Parapsychology and the mind‐body problem

The paper argues that there are effectively only two tenable theories of the mind‐brain relationship: ‘epiphenomenalism’ and ‘radical dualism’ (interactionism). So long as account is taken only of the conventional sciences, the odds are heavily stacked in favour of epiphenomenalism. However, once the findings of parapsychology are admitted to consideration, a very different situation obtains. It is here argued that parapsychology only makes sense within a dualist metaphysic.     

Cybernetics and mind‐body problems 1

It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as ‘Can machines think?’, ‘Could robots have feelings?’ might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind‐body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are mistaken. It is then claimed, although not argued in detail, that the following three approaches to the first set of questions are mistaken: (1) machines (and robots) obviously cannot think, feel, create, etc., since they do only what they are programmed to do; (2) on the basis of ah analysis of the meaning of the words ‘machine’ ('robot’, ‘think’, ‘feel’, etc.) we can see that in principle it would be impossible for machines (or robots) to think, feel, create, etc.; (3) machines (and robots) obviously can (or could) think, feel, etc., since they do certain things which, if we were to do them, would require thought, feeling, etc. It is argued that, once it is seen why approach (2) is mistaken, it becomes desirable to decline ‘in principle’ approaches to the first set of questions and to favor ‘piecemeal investigations’ where attention is centered upon what is actually taking place in machine technology, the development of new programming techniques, etc. Some suggestions are made concerning the relevance of current computer simulation studies to traditional mind‐body questions. A new set of questions is proposed as a substitute for the first set of questions. It is hoped that attempts to answer these may provide us with new and detailed portraits of the mind‐body relationship.     

Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis

The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life–mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.     

Brain and mind operational architectonics and man-made “machine” consciousness

To build a true conscious robot requires that a robot’s “brain” be capable of supporting the phenomenal consciousness as human’s brain enjoys. Operational Architectonics framework through exploration of the temporal structure of information flow and inter-area interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations [by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) on the millisecond scale] reveals and describes the EEG architecture which is analogous to the architecture of the phenomenal world. This suggests that the task of creating the “machine” consciousness would require a machine implementation that can support the kind of hierarchical architecture found in EEG.

Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind

Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available; (3) retrieved information is automatically endorsed; (4) information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on forgetting and metamemory shows that most of these criteria are not satisfied by biological memory, so they are inadequate. More psychologically realistic criteria generate a similar classification of standard putative external memories, but the criteria still do not capture the function of memory. An adequate account of memory function, compatible with its evolution and its roles in prospection and imagination, suggests that external memory performs a function not performed by biological memory systems. External memory is thus not memory. This has implications for: extended mind theorizing, ecological validity of memory research, the causal theory of memory.     

What did you have in mind? Examining the content of intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering

It has recently been argued that researchers should distinguish between mind wandering (MW) that is engaged with and without intention. Supporting this argument, studies have found that intentional and unintentional MW have behavioral/neural differences, and that they are differentially associated with certain variables of theoretical interest. Although there have been considerable inroads made into the distinction between intentional/unintentional MW, possible differences in their content remain unexplored. To determine whether these two types of MW differ in content, we had participants complete a task during which they categorized their MW as intentional or unintentional, and then provided responses to questions about the content of their MW. Results indicated that intentional MW was more frequently rated as being future-oriented and less vague than unintentional MW. These findings shed light on the nature of intentional and unintentional MW and provide support for the argument that researchers should distinguish between intentional and unintentional types.     

Is the mind inherently forward looking? Comparing prediction and retrodiction

It has been suggested that prediction may be an organizing principle of the mind and/or the neocortex, with cognitive machinery specifically engineered to detect forward-looking temporal relationships, rather than merely associating temporally contiguous events. There is a remarkable absence of behavioral tests of this idea, however. To address this gap, we showed subjects sequences of shapes governed by stochastic Markov processes, and then asked them to choose which shape reliably came after a probe shape (prediction test) or before a probe shape (retrodiction test). Prediction was never superior to retrodiction, even when subjects were forewarned of a forward-directional test.     

What is the relationship between ideas in the human mind and ideas in the mind of God for Spinoza?

The relation between ideas in the human mind and ideas in the mind of God in Spinoza is problematic because it is often expressed in obscure language and because Spinoza seems to be making puzzling and contradictory statements about it. I try to eliminate the problem by going from the idea that God has of himself to his idea of the essence and existence of the human mind and the human body. I then go from the idea of the essence of the human mind to the idea of the essence of other things, including God.     

Theory of mind and joint action in Parkinson’s disease

It has been suggested that the Theory of Mind (ToM) may rely on more basic processes of social cognition, such as action control (e.g., joint action), even if little is known about this relationship. The relationship between ToM and joint action can be studied in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD), because they are characterized not only by a deficit in ToM (and in its cognitive and affective subcomponents) but also by a deficit in the inhibition of competing responses. Sixty PD patients and 60 matched healthy controls (HCs) performed a go/no-go Flanker task in both joint and individual conditions. Cognitive (Advanced Test or AT) and affective (Emotion Attribution Task or EAT) ToM also were measured. Thirty-five PD patients and matched HCs also performed the standard Flanker task, as a control measure. In patients, only individuals with high AT scores exhibited a joint Flanker effect, whereas in HCs the joint effect was found irrespectively of AT score. Patients with low EAT scores showed a greater interference effect than patients with high scores, whereas the opposite pattern was found for HCs. In regression analysis AT and EAT scores predicted the Flanker effect in the joint condition only. In the standard task, both groups showed a Flanker effect. The role of different fronto-striatal circuits, especially in PD patients, could explain the different involvement of cognitive and affective ToM in joint tasks. The Flanker effect is discussed considering the referential coding account and the attention-focus account as possible candidates to explain joint action effects.     

