Contextual influences on the internal structure of phonetic categories: a distinction between lexical status and speaking rate

Previous research has shown that phonetic categories have a graded internal structure that is highly dependent on acoustic-phonetic contextual factors, such as speaking rate; these factors alter not only the location of phonetic category boundaries, but also the location of a category's best exemplars. The purpose of the present investigation, which focused on the voiceless category as specified by voice onset time (VOT), was to determine whether a higher order linguistic contextual factor, lexical status, which is known to alter the location of the voiced-voiceless phonetic category boundary, also alters the location of the best exemplars of the voiceless category. The results indicated that lexical status has a more limited and qualitatively different effect on the category's best exemplars than does the acoustic-phonetic factor of speaking rate. This dissociation is discussed in terms of a production-based account in which perceived best exemplars of a category track contextual variation in speech production.     

Contextual influences on the internal structure of phonetic categories: A distinction between lexical status and speaking rate

Previous research has shown that phonetic categories have a graded internal structure that is highly dependent on acoustic-phonetic contextual factors, such as speaking rate; these factors alter not only the location of phonetic category boundaries, but also the location of a category’s best exemplars. The purpose of the present investigation, which focused on the voiceless category as specified by voice onset time (VOT), was to determine whether a higher order linguistic contextual factor, lexical status, which is known to alter the location of the voiced—voiceless phonetic category boundary, also alters the location of the best exemplars of the voiceless category. The results indicated that lexical status has a more limited and qualitatively different effect on the category’s best exemplars than does the acousticphonetic factor of speaking rate. This dissociation is discussed in terms of a production-based account in which perceived best exemplars of a category track contextual variation in speech production.     

Accounting for taste: Individual differences in preference for harmony

Although empirical research on aesthetics has had some success in explaining the average preferences of groups of observers, relatively little is known about individual differences in preference, and especially about how such differences might covary across different domains. In this study, we identified a new factor underlying aesthetic response—preference for harmonious stimuli—and examined how it varies over four domains (color, shape, spatial location, and music) across individuals with different levels of training in art and music. We found that individual preferences for harmony are strongly correlated across all four dimensions tested and decrease consistently with training in the relevant aesthetic domains. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that cross-domain preference for harmony is well-represented as a single, unified factor, with effects separate from those of training and of common personality measures.     

Categories of Large Numbers in Line Estimation

How do people stretch their understanding of magnitude from the experiential range to the very large quantities and ranges important in science, geopolitics, and mathematics? This paper empirically evaluates how and whether people make use of numerical categories when estimating relative magnitudes of numbers across many orders of magnitude. We hypothesize that people use scale words—thousand, million, billion—to carve the large number line into categories, stretching linear responses across items within each category. If so, discontinuities in position and response time are expected near the boundaries between categories. In contrast to previous work (Landy, Silbert, & Goldin, 2013) that suggested only that a minority of college undergraduates employed categorical boundaries, we find that discontinuities near category boundaries occur in most or all participants, but that accurate and inaccurate participants respond in opposite ways to category boundaries. Accurate participants highlight contrasts within a category, whereas inaccurate participants adjust their responses toward category centers.     

The role of landmarks and boundaries in the development of spatial memory

It has been suggested that learning an object's location relative to (1) intramaze landmarks and (2) local boundaries is supported by parallel striatal and hippocampal systems, both of which rely upon input from a third system for orientation. However, little is known about the developmental trajectories of these systems' contributions to spatial learning. The present study tested 5- and 7-year-old children and adults on a water maze-like task in which all three types of cue were available. Participants had to remember the location of an object hidden in a circular bounded environment containing a moveable intramaze landmark and surrounded by distal cues. Children performed less accurately than adults, and showed a different pattern of error. While adults relied most on the stable cue provided by the boundary, children relied on both landmark and boundary cues similarly, suggesting a developmental increase in the weighting given to boundary cues. Further, adults were most accurate in coding angular information (dependent on distal cues), whereas children were most accurate in coding distance, suggesting a developing ability to use distal cues to orient. These results indicate that children as young as 5 years use boundary, intramaze landmark, and distal visual cues in parallel, but that the basic accuracy and relative weighting of these cues changes during subsequent development.     

