A dynamic view of cultural influence: A review

Static models of culture's influence have given way to a dynamic view, which identifies not only differences across cultures in people's judgments and decisions, but also the situations and conditions in which these differences do or do not appear. Theory and evidence developed from a cognitive psychological perspective underlie this dynamic approach, including research emerging from the “dynamic constructivist” and “situated cognition” models. In the present review, we focus on findings that confirm the utility of this cognitively oriented approach, and briefly discuss the advantages and complementary nature of the “social collective” and neuroscience approaches to understanding culture.     

To Add Insight to Injury: Childhood Abuse,Abuse Perceptions,and the Emotional and Physical Health of Young Adults

Although childhood abuse is strongly associated with psychological difficulties, survivors may not perceive their experiences as abusive. Depression, anxiety, dissociation, and physical health complaints may decrease perceptions of abuse and may also be exacerbated by individuals' abuse perceptions. The current study examined abuse perceptions, abuse experiences, and current symptoms among 185 university students. Ninety-six participants repeated the study 1–2 years later. At Time 1, self-labeling as “abused” or “maltreated” was not related to psychological or physical health symptoms. At Time 2, self-labeling as “abused” or “maltreated” was positively related to depression, anxiety, and dissociation. Results indicate that abuse perceptions may change over time and may be connected with emotional and physical symptoms.     

Speaking for Oneself: Wittgenstein on Ethics

In the “Lecture on ethics”, Wittgenstein declares that ethical statements are essentially nonsense. He later told Friedrich Waismann that it is essential to “speak for oneself” on ethical matters. These comments might be taken to suggest that Wittgenstein shared an emotivist view of ethics—that one can only speak for oneself because there is no truth in ethics, only expressions of opinion (or emotions). I argue that this assimilation of Wittgenstein to emotivist thought is deeply misguided, and rests upon a serious misunderstanding of what is implied by the nonsensicality of ethical claims on Wittgenstein's view. I develop a reading of Wittgenstein's remarks in the “Lecture on ethics” on which ethical statements, despite their nonsensicality, reveal the perspective of the speaker. The purpose of ethical language is to elucidate a speaker's perspective. Such elucidations, and the perspectives they reveal, can be evaluated, criticized, and respected on principled grounds even if, as Wittgenstein insists, no ethical judgment can be (objectively) justified by any fact. I contrast Wittgenstein's comments on ethics with some comments made by Frank Ramsey (from the same period), which appear similar to Wittgenstein's remarks on value. Contra Ramsey's insistence that there is “nothing to discuss” about (or within) ethics, a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's views does not commit us to passing over ethics in silence.     

心理学视角下的极端膜拜伤害问题

对极端膜拜团体造成身心伤害现象的科学研究, 集中在对极端膜拜伤害的界定、测量和机制三个方面。本文的目的, 是梳理这三个主题上的研究脉络, 明晰其中的争议之处和取得的成绩。文本分析表明, 对极端膜拜伤害的界定从“洗脑”转向了“心理虐待”, 对这类伤害的经验观察由个体症状转向了群体行为和经历的描述, 测量方法由传统心理测试工具变成了新型团体心理虐待量表, 膜拜伤害的心理机制研究在综合环境和个人精神特质两种因素的基础上建立了二者交互的病理模型, 表观遗传学和人际神经生物学用于极端膜拜伤害的生理机制研究已见端倪。但是, 迄今对于极端膜拜伤害的学术研究尚未形成范式。     

The paradox of innocence dissociative “adhesive”; states in perpetrators of incest

This paper attempts to develop a phenomenology of the perpetrator's conviction of innocence in a condition of actual guilt. This phenomenology is developed through the investigation of dissociative states in a certain type of incestuous perpetrator: one who is herself a survivor of sexual abuse, physical abuse, or both. Clinical material suggests that certain types of schizoid perpetrators can genuinely experience the incestuous act as not really real not really sex, not really mine. This clinical phenomenon is examined from the perspective of two contemporary theoretical trends: the new view of the self as multiple (Bromberg, 1993; Mitchell, 1993), and the neo‐Kleinian formulation of “adhesive”; (Mitrani, 1994) or “autistic‐contiguous”; (Ogden, 1989, 1990) modes of pseudo‐object relatedness. Incestuous acts are conceived as occurring within a prelinguistic modality, and are therefore not encoded in discursive, autobiographical memory. The coexistence of dissociated, multiple self states and modalities accounts for the contradictory levels of object relatedness, memory, and concern frequently encountered in perpetrators of incest.     

