On Being Lutheran In A Religiously Plural World

Abstract : For those of us who are self‐consciously Lutheran, the reality of contemporary religious pluralism engenders important theological questions. The thesis of this essay is that “being Lutheran” within the context of contemporary religious pluralism requires the creation of “Lutheran identity” that is pluralistic in structure, while simultaneously avoiding either theological exclusivism or theological inclusivism. The implications of this thesis are that (1) dialogue with the religious traditions of the world is of primary importance for thinking Lutherans, and (2) the church's witness and mission needs to be reconfigured in light of the practice of interreligious dialogue.     

On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification

Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. It is claimed to be innocent in the sense that it incurs no ontological commitments beyond those already incurred by the first‐order quantifiers. It is claimed to be determinate in the sense that it is immune to the threat of non‐standard (Henkin) interpretations that confronts higher‐order logics on their more traditional, set‐based semantics. We challenge both claims. Our challenge is based on a Henkin‐style semantics for plural logic that does not resort to sets or set‐like objects to interpret plural variables, but adopts the view that a plural variable has many objects as its values. Using this semantics, we also articulate a generalized notion of ontological commitment which enables us to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic.     

Plural self-awareness

It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) it is neither the case that the sense in question has the community (or “us”) in its content or as its object nor does the attitude in question presuppose a preexistent community (or “us”) as its subject. (2) The “sense of ‘us’” is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. (3) Plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the individual mind. (4) The most important conceptions of plural subjects, collective persons, or group agents in the current literature fail to recognize the nature and role of plural self-awareness, and therefore fall short in important respects. (5) In spite of the striking similarities between the plural and the singular mind, there are important differences to consider. The authority of the singular first person point of view has no equivalent in the plural case.     

Plural Agents

Genuine agents are able to engage in activity because they find it worth pursuing—because they care about it. In this respect, they differ from what might be called “mere intentional systems”: systems like chess‐playing computers that exhibit merely goal‐directed behavior mediated by instrumental rationality, without caring. A parallel distinction can be made in the domain of social activity: plural agents must be distinguished from plural intentional systems in that plural agents have cares and engage in activity because of those cares. In this paper, I sketch an account of what it is for an individual to care about things in terms of her exhibiting a certain pattern of emotions. After extending this account to make sense of an individual's caring about other agents, I then show how a certain sort of emotional connectedness among a group of people can make intelligible the group's having cares and thereby constitute that group as a plural agent. Alternative accounts of social action, by ignoring the difference between mere intentional systems and genuine agents, and so by leaving out these emotional entanglements from their accounts of social action, thereby fail to capture a whole range of social phenomena involving plural agents.     

Plural Reference

A plural referring expression ('the F s' or 'Tom, Dick and Harriet') may be used to refer either distributively, saying something which applies to each of the F s individually, or collectively, to the F s taken as a single totality. Predicate Logic has to analyse both uses in terms of singular reference, treating them quite differently in so doing; but we think of such an expression as functioning in basically the same way in both kinds of use. This understanding can be vindicated if we recognise that what a plural referring expression picks out is not either an aggregate simpliciter or a set, but a plurality – an aggregate taken relative to a principle for individuating its constituents; this admits of being seen either as many things or as one. In any given case, it is the nature of what is being said about the plurality which tells us whether the reference to it is to be taken as distributive, collective, or a combination of the two. Talk about pluralities is extensional. Augmenting Predicate Logic to accommodate the distinctive inference-pattern associated with distributive plural reference is simple – and arguably necessary, to cope with cases in which distributive and collective reference are essentially combined (e.g., attributions of concerted action).     

票决民主中的票决困境解析

票决民主在具体运行过程中,时常遭遇到诸如某些投票者的经济人属性、投票规则弊病、投票选择的非真实性和不完全性、投票者的有限理性、信息不对称、代表俘获与代表性不足等多重困境.这些困境的存在既意味着票决民主的不尽善尽美性,也对其有效运转构成了严峻挑战.只有审慎地对待这些困境并找寻救治的药方,我们才能避免盲目地制造票决民主的神话和在社会主义民主政治建设进程中付出不必要的代价.     

