Exploring the Valence‐Framing Effect: Negative Framing Enhances Attitude Strength

In his now‐classic research on inoculation theory, McGuire (1964 ) demonstrated that exposing people to an initial weak counterattitudinal message could lead to enhanced resistance to a subsequent stronger counterattitudinal message. More recently, research on the valence‐framing effect ( Bizer & Petty, 2005 ) demonstrated an alternative way to make attitudes more resistant. Simply framing a person's attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a rejected position such as anti‐Democrat) led to more resistance to an attack on that attitude than did framing the same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as pro‐Republican). Using an election context, the current research tested whether valence framing influences attitude resistance specifically or attitude strength more generally, providing insight into the effect's mechanism and generalizability. In two experiments, attitude valence was manipulated by framing a position either negatively or positively. Experiment 1 showed that negatively framed attitudes were held with more certainty than were positively framed attitudes. In Experiment 2, conducted among a representative sample of residents of two U.S. states during political campaigns, negatively framed attitudes demonstrated higher levels of attitude certainty and attitude‐consistent behavioral intentions than did attitudes that were framed positively. Furthermore, the effect of valence framing on behavioral intentions was mediated by attitude certainty. Valence framing thus appears to be a relatively low‐effort way to impact multiple features associated with strong attitudes.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Mortality salience and evaluations of in‐group versus out‐group critics: The role of criticism legitimacy and perceived threat

Significant terror management research has examined the impact of mortality salience on evaluations toward in‐group versus out‐group and attitudinally similar versus dissimilar others. However, relatively little research has examined evaluations when group membership is disentangled from attitude similarity. The current research examined the impact of mortality salience on evaluations toward in‐group and out‐group critics when people are less likely to rely on group membership as a heuristic. In Experiment 1, the results showed that in the control condition, participants rated an in‐group member who provided unjustified criticism more positively than an out‐group member who provided the same criticism. Under mortality salience, the reverse occurred: An in‐group member who provided unjustified criticism was rated more negatively than an out‐group member. Experiment 2 showed that under mortality salience, the derogation of an in‐group critic who provided unjustified criticism was mediated by perceptions of threat. Implications for reactions to group‐directed criticism as well as mortality salience effects are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recalibrating positive and negative weighting tendencies in attitude generalization

Individual differences in the weighting of positive versus negative information when generalizing attitudes towards novel objects predict a variety of assessments that involve the integration of valence information (Pietri, Fazio, & Shook, 2013). The goal of the current research was to manipulate valence weighting in attitude generalization to demonstrate its causal impact on various judgments and behaviors. In four experiments, participants first played BeanFest—a game in which they approached/avoided novel stimuli (beans) varying in shape and speckles, in order to increase and not decrease their points (Fazio et al., 2004). Following the game, participants classified game beans, and novel ones that varied in resemblance to the game beans as either positive or negative. In the recalibration condition, participants were told whether each classification was or was not correct. Thus, they received feedback regarding the appropriate valence weighting of resemblance to a known positive versus a known negative. In Experiment 1, this recalibration influenced individuals' attitude generalizations regarding other (non-bean) novel objects. We then examined if recalibration would produce far-transferring effects by influencing interpretations of ambiguous situations (Experiment 2), risk assessments (Experiment 3), and finally risk-taking behavior (Experiment 4). Across the four experiments, the recalibration procedure led participants who were initially relatively cautious to be more positive when making these various judgments, whereas people who exhibited an initial risky bias became more negative as a function of recalibration.     

Preschoolers’ Theory-of-Mind Knowledge Influences Whom They Trust About Others’ Theories of Mind

Two experiments examined whether particular aspects of social-cognitive knowledge predicted how preschoolers would treat informants who displayed a more or less developed understanding of that knowledge. In Experiment 1, children's own success on false-belief measures correlated with the extent to which they endorsed information generated by a confederate with a more developed sense of false belief over a confederate with a less developed sense of false belief. In Experiment 2, preschoolers were assessed for whether they possessed a more action-based or mental state-based understanding of pretense. They were then presented with informants who displayed each kind of knowledge. Children's own knowledge again correlated with which informant they believed was a reliable source of knowledge about novel pretend actions. These results not only extend findings in the “trust in testimony” literature beyond word learning, but also potentially reveal another mechanism by which children learn from others—they might trust others’ information about a specific piece of knowledge based on examination of their own knowledge of that domain.     

