共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Dorit Ganson 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):441-458
Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely
determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array
of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their
force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive
to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance
requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances),
we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that
p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.
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Dorit GansonEmail: |
2.
Jennie Louise 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):345-364
The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually
prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object
does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to
have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike
awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons.
I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response.
I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration
or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’
phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of
such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.
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Jennie LouiseEmail: |
3.
Mark Schroeder 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):223-248
Intentions matter. They have some kind of normative impact on our agency. Something goes wrong when an agent intends some end and fails to
carry out the means she believes to be necessary for it, and something goes right when, intending the end, she adopts the
means she thinks are required. This has even been claimed to be one of the only uncontroversial truths in ethical theory.
But not only is there widespread disagreement about why this is so, there is widespread disagreement about in what sense it is so. In this paper I explore an underdeveloped answer to the question of in what sense it is so, and argue that resolving an apparent difficulty with this view leads to an attractive picture about why it is so.
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Mark SchroederEmail: |
4.
The epistemic regress problem 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Andrew D. Cling 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):401-421
The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes
only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some
proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support
by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all
require either additional reasons or an external condition on support that is arbitrary from the believer’s own point of view.
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Andrew D. ClingEmail: |
5.
Christopher Woodard 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):247-261
We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform
some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the
same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based
reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist
theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative
importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims.
They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though,
that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This
suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.
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Christopher WoodardEmail: |
6.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
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Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
7.
Benjamin Sachs 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):73-83
In this essay I defend the claim that all reasons can ground final requirements. I begin by establishing a prima facie case
for the thesis by noting that on a common-sense understanding of what finality is, it must be the case that all reasons can
ground such requirements. I spend the rest of the paper defending the thesis against two recent challenges. The first challenge
is found in Joshua Gert’s recent book, Brute Rationality. In it he argues that reasons play two logically distinct roles –
requiring action and justifying action. He argues, further, that some reasons – ‘purely justificatory’ reasons – play only
the latter role. Jonathan Dancy offers the second challenge in his Ethics Without Principles, where he distinguishes between
the ‘favoring’ and ‘ought-making’ roles of reasons. While all reasons play the former role, some do not play the latter, and
are therefore irrelevant to what one ought to do. My contention is that both Gert and Dancy are going to have trouble accounting
for our intuitions in a number of cases.
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Benjamin SachsEmail: |
8.
Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
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Harold LangsamEmail: |
9.
Edmund Henden 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(4):339-352
There have been different interpretations of satisficing rationality. A common view is that it is sometimes rationally permitted
to choose an option one judges is good enough even when one does not know that it is the best option. But there is available
a more radical view of satisficing. On this view, it is rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough
even when a better option is known to be available. In this paper I distinguish between two possible interpretations of ‘genuine’
satisficing, a de re and a de dicto interpretation. I then argue that while de re genuine satisficing is always irrational,
de dicto genuine satisficing might be rationally permissible. In fact, de dicto genuine satisficing does not appear to be
covered by existing accounts of satisficing behaviour.
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Edmund HendenEmail: |
10.
Andrew E. Reisner 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):379-395
In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should
be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this
paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond
to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It is not attractive for two reasons: the
first being that the BPA lacks the features typical of successful conceptual analyses and the second being that it is unable
to deliver on the advantages that its proponents claim for it. While not offering a knock-down technical refutation of the
BPA, this paper aims to show that there is little reason to think that the BPA is correct, and that it should therefore be
given up as an analysis of final value.
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Andrew E. ReisnerEmail: |
11.
Thomas Grundmann 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):89-105
According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from
an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively
highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of
the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be
justified. In my view, this is not the whole story. While I agree that introspective access to our reasons is a defining feature
of justification for the access internalist, not the externalist, I will argue that even for the latter, some kind of introspective access is an epistemic desideratum. Yet, even given that I am right, the desirable might not be achievable
for us. Recent psychological research suggests that we do not dispose of reliable introspection into the sources of our own
beliefs. This seems to undermine the claim that we can introspectively know about the reasons upon which our beliefs are based.
In this paper I will therefore additionally show why these results do not threaten the kind of introspective access desirable
from an externalist point of view.
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Thomas GrundmannEmail: |
12.
13.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
14.
15.
Melissa Barry 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):231-242
Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of
motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate
rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right,
either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the action. I argue that the realist who adopts a
Humean model for explaining rational action will have a difficult time giving a plausible account of the role that desire
plays in this explanation. I explore four interpretations of this role and argue that none allows a Humean theory to explain
rational action as convincingly as an anti-Humean theory does. The first two models, in different ways, make acting on a reason
impossible. The third allows this possibility, but only by positing a reason-sensitive desire that itself demands an explanation.
The fourth avoids this explanatory challenge only by retreating to an empty form of the Humean view. In contrast, an anti-Humean
theory can provide an intuitively plausible explanation of rational action. I conclude that the realist about reasons should
adopt an anti-Humean theory to explain rational action.
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Melissa BarryEmail: |
16.
Hannes Leitgeb 《Topoi》2007,26(1):115-132
On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs
differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional,
even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are
not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of
conditional beliefs are studied, and it is explained how the failure of not distinguishing conditional beliefs from beliefs
in conditionals can lead philosophical and empirical theories astray.
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Hannes LeitgebEmail: |
17.
Timothy Chan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):395-414
In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually
contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the
functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA),
the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean
assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are,
in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I
explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive
relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions.
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Timothy ChanEmail: |
18.
C. Behan McCullagh 《Sophia》2007,46(1):21-34
One cannot prove the truth of theological statement, but perhaps one can justify believing them because of the good consequences
of doing so. It is irrational to believe statements of which there are good reasons to think false, but those of which there
is some, albeit inconclusive, evidence can be believed for pragmatic reasons. However, in the interest of simplicity, it must
not be possible to achieve those good consequences without such faith. John Bishop and others have argued that one need only
assume theological statements to be true to enjoy the good consequences of a religious life, but in fact, faith is needed
for most of these consequences to be achieved.
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C. Behan McCullaghEmail: |
19.
Garry Young 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):341-360
Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic
distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge
intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting
a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished
from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the
criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not
only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument
for exhaustive epistemic reduction.
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Garry YoungEmail: |
20.
De-Ontologizing the Debate on Social Explanations: A Pragmatic Approach Based on Epistemic Interests
In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading
for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences—refining the conceptual tools of social scientists—and
less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation
and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation
in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation,
and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating
a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.
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Erik WeberEmail: |