A theory of the normative force of pleas

A familiar feature of our moral responsibility practices are pleas: considerations, such as “That was an accident”, or “I didn’t know what else to do”, that attempt to get agents accused of wrongdoing off the hook. But why do these pleas have the normative force they do in fact have? Why does physical constraint excuse one from responsibility, while forgetfulness or laziness does not? I begin by laying out R. Jay Wallace’s (Responsibility and the moral sentiments, 1994) theory of the normative force of excuses and exemptions. For each category of plea, Wallace offers a single governing moral principle that explains their normative force. The principle he identifies as governing excuses is the Principle of No Blameworthiness without Fault: an agent is blameworthy only if he has done something wrong. The principle he identifies as governing exemptions is the Principle of Reasonableness: an agent is morally accountable only if he is normatively competent. I argue that Wallace’s theory of exemptions is sound, but that his account of the normative force of excuses is problematic, in that it fails to explain the full range of excuses we offer in our practices, especially the excuses of addiction and extreme stress. I then develop a novel account of the normative force of excuses, which employs what I call the “Principle of Reasonable Opportunity,” that can explain the full range of excuses we offer and that is deeply unified with Wallace’s theory of the normative force of exemptions. An important implication of the theory I develop is that moral responsibility requires free will.     

The normative bond between Kantian autonomy and Sartrean authenticity: A critical existentialist perspective

Sartre and Kant are not often compared, especially because the former is frequently considered a theorist of a totally arbitrary free will. Nevertheless, this is not a fair interpretation of Sartre. Starting already from Being and Nothingness, he conceived an ethical difference between bad faith and authenticity. More unequivocally, in Notebooks for an Ethics he developed an existentialist ethics, which is more Kantian than expected. In that text, the ethical ideal of authenticity is not so different from the ethical ideal of autonomy in Kant. The aim of this article is to characterize Sartrean authenticity as a radicalization of Kantian autonomy. In both cases, there is a normative criterion, which implies a correct exercise of freedom towards oneself and others. This correct exercise of freedom implies for Kant the exclusion of the will determined by material conditions. For Sartre, this correct exercise means the rejection of bad faith. There is also a similar connection between autonomy and respect in Kant, and between authenticity and generosity in Sartre. Highlighting this little‐known affinity between the two most radical philosophers of freedom could also reveal a non‐ideological Sartre, ready to dialogue with contemporary ethical debate.     

The conditioning theory of fear-acquisition: a critical examination

The conditioning theory of fear-acquisition is outlined and the supporting evidence and arguments presented. It is argued that the theory lacks comprehensiveness and is also inadequate in other respects.Six arguments against acceptance of the theory are advanced. People fail to acquire fears in what are theoretically fear-evoking situations (e.g. air raids). It is difficult to produce conditioned fear reactions in human subjects in the laboratory. The theory rests on the untenable equipotentiality premise. The distribution of human fears is not consistent with the theory. Many phobic patients recount histories inconsistent with the theory. Lastly, fears can be acquired indirectly, contrary to the demands of the conditioning theory. It is suggested that fears can be acquired by three pathways: conditioning, vicarious exposures and by the transmission of information and instruction. Vicarious and informational transmission of fears can take place in the absence of direct contact with the fear stimuli.     

The sources of normativity: young children's awareness of the normative structure of games

In two studies, the authors investigated 2- and 3-year-old children's awareness of the normative structure of conventional games. In the target conditions, an experimenter showed a child how to play a simple rule game. After the child and the experimenter had played for a while, a puppet came (controlled by a 2nd experimenter), asked to join in, and then performed an action that constituted a mistake in the game. In control conditions, the puppet performed the exact same action as in the experimental conditions, but the context was different such that this act did not constitute a mistake. Children's normative responses to the puppet's acts (e.g., protest, critique, or teaching) were scored. Both age groups performed more normative responses in the target than in the control conditions, but the 3-year-olds did so on a more explicit level. These studies demonstrate in a particularly strong way that even very young children have some grasp of the normative structure of conventional activities.     

