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1.
Joseph Almog 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(6):549-574
The first page of Frege’s classic “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung” sets for more than a hundred years now the agenda for much of
semantics and the philosophy of mind. It presents a purported puzzle whose solution is said to call upon the “entities” of
semantics (meanings) and psychological explanation (Psychological states, beliefs, concepts). The paper separates three separate
alleged puzzles that can be read into Frege’s data. It then argues that none are genuine puzzles. In turn, much of the Frege-driven
theoretical development, motivated as an inevitable “solution”, is thrown into doubt. 相似文献
2.
Claude Romano 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(1):1-21
Taking the problem of perception and illusion as a leading clue, this article presents a new phenomenological approach to
perception and the world: “holism of experience.” It challenges not only Husserl’s transcendentalism, but also what remains
of it in Heidegger’s early thought, on the grounds that it is committed to the skeptical inference: “Since we can always doubt
any perception, we can always doubt perception as a whole.” The rejection of such an implicit inference leads to a relational
paradigm of Being-in-the-World that differs from Heidegger’s on many points. 相似文献
3.
Wim Dekkers 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(5):335-349
The notion of home is well known from our everyday experience, and plays a crucial role in all kinds of narratives about human
life, but is hardly ever systematically dealt with in the philosophy of medicine and health care. This paper is based upon
the intuitively positive connotation of the term “home.” By metaphorically describing the goal of palliative care as “the
patient’s coming home,” it wants to contribute to a medical humanities approach of medicine. It is argued that this metaphor
can enrich our understanding of the goals of palliative care and its proper objectives. Four interpretations of “home” and
“coming home” are explored: (1) one’s own house or homelike environment, (2) one’s own body, (3) the psychosocial environment,
and (4) the spiritual dimension, in particular, the origin of human existence. Thinking in terms of coming home implies a
normative point of view. It represents central human values and refers not only to the medical-technical and care aspects
of health care, but also to the moral context. 相似文献
4.
Michael McGlone 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(2):199-205
In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam argues, among other things, that “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”. Putnam’s central
arguments in favor of this conclusion are unsound. The arguments in question are the famous intra-world Twin Earth arguments,
given on pages 223–227 of the article in question. Each of these arguments relies on a premise to the effect that this or
that Twin Earth scenario is both logically possible and one in which certain individuals are in the same overall “psychological
[state] in the narrow sense”. The problem is that none of the scenarios are as advertised; that is, none of them are logically
possible situations in which the relevant individuals are in the same overall “psychological [state] in the narrow sense”. 相似文献
5.
Felix Mühlh?lzer 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):265-292
Charles Parsons’ book “Mathematical Thought and Its Objects” of 2008 (Cambridge University Press, New York) is critically
discussed by concentrating on one of Parsons’ main themes: the role of intuition in our understanding of arithmetic (“intuition”
in the specific sense of Kant and Hilbert). Parsons argues for a version of structuralism which is restricted by the condition
that some paradigmatic structure should be presented that makes clear the actual existence of structures of the necessary
sort. Parsons’ paradigmatic structure is the so-called ‘intuitive model’ of arithmetic realized by Hilbert’s strings of strokes.
This paper argues that Hilbert’s strings, considered as given in intuition, cannot play the role Parsons assigns to them:
the criteria of identity of these strings do not have the sharpness that Parsons wants to see in them, and Parsons inadvertently
projects abstract structures into his ‘intuitive model’. This diagnosis is exemplified with respect to (a) Parsons’ distinction
between addition and multiplication on the one hand and exponentiation on the other and (b) his analysis of arithmetical knowledge
in simple cases like “7 + 5 = 12”. All in all, it is claimed that Parsons book contains many important insights with respect
to, for example, different versions structuralism, the notion of “natural number” and its uniqueness, induction, predicativity
and other things, for which he is rightly famous, but that his way of drawing on the notion of intuition leaves too many questions
unanswered. 相似文献
6.