Attitude alignment increases trust,respect, and perceived reasoning ability to produce attraction

When others disagree with us, we like them more if they shift their attitude toward ours (i.e., engage in attitude alignment), but why? This article examined the effects of partner attitude alignment on dyadic (trust, inferred attraction) and personal (respect, perceived reasoning ability) evaluations. In two experiments, participants received feedback that imagined (Experiment 1) or real (Experiment 2) partners engaged (vs. did not engage) in attitude alignment; rated partners on trust, inferred attraction, respect (Experiments 1 and 2), and perceived reasoning ability (Experiment 2); and reported attraction. Individuals were more attracted to partners who engaged in attitude alignment because they viewed them as more trustworthy and worthy of respect and as possessing greater reasoning ability. The role of inferred attraction was unclear.     

Incidental anger and the desire to evaluate

Our results indicate that people experiencing incidental anger are more likely than people in neutral and other emotional states to prefer to perform evaluative tasks, even though their anger may bias the evaluations they make. Induced anger increased participants’ desire to evaluate others’ ideas (Experiment 1) and made the evaluations of those ideas more negative in valence (Experiment 2). Anger increased the appeal of evaluating ideas when evaluations were expected to be largely negative but not when evaluations were expected to be positive (Experiments 3 and 4). Mediation analyses revealed that this willingness to evaluate when angry stems from a belief that evaluating others can leave angry people in a positive mood. Because people are often free to decide when to perform the tasks required of them, this tendency may have implications for how and when ideas are evaluated.     

Getting it right generally,but not precisely: learning the relation between multiple inputs and outputs

In real-world situations, people are often faced with the complex task of deciding which of many potential variables are affecting their own or others’ behavior, as well as noting which specific aspects of behavior are being affected. Although it is common for professionals who encounter such conditions to claim that they acquire accurate and specific knowledge from their experience, it is unclear that such confidence is justified. Using a managerial task, we examined participants’ ability to learn how various interventions affect various aspects of their employees’ performance. The results of three experiments reveal that although participants appear to avoid prescribing an intervention that has a positive effect on a primary performance measure and a negative side effect on a secondary measure, when asked directly about the impact of the intervention, they respond by reducing their judgments of its positive impact. This was true regardless of whether participants indicated clear knowledge of its negative side effect (Experiment 3) or did not (Experiments 1 and 2). Thus, participants appear to be automatically integrating across the effects on different outcome measures.     

Beyond attitude consensus: The social context of persuasion and resistance

The current research presents a new type of social context effect on attitude certainty. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, they appraise their attitudes not only in terms of whether they are shared or not shared by others, but also in terms of whether they are based on similar or dissimilar assessments of the information presented. In two experiments, participants were presented with persuasive messages. In Experiment 1, they were induced to perceive that they responded favorably (persuasion) or unfavorably (resistance) to the message arguments. In Experiment 2, they were allowed to vary in their actual message responses. In both experiments, message response similarity—the degree to which people perceived that their evaluations of persuasive arguments were shared or unshared by others—moderated the classic effect of attitude similarity on attitude certainty. In particular, attitude similarity only affected attitude certainty under conditions of message response similarity. When message responses were believed to be dissimilar, attitude similarity had no effect on attitude certainty.     

Robust affective priming effects in a conditional pronunciation task: Evidence for the semantic representation of evaluative information

Based on the hypothesis that information about the valence of words is encoded in a semantic system, we predicted that the match between the valence of a prime and the valence of a target word will influence the pronunciation of the target only if and to the extent that pronunciation is semantically mediated. In line with this prediction, we found affective priming effects (faster pronunciation when prime and target had the same valence than when they had a different valence) only when participants were instructed to read words but not nonwords (Experiment 1) or words that were not names of occupations (Experiment 2). Priming was not significant when participants were asked to read white but not red words (Experiment 1) or words that did not have a frame around them (Experiment 2).     