Freud's philosophy of the uncanny

This paper is an attempt to uncover and bring to a coherent interpretation Freud's thoughts on the phenomenon of uncanniness. Starting out with the essay “The uncanny” the author wants to show that uncanniness plays an important rôle in the turn that Freud's thinking goes through at this time, and that the concept can serve as a springboard for a critical, phenomeno- logical reading of Freud's thoughts on the development of the ego. The analysis of the phenomenon of uncanniness itself tends to disrupt the coherence of Freud's earlier views and pushes him towards his later thinking. “Unheimlich” in German has the double meaning of uncanny and unhome-like, and what is not at home in itself in an uncanny sense, according to Freud, is precisely the human ego. Freud in “The uncanny” links the interpretation of uncanniness to compulsive repetition and thus makes the connection to trauma and birth anxiety discussed in later works such as “Beyond the pleasure principle” and “Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety”. The origin of our general sensitivity to the uncanny is thus, according to Freud, the loss of the mother suffered by the child as a kind of a priori traumatic experience, which is also the very event that makes the child into an ego. The understanding of traumatic neurosis and other forms of mental illness is consequently linked to an analysis of this primal uncanniness of life.     

Murakami,Connoisseur of Uncertainty: Commentary on Paper by Thomas Rosbrow

My discussion embroiders around Thomas Rosbrow's view of Murakami as a “trauma analyst.” I highlight the ways in which Murakami's writing reflects his keen sensitivity to existential uncertainty and how he seems to understand trauma, much as I do, as a shattering experience that destroys the certainties that organize psychological life and generates efforts at self restoration. Although I share Rosbrow's view that “After the Quake” depicts a character's awakening from the dissociative manifestations of trauma, I spell out how my perspective on this process differs from his.     

Review Essay: Constructivism with a Human Face

Irwin Hoffman's book Ritual and Spontaneity includes, but goes well beyond, his series of seminal papers—written over the past several decades—developing a psychoanalytic, constructivist perspective. A new, existential framework depicts what Hoffman calls the “psychobiological bedrock” at the core of the human process of constructing meaning—the lifelong effort to create a livable, subjective world in face of our ever present sense of loss, suffering, and, ultimately, mortality.

This review describes Hoffman's encompassing, existential perspective and discusses how, within this framework, he uses his dialectical sensibility to frame our understanding of both parenting and analysis as “semisacred” activities. The “dialectic of ritual and spontaneity”—the vital clash between disciplined adherence to the analytic frame and personally expressive deviations from it—represents the creative tension between the “magical” dimension of analytic authority and the healing influence of a genuinely expressive human relationship. Hoffman's perspective on the self-interested, “dark side” of the analytic relationship is compared with Winnicott's views on the vital, therapeutic role of “hate” and the paradoxical process by which the patient comes to “use” the analyst.

Unlike most postmodernist “constructivists,” Hoffman openly reveals his underlying belief in certain “transcultural, transhistorical universals”—his “psychobiological bedrock.” In acknowledging these “essentials” (assumptions about human nature) that in some form are integral, yet often hidden, elements of any system of thought, Hoffman saves his own dialectical constructivism from falling into dichotomous (constructivist vs. essentialist) thinking.     

Psychological essentialist reasoning and perspective taking during reading: A donkey is not a zebra,but a plate can be a clock

In an eyetracking study, we examined whether readers use psychological essentialist reasoning and perspective taking online. Stories were presented in which an animal or an artifact was transformed into another animal (e.g., a donkey into a zebra) or artifact (e.g., a plate into a clock). According to psychological essentialism, the essence of the animal did not change in these stories, while the transformed artifact would be thought to have changed categories. We found evidence that readers use this kind of reasoning online: When reference was made to the transformed animal, the nontransformed term (“donkey”) was preferred, but the opposite held for the transformed artifact (“clock” was read faster than “plate”). The immediacy of the effect suggests that this kind of reasoning is employed automatically. Perspective taking was examined within the same stories by the introduction of a novel story character. This character, who was naïve about the transformation, commented on the transformed animal or artifact. If the reader were to take this character’s perspective immediately and exclusively for reference solving, then only the transformed term (“zebra” or “clock”) would be felicitous. However, the results suggested that while this character’s perspective could be taken into account, it seems difficult to completely discard one’s own perspective at the same time.     