Daniel Peterson 《Synthese》2011,181(3):367-374
In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation
of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping
beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences
even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping
beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical
and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments
support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books,
I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency
in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences. 相似文献
7.
Soo-Young Kwon 《Pastoral Psychology》2008,56(6):573-584
Criteria for well-being and spirituality are culturally bound. In this article, therefore, the notions of well-being and spirituality
were reconsidered from a Korean perspective. Two major conceptual approaches that pertain to “subjective well-being” research
in social psychology provide the methodological framework for this study. While “bottom-up” approaches focus on how external
events and situations influence happiness, “top-down” approaches center on diverse variables within an individual and his
or her culture. Noting the cultural differences between American and Korean self-construals (i.e., independence vs. interdependence),
the author argues that Koreans need to construct “top-down” approaches to both well-being and spirituality. Reviewing Robert
Emmon’s concept of “spiritual intelligence,” the author also suggests an integrative model for spirituality and well-being
in Korea. 相似文献
8.
Hofmann B 《Science and engineering ethics》2003,9(3):343-352
The objective of this article is to investigate ethical aspects of technology through the moral term “paternalism”. The field
of investigation is medicine. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, “paternalism” has gained moral relevance through modern
medicine, where physicians have been accused of behaving paternalistic and threatening patients’ autonomy. Secondly, medicine
is a brilliant area to scrutinise the evaluative aspects of technology. It is argued that paternalism is a morally relevant
term for the ethics of technology, but that its traditional conception is not adequate to address the challenges of modern
technology. A modification towards a “technological paternalism” is necessary. That is, “technological paternalism” is a fruitful
term in the ethics of technology. Moreover, it is suited to point out the deficiencies of the traditional concept of paternalism
and to reform and vitalise the conception of paternalism in ethics in order to handle the challenges of technology. 相似文献
9.
Peter Hawke 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):351-364
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday
modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed
from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism,
offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s
recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The
author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account
of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology. 相似文献
10.
Tu Weiming, as a leading spokesman for contemporary New Confucianism, has been reinterpreting the Confucian tradition in the
face of the challenges of modernity. Tu takes selfhood as his starting point, emphasizing the importance of cultivating the
human mind-and-heart as a deepening and broadening process to realize the anthropocosmic dao. He highlights the concept of a “fiduciary community” and advocates that, because of it, Confucianism remains a dynamic “inclusive
humanism.” Tu’s mode of thinking tallies well with Wilfred C. Smith’s vision of religion, specifically the latter’s exposition
of faith as a universal human quality and proposal of “corporate critical self-consciousness.” This article details the theories
of both scholars, highlights their similarities, and contrasts their differences. It argues that Smith’s world theology provides
a heuristic framework through which one understands how Tu has advanced his Confucian humanism from a Chinese philosophical
or cultural tradition to the midst of world religions. 相似文献
11.
李景林 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(2):198-210
Feng Youlan emphasizes the concept of “creativity” in his article “Explanation of Mencius’ Chapter on Strong, Moving Vital
Force”, in particular highlighting the problem whether the “strong, moving vital force” is “innate” or “acquired”. Cheng Hao
and Zhu Xi believed the “strong, moving vital force” was endowed by Heaven, so was therefore innate; “nourishment” cleared
fog and allowed one to “recover one’s original nature”. Mencius’ theory on “the good of human nature” is illustrated in the
concept of integrated “original endowment”. So Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi’s theory of “recovering the original nature” proposed
that the “strong, moving vital force” was innate, which is in complete agreement with Mencius and of which there is ample
evidence in Mencius. However, “nature” is “created by the accumulation of righteousness”. Namely, it is the completion and presentation of the
process of creation and transformation of human beings. Only when we consider both Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi’s theory and Feng
Youlan’s theory can we fully understand Mencius’ theory of “the nourishment of the strong, moving vital force”, which is of
great theoretical and academic value in accurately understanding Mencius and the Confucian theory of mind-nature.