"Pray for those who mistreat you": effects of prayer on anger and aggression

Although some religious teachings have been used to justify aggression, most religious teachings promote peace in human affairs. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that praying for others brings out the more peaceful side of religion by reducing anger and aggression after a provocation. In Experiment 1, praying for a stranger led provoked participants to report less anger than control participants who thought about a stranger. In Experiment 2, provoked participants who prayed for the person who angered them were less aggressive toward that person than were participants who thought about the person who angered them. In Experiment 3, provoked participants who prayed for a friend in need showed a less angry appraisal style than did people who thought about a friend in need. These results are consistent with recent evolutionary theories, which suggest that religious practices can promote cooperation among nonkin or in situations in which reciprocity is highly unlikely.     

On attributing negative motives to others who disagree with our opinions

The research explores the tendency for people to attribute negative motives to others who hold an attitude position that is discrepant from their own. In Studies 1 and 2, American and Canadian respondents indicated their perceptions of U.S. President Bush's motives for initiating war in Iraq. Consistent with the proposed bias, respondents who disagreed with the war attributed more selfish motivations than did those who supported the war. Study 3 revealed a similar bias when respondents rated the motives of the general citizenry concerning their attitudes about the war, and Study 4 provided evidence of the bias on different attitudinal issues (e.g., abortion and gay marriage). Study 4 also indicated that biased attributions of motive were primarily confined to respondents who were highly involved in the attitude issue. Discussion centers on na?ve realism, social identity concerns, and attitude justification as relevant underlying theoretical factors.     

Abstract construals make the emotional rewards of prosocial behavior more salient

Although previous research has shown that helping others leads to higher happiness than helping oneself, people frequently predict that self-serving behavior will make them happier than prosocial behavior. Here, we explore whether abstract construal – thinking about an event from a higher level, distanced perspective – influences predictions about how rewarding prosocial actions will be for people’s own well-being. In Experiment 1, Hurricane Katrina volunteers who adopted an abstract construal predicted that their efforts would be more rewarding than did volunteers who adopted a concrete construal. Experiment 2 provided a conceptual replication with a hypothetical donation scenario; people who adopted an abstract rather than concrete construal predicted that giving more money would be more rewarding than giving less. These findings suggest that people are more likely to appreciate the emotional benefits of prosocial actions when they adopt high-level construals than when they adopt low-level construals.     

When linking is stronger than thinking: Associative transfer of valence disrupts the emergence of cognitive balance after attitude change

The present research investigated the role of cognitive balance vs. associative transfer of valence in attitude change. Participants first formed positive or negative attitudes toward several source individuals. Subsequently, participants were shown source–target pairs along with information about the source–target relationship (‘likes’/‘dislikes’). Afterwards, participants’ attitudes toward the sources were changed by means of information that was opposite to the initially induced attitude. In a control condition, initial source attitudes remained unqualified. Results in the control condition showed that initially formed attitudes and available relationship information produced target evaluations that were consistent with the notion of cognitive balance. However, when attitudes toward the sources changed, target evaluations directly matched attitudes toward individually associated sources, irrespective of the relation between source and target. These results suggest that associative transfer of valence can disrupt the emergence of cognitive balance after attitude change.     

The Public and Private Use of Consensus-Raising Excuses

ABSTRACT Two experiments tested the proposition that people use consensus-raising excuses more in private than in public when the audience has information that could refute subjects' claims about others In Experiment 1, subjects received success or failure feedback and made public or private attributions to ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck In Experiment 2, subjects received positive or negative feedback and evaluated themselves and others on the trait Task difficulty attributions and evaluations of others are consensus-raising measures Consistent with our hypothesis, subjects receiving negative feedback in Experiment 1 claimed that the task was more difficult, and in Experiment 2 evaluated the other more negatively in private than in public.     

