The persistence of false beliefs

Do false beliefs last? To explore this question, this study planted false beliefs or memories of a childhood experience with asparagus. We found that these false beliefs had consequences for subjects, when assessed directly after the suggestive manipulation. Moreover, subjects were brought back two weeks later to see if their false beliefs persisted. After two weeks, subjects' confidence in their new memories, and the consequences of those memories were diminished, but not extinguished. These false beliefs were found to be somewhat weaker than other subjects' true beliefs for the same events. Another novel finding was that the manipulation was sufficiently powerful to affect actual food choices.     

Experimenter effects on children's understanding of false drawings and false beliefs

Two experiments were conducted in which a variant of J. McGarrigle and M. Donaldson's (1975) "Naughty Teddy" intervention was applied to children's understanding of false drawings and false beliefs. The results showed that preschool children's understanding of the contents of an out-of-date drawing improved when the drawing was made by a capricious agent ("Naughty Snakey" glove puppet) rather than by the experimenter. The children's performance on a false belief task also improved when the events that set up the false belief were the result of the actions of the glove puppet. The results are discussed in terms of the role of children's sensitivity to the pragmatics of interactions in their development of a theory of mind.     

Lasting false beliefs and their behavioral consequences

False beliefs and memories can affect people's attitudes, at least in the short term. But can they produce real changes in behavior? This study explored whether falsely suggesting to subjects that they had experienced a food-related event in their childhood would lead to a change in their behavior shortly after the suggestion and up to 4 months later. We falsely suggested to 180 subjects that, as children, they had gotten ill after eating egg salad. Results showed that, after this manipulation, a significant minority of subjects came to believe they had experienced this childhood event even though they had initially denied having experienced it. This newfound autobiographical belief was accompanied by the intent to avoid egg salad, and also by significantly reduced consumption of egg-salad sandwiches, both immediately and 4 months after the false suggestion. The false suggestion of a childhood event can lead to persistent false beliefs that have lasting behavioral consequences.     

Evoking false beliefs about autobiographical experience

In two experiments, we demonstrate that laboratory procedures can evoke false beliefs about autobiographical experience. After shallowly processing photographs ofreal-world locations, participants returned 1 week (Experiments 1 and 2) or 3 weeks (Experiment 2) later to evaluate whether they had actually visited each of a series of new and old pictured locations. Mundane and unique scenes from an unfamiliar college campus (Duke or SMU) were shown zero, one, or two times in the first session. Prior exposure increased participants' beliefs that they had visited locations that they had never actually visited. Furthermore, participants gave higher visit ratings to mundane than to unique scenes, and this did not vary with exposure frequency or delay. This laboratory procedure for inducing autobiographical false beliefs may have implications for better understanding various illusions of recognition.     

Credible suggestions affect false autobiographical beliefs

False memory implantation studies are characterised by suggestions indicating that specific unremembered events occurred, attributing suggested events to a knowledgeable source (e.g., parents), and including true events that provide evidence that this source was consulted. These characteristics create a particular retrieval context that influences how individuals come to believe that false events occurred. Two studies used a variant of implantation methods to vary the proportion of events attributed to parents and the presence of true events within the suggestion. In Study 1 participants received six false events, and were told that all or some events came from parents. Participants told that all of the events came from parents formed more and stronger false beliefs. In Study 2 participants also received two true events, and a third group was told that half of the events came from their parents. Participants given the specific ratio ("half") endorsed more false beliefs, and beliefs between the other groups no longer differed. Across both studies participants told that some events came from parents reported stronger memory phenomenology. The effect of suggestions on false beliefs in implantation studies depends partly on the credibility of suggestions derived from providing information about the source of suggested events.     

Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs

Philosophical Studies - Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper...     

Attributing false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months

Reports that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to others have all used a search paradigm in which an agent with a false belief about an object’s location searches for the object. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds would still demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with a novel non-search paradigm. An experimenter shook an object, demonstrating that it rattled, and then asked an agent, “Can you do it?” In response to this prompt, the agent selected one of two test objects. Infants realized that the agent could be led through inference (Experiment 1) or memory (Experiment 2) to hold a false belief about which of the two test objects rattled. These results suggest that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about non-obvious properties to others, and can do so in a non-search paradigm. These and additional results (Experiment 3) help address several alternative interpretations of false-belief findings with infants.     

Story stimuli for creating false beliefs about the world

Fiction is not always accurate, and this has consequences for readers. In laboratory studies, the reading of short stories led participants to produce story errors as facts on a later test of general knowledge (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003). The present article describes these story stimuli in detail, so that interested researchers will be able to use the stimuli and change them as needed for particular research projects. This article provides instructions for using the stories and suggestions for modifying them; it is a manual for one way of creating suggestibility. The full set of stories and reading comprehension questions may be downloaded fromwww.psychonomic.org/archive/.     

The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs

Assessing what other people know and believe is critical for accurately understanding human action. Young children find it difficult to reason about false beliefs (i.e., beliefs that conflict with reality). The source of this difficulty is a matter of considerable debate. Here we show that if sensitive-enough measures are used, adults show deficits in a false-belief task similar to one used with young children. In particular, we show a curse-of-knowledge bias in false-belief reasoning. That is, adults' own knowledge of an event's outcome can compromise their ability to reason about another person's beliefs about that event. We also found that adults' perception of the plausibility of an event mediates the extent of this bias. These findings shed light on the factors involved in false-belief reasoning and are discussed in light of their implications for both adults' and children's social cognition.     