Sets and Plural Comprehension

The state of affairs of some things falling under a predicate is supposedly a single entity that collects these things as its constituents. But whether we think of a state of affairs as a fact, a proposition or a possibility, problems will arise if we adopt a plural logic. For plural logic says that any plurality include themselves, so whenever there are some things, the state of affairs of their plural self-inclusion should be a single thing that collects them all. This leads to paradoxes analogous to those that afflict naïve set theory. Here I suggest that they are the very same paradoxes, because sets can be reduced to states of affairs. However, to obtain a consistent theoretical reduction we must restrict the usual axiom scheme of Comprehension for plural logic to ‘stratified’ formulas, to avoid viciously circular definitions. I prove that with this modification to the background plural logic, the theory of states of affairs is consistent; moreover, it yields the axioms of the familiar set theory NFU.     

多元目标与社会稳定

社会稳定不仅是一个现实问题 ,也是一个理论问题。对社会稳定的不同理解和界定 ,直接影响着致力于社会稳定的实践及其结果。从理论上说 ,社会本身是由多维度组成的结构整体 ,每一社会单元组织都依存于这个结构整体的不同维度之上 ,并朝着不同的方向用力。传统社会 ,由于社会单元组织的目标单一 ,因而是向一个点上用力 ,从而导致社会结构紧张 ,使社会产生不稳定。现代社会 ,由于改革开放 ,使社会目标多元化 ,也使社会结构整体出现松弛的现象。但这并不是不稳定 ,相反 ,正是现代意义下的动态稳定     

The Epistemic Edge of Majority Voting Over Lottery Voting

I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point.     

Acculturation Attitudes in Plural Societies

Dans les sociétés culturellement diversifiés, les individus peuvent présenter des attitudes relatives à leurs relations avec les autres et les groupes. Ces attitudes (dites "attitudes d'acculturation") sont liées à des prises de position sur deux problèmes généraux posés à toute personne en acculturation: la préservation culturelle de son propre groupe et le contact avec les autres groupes. On définit les attitudes d'assimilation, d'intégration, de séparation et de marginalisation, puis on les mesure dans plusieurs groupes en acculturation d'Australie et du Canada (les indigènes, les immigrants et les groupes ethniques implantés). On donne la validité et la fidélité des échelles d'attitude, puis on analyse les relations des échelles entre elles par rapport aux deux problèmes sous-jacents que sont la préservation et le contact. Enfin, quelques-unes des applications pratiques des attitudes d'acculturation sont envisagées.     

Values and Voting

We examined relations of the 10 types of values in Schwartz's (1992) theory of voting. Hypotheses were generated by relating the core motivations of each value type to the ideological messages conveyed by party policies and symbols. Eight parties that ran in the 1988 Israeli elections were arrayed by judges on three ideological dimensions: classical liberalism, economic egalitarianism, state and religion. Discriminant analyses yielded a function whose coefficients for value types corresponded to hypotheses for the state and religion dimension and ordered party supporters on this dimension. After dropping religious parties, another value-based function ordered party supporters on the classical liberalism dimension, as predicted. Both functions significantly improved the party classification of voters in a representative national sample (N=769). Economic egalitarianism, a nonsalient dimension in Israeli politics, was unrelated to values. Results suggest that all types of values may be politically relevant depending on context.     

Plural Logic and Sensitivity to Order

Sentences that exhibit sensitivity to order (e.g. John and Mary arrived at school in that order and Mary and John arrived at school in that order) present a challenge for the standard formulation of plural logic. In response, some authors have advocated new versions of plural logic based on fine-grained notions of plural reference, such as serial reference [Hewitt 2012] and articulated reference [Ben-Yami 2013]. The aim of this article is to show that sensitivity to order should be accounted for without altering the standard formulation of plural logic. In particular, sensitivity to order does not call for a fine-grained notion of plural reference. We point out that the phenomenon in question is quite broad and that current proposals are not equipped to deal with the full range of cases in which order plays a role. Then we develop an alternative and unified account, which locates the phenomenon not in the way in which plural terms can refer, but in the meaning of special expressions such as in that order and respectively.