Guilty by mere association: evaluative conditioning and the spreading attitude effect

Five experiments investigated the phenomenon that attitude formation is not confined to the co-occurrence of an attitudinal object with an evaluated experience. The pairing of a target with a (dis)liked person not only affects the evaluation of the previously neutral person but spreads to other individuals who are (pre)associated with the target (spreading attitude effect). Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence for the spreading attitude effect in appetitive as well as aversive evaluative conditioning. Experiment 3 showed that the spreading attitude effect is a robust phenomenon resistant to extinction. Experiment 4 demonstrated that attitude spread can be transferred to 2nd-order conditioning. Finally, Experiment 5 supports the notion that the spreading attitude effect is not dependent on cognitive resources. Implications for social as well as applied psychology are discussed.     

Contextual influences on implicit evaluation: a test of additive versus contrastive effects of evaluative context stimuli in affective priming

Drawing on two alternative accounts of the affective priming effect (spreading activation vs. response interference), the present research investigated the underlying processes of how evaluative context stimuli influence implicit evaluations in the affective priming task. Employing two sequentially presented prime stimuli (rather than a single prime), two experiments showed that affective priming effects elicited by a given prime stimulus were more pronounced when this stimulus was preceded by a context prime of the opposite valence than when it was preceded by a context prime of the same valence. This effect consistently emerged for pictures (Experiment 1) and words (Experiment 2) as prime stimuli. These results suggest that the impact of evaluative context stimuli on implicit evaluations is mediated by contrast effects in the attention to evaluative information rather than by additive effects in the activation of evaluative information in associative memory.     

Do-no-harm in coalition formation: Why losses inhibit exclusion and promote fairness cognitions

Previous research on coalition formation has established that people will not hesitate to exclude others in order to maximize their payoff. The authors propose that this view is too narrow and that the decision to exclude depends on the valence of the payoff. Consistent with a “do-no-harm” hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed that participants were more reluctant to exclude in order to minimize their losses than to maximize their gains. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and showed that participants were most affected by payoff valence when they were disposed to consider the viewpoint of others. Additional analyses revealed that participants were more motivated by fairness (Experiment 1) and that fairness was more cognitively accessible (Experiment 2) when payoffs were negative rather than positive.     

What we think we do (to each other): how personality can bias behavior schemas through the projection of if-then profiles

People's knowledge about others includes not only person schemas about the typical traits of others but also behavior schemas about the likely interpersonal consequences of different behaviors. In this article, it is argued that perceiver effects can be interactive at the level of behavior schemas. A person's own personality configuration of if-then responses in social interactions (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) may contribute to that person's beliefs about the meaning and impact of relational behaviors more generally. In consequence, people who experience strong (or weak) responses to behaviors that vary along a particular trait dimension, such as warmth-coldness, may expect others to experience similarly strong (or weak) responses to those same kinds of behaviors. In 3 studies, people who were high in trait communion expected others to respond more strongly to behaviors that varied in warmth-coldness than did people who were low in trait communion, and people who were low in trait agency expected others to respond more strongly to behaviors that varied in assertiveness-unassertiveness than did people who were high in trait agency. Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that participants' behavior schemas were based on assumptions derived from their own if-then personality profiles.     

Resistance can be good or bad: how theories of resistance and dissonance affect attitude certainty

This research investigated how lay theories about resisting persuasion can affect attitude certainty. Specifically, people who believed that resistance was negative (i.e., implies close-mindedness) showed different levels of attitude certainty after resisting persuasive messages than people who believed resistance was positive (i.e., implies intelligence). When people held positive lay theories of resistance and overcame ostensibly strong arguments, they showed increased attitude certainty (compared to those who overcame ostensibly weak arguments). However, individuals who believed that resistance was negative did not show increases in attitude certainty when overcoming strong arguments. Experiment 2 suggests that the effect of lay theories and perceived argument strength on attitude certainty was due to dissonance created by believing that resistance is undesirable but nonetheless resisting persuasion.