Sociocultural Influences on Body Image Among Adolescent Boys From Fiji,Tonga, and Australia

The current study examined the factors related to body‐image concerns among adolescent boys in Fiji and Tonga. This qualitative study determined the impact of messages from family, peers, and the media on body image among 24 adolescent boys from the following cultural groups: Indo‐Fijian, Indigenous Fijian, Tongan, and Australian boys of European heritage. Boys from Fiji and Tonga had a high focus on their bodies. Fijian and Tongan boys also demonstrated high levels of body dissatisfaction and wanted to be bigger. Tongan and Indigenous Fijian boys evidenced high levels of sociocultural pressures. Indo‐Fijian and Australian boys received few messages about their bodies. Boys from Fiji and Tonga appear to have strong pressures to achieve a large, muscular body.     

Body image and body change strategies among adolescent males and females from Fiji, Tonga and Australia

The current study was designed to investigate the body image and body change strategies of adolescents from Fiji, Tonga and Australia. Participants were 628 Fijians, 463 Indo-Fijians, 598 Tongans and 535 European Australians. Adolescents completed measures of height, weight, body dissatisfaction, strategies to lose weight, increase weight and increase muscles. The results demonstrated that overweight adolescents were more dissatisfied with their bodies than those who were normal weight. Overweight Fijians and Tongans were more satisfied with their body than Indo-Fijian or Australian adolescents. Tongans, followed by Fijians and Indo-Fijians, were more likely to engage in strategies to lose weight, increase weight and increase muscles. These results are consistent with the focus in Fiji and Tonga on the value of the large body ideal, but may also reflect the recent focus on the attainment of a healthy body size.     

When sanctions fail to increase cooperation in social dilemmas: considering the presence of an alternative option to defect

Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a "social trilemma" (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective.     

Factors influencing failure to show for a family evaluation

Abstract

An important issue in clinical practice concerns clients' failure to keep their initial evaluation appointments, which has been termed defection (Shapiro and Budman, 1973). Research findings and clinical impressions suggest that client defection can be related to three sets of factors: actuarial variables, client psychological and motivational variables, and client-clinician interaction prior to the initial appointment (Rubinstein and Lorr, 1956; Garfield, 1971). Among the actuarial variables, the following have been suggested as being related to clients' defection: referral source, distance client must travel for the appointment, client socioeconomic status (SES), and waiting time (Brill and Storow, 1960; Raynes and Warren, 1971; Lorion, 1973).     

Tolerance of free-riding: The effects of defection size,defection pattern,and social orientation in a repeated public goods dilemma

Tolerance of free riding is defined as “the extent to which group members are willing to continue cooperation after observing other members’ defection behavior in a social dilemma.” We hypothesized that defection size (number of other members who defect), defection pattern (how other members’ defection choices are repeated), and social orientation (individual preference for different distributions of resources for self and/or others) would influence members’ level of tolerance in a repeated public goods dilemma. One hundred and ten business students participated in a computerized laboratory experiment in which four conditions were created: the same one (or two) members defect over all trials—a fixed pattern, or a different one (or two) members defect on different trials—a diffused pattern. Results show that the effects of social orientation and defection size were initially significant but diminished over trials. In contrast, the effects of defection pattern became increasingly significant over trials. Specifically, we found that members’ tolerance level was significantly higher in conditions where a diffused rather than a fixed pattern of defection was observed. A “perceived impact” hypothesis was proposed to explain these results.     

Acting for the Greater Good: Identification with Group Determines Choices in Sequential Contribution Dilemmas

In mixed‐motive interactions, defection is the rational and common response to the defection of others. In some cases, however, group members not only cooperate in the face of defection but also compensate for the shortfalls caused by others' defection. In one field and two lab studies, we examined when group members were willing to compensate for versus match defection using sequential dilemmas. We found that the level of identification with the broader group increased willingness to compensate for intragroup defection, even when it was personally costly. Compensating for a defecting partner's actions, however, is not an act of unconditional cooperation: It is accompanied by a lack of trust in the errant group member and a desire to be perceived as more ethical. Cooperation by others, on the other hand, is matched independent of whether the cooperator was an in‐group or out‐group member. We find similar patterns of compensation and matching when the personal cost involved contributing money or effort. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spill‐over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas

This research investigates the role of intermittent monetary costs in restraining individuals from defection in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1, 104 car owners made fictitious choices between a slow and a fast travel mode in the context of a continuous social dilemma. There were four different conditions of monetary costs for choosing the fast mode (defection): no cost, low cost, high cost to self, or high cost to others. Participants defected most when there was no cost and least when they themselves were charged a high cost. A spill‐over effect was obtained such that when others were charged a high cost to defect, defection rates were lower than under no cost. Experiment 2 used 36 undergraduates as participants in an iterated decision task with real groups. The results replicated the major results of Experiment 1. Furthermore, whereas prosocials were strongly affected by intermittent costs for defection (i.e. showed large spill‐over effects), proselfs seemed to be unaffected. Possible explanations of this interaction effect between social value orientation and intermittent punishment for defection are provided. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contingencies of reinforcement in a five-person prisoner's dilemma

As in studies of self-control, a tit-for-tat contingency in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game creates a conflict between maximization of local and global reinforcement. The present experiments examine this conflict in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma game. Versus tit for tat, cooperation corresponds to self-control; defection, always immediately reinforced, corresponds to impulsiveness. Three experiments examined sensitivity of behavior to the global reinforcement contingency imposed by tit for tat. Undergraduates played a five-player prisoner's dilemma game against four dummy players programmed to play tit for tat or randomly. With tit for tat, a player's cooperation (or defection) increased dummy players' cooperation (or defection) on subsequent trials-reinforcing cooperation and punishing defection in the long run. Participants cooperated at a higher rate when the dummy players played tit for tat than when the dummy players played randomly. These results are consistent with findings in corresponding studies of self-control. Some participants, caught in a trap of mutual defection with the tit-for-tat playing dummy players, came to cooperate when the tit-for-tat contingency was reset ("forgiving" participants' previous defections) during a pause in the game. This increase was a result of the combined effects of a pause and reset; neither pausing nor resetting independently resulted in an increase in cooperation.     

Female voices of aggression in Tonga

Tonga, a Polynesian society, is characterized by a social order and by Christian beliