Children and Politics: An Empirical Reassessment of Early Political Socialization

Demands for the inclusion of children, the youngest citizens, in democratic decision making are increasing. Although there is an abundance of empirical research on the political orientations of adolescents, there is a paucity of research on younger children's orientations. Our panel study of more than 700 children in their first year of primary school shows that these young children already exhibit consistent, structured political orientations. We examine the distribution and development of political knowledge, issue orientations, and notions of good citizenship. We find achievement differences between subgroups at the beginning of the school year, and these differences do not disappear. Children from ethnic minorities and lower socioeconomic residence areas show relatively less developed political orientations, and they do not improve as much over the school year as other children. Furthermore, normative political orientations and cognitive orientations differ in their development.     

The politics of insight

Previous studies showed that liberals and conservatives differ in cognitive style. Liberals are more flexible, and tolerant of complexity and novelty, whereas conservatives are more rigid, are more resistant to change, and prefer clear answers. We administered a set of compound remote associate problems, a task extensively used to differentiate problem-solving styles (via insight or analysis). Using this task, several researches have proven that self-reports, which differentiate between insight and analytic problem-solving, are reliable and are associated with two different neural circuits. In our research we found that participants self-identifying with distinct political orientations demonstrated differences in problem-solving strategy. Liberals solved significantly more problems via insight instead of in a step-by-step analytic fashion. Our findings extend previous observations that self-identified political orientations reflect differences in cognitive styles. More specifically, we show that type of political orientation is associated with problem-solving strategy. The data converge with previous neurobehavioural and cognitive studies indicating a link between cognitive style and the psychological mechanisms that mediate political beliefs.     

Values-based Political Messages and Persuasion: Relationships among Speaker, Recipient, and Evoked Values

The persuasive power of values-based political messages may depend on recipients having (1) shared values with the speaker (a type of personal identity match ); (2) shared political party identifications with the speaker (a type of social identity match ); and/or (3) expectations about values traditionally associated with different political parties (an expectancy violation/confirmation ). The independent and joint effects of these factors on the success of a persuasive message were examined, using the theoretical framework of dual-process models of persuasion. Participants (N = 301), classified according to their party identifications and primary value orientations, read a political speech that varied by argument quality, speaker party, and values evoked. Results indicated that value matching promotes close attention to the message, while party mismatching increases message rejection. These effects depend to some extent, however, on expectancies about values traditionally associated with different parties. Participants especially rejected messages from rival party members when the speaker evoked unexpected values. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the efficacy of values-based political communication.     

Understanding the relation between explicitly and implicitly measured political orientation: The moderating role of political sophistication

Researchers have argued that to understand more fully political orientation, non-reactive measures similar to those used in the broader implicit attitudes literature should be explored. Recently, the nature of the relation between explicitly and implicitly measured attitudes has been a topic of considerable discussion, with researchers stressing the importance of when explicit and implicit measures are related and when they are not. In the present research, the relation between explicit and implicit political orientation, and the potential moderating role of political sophistication was investigated. Participants (N = 116) completed an explicit measure of political orientation, a liberal–conservative Implicit Association Test (IAT), and a test of political knowledge. Results showed that explicit and implicit political orientation scores were moderately correlated (r = .48) with each other. Moreover, results from regression analyses showed that the association between explicit and implicit political orientation was moderated by political knowledge scores, such that the positive association was stronger among participants with a greater knowledge of politics.     

Linking Genes and Political Orientations: Testing the Cognitive Ability as Mediator Hypothesis

Recent research has demonstrated that genetic differences explain a sizeable fraction of the variance in political orientations, but little is known about the pathways through which genes might affect political preferences. In this article, we use a uniquely assembled dataset of almost 1,000 Swedish male twin pairs containing detailed information on cognitive ability and political attitudes in order to further examine the genetic and environmental causes of political orientations. Our study makes three distinct contributions to our understanding of the etiology of political orientations: (1) we report heritability estimates across different dimensions of political ideology; (2) we show that cognitive ability and political orientations are related; and (3) we provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive ability mediates part of the genetic influence on political orientations. These findings provide important clues about the nature of the complex pathways from molecular genetic variation to political orientations.     

The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles,Interaction Styles,and the Things They Leave Behind

Although skeptics continue to doubt that most people are “ideological,” evidence suggests that meaningful left‐right differences do exist and that they may be rooted in basic personality dispositions, that is, relatively stable individual differences in psychological needs, motives, and orientations toward the world. Seventy‐five years of theory and research on personality and political orientation has produced a long list of dispositions, traits, and behaviors. Applying a theory of ideology as motivated social cognition and a “Big Five” framework, we find that two traits, Openness to New Experiences and Conscientiousness, parsimoniously capture many of the ways in which individual differences underlying political orientation have been conceptualized. In three studies we investigate the relationship between personality and political orientation using multiple domains and measurement techniques, including: self‐reported personality assessment; nonverbal behavior in the context of social interaction; and personal possessions and the characteristics of living and working spaces. We obtained consistent and converging evidence that personality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, and behaviorally significant, especially with respect to social (vs. economic) dimensions of ideology. In general, liberals are more open‐minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly, conventional, and better organized.     

When Power Changes Hands: The Political Psychology of Leadership Succession in Democracies

Leadership succession in democratic governments and political parties is an ubiquitous but relatively understudied phenomen, where the political becomes intensely personal and vice versa. This article outlines the puzzles that leadership succession poses to political analysts, reviews the literature, and offers a conceptual framework deconstructing the process in terms of a flow from succession contexts and triggers via the role choices of key participants (incumbents and aspiring successors) through to the eventual succession outcomes. It concludes by presenting a series of testable hypotheses to describe and explain leadership successions.     

Multi‐group acculturation orientations in a changing context: Palestinian Christian Arab adolescents in Israel after the lost decade

Grounded in a contextual approach to acculturation of minorities, this study examines changes in acculturation orientations among Palestinian Christian Arab adolescents in Israel following the “lost decade of Arab–Jewish coexistence.” Multi‐group acculturation orientations among 237 respondents were assessed vis‐à‐vis two majorities—Muslim Arabs and Israeli Jews—and compared to 1998 data. Separation was the strongest endorsed orientation towards both majority groups. Comparisons with the 1998 data also show a weakening of the Integration attitude towards Israeli Jews, and also distancing from Muslim Arabs. For the examination of the “Westernisation” hypothesis, multi‐dimensional scaling (MDS) analyses of perceptions of Self and group values clearly showed that, after 10 years, Palestinian Christian Arabs perceive Israeli Jewish culture as less close to Western culture, and that Self and the Christian Arab group have become much closer, suggesting an increasing identification of Palestinian Christian Arab adolescents with their ethnoreligious culture. We discuss the value of a multi‐group, multi‐method, and multi‐wave approach to the examination of the role of the political context in acculturation processes.     

The Central Role of Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from Israel

In recent years, political scientists have shifted the focus of explaining political phenomena from the purely cognitive perspective to an integrated emotion-cognition one. Yet most studies which examine antecedents of political intolerance ignore the potential role played by "gut feelings" or group-based negative emotions in endorsing those attitudes. Moreover, even the few studies that deal with emotions and intolerance concentrate exclusively on the role of groups of emotions (positive vs. negative, dispositional vs. surveillance) or on basic emotions (anger or fear) and ignore the potential influence of more complex discrete emotions like hatred on political intolerance. Hence, the main goal of this study was to create a deeper understanding regarding the role of discrete negative emotions in increasing political intolerance among different groups of individuals in different contexts. In order to do so, the relations between political intolerance and three group-based negative emotions (hatred, anger, and fear) were tested by means of four large-scale nationwide surveys. Within the surveys, various intolerance measurement methods were used in various contexts (wartime vs. no-war/routine periods) and among individuals with different levels of political sophistication. Results, obtained via multiple regression analysis and structural equation modeling, show that: (1) Group-based hatred is the most important antecedent of political intolerance even when controlling for important intolerance inducers such as perceived threat. (2) Other group-based negative emotions like anger or fear influence political intolerance wholly through the mediation of hatred or perceived threat. (3) The role of group-based hatred in inducing political intolerance is more substantial in the face of heightened existential threat and among unsophisticated individuals than among sophisticated ones.     

Must we choose our leaders? human rights and political participation in China

The essay begins from Alan Gewirth's influential account of human rights, and specifically with his argument that the human right to political participation can only be fulfilled by competitive, liberal democracy. I show that his argument rests on empirical, rather than conceptual grounds, which opens the possibility that in China, alternative forms of participation may be legitimate or even superior. An examination of the theory and contemporary practice of ‘democratic centralism’ shows that while it does not now adequately support the right to political participation, a reformed version could. I focus in particular on the roles that could be played by consultative institutions, looking both to recent Chinese proposals and to analogues currently existing in Japan. I conclude that a reformed democratic centralism may well be the objective toward which Chinese people should strive.     

An emotional signature of political ideology: Evidence from two linguistic content-coding studies

Approach–avoidance frameworks for political ideology have been proposed with increasing frequency. Following such frameworks and a wider motivation–emotion literature, it was hypothesized that political ideology would be predictive of the extent to which anxiety (avoidance-related) versus anger (approach-related) words would be evident in written texts. Study 1 sampled user-generated text within conservative versus liberal Internet chat rooms. After correcting for the greater normative frequency of anger words, a crossover ideology by emotion type interaction was found. Study 2 found a parallel interaction among college students writing about a non-political topic. Political ideology thus has a discrete emotional signature, one favoring anxiety among conservatives and anger among liberals.     

Basic Personal Values,Core Political Values,and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis

We theorize that political values express basic personal values in the domain of politics. We test a set of hypotheses that specify how the motivational structure of basic values constrains and gives coherence to core political values. We also test the hypothesis that core political values mediate relations of basic personal values to voting demonstrated in previous research. We measured the basic personal values, core political values, and vote of Italian adults both before (n = 1699) and after (n = 1030) the 2006 national election. Basic values explained substantial variance in each of eight political values (22% to 53%) and predicted voting significantly. Correlations and an MDS projection of relations among basic values and political values supported the hypothesized coherent structuring of core political values by basic values. Core political values fully mediated relations of basic values to voting, supporting a basic values—political values—voting causal hierarchy.     

政治伦理的现代建构

政治伦理作为一门研究人类政治正当性及其操作规范和方法论的价值哲学。时政治明的发展和政治体制改革,具有导向、规范和终极价值关怀的意义。政治的正当性在于谋取人类“优良的生活”。在人类政治生活中具有优先性。围绕政治的正当性问题而展开的人类政治的价值选择和伦理结构是政治伦理的主体内容。人类生活在由政治支撑着的社会框架中,政治价值理念、政治制度伦理、政治组织伦理以及政治行为主体伦理,是现代政治伦理构成的基本框架。     

The Limitations of Heuristics for Political Elites

Despite the extensive literature on citizens' use of cognitive heuristics in political settings, far less is known about how political elites use these shortcuts. Legislative elites benefit from the efficiency of the accessibility heuristic, but their judgments can also be flawed if accessible information is incomplete or unrepresentative. Using personal interviews and a quasi-experimental design, this paper examines the use of the accessibility heuristic by professional legislative staff when assessing the importance of natural resources issues to their constituents. Staff members recall only a small subset of the relevant constituents in the district, and this subset is biased in favor of active and resource-rich constituents over other, equally relevant constituents. This paper provides a new application of cognitive psychology to political elites and addresses important normative questions about the importance of information processing for political representation. By drawing on the psychology literature on heuristics, this paper identifies the cognitive mechanisms of congressional representation and provides new evidence of old biases.     

The Relationship between Cultural Values and Political Ideology, and the Role of Political Knowledge

Cultural theory maintains that four worldviews—egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchicalism, and fatalism—can be used to describe people and societies. We examine survey measures of two of those worldviews—egalitarianism and individualism—to understand their relationship with belief systems. Contrary to what one might expect based on the cultural theory literature, we find that people with low levels of political knowledge seem not to have coherent worldviews regarding these issues. In contrast, people with high levels of political knowledge respond to egalitarianism and individualism questions as if they were opposite ends of a single, liberal-conservative continuum, rather than two of four distinct worldviews. We conclude that cultural theory researchers should take account of the influence of political knowledge whenever they investigate worldviews.     

政治的,抑或道德的——对政治自由主义一个关键悖论的解读

政治自由主义试图将其正义观念塑造为纯粹"政治的"观念,而不能是完备性的"道德的"观念。但任何规范性的正义观念似乎都不能不是道德的,这就形成了政治自由主义所面对的一个最根本的悖论。通过分析我们可以看到,政治自由主义要克服这一悖论,必须寻求一种具有自主性的规范性政治概念。此外,政治自由主义把公民的两种道德能力当作理论前提,同时强调道德化的公民美德,这两个因素都加深了这一悖论。通过解释和分析这两种因素所带来的理论难题及其原因,文章认为,"政治的"自由主义之所以难以抹去"道德的"面纱,其根源在于政治在自由主义价值系统中的处境。     

Alienable Speech: Ideological Variations in the Application of Free-Speech Principles

Although freedom of speech is a Constitutionally protected and widely endorsed value, political tolerance research finds that people are less willing to protect speech they dislike than speech they like ( Gibson, 2006 ). Research also suggests liberal-conservative differences in political tolerance ( Davis & Silver, 2004 ). We measured U.S. citizens' political tolerance for speech acts, while manipulating the speaker's ethnicity and the speech's ideological content. Speech criticizing Americans was protected more strongly than was speech criticizing Arabs, especially among more politically liberal respondents. Liberals also reported greater free-speech support. Respondents expressed greater political tolerance for a speaker when he was an exemplar of the criticized group, but showed equal political tolerance for speakers whose group membership (as a White or Black American) was irrelevant to the speech. Finally, implicit political identity showed convergent validity with explicit political identity in predicting speech tolerance, and implicit racial and ethnic preferences showed variable prediction of speech tolerance across the two studies.     

What if there were no God? Politically conservative and liberal Christians imagine their lives without faith

A sample of devout Christian adults, ranging widely in political orientation, described what their lives (and the world) might be like had they never embraced faith. Politically conservative Christians (also scoring high on right-wing authoritarianism) tended to imagine a life deficient in impulse control, wherein unrestrained sexual and aggressive urges, addictive behaviors, and human selfishness undermined the social good. By contrast, politically liberal Christians (also scoring low on right-wing authoritarianism) imagined an empty and barren world, devoid of the emotional intensity that makes life worth living. Gender differences were also observed, but they did not interfere with the relation between political orientation and the narrative themes. In accord with theoretical writings regarding normative and humanistic ideologies, the findings suggest that, at least among American Christians, political conservatism may entail a fear of, or strong sensitivity to, the prospects of conflict and chaos, whereas political liberalism may entail an equally strong fear of, or sensitivity to, emptiness.     

Political conservatism and variety‐seeking

In this research, we document and explain a counterintuitive effect of political ideology on variety-seeking. Although political conservatives have a higher desire for control, which exerts a negative effect on variety-seeking, they also have a stronger motivation to follow social norms, which exerts a positive effect on variety-seeking. Three studies demonstrate that conservatism is positively related to variety-seeking due to social normative concerns and rule out an alternative explanation of heightened self-expressive motives among conservatives. This research provides preliminary evidence of how political ideology may explain differences in product choices.