Estimating stimuli from contrasting categories: truncation due to boundaries

In this article, the authors present and test a formal model that holds that people use information about category boundaries in estimating inexactly represented stimuli. Boundaries restrict stimuli that are category members to fall within a particular range. This model posits that people increase the average accuracy of stimulus estimates by integrating fine-grain values with boundary information, eliminating extreme responses. The authors present 4 experiments in which people estimated sizes of squares from 2 adjacent or partially overlapping stimulus sets. When stimuli from the 2 sets were paired in presentation, people formed relative size categories, truncating their estimates at the boundaries of these categories. Truncation at the boundary of separation between the categories led to exaggeration of differences between stimuli that cross categories. Yet truncated values are shown to be more accurate on average than unadjusted values.     

Cultural influences on preference consistency: Consistency at the individual and collective levels

Previous research has shown that there are cultural differences in self-concept consistency across situations. However, little is known about cultural differences in preference consistency over time. The present research examined whether Americans are more consistent in their preferences over time than are Japanese. As hypothesized, there were cultural differences in self-reported ( and ) and actual ( and ) preference consistency over time. Further, cultural differences in preference consistency at the individual level (Study 1) were found to aggregate into collective level differences ( and ) in the consistency of preference trends, such as the popularity of baby names. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Visual memory and the perception of a stable visual environment

The visual world appears stable and continuous despite eye movements. One hypothesis about how this perception is achieved is that the contents of successive fixations are fused in memory according to environmental coordinates. Two experiments failed to support this hypothesis; they showed that one's ability to detect a grating presented after a saccade is unaffected by the presentation of a grating with the same spatial frequency in the same spatial location before the saccade. A third experiment tested an alternative explanation of perceptual stability that claims that the contents of successive fixations are compared, rather than fused, across saccades, allowing one to determine whether the world has remained stable. This hypothesis was supported: Experienced subjects could accurately determine whether two patterns viewed in successive fixations were identical or different, even when the two patterns appeared in different spatial positions across the saccade. Taken together, these results suggest that perceptual stability and information integration across saccades rely on memory for the relative positions of objects in the environment, rather than on the spatiotopic fusion of visual information from successive fixations.     

Dichotomous perception of animal categories in infancy

ABSTRACT

Although there is a wealth of knowledge on categorization early in life, there are still many unanswered questions about the nature of category representation in infancy. For example, it is unclear whether infants are sensitive to boundaries between complex categories, such as types of animals, or whether young infants exhibit such sensitivity without explicit experience in the lab. Using a morphing technique, we linearly altered the category composition of images and measured 6.5-month-olds’ attention to pairs of animal faces that either did or did not cross the categorical boundary, with the stimuli in each pair being equally dissimilar from one another across the two types of image pairs. Results indicated that infants dichotomize the continua between cats and dogs and between cows and otters, but only when the images are presented in their canonical, upright orientations. These findings demonstrate a propensity to dichotomize early in life that could have implications for social categorizations, such as race and gender.     

Beyond the debate: Why some adolescents report stable self-worth over time and situation, whereas others report changes in self-worth

Within the field of personality and social psychology, there has been historical controversy over whether constructs such as self-esteem are stable over time and situation or whether they are changeable. One response to this question has been to invoke two types of self-esteem or self-worth, trait self-esteem and state self-esteem. Thus it has been asserted that adolescents, the participants in this paper, have both a baseline self-esteem as well as a barometric self-esteem that represents short-term fluctuations (Rosenberg, 1986). In this paper, we contend that constructs such as self-esteem are not, in and of themselves, trait-like or state-like in nature. Rather, certain individuals display trait-like behavior, whereas others demonstrate change in self-esteem or self-worth across relatively long periods of time, on a short-term basis, and across situations. Three studies document these claims. The first addresses self-worth as a function of the transition from high school to college. The second examines short-term fluctuations in self-worth. The third investigates variability in self-worth across relational contexts, namely, relational self-worth. In each study, findings reveal that certain adolescents report stability in self-worth whereas others report change, fluctuations, or variability. Social causes of these individual differences are identified in each study, as are mental health implications. It is argued that such approaches provide a clearer understanding of the complexity of self-processes.     