On the origin of normative argumentation theory: The paradoxical case of the Rhetoric to Alexander

The Rhetoric to Alexander (second half of the fourth century B.C.) is among the oldest contributions to the study of argumentation. From antiquity on, this treatise, which abounds in opportunistic advice, has come under heavy criticism on normative grounds. And yet, as I shall maintain here, it clearly takes into account the requirements of rational argumentation which are still in use today. Moreover, it contains the seeds of a whole series of doctrines found in modern normative argumentation theory. There are reasonable grounds for maintaining that some of these modern doctrines stem indirectly from the tradition to which the Rhetoric to Alexander belongs.     

Dialogue theory for critical thinking

A general outline of a theory of reasoned dialogue is presented as an underlying basis of critical analysis of a text of argument discourse. This theory is applied to the analysis of informal fallacies by showing how textual evidence can be brought to bear in argument reconstruction. Several basic types of dialogue are identified and described, but the persuasive type of dialogue is emphasized as being of key importance to critical thinking theory.     

Integrating medical ethics with normative theory: Patient advocacy and social responsibility

It is often assumed that the chief responsibility medical professionals bear is patient care and advocacy. The meeting of other duties, such as ensuring a more just distribution of medical resources and promoting the public good, is not considered a legitimate basis for curtailing or slackening beneficial patient services. It is argued that this assumption is often made without sufficient attention to foundational principles of professional ethics; that once core principles are laid bare this assumption is revealed as largely unwarranted; and, finally, that these observations at the level of moral theory should be reflected, in various ways, in medical practice. Specifically, this essay clarifies a tension that exists between different kinds of moral principles and explores the possibility of dissipating that tension by shoring up foundational principles. The paper begins by setting out three alternative models of how best to balance patient advocacy responsibilities with broader social responsibilities. It then turns to critically assess these models and argue that one has several advantages over the others.     

Domain theory: A critical review

The domain approach of Turiel and colleagues has emerging as the dominant paradigm in the field of social development, moral development in particular. If it is proven correct, Piaget's and Kohlberg's structural accounts of moral development must be radically modified and possibly even discarded. After an introduction where we set the context for our critical view, this study has three parts. In the first part, we present the main propositions of the domain approach. In the second part, we show that despite of its strengths, the domain approach suffers from several conceptual and methodological flaws. In the third part, we summarize the main ideas of our analysis, suggest avenues for future research, and articulate what can be learned for future research from our critique of the domain approach. Our main conclusion is that the domain approach should be seen more as complementary rather than an alternative to, existing accounts of moral development. Thus, despite some of its insights and power to stimulate empirical research and theoretical debate, the domain approach is not yet an unquestionable and complete alternative to existing accounts of moral development because of its conceptual and methodological flaws.     

Prototypes reflect normative perceptions: implications for the development of reasoned action theory

The reasoned action approach is one of the most successful behavioral theories in the history of social psychology. This study outlines the theoretical principles of reasoned action and considers when it is appropriate to augment it with a new variable. To demonstrate, we use survey data collected from a 4 to 17 year old U.S. adolescents to test how the ‘prototype’ variables fit into reasoned action approach. Through confirmatory factor analysis, we find that the prototype measures are normative pressure measures and when treated as a separate theoretical construct, prototype identity is not completely mediated by the proximal predictors of behavioral intention. We discuss the assumptions of the two theories and finally consider the distinction between augmenting a specific theory versus combining measures derived from different theoretical perspectives.     

Toward a critical relational theory of gender

This article analyzes and critiques the construct of gender as a psychoanalytic and cultural category. Without succumbing to a nonpsychoanalytic notion of androgyny, the argument developed here challenges the assumption that an internally consistent gender identity is possible or even desirable. Beginning with the idea that, from an analytic perspective, the construct of “identity”; is problematic and implausible, because it denotes and privileges a unified psychic world, the author develops a deconstructionist critique of our dominant gender‐identity paradigm. It is argued that gender coherence, consistency, conformity, and identity are culturally mandated normative ideals that psychoanalysis has absorbed uncritically. These ideals, moreover, are said to create a universal pathogenic situation, insofar as the attempt to conform to their dictates requires the activation of a false‐self system.

An alternative, “decentered”; gender paradigm is then proposed, which conceives of gender as a “necessary fiction”; that is used for magical ends in the psyche, the family, and the culture. From this perspective, gender identity is seen as a problem as well as a solution, a defensive inhibition as well as an accomplishment. It is suggested that as a goal for analytic treatment, the ability to tolerate the ambiguity and instability of gender categories is more appropriate than the goal of “achieving”; a single, pure, sex‐appropriate view of oneself.