the puzzle with respect to racial affirmative action. In this article, we use unique survey questions included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer in Brazil to show that citizens tend to support electoral gender quotas while rejecting gender-based egalitarianism in a reversed version of the “principle-policy puzzle.” We argue that a different type of gender attitudes, namely benevolent sexism, shapes support for gender quotas as well as for the principle of equality. While benevolent sexists tend to reject gender equality based on views about gender complementarity and stereotypes about women's purity, they also support quotas as policies to foster such values. Our findings suggest that even though the political and scholarly debates can provide sound normative reasons for the adoption of quotas across different contexts, public support for them often relies on paternalistic views and expectations about the role of women in politics.     

Genetic inquiry and ideological thought

It is customary to apply the term “ideology” to political statements and statements about politics believed to be saturated with irrational elements. Since more often than not it is applied to the political science and policies of parties of the extreme, one may suspect that this usage is itself colored by political interests. However, “ideology” can be redefined at the level of a meta‐science that reduces, though it cannot altogether eliminate, the partisan function of language about politics. Ideological thinking can then be shown to involve a logical error that is the counterpart of the genetic fallacy. Surprisingly, in this usage liberal political science, or that with liberal preconceptions, is a more frequent offender against the logic of science than a science of politics with illiberal preconceptions.     

Determinants of Human Rights Attitudes and Behavior: A Comparison and Integration of Psychological Perspectives

Following several political-psychological approaches, the present research analyzed whether orientations toward human rights are a function of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), basic human values in the sense of Schwartz (1992 ), and political ideology. Three dimensions of human rights attitudes (endorsement, restriction, and enforcement) were differentiated from human rights knowledge and behavior. In a time-lagged Internet survey ( N   =  479), using structural equation modeling, RWA, universalism and power values, and political ideology (measured at Time 1) differentially predicted dimensions of human rights attitudes (measured at Time 2 five months later). RWA and universalism values also predicted self-reported human rights behavior, with the effects mediated through human rights endorsement. Human rights knowledge also predicted behavior. The psychological roots of positive and negative orientations toward human rights, consequences for human rights education, and the particular role of military enforcement of human rights are discussed.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

Person and Community in the Culture of Entertainment

Entertainment is so pervasive and influential in contemporary society that it is fair to say we live in an entertainment culture. What are the political, ethical, and spiritual implications of such a cultural environment? Building on the analysis offered in the author’s recent book Caught in Play: How Entertainment Works on You (Stromberg, 2009), this essay argues that entertainment is not susceptible to global moral evaluation, it is not “good” or “bad.” Rather, entertainment is a cultural system through which commitment to certain values is generated. This process, and these values, need to be brought into the light of day and assessed in open and critical discussion.     

Personality,Childhood Experience,and Political Ideology

This article studies the relationship between the “big five” personality traits and political ideology in a large U.S. representative sample (N = 14,672). In line with research in political psychology, “openness to experience” is found to predict liberal ideology, and “conscientiousness” predicts conservative ideology. The availability of family clusters in the data is leveraged to show that these results are robust to a sibling fixed‐effects specification. The way that personality might interact with environmental influences in the development of ideology is also explored. A variety of childhood experiences are studied that may have a differential effect on political ideology based on a respondent's personality profile. Childhood trauma is found to interact with “openness” in predicting ideology, and this complex relationship is investigated using mediation analysis. These findings provide new evidence for the idea that differences in political ideology are deeply intertwined with variation in the nature and nurture of individual personalities.     

Measurements, Morality, and the Politics of “Normal” Infant Growth

Although the birth and early life of an infant is similar throughout the world, meanings ascribed to infants differ according to cultural values and beliefs. This essay describes how scholars and healers have come to see the infant as distinct from other types of people, and what implications this distinction carries for how health care is practiced. The first portion of this essay explores how understanding of the infant, particularly the well-accepted notion of “normal” infant growth and development, came to prominence. Drawing from the history of medicine, philosophical thought and colonial practice, this essay demonstrates that the roots of thinking about the infant in terms of his growth are deep and well-defined in North American and European ideologies. The second portion of this essay describes the practical applications and political implications of beliefs about the “normal” infant. In the arena of applied health, policy makers measure infant growth in light of assumptions about the “normal.” A case study of indigenous populations in Irian Jaya, Indonesia, shows that these measurements are highly political. Here government health officials create and manipulate statistics to ensure that indigenous infant health is represented as being below “normal.” The “normal” infant can thus be understood as a subtle and effective construct which, in Irian Jaya, at the least, is used to assimilate indigenous people into the nation-state.     

The Greta Thunberg Effect: Familiarity with Greta Thunberg predicts intentions to engage in climate activism in the United States

Despite Greta Thunberg's popularity, research has yet to investigate her impact on the public's willingness to take collective action on climate change. Using cross-sectional data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults (N = 1,303), we investigate the “Greta Thunberg Effect,” or whether exposure to Greta Thunberg predicts collective efficacy and intentions to engage in collective action. We find that those who are more familiar with Greta Thunberg have higher intentions of taking collective actions to reduce global warming and that stronger collective efficacy beliefs mediate this relationship. This association between familiarity with Greta Thunberg, collective efficacy beliefs, and collective action intentions is present even after accounting for respondents’ overall support for climate activism. Moderated mediation models testing age and political ideology as moderators of the “Greta Thunberg Effect” indicate that although the indirect effect of familiarity with Greta Thunberg via collective efficacy is present across all age-groups, and across the political spectrum, it may be stronger among those who identify as more liberal (than conservative). Our findings suggest that young public figures like Greta Thunberg may motivate collective action across the U.S. public, but their effect may be stronger among those with a shared political ideology. Implications for future research and for broadening climate activists’ appeals across the political spectrum are discussed.