The temporal locus of the categorical bias in spatial memories

People often use the region of a target's location to make judgements about its exact position. Although there is general agreement that this category-based effect is due to a blending of the specific coding of a target's location and the categorical coding of its region, there is little agreement on when the blending occurs. The current paper examines whether the systematic bias is the result of combining separate undistorted mental representations at the time of retrieval or a result of using a category-distorted mental representation. Participants studied a dot within a circle and reproduced its location from memory after a short or long delay, and new categorical information was introduced during target retrieval. The results showed a larger increase over time in the biases caused by the new category introduced at retrieval than in the biases caused by the originally encoded category. The findings are consistent with retrieval models, providing evidence that category biasing processes operate at the time of memory retrieval.     

Can semi-supervised learning explain incorrect beliefs about categories?

Three experiments with 88 college-aged participants explored how unlabeled experiences—learning episodes in which people encounter objects without information about their category membership—influence beliefs about category structure. Participants performed a simple one-dimensional categorization task in a brief supervised learning phase, then made a large number of unsupervised categorization decisions about new items. In all three experiments, the unsupervised experience altered participants’ implicit and explicit mental category boundaries, their explicit beliefs about the most representative members of each category, and even their memory for the items encountered during the supervised learning phase. These changes were influenced by both the range and frequency distribution of the unlabeled stimuli: mental category boundaries shifted toward the middle of the range and toward the trough of the bimodal distribution of unlabeled items, whereas beliefs about the most representative category members shifted toward the modes of the unlabeled distribution. One consequence of this shift in representations is a false-consensus effect (Experiment 3) where participants, despite receiving very disparate training experiences, show strong agreement in judgments about representativeness and boundary location following unsupervised category judgments.     

The eyes grasp,the hands see: Metric category knowledge transfers between vision and touch

Categorization of seen objects is often determined by the shapes of objects. However, shape is not exclusive to the visual modality: The haptic system also is expert at identifying shapes. Hence, an important question for understanding shape processing is whether humans store separate modality-dependent shape representations, or whether information is integrated into one multisensory representation. To answer this question, we created a metric space of computer-generated novel objects varying in shape. These objects were then printed using a 3-D printer, to generate tangible stimuli. In a categorization experiment, participants first explored the objects visually and haptically. We found that both modalities led to highly similar categorization behavior. Next, participants were trained either visually or haptically on shape categories within the metric space. As expected, visual training increased visual performance, and haptic training increased haptic performance. Importantly, however, we found that visual training also improved haptic performance, and vice versa. Two additional experiments showed that the location of the categorical boundary in the metric space also transferred across modalities, as did heightened discriminability of objects adjacent to the boundary. This observed transfer of metric category knowledge across modalities indicates that visual and haptic forms of shape information are integrated into a shared multisensory representation.     

Asymmetric dependencies in perceiving identity and emotion: Experiments with morphed faces

We investigated whether an asymmetric relationship between the perception of identity and emo-tional expressions in faces (Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998) may be related to differences in the rela-tive processing speed of identity and expression information. Stimulus faces were morphed across identity within a given emotional expression, or were morphed across emotion within a given identity. In Experiment 1, consistent classifications of these images were demonstrated across a wide range of morphing, with only a relatively narrow category boundary. At the same time, classification reaction times (RTs) reflected the increased perceptual difficulty of the morphed images. In Experiment 2, we investigated the effects of variations in the irrelevant dimension on judgments of faces with respect to a relevant dimension, using a Garner-type speeded classification task. RTs for expression classifica-tions were strongly influenced by irrelevant identity information. In contrast, RTs for identity classifi-cations were unaffected by irrelevant expression information, and this held even for stimuli in which identity was more difficult and slower to discriminate than expression. This suggests that differences in processing speed cannot account for the asymmetric relationship between identity and emotion per-ception. Theoretical accounts proposing independence of identity and emotion perception are dis-cussed in the light of these findings.     

Functions in biological kind classification

Biological traits that serve functions, such as a zebra’s coloration (for camouflage) or a kangaroo’s tail (for balance), seem to have a special role in conceptual representations for biological kinds. In five experiments, we investigate whether and why functional features are privileged in biological kind classification. Experiment 1 experimentally manipulates whether a feature serves a function and finds that functional features are judged more diagnostic of category membership as well as more likely to have a deep evolutionary history, be frequent in the current population, and persist in future populations. Experiments 2–5 reveal that these inferences about history, frequency, and persistence account for nearly all the effect of function on classification. We conclude that functional features are privileged because their relationship with the kind is viewed as stable over time and thus as especially well suited for establishing category membership, with implications for theories of classification and folk biological understanding.     

A nonhuman primate's expectations about object motion and destination: The importance of self-propelled movement and animacy

Human infants have considerable understanding of why objects move and what causes them to take one trajectory over another. Here, we explore the possibility that this capacity is shared with other nonhumans and present results from preferential looking time tests with a New World monkey, the cotton-top tamarin. Experiments examined whether individuals form different expectations about an object's potential capacity to change locations. Test objects were: 1) self-propelled, moving, animate; 2) self-propelled, moving, inanimate; 3) non-self-propelled, moving due to an external agent, inanimate; 4) non-self-propelled, motionless, inanimate. When category 1 objects, either a live mouse or frog, emerged from behind an occluder in a novel location, this did not affect looking time; subjects appeared to expect such changes. In contrast, when the other objects emerged in a novel location following occlusion from view, subjects looked longer than when the object emerged in the location seen prior to occlusion; such locational changes were apparently not expected. Some feature other than self-propelled motion accounts for the tamarins’ looking time responses and at least one candidate feature is whether the object is animate or inanimate.     

Asymmetric dependencies in perceiving identity and emotion: experiments with morphed faces.

We investigated whether an asymmetric relationship between the perception of identity and emotional expressions in faces (Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998) may be related to differences in the relative processing speed of identity and expression information. Stimulus faces were morphed across identity within a given emotional expression, or were morphed across emotion within a given identity. In Experiment 1, consistent classifications of these images were demonstrated across a wide range of morphing, with only a relatively narrow category boundary. At the same time, classification reaction times (RTs) reflected the increased perceptual difficulty of the morphed images. In Experiment 2, we investigated the effects of variations in the irrelevant dimension on judgments of faces with respect to a relevant dimension, using a Garner-type speeded classification task. RTs for expression classifications were strongly influenced by irrelevant identity information. In contrast, RTs for identity classifications were unaffected by irrelevant expression information, and this held even for stimuli in which identity was more difficult and slower to discriminate than expression. This suggests that differences in processing speed cannot account for the asymmetric relationship between identity and emotion perception. Theoretical accounts proposing independence of identity and emotion perception are discussed in the light of these findings.     

Functions in biological kind classification

Biological traits that serve functions, such as a zebra's coloration (for camouflage) or a kangaroo's tail (for balance), seem to have a special role in conceptual representations for biological kinds. In five experiments, we investigate whether and why functional features are privileged in biological kind classification. Experiment 1 experimentally manipulates whether a feature serves a function and finds that functional features are judged more diagnostic of category membership as well as more likely to have a deep evolutionary history, be frequent in the current population, and persist in future populations. Experiments 2-5 reveal that these inferences about history, frequency, and persistence account for nearly all the effect of function on classification. We conclude that functional features are privileged because their relationship with the kind is viewed as stable over time and thus as especially well suited for establishing category membership, with implications for theories of classification and folk biological understanding.     

Chromatic information processing: Rate depends on stimulus location in the category and psychological complexity

Summary Colors are typically categorized, and color sensations can be conceived to lie on a continuum of psychological complexity from simple, sensations provoked by colors that fall near the centers of color categories and that convey predominately a single percept (like blue), to complex, sensations provoked by colors that fall near boundaries between color categories and that convey two percepts (like blue-green). In three experiments we assessed the effect of the location of colors in a category (their psychological complexity) on the rate at which observers identified and classified them. In Experiment 1, observers named category center colors faster than boundary colors. A subsidiary experiment with range-shifted stimuli showed that observers were not merely bisecting a stimulus continuum. In Experiment 2, observers classified a variety of category centers more rapidly than a variety of boundaries. In Experiment 3, observers who first practiced classifying color centers or boundaries as such later classified category centers faster than boundaries. A subsidiary experiment showed that this differential was not selective to particular response category labels. Neither Experiment 2 nor Experiment 3 showed any differential effect of visual field of presentation. The advantage of category center or simple over boundary or complex sensations in chromatic information processing is discussed in terms of the physiological sensitivity of the visual system to color.