Modularity and the social mind: are psychologists too self-ish?

A modular view of the mind implies that there is no unitary "self" and that the mind consists of a set of informationally encapsulated systems, many of which have functions associated with navigating an inherently ambiguous and competitive social world. It is proposed that there are a set of cognitive mechanisms--a social cognitive interface (SCI)--designed for strategic manipulation of others' representations of one's traits, abilities, and prospects. Although constrained by plausibility, these mechanisms are not necessarily designed to maximize accuracy or to maintain consistency with other encapsulated representational systems. The modular view provides a useful framework for talking about multiple phenomena previously discussed under the rubric of the self.     

Brain‐mind philosophy

The remarkable advances in continuing elucidation of the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the central nervous system in recent experimental animal and clinical studies have provided new contexts for evaluating earlier historical and current controversies on human brain‐structure‐function and brain‐mind relationships. Churchland's Neurophilosophy reviews and critically evaluates the implications of the recent advances in the various neurosciences for formulation of a comprehensive concept of the nature of the mind and the historical controversies on human structure‐function and brain‐mind relationships. Although uneven, it is a monumental effort and a remarkable achievement that will provide new, broader, and deeper contexts for philosophers as well as for those engaged in the various neurosciences.     

What do I think you're doing? Action identification and mind attribution

The authors examined how a perceiver's identification of a target person's actions co-varies with attributions of mind to the target. The authors found in Study 1 that the attribution of intentionality and cognition to a target was associated with identifying the target's action in terms of high-level effects rather than low-level details. In Study 2, both action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, and in Study 3, they were reduced for a target suffering misfortune. In Study 4, it was again found that action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, but like that for the self or a liked other, positive actions were identified at higher levels than negative actions, with the reverse being true for disliked others. In Study 5, the authors found that instructing participants to adopt the target's perspective did not affect mind attribution but did lead to higher level identifications of the target's actions.     

Logical and psychological partitioning of mind: Depicting the same map?

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that empirically delimited structures of mind are also differentiable by means of systematic logical analysis. For the sake of this aim, the paper first summarizes Demetriou’s theory of cognitive organization and growth. This theory assumes that the mind is a multistructural entity that develops across three fronts: the processing system that constrains processing potentials, a set of specialized structural systems (SSSs) that guide processing within different reality and knowledge domains, and a hypercognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The second part of the paper focuses on the SSSs, which are the target of our logical analysis, and it summarizes a series of empirical studies demonstrating their autonomous operation. The third part develops the logical proof showing that each SSS involves a kernel element that cannot be reduced to standard logic or to any other SSS. The implications of this analysis for the general theory of knowledge and cognitive development are discussed.     

Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?

In three experiments, children aged between 4 and 7 years viewed a circular disc oriented at a slant. The disc was made of luminous material and situated in a darkened chamber. Children of all ages exaggerated the circularity of the disc when they knew that the object was really a circle (the circle task), and the effect was greatest in the younger members of the sample. Crucially, however, a group of children in Experiment 3 who viewed an identical shape that they knew emanated from an actual ellipse did not exaggerate circularity. In the second experiment, children tackled three standard theory of mind tasks in addition to the circle task mentioned above. A significant correlation emerged (even with age partialed) between the extent of exaggeration made by those who knew that the shape was a circle and ability to pass the theory of mind tests. It seems knowledge of reality contaminates judgements of appearance in the circle task. This might be the same bias that features in realist errors in theory of mind tasks.     

Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

     

Collaborative mother–toddler communication and theory of mind development at age 4

Focusing on social pragmatics, this longitudinal study investigated the contribution of mother–toddler collaborative communication to theory of mind (ToM) development at age 4. At age 2½, 78 toddlers (42 boys) and their mothers were observed during pretend play. At age 4, children were tested using 4 false belief understanding tasks. Both mothers and toddlers engaged in more collaborative (inform, guide/request, and support/confirm) than non-collaborative communication acts. Other-focused collaborative acts of support/confirm by mothers and toddlers predicted children's false belief understanding, even after controlling for 5 covariates. In addition, as active agents in their own ToM development, the contribution of toddlers' collaborative acts to false belief understanding was independent of their mother's. Finally, the way toddlers and their mothers co-constructed their communication mattered. Only when toddlers engaged in high levels of collaborative acts, the mothers' high levels of collaborative acts demonstrated a positive effect on children's ToM development. The applied implications of these findings are discussed.     

Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported by empirical evidence. Dreams can indeed replicate waking phenomenal experience during inactive periods of sleep, and we have no reason to suspect that dreams which are more inactive are less “full-blown”. Taken together, this shows that dreams are indeed relevant to extended conscious mind theories and need to be taken into account by enactivists.