The influence of social comparison on career decision-making: Vocational identity as a moderator and regret as a mediator

This study investigated the influence of social comparison on career choice certainty and its potential mechanisms: regret as a mediator and vocational identity as a moderator. Before the formal experiment, 30 pairs of vocational values representing typical conflicts in career decision-making for Chinese university students were obtained. The formal experiment adopted a single-factor (social comparison VS no comparison) between-subject design with vocational identity as an independent covariate. Ninety-eight junior and senior undergraduate students and graduate students in a university in China were invited to participate in the computer-controlled experiment, which involved vocational identity assessment, social comparison manipulation, and analogue career-choice scenario tests. Path analysis showed that: (a) Social comparison significantly and negatively predicted career choice certainty; (b) Regret partially mediated the effect of social comparison on career choice certainty; and (c) Vocational identity did not moderate the path between social comparison and regret, but significantly moderated the negative effect of regret on career choice certainty. These results indicated that in the collectivistic Chinese culture, individuals' career development trajectories may not be totally independent and are subject to influences by other people's choices, while emotion of regret and vocational identity development all play significant roles in this intricate process.     

Using confidence intervals in within-subject designs

We argue that to best comprehend many data sets, plotting judiciously selected sample statistics with associated confidence intervals can usefully supplement, or even replace, standard hypothesis-testing procedures. We note that most social science statistics textbooks limit discussion of confidence intervals to their use in between-subject designs. Our central purpose in this article is to describe how to compute an analogous confidence interval that can be used in within-subject designs. This confidence interval rests on the reasoning that because between-subject variance typically plays no role in statistical analyses of within-subject designs, it can legitimately be ignored; hence, an appropriate confidence interval can be based on the standard within-subject error term—that is, on the variability due to the subject × condition interaction. Computation of such a confidence interval is simple and is embodied in Equation 2 on p. 482 of this article. This confidence interval has two useful properties. First, it is based on the same error term as is the corresponding analysis of variance, and hence leads to comparable conclusions. Second, it is related by a known factor (√2) to a confidence interval of the difference between sample means; accordingly, it can be used to infer the faith one can put in some pattern of sample means as a reflection of the underlying pattern of population means. These two properties correspond to analogous properties of the more widely used between-subject confidence interval.     

The production effect benefits performance in between-subject designs: A meta-analysis

Producing (e.g., saying, mouthing) some items and silently reading others has been shown to result in a reliable advantage favoring retention of the produced compared to non-produced items at test. However, evidence has been mixed as to whether the benefits of production are limited to within- as opposed to between-subject designs. It has even been suggested that the within-subjects nature of the production effect may be one of its defining characteristics. Meta-analytic techniques were applied to evaluate this claim. Findings indicated a moderate effect of production on recognition memory when varied between-subjects (g = 0.37). This outcome suggests that the production effect is not defined as an exclusively within-subject occurrence.     

What Dutch women of different ages regret most

The present study examined the relationship between age, regret, well-being, and three categories of current interpretation of regretted events (not having come to terms, putting the best face on it, and coming to terms) in a large sample (n = 3579) of women varying in age from 16 to 81. Although the occurrence of regret was not related to age, its interpretation was: with age, both a growing number of women interpreted their regret experience as something they could not come to terms with also a growing number of women were able to do so. In addition, as women were more able to come to terms with their regrets, they reported higher well-being.     

Counterfactual Reasoning for Regretted Situations Involving Controllable Versus Uncontrollable Events: The Modulating Role of Contingent Self-Esteem

We report a study that examined the modulating impact of contingent self-esteem on regret intensity for regretted outcomes associated with controllable versus uncontrollable events. The Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (e.g., Kernis & Goldman, 2006) was used to assess the extent to which a person’s sense of self-worth is based on self and others’ expectations. We found that there was an influence of self-esteem contingency for controllable but not for uncontrollable regret types. For controllable regret types individuals with a high contingent (i.e., unstable) self-esteem reported greater regret intensity than those with a low contingent (i.e., stable) self-esteem. We interpret this finding as reflecting a functional and adaptive role of high contingent self-esteem in terms of mobilizing the application of counterfactual reasoning and planning mechanisms that can enable personal expectations to be achieved in the future.     

The Role of Anticipated Regret in Advice Taking

Across five studies, we demonstrate that anticipated future regret influences receptiveness to advice. While making a revision to one's own judgment based on advice, people can anticipate two kinds of future regret: (a) the regret of following non‐beneficial advice and (b) the regret of ignoring beneficial advice. In studies 1a (scenario task) and 1b (judgment task), we find that anticipated regret from erring after following advice is greater than anticipated regret from erring after ignoring advice. Furthermore, receptiveness decreases as the difference between anticipated regret from following and from ignoring advice increases. In study 2, we demonstrate that perceived justifiability of one's own initial decision is greater than that of advice. This difference in perceived justifiability influences anticipated regret and that, in turn, influences receptiveness. In study 3, we investigate the effect of advisor's expertise on perceived justifiability, anticipated regret, and receptiveness. In study 4, we propose and test an intervention to improve receptiveness based on self‐generation of advice justifications. Participants who were asked to self‐generate justifications for the advice were more receptive to it. This effect was mediated by perceived justifiability and anticipated regret. These findings shed further light on what prevents people from being receptive to advice and how this can be improved. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Center-of-pressure regularity as a marker for attentional investment in postural control: A comparison between sitting and standing postures