The effects of photographs and event plausibility in creating false beliefs

Recent studies have shown that using photographs as memory retrieval aids can significantly increase the likelihood of false memories. The current study further investigated this effect by examining the interactive effects of photographs and event plausibility in developing false beliefs. At Time 1 and two weeks later at Time 2, participants rated 20 events on the Life Events Inventory (LEI) as to whether each occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, participants were told that two target events were plausible and two were implausible. They then used event-related photographs to visualize one plausible and one implausible event. Occurrence ratings significantly increased from Time 1 to Time 2 for plausible events in the photo condition. These results suggest that the use of photographs as a memory enhancing technique is unlikely to cause false memories for events that are not perceived personally plausible.     

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.     

Where to look first for children's knowledge of false beliefs

Recent research has shown that, although young children have a substantial knowledge of beliefs as internal mental states, they have considerable difficulty in understanding how a false belief can lead to an outcome which is in conflict with a desire. However, this evidence has come from tasks which assume that children follow an experimenter's "implicatures" in conversation and interpret the question "Where will a person (with the false belief) look for the object?" to mean "Where will the person look first?" rather than "Where will the person have to look (or go to look) to find the object?" In our investigation, even 3-year-olds often responded correctly when asked to predict the initial behavior of a story character with a false belief. We discuss these results in terms of the conversational worlds of children and adults.     

A positive emotional bias in confabulatory false beliefs about place

Some neurological patients with medial frontal lesions exhibit striking confabulations. Most accounts of the cause of confabulations are cognitive, though the literature has produced anecdotal suggestions that confabulations may not be emotionally neutral, having a ('wish-fulfilment') bias that shapes the patient's perception of reality in a more affectively positive direction. The present study reviewed every case (N = 16) of false beliefs about place reported in the neuroscientific literature from 1980 to 2000, with blind raters evaluating the 'pleasantness' of the patient's actual and confabulated locations. In each case the confabulated location was evaluated as more pleasant. This striking finding supports the claim that there may be a systematic affective bias in the false beliefs held by neurological patients with confabulation.     

Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others' referential communication

Recent studies have demonstrated infants' pragmatic abilities for resolving the referential ambiguity of non-verbal communicative gestures, and for inferring the intended meaning of a communicator's utterances. These abilities are difficult to reconcile with the view that it is not until around 4 years that children can reason about the internal mental states of others. In the current study, we tested whether 17-month-old infants are able to track the status of a communicator's epistemic state and use this to infer what she intends to refer to. Our results show that manipulating whether or not a communicator has a false belief leads infants to different interpretations of the same communicative act, and demonstrate early mental state attribution in a pragmatic context.     

Story stimuli for creating false beliefs about the world.

Fiction is not always accurate, and this has consequences for readers. In laboratory studies, the reading of short stories led participants to produce story errors as facts on a later test of general knowledge (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003). The present article describes these story stimuli in detail, so that interested researchers will be able to use the stimuli and change them as needed for particular research projects. This article provides instructions for using the stories and suggestions for modifying them; it is a manual for one way of creating suggestibility. The full set of stories and reading comprehension questions may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive/.     

Autonomy and interdependence: beliefs of Brazilian mothers from state capitals and small towns

This study aimed to investigate characteristics of Brazilian mothers' beliefs system, in the dimensions of autonomy and interdependence. A group of 600 women, half from state capitals and half from small towns, participated in the study. They were individually interviewed with Scales of Allocentrism, Beliefs about Parental Practices and Socialization Goals. Paired and Independent samples t tests and Multivariate GLM were performed. The results indicate that although mothers from both contexts value autonomy, mothers inhabiting small towns considered the relational dimension as the most important; whereas mothers inhabiting capitals valued equally both dimensions, either in their beliefs about practices or in the socialization goals for their children. Mothers from small towns have a higher mean score for allocentrism than mothers living in capitals. Thus, place of residence proved to be a relevant variable in the modulation of maternal beliefs. Educational level was not a significant factor in the variables considered and with this group of mothers. The study results are discussed in terms of their contribution to the understanding of the complex relationship between dimensions of autonomy and interdependence in mothers' beliefs system.     

Acting and planning on the basis of a false belief: its effects on 3-year-old children's reasoning about their own false beliefs

This study examined 3-year-olds' explanations for actions of theirs that were premised on a false belief. In Experiment 1, children stated what they thought was inside a crayon box. After stating "crayons," they went to retrieve some paper to draw on. Children were then shown that the box contained candles and were asked to (a) state their initial belief and (b) explain their action of getting paper. Children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action. Experiments 2 and 3 ruled out several alternative interpretations for these findings. In Experiment 4, children planned and acted on their false belief. Again, children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action.     

Getting it wrong about Miranda rights: false beliefs, impaired reasoning, and professional neglect

Television and other media inundate Americans with innumerable yet fragmentary examples of Miranda warnings; however, familiarity born of repeated exposures cannot be equated with accuracy or understanding. The intended purpose of these warnings is to inform and caution rather than to pacify and reassure--a purpose that cannot be realized when most custodial suspects assume that they already know everything the law insists they should be told. Painstakingly negotiated Constitutional safeguards are further imperiled when attorneys, judges, and forensic evaluators are lulled into complacency by the commonly held misconception that everyone understands their Miranda rights. This article elucidates certain false beliefs and misapprehensions regarding Miranda comprehension and identifies widespread neglect of these issues by the professional community. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).