Translated by Lei Yongqiang from Shehui kexue zhanxian 社会科学战线 (Social Science Front), 2007, (5):12–16 相似文献
12.
In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood
as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving
force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that
the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving
and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection
that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood
is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints
generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational. 相似文献
13.
Christian Plantin 《Argumentation》2012,26(1):83-97
Persuasion is a fact of social life, one upon which positive and negative views can be taken. Argumentative rhetoric is often
functionally defined as aiming to persuade. Different views on persuasion are taken in argumentative studies, and many other
disciplines focus on persuasion. This article takes an “inter-discursive” view of argumentation, and, following the “Hamblin’s
trend”, suggests a possible replacement for the concept of persuasion by the inter-discursive concept of alignment. 相似文献
14.
István Aranyosi 《Axiomathes》2009,19(2):223-224
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg argues in a recent article that the truth of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” depends on the assumption that
the endurance theory of persistence is true. I argue that the premise Wahlberg’s conclusion is based upon leads to absurd
consequences, therefore, nothing recommends it. As a consequence, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” has to be true, if it is true,
regardless of which theory of persistence one is committed to. 相似文献
15.
We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models.
Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality
changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to
extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the
epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements)
that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the
game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in
rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness
of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains
why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe
in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality. 相似文献
16.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献
17.
Birger Siebert 《Studies in East European Thought》2005,57(3-4):305-317
The ideas of cultural-historical psychology have led to a new understanding of the human psyche as developing in the process
of the subject acting in social and historical contexts. Such a “non-classical” reinterpretation of psychological concepts
should be based on a theoretical and philosophical framework in order to explain genetic sources of these concepts. For this
purpose, Il’enkov’s philosophy is of great significance. This is illustrated by discussing a possible cultural-historical
understanding of the concept of intelligence.
“If we enrich Vygotsky’s ideas with Il’enkov’s basic postulates, modern psychology and pedagogy will take a considerable step
forward in study of the genesis and development of consciousness and of the individual subject of activity” (Davydov 1998,
92). 相似文献
18.
Bell DR 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2003,24(5):381-393
In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research
on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of
justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted
it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested
by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However,
an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We
should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
19.
Sanford C. Goldberg 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):95-107
In Sven Bernecker’s excellent new book, Memory, he proposes an account of what we might call the “metasemantics” of memory: the conditions that determine the contents of
the mental representations employed in memory. Bernecker endorses a “pastist externalist” view, according to which the content
of a memory-constituting representation is fixed, in part, by the “external” conditions prevalent at the (past) time of the
tokening of the original representation (the one from which the memory-constituting one is causally derived). Bernecker argues
that the best version of a pastist externalism about memory contents will have the result that there can be semantically-induced
memory losses in cases involving unwitting “world-switching”. The burden of this paper is to show that Bernecker’s argument
for this conclusion does not succeed. My arguments on this score have implications for our picture of mind-world relations,
as these are reflected in a subject’s attempts to recall her past thoughts. 相似文献
20.
In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collection “Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall
(1995) severely criticised several aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I have no doubt that, given suffi-cient
motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated version of theory
production......” (p. 102). Part of Worrall’s criticism is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Darwinian Model” emphasising
the similarities and differences between genetic mutation, variation in animal behaviour and the gestation of scientific theories,
Popper (1975, 1981, 1994) never stated that tentative scientific conjec-tures “while more or less random, are not completely
blind.” He was referring to variation in animal species behaviour, and about tentative scientific conjectures he said nothing,
although common sense would indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less blind and less random. In Popper (1977,
1983), giving a summary of his “Darwinian Model”, he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures by inserting
the sentence “On a level of World 3 theory formation they are of the character of planned gropings into the unknown.” Recent
developments in the field of genetics (see for example Raff (1996), Lewis (1999), Korn (2002)) indicate that Popper’s intuitions
were along the modern lines while Worrall’s intuitions are old fashioned. Therefore Popper’s “Darwinian Model” remains both
viable and fruitful. 相似文献