On the asymmetry in the cognitive construal of ingroup and outgroup: A model of egocentric social categorization

A model of egocentric social categorization (ESC-model) is presented. It predicts an asymmetry in the cognitive construal of ingroups and outgroups which is traced back to an egocentrism in the cognitive differentiation of the social world. The more specific assumptions are: (1) At the most basic level of cognitive differentiation, the perceiver distinguishes between the categories ME and NOT-ME. (2) This basic level categorization predicates an asymmetry in the cognitive construal of ingroup and out-group as social categories: The ingroup is construed as a heterogeneous aggregate of separate entities and the outgroup as a homogeneous social category. (3) Egocentric social categorization thus facilitates self-definition in terms of personal identity relative to self-definition in terms of social identity. The ESC-model is highly relevant to research on perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity. Moreover, it alerts researchers to the possibility of ‘quasi-intergroup’ situations in which the outgroup, but not the ingroup, is a salient entity. This article also discusses the relationship between the ESC-model and self-categorization theory and points out some prospects for future research.     

Mood and the impact of individuating information on the evaluation of ingroup and outgroup members: The role of mood-based expectancies

This research investigates the role of mood-based expectancies regarding a target's group membership for the impact of individuating information on target judgments. We argue that target judgments in both positive and negative mood may be more or less affected by individuating information depending on whether the target is an ingroup member or an outgroup member. Specifically, in a competitive intergroup setting it should be less congruent with mood-based expectancies when individuals in positive (negative) mood learn that an outgroup (ingroup) member rather than an ingroup (outgroup) member has succeeded. Hence, unexpected (i.e., mood-incongruent) category information should elicit more attention than expected (mood-congruent) category information. More importantly, subsequent individuating information (high vs. low target competence) should be processed more effortful and influence target judgments more strongly given mood-incongruent (vs. mood-congruent) category membership. Findings of an experiment support these predictions. Results are discussed in regard to implications for different research domains.     

Cognitive differentiation between self,ingroup, and outgroup: The roles of identification and perceived intergroup conflict

Several models predict that persons ascribe opposite characteristics to self and ingroups on the one hand and outgroups on the other (outgroup contrast). However, only few studies have found this effect. This study explored its boundary conditions. Sixty‐two students rated (a) characteristics of themselves, an ingroup (own study major), and an outgroup (other study major), (b) ingroup identification, and (c) perceived intergroup conflict. Participants who were relatively high in ingroup identification and who perceived relatively high levels of intergroup conflict displayed outgroup contrast, as indicated by negative correlations between trait ratings for self and ingroup and between trait ratings for ingroup and outgroup. The other participants showed weaker or no outgroup contrast. Thus, this study is one of the few empirical demonstrations of outgroup contrast and points to moderators that should be considered in future research on this effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The “Black Sheep Effect”: Extremity of judgments towards ingroup members as a function of group identification

The present study proposes an extension to the phenomenon of ingroup favouritism, based on the hypothesis that judgments about ingroup members may be more positive or more negative than judgments about similar outgroup members. It contrasts predictions issued from the complexity-extremity hypothesis (Linville, 1982; Linville and Jones, 1980), from the ingroup favouritism hypothesis (Tajfel, 1982) and from Tesser's (1978; Millar and Tesser, 1986) attitude polarization model. Our main prediction, based on Social Identity Theory, is that judgments about both likeable and unlikeable ingroup members are more extreme than judgments about outgroup members. This phenomenon, coined the Black Sheep Effect, is viewed as due to the relevance that ingroup members'behaviour, as compared to that of outgroup members, has for the subjects' social identity. Three experiments supported our predictions. Experiment I additionally showed that inter-trait correlations were stronger for the ingroup than for the outgroup. Experiment 2 showed that the black sheep effect occurs only when the judgmental cues are relevant for the subjects' social identity, and Experiment 3 showed that levels of information about the target of the judgment were ineffective in generating judgmental extremity. Results are discussed in light of a cognitive-motivational alternative explanation to a purely cognitive interpretation of outgroup homogeneity.     