Postural control is a highly automatized basic activity that requires limited attentional investments. These investments have been shown to increase from balancing experts to controls, and from controls to persons with impaired postural control. Such between-subject comparisons led to a proposed direct relation between the regularity of center-of-pressure (COP) fluctuations and the amount of attention invested in posture. This study aims to expand this relation to a within-subject comparison of conditions that differ in balance demands. Specifically, more regular COP fluctuations were expected for standing than sitting, as stimulus-response reaction-time studies showed that the required attentional demands are lower for sitting than standing. COP registrations were made for fifteen healthy young adults in seated and standing postures. COP regularity was quantified with sample entropy. As expected, COP fluctuations were found to be more regular for standing than sitting, as evidenced by significantly lower sample entropy values. These findings expand the relation between COP regularity and the amount of attention invested in posture to postural tasks that vary in balance demands. An assessment of COP regularity may thus not only be instrumental in the examination of attentional investment in posture in between-subject designs, but also for different postures in within-subjects designs.     

The Effects of Personal Agency on Regret

In this paper, we examine the role of personal agency as a key antecedent of regret that individuals experience when the outcome of their decision is unfavorable. In contrast to previous research that documents its exacerbating role, we find that personal agency mitigates regret under certain circumstances. A series of experimental studies show that personal responsibility for the decision may attenuate subjective perceptions of the extent of failure and mitigate regret. However, when the superior outcome of the foregone option is known and the failure of the chosen option is irreversible, personal agency may amplify regret. We also find that subjective failure perceptions mediate the relationship between personal agency and regret levels. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Value in the guise of regret

Abstract

According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent‐regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent‐regret. I suggest that the object of agent‐regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention is that agent‐regret is a mode of valuing: a way in which the agent expresses and confers value.     

Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment are emotions that can be experienced in response to an unfavorable outcome of a decision. Previous research suggests that both emotions are related to the process of counterfactual thinking. The present research extends this idea by combining it with ideas from regret and disappointment theory. The results show that regret is related to behavior-focused counterfactual thought in which the decision-maker's own actions are changed, whereas disappointment is related to situation-focused counterfactual thought in which aspects of the situation are changed. In Study 1 participants (N= 130) were asked to recall an autobiographical episode of either a regretful or a disappointing event. When asked to undo this event, regret participants predominantly changed their own actions, whereas disappointment participants predominantly changed aspects of the situation. In Study 2 all participants (N= 50) read a scenario in which a person experiences a negative event. Participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing the person's actions reported more regret than disappointment, while participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing aspects of the situation reported more disappointment than regret. Study 3 (N= 140) replicated the findings from Study 2 with a different scenario, and a design in which regret and disappointment were measured between rather than within subjects. In the discussion we address the relation among counterfactual thinking, attributions and affective reactions to decision outcomes, and the implications for decision research.     

Reconsidering the Relation between Regret and Responsibility

Recently Connolly, Ordóñez, and Coughlan challenged the view that regret is partly determined by perceived responsibility for the regretted outcome [Connolly, T. Ordóñez, L. D., & Coughlan, R. (1997). Regret and responsibility in the evaluation of decision outcomes.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73–85]. In a series of experiments they manipulated whether actors arrived at an outcome through their own decision or through a “computer assignment” over which they had no influence. This decision agency manipulation did not affect their “regret measure.” We show in two experiments that this null-effect is due to the fact that regret was measured by means of a general happiness assessment. In the present research we replicated the basic design of their experiments and also found no effects of decision agency on the happiness assessment. However, the results showed the predicted effects of decision agency when regret was directly measured. Moreover, a measure of disappointment seemed to indicate the opposite effect: People are more disappointed when a negative outcome is caused by a computer assignment than when caused by their own choice. The role of regret and disappointment in decision making is discussed.     

Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked

Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pre‐outcome period has an important function post‐outcome regret (usually) cannot have, namely to motivate the decision maker to reconsider the ongoing decision process and reverse the initial decision. Pre‐outcome regret should for these reasons be distinguished from post‐outcome regret, and studied separately. In two scenario studies, participants were asked to imagine their regret after agreeing to perform an inconvenient task. In both, more regret was reported before than after the event, even when they had imagined a ‘worst case’ outcome. In the third study, participants described a difficult choice from their own life. Again, regret was perceived as higher in the pre‐outcome period than afterwards. In a fourth study, participants reported regret ‘online’ during an economic game (a version of the ultimatum game). They regretted their decisions more before than after they knew the outcome. We conclude that experienced pre‐outcome regret is often stronger than post‐outcome regret, and typically increases during the pre‐outcome period. We suspect that the absence of JDM studies of pre‐outcome regret is a legacy of the dominant gambling metaphor within decision research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regret Causes Ego-Depletion and Finding Benefits in the Regrettable Events Alleviates Ego-Depletion