The Analyst's Necessary Vertigo

The euphemistic phrase “the difficult to reach patient” often refers to work with patients who have serious difficulties relating. The author examines the basic construct of “reach,” its pitfalls, and potentials. In the author's view, often we are talking about patients who do not fully experience their own subjective existence or the existence of others. This requires unusual efforts to “reach” the patient in order for the patient to consolidate a sense of self and other, creating the possibility of reflective relating. In contrast to views that see such psychoanalytic “reach” as associated primarily with the analyst's needs or pathology, the author views the analyst's extraordinary efforts as responsive to the patient's need to move the analyst into the foundations of the analyst's own being.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

Explaining the Relationship between Religiosity and Political Participation: The Mediating Roles of Transcendent Accountability and Religiopolitical Awareness

Prior research tends to find a positive relationship between religiosity and political participation. Explanations of this relationship have focused mostly on religiosity-generated organizational resources (e.g., civic skills), while paying less attention to psychological resources. We simultaneously examined different aspects of religiosity (belief, behavior, and belonging) and political participation (electoral and nonelectoral) in a structural equation model with two psychological resources as mediators: (1) “transcendent accountability”—seeing oneself as responsible to God or a higher power for one's impact on other people and the environment, and (2) “religiopolitical awareness”—perceiving the influence of one's religion and/or spirituality on one's political views and activities. Results from analyzing survey data from a US representative sample showed that transcendent accountability and religiopolitical awareness, whether together or awareness only, mediated positive relationships between religiosity (belief, private and public behaviors, and membership) and political participation (voting and other political activity), highlighting key psychological motivators of political participation.     

Discussion of Robert Grossmark's Case of Pamela

The author discusses Robert Grossmark's “Case of Pamela” from the perspective of developmental (relational) trauma and offers the view that Pamela's remarkable growth as well as the stunning power of the clinical process that made it possible is best illuminated from the vantage point of self-states, dissociation, affect dysregulation, and the dread of annihilation. The phenomenon of pathological narcissism, which in a classical idiom would be a central concept in describing Pamela's personality organization, is here formulated relationally in a self-state context. That is, each self-state, to the extent that it is protectively dissociated from others becomes, inherently, an island of narcissism and is what narcissism truly means. In the face of trauma, each island of selfhood operates to obliterate, automatically, the felt invasion of otherness from parts of the self that hold alternative views of “self-truth,” as well as from an other in real life—a separate person with a mind of his or her own. As each narcissistic island of Pamela's selfhood was recognized and accepted as valid in its own terms by Robert, the experiential wholeness of Pamela's sense of self began to be restored. The clinical process through which this was accomplished is seen by the author as the expansion and enrichment of Pamela's overarching self-coherence through her gradual representation of Robert's “otherness” as part of each self-representation. This in turn allowed the restoration of safe, communicative interchange between the formerly dissociated self-state islands of narcissistic insularity.     

Affective Experiences and Honesty in the Interaction: Discussion of Holly Levenkron's Paper

Anchoring her views in the work of Benjamin and other American relational authors, Levenkron asserts that intersubjective relatedness in which there is recognition of separate realities is essentially the only form of relatedness. Framing growth as coming about through the recognition of another's subjectivity provides a basis for “confrontation” and for a more direct injection of the analyst's subjectivity into the analytic encounter. More specifically, it fosters the expression of the analyst's subjectivity from what this author calls the “other-centered” and “self” perspectives.