Reactance,the self,and its group: When threats to freedom come from the ingroup versus the outgroup

We investigated the assumption that independent versus interdependent self‐construals yield different manifestations of psychological reactance in different group contexts. We expected collectivists (interdependent) to value the collective freedom of an ingroup more in face of an outgroup threat than individualists (independent) who should be protective of their individual freedom especially within an ingroup. In Study 1, we showed that collectivists (Taiwanese students) did not show reactance when a threat to their freedom of choice originated in the ingroup, but they did show reactance when it originated in an outgroup. In Study 2, Austrian students showed more reactance the more interdependent their self‐construal was when confronted with an outgroup restriction. However, the more independent Austrian students' self‐construal was, the more reactance they showed when the threat came from the ingroup. Priming an independent (versus interdependent) self‐construal in Study 3, we again observed more reactance when freedom was restricted by the ingroup. The findings underline the importance of understanding psychological reactance as a socially situated phenomenon. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Criticizing groups from the inside and the outside: an identity perspective on the intergroup sensitivity effect

Research on group criticism has demonstrated that criticisms are received less defensively when made by an ingroup member than when made by an outsider (the intergroup sensitivity effect). Three experiments tested the extent to which this effect is driven by social identity concerns or by judgments of how experienced the source of the criticism is. In Experiments 1 and 2, Australians who criticized Australia (ingroup critics) were met with less defensiveness than were foreigners who criticized Australia (outgroup critics), regardless of the amount of experience the foreigner had with Australia. Furthermore, the effects of speaker type on evaluations were mediated by perceptions of the extent to which the criticisms were intended to be constructive but not by perceptions of experience. Finally, Experiment 3 indicated that although experience does not help outgroup critics, a lack of experience can hurt ingroup critics. Recommendations are provided as to how people can reduce defensiveness when making group criticisms.     

Towards tolerance: Representations of superordinate categories and perceived ingroup prototypicality

According to Mummendey and Wenzel (1999), group members tend to perceive their ingroup, relative to an outgroup, as more prototypical of the superordinate category encompassing both groups. Hence, they tend to regard the outgroup as deviating from the norms of the superordinate category. Factors that inhibit perception of relative ingroup prototypicality should thus promote intergroup tolerance. In two experiments, the representation of the superordinate category was manipulated. Both an undefinable prototype (Experiment 1; N=63) and a complex representation (Experiment 2; N=88) led to a decrease in relative ingroup prototypicality. Dual identification with the ingroup and the superordinate category increased relative ingroup prototypicality, which was negatively correlated with positive attitudes towards the outgroup. The findings supported Mummendey and Wenzel’s assumptions about the conditions that lead to intergroup tolerance.     

The two faces of dominance: The differential effect of ingroup superiority and outgroup inferiority on dominant-group identity and group esteem

The present paper provides evidence that dominant-group members distinguish dominance framed as ingroup superiority from dominance framed as outgroup inferiority, and that ingroup superiority enhances esteem for, and thus identification with, the group more than outgroup inferiority. In Experiment 1, Democrats report higher levels of party identification after being told that Democrats won an election than after being told that Republicans lost the election. These effects are attenuated among dominant group members whose values are in conflict with how dominance was achieved. In Experiments 2a and 2b, unearned dominance framed as ingroup superiority resulted in higher levels of White identification than unearned dominance framed as outgroup inferiority among Whites who did not value meritocracy. In contrast, Whites who valued meritocracy did not increase their levels of identification with the group. In Experiment 2b, this interactive effect on racial identification was mediated by esteem for the group.     

Representing ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Building Blocks of Intergroup Cognition

Three experiments explored whether group membership affects the acquisition of richer information about social groups. Employing a minimal-groups paradigm, 6- to 8-year-olds were randomly assigned to 1 of 2 novel social groups. Experiment 1 demonstrated that immediately following random assignment to a novel group, children were more likely to generalize negative behaviors to outgroup members and positive behaviors to ingroup members and to report a preference for ingroup members. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that this initial ingroup-favoring bias interacts with subsequent learning, thereby attenuating the effect of negative information about the ingroup and enhancing the effect of negative information about the outgroup. These effects were more powerful with respect to preferences than induction: After hearing that some ingroup members behaved badly, children predicted that ingroup members would behave more negatively than outgroup members, but they did not express preferences for the outgroup over the ingroup. Together these data shed light on the construction of social category knowledge as well as the processes underlying the absence of own-group positivity among children from lower-status social groups.     