ABSTRACT. This study tested the hypotheses that experiencing regret would result in ego-depletion, while finding benefits (i.e., “silver linings”) in the regret-eliciting events counteracted the ego-depletion effect. Using a modified gambling paradigm (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) and a retrospective method (Experiments 3 and 5), five experiments were conducted to induce regret. Results revealed that experiencing regret undermined performance on subsequent tasks, including a paper-and-pencil calculation task (Experiment 1), a Stroop task (Experiment 2), and a mental arithmetic task (Experiment 3). Furthermore, finding benefits in the regret-eliciting events improved subsequent performance (Experiments 4 and 5), and this improvement was mediated by participants’ perceived vitality (Experiment 4). This study extended the depletion model of self-regulation by considering emotions with self-conscious components (in our case, regret). Moreover, it provided a comprehensive understanding of how people felt and performed after experiencing regret and after finding benefits in the events that caused the regret.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing the multiplicative hypothesis of intensifiers

The way in which intensifiers affect the meaning of the phrases to which they are applied is investigated. Previous research demonstrates that they often have little impact in between-subject designs. Here we present research which demonstrates that their effects in within-subject designs do not conform to the multiplicative hypothesis. Both the psychological mechanisms employed and the implications for survey methodologists are discussed.     

Regulatory mode effects on counterfactual thinking and regret

The present studies examined the influence of two regulatory mode concerns—a locomotion concern with movement from state to state and an assessment concern with making comparisons [see Higgins, E. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pierro, A. (2003). Regulatory mode: Locomotion and assessment as distinct orientations. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 293-344). New York: Academic Press]—on engaging in counterfactual thinking and experiencing post-decisional regret. When contemplating a decision with a negative outcome, it was predicted that high (vs. low) locomotion would induce less counterfactual thinking and less regret, whereas the opposite would be true for high (vs. low) assessment. Locomotion and assessment orientations were measured as chronic individual differences in Study 1 and 2, and were induced experimentally in Study 3. In Study 1 and 3 a purchase scenario with a negative outcome was used to elicit counterfactuals and regret, while in Study 2 participants were asked to recall one of their own personal purchases that had a negative outcome. The results supported our predictions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of counterfactual thinking and regret from the perspective of their relation to regulatory mode.     

Cognitive-behavioral treatment and antidepressants combined with virtual reality exposure for patients with chronic agoraphobia

In this study we compared the efficacy of virtual reality exposure combined with cognitive-behavioral therapy (VRET) to that of traditional cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) alone in reducing phobic symptoms in a sample of patients with long-term agoraphobia. The study was a between-subject design with three experimental conditions (VRET group, N = 30; CBT group, N = 30; and medication only group, N = 20) and repeated measures (pre-treatment, post-treatment, and six-month follow-up). All patients were receiving antidepressant medication. Results showed that all therapies were statistically effective both at post-treatment and six-month follow-up. The VRET group showed clinical improvement in most variables measured at follow-up. The CBT group showed the highest dropout rates. These results are discussed pointing out that VRET probably serves as an intermediate procedure for an efficient exposure to phobic stimuli. Besides describing the advantages of VRET for the treatment of agoraphobia symptoms in cost-benefit terms, the study also considered issues related to higher treatment adherence and motivation.     

Consequences of regret aversion in real life: The case of the Dutch postcode lottery

Although ample research has shown that decisions may cause regret and that the anticipation of regret may influence decision-making, this previous research was largely limited to hypothetical choices with student participants. The current research replicates and extends these findings for real life lottery participation decisions in non-student samples. Four studies are reported in which two lotteries in the Netherlands, the Postcode Lottery and the National State Lottery, were compared. The State Lottery is a traditional lottery in which one has to buy a ticket with a number printed on it. In the Postcode Lottery, one’s postcode is the ticket number, and hence even if not participating one may still find out that one would have won had one played. As our research shows, this particular feedback that is present in the Postcode Lottery but absent in the State Lottery influences the level of anticipated post-decisional regret, and moderates the influence that anticipated regret has on lottery participation. Study 1, 100 street interviews, confirmed our expectations that the Postcode Lottery may elicit regret. Study 2 found under controlled conditions, that people anticipate more regret over not playing when there is feedback about the neighbors winning a prize in the Postcode Lottery than in the State Lottery. However, when this feedback is absent they anticipate equal amounts of regret over not playing. Study 3 replicated these findings for regret, while showing that the two lotteries do not differ with respect to envy and jealousy, emotions that might also be invoked in this context. Study 4 validated that, as we predicted, anticipations of post-decisional regret influence decisions to play the Postcode lottery, but not the State Lottery. These findings demonstrate the external and discriminant validity of anticipated regret for decision-making, and indicate its pragmatic relevance. The implications or recent developments in regret research are discussed.