In contrast, the recognition of selfobject and caretaking relatedness positions the analyst to express directly aspects of the analyst's subjectivity pertaining to mirroring, idealizing, and twinship selfobject needs. Kohut and classical self psychologists have delineated selfobject needs and the selfobject dimension of relatedness and transference and have emphasized the consistent use of the empathic listening/experiencing perspective. American relational theorists have delineated intersubjective relatedness and the usefulness of the other-centered listening/experiencing perspective. This author focuses on an integrative theory including three forms of relatedness and different listening/experiencing perspectives. Different listening/experiencing perspectives and forms of relatedness fundamentally influence analysts' affective experiences within the analytic encounter as exemplified in Levenkron's case.     

Hume's “Wilt Chamberlain Argument” and taxation

Robert Nozick addresses the idea of egalitarian redistribution in an argument standardly considered original: the “Wilt Chamberlain Argument”. However, this argument (without reference to Wilt Chamberlain) is found in David Hume's AnEnquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, first published in 1751. Placing this argument within a Humean and Hayekian, rather than a Lockean or Kantian, perspective radically changes its import for issues of economic justice. Rather than vindicating the radical individualism of Nozick and other libertarians, applied to our circumstances using Hume's conventionalist and evolutionary account of justice, Hume's Wilt Chamberlain argument vindicates moderate redistribution constrained by the rule of general laws and the goal of fostering innovation and industriousness.     

Reducing cigarette smoking in a retarded adult: An application of self-management procedures

An attempt was made to reduce the overall number of cigarettes smoked per day with a mildly retarded adult. Self-monitoring was compared to self-monitoring plus self-graphing and goal setting procedures in reducing the number of cigarettes smoked. Self-monitoring plus self-graphing and goal setting was superior to self-monitoring alone when the goal was set at 15 cigarettes per day, but the actual number of cigarettes smoked increased when the goal was set at 12. The number of cigarettes smoked during all treatment conditions was lower than either baseline conditions. The therapist also reduced the patient's caffeine intake and switched the client's brand of cigarettes to a low “tar”/nicotine brand. The reduction in caffeine and “tar”/nicotine was related to a small and transient increase in somatic complaints and verbal abuse, as well as the complete elimination of nocturnal enuresis. Brand switching to low “tar”/nicotine cigarettes did not result in an increase in the number of cigarettes smoked per day.     

Pray for the fatherland! Discursive and digital strategies at play in nationalist political blogging

Political blogs have come to constitute important channels for expressing nationalist and anti-immigration political views. The new forms that this rhetoric may take, comprising an intricate intermingling of verbal, digital, (audio-)visual, and communicative elements, present challenges for qualitative research. In this article we propose a way for analysing this “new” nationalist political discourse from a qualitative social psychological perspective. The suggested approach combines analytical procedures form critical discursive and rhetorical psychology with social semiotic and rhetorical studies of images, completed with analytical tools and concepts from narrative psychology and research into online political communication. Using two empirical examples of nationalist and anti-immigration political blog-entries written during the 2015 “refugee crisis,” we show this approach enables the researcher to adequately study how such political messages are conveyed through the multitude of elements provided by the blogs. In so doing, our ultimate goal is to contribute to the analytical capacity of qualitative social psychological research into contemporary political communication and persuasion.     

The new birth phenomenon during imprisonment: Corrective emotional experience or flight into health?

In prisons the “born-again” experience is frequently encountered in the inmate population. The goal of this article is to examine the social and psychological parameters of this phenomenon, as well as those issues which indicate an enduring or transitory response.     

Feeling at home in language

What do we learn about language from reading Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations? This question gains urgency from Wittgenstein's alleged animus against philosophical theorizing and his indirectness. Section 1 argues that Wittgenstein's goal is to prevent philosophical questioning about the foundations of language from the beginning. This conception of his aim is not in tension with Wittgenstein's use of the notion of community; “community interpretations” of his views betray a misguided commitment to the coherence of the idea that language might need grounding. Wittgenstein's goal is not to enjoin us not to step “outside of language-games”, but to show that we have insufficiently clear grasp of the terms we try to use to express the limits of intelligibility. Section 2 suggests that appreciating Wittgenstein's moral concerning the relation between language and philosophizing about it involves allowing him to teach us how to read his book. What makes readingPhilosophical Investigations possible is openness to learning how not to forget our lives in language.