Pals in power armor: attribution of human-like emotions to video game characters in an ingroup/outgroup situation

Previous research has demonstrated the tendency for humans to anthropomorphize computers-that is, to react to computers as social actors, despite knowing that the computers are mere machines. In the present research, we examined the attribution of both primary (non-uniquely human) and secondary (human-like) emotions to ingroup (teammate) and outgroup (opponent) computer-controlled characters in a video game. We found that participants perceived the teammate character as experiencing more secondary emotions than the opponent character, but that they perceived the teammate and opponent character as experiencing equal levels of primary emotions. Thus, participants anthropomorphized the ingroup character to a greater extent than the outgroup character. These results imply that computers' "emotions" are treated with a similar ingroup/outgroup social regard as the emotions of actual humans.     

Retributive justice and social categorizations: the perceived fairness of punishment depends on intergroup status

In the current research, the authors investigate the influence of intergroup status and social categorizations on retributive justice judgments, that is, the extent to which observers perceive punishment as fair. Building on social identity theory and the model of subjective group dynamics, it is predicted that when the ingroup has higher status than the outgroup, people are relatively less concerned about punishment of an outgroup offender than when the ingroup has lower status than the outgroup. Two experiments revealed that participants are more punitive towards an ingroup than an outgroup offender when ingroup status is high but not when ingroup status is low. Furthermore, in correspondence with our line of reasoning, this finding emerged because participants were less punitive towards outgroup offenders when ingroup status is high than when ingroup status was low. It is concluded that the perceived fairness of punishment depends on the offender's social categorization and intergroup status. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social creativity strikes back: improving motivated performance of low status group members by valuing ingroup dimensions

Motivation of stigmatized group members to perform on status‐relevant ‘outgroup’ dimensions can be impaired after ingroup failure. Three experiments examined whether social creativity by valuing ingroup dimensions (dimensions on which an ingroup outperforms an outgroup) can increase motivation and performance on outgroup dimensions. It was hypothesized that under high social identity threat, motivation on the outgroup dimension would benefit from valuing an ingroup dimension. Experiments 1 and 2 show that when social identity threat is increased, low status group members who personally value ingroup dimensions show higher motivation to perform on the outgroup dimension. Experiment 3 shows that the induction of high contextual value of both ingroup and outgroup dimensions improves low status group members' well‐being and motivated performance on the outgroup dimension. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Extended contact effects: is exposure to positive outgroup exemplars sufficient or is interaction with ingroup members necessary?

Previous research does not inform us if exposure to positive outgroup exemplars is sufficient to explain the observed prejudice reduction effect of extended contact or if interaction with ingroup members is necessary. An experiment (N = 108) in which Romanian students read identical stories about the friendship between a Roma and a Romanian/Bulgarian found that, while information about close outgroup-outgroup relationships is sufficient to improve outgroup attitudes and reduce intergroup anxiety, information about close ingroup-outgroup relationships has stronger and broader positive effects. Mediational analyses revealed that group emotions rather than intergroup anxiety, ingroup norms, or outgroup norms mediated the effect of extended contact on outgroup perception. A core affect perspective of group emotions is used to explain the results.     

Our flaws are more human than yours: ingroup bias in humanizing negative characteristics

Four studies investigated whether people tend to see ingroup flaws as part of human nature (HN) to a greater degree than outgroup flaws. In Study 1, people preferentially ascribed high HN flaws to their ingroup relative to two outgroups. Study 2 demonstrated that flaws were rated higher on HN when attributed to the ingroup than when attributed to an outgroup, and no such difference occurred for positive traits. Study 3 replicated this humanizing ingroup flaws (HIF) effect and showed that it was (a) independent of desirability and (b) specific to the HN sense of humanness. Study 4 replicated the results of Study 3 and demonstrated that the HIF effect is amplified under ingroup identity threat. Together, these findings show that people humanize ingroup flaws and preferentially ascribe high HN flaws to the ingroup. These ingroup humanizing biases may serve a group-protective function by mitigating ingroup flaws as "only human."     

Reaction in action: intergroup contrast in automatic behavior

Whereas previous research has shown automatic behavior conforming to outgroup stereotypes, the authors demonstrate automatic behavioral contrast away from a stereotype/trait associated with an outgroup (Study 1 and 2) and point to the importance of an "us-them" intergroup comparison in this process. In Study 1, participants colored pictures more messily when neatness was associated with an outgroup rather than the ingroup. In Study 2, using a different behavior, participants primed with busy business people reacted faster than controls (assimilation) but became slower when their student ingroup identity was activated (contrast). Subliminally priming an "us-them" intergroup comparison set undermined the accessibility of outgroup stereotypic words (Study 3), especially for those higher in prejudice (Study 4). This suggests that people automatically distance themselves from outgroup attributes when intergroup antagonism is cued or chronic. Implications for the role of self and comparison processes in automatic behavior are discussed.     

Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: categorization, reciprocation, or fear?

H. Tajfel's (1970) minimal group paradigm (MGP) research suggests that social categorization is a sufficient antecedent of ingroup-favoring discrimination. Two experiments examined whether discrimination in the MGP arises from categorization or processes of outcome dependence, that is, ingroup reciprocity and outgroup fear. Experiment 1 unconfounded categorization from outcome dependence. Categorized men discriminated only when dependent on others. Categorized women discriminated regardless of the structure of dependence. Experiment 2 examined dependence on the ingroup versus the outgroup as the locus of male-initiated discrimination. Consistently with an ingroup reciprocity effect, men discriminated when dependent on ingroup, but not outgroup, members. Sex differences are discussed in regard to women's heightened ingroup dependence produced by biological or environmental constraints.     

Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups

According to the psychological essentialism perspective, people tend to explain differences between groups by attributing them different essences. Given a pervasive ethnocentrism, this tendency implies that the human essence will be restricted to the ingroup whereas outgroups will receive a lesser degree of humanity. Therefore, it is argued that people attribute more uniquely human characteristics to the ingroup than to the outgroup. The present article focuses on secondary emotions that constitute such characteristics. Study 1 showed that members of high‐ and low‐status groups attribute more positive secondary emotions to the ingroup than to the outgroup. Study 2 verified that the differential attribution extended also to negative secondary emotions. No exemplars of emotions were provided in Study 3. Instead, participants had to estimate the means of two distributions of numbers that supposedly represented characteristics of the ingroup and of the outgroup. The results of this third experiment illustrated the reluctance to attribute secondary emotions to the outgroup. The findings are discussed from the perspective of psychological essentialism. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Affective divergence: automatic responses to others' emotions depend on group membership

Extant research suggests that targets' emotion expressions automatically evoke similar affect in perceivers. The authors hypothesized that the automatic impact of emotion expressions depends on group membership. In Experiments 1 and 2, an affective priming paradigm was used to measure immediate and preconscious affective responses to same-race or other-race emotion expressions. In Experiment 3, spontaneous vocal affect was measured as participants described the emotions of an ingroup or outgroup sports team fan. In these experiments, immediate and spontaneous affective responses depended on whether the emotional target was ingroup or outgroup. Positive responses to fear expressions and negative responses to joy expressions were observed in outgroup perceivers, relative to ingroup perceivers. In Experiments 4 and 5, discrete emotional responses were examined. In a lexical decision task (Experiment 4), facial expressions of joy elicited fear in outgroup perceivers, relative to ingroup perceivers. In contrast, facial expressions of fear elicited less fear in outgroup than in ingroup perceivers. In Experiment 5, felt dominance mediated emotional responses to ingroup and outgroup vocal emotion. These data support a signal-value model in which emotion expressions signal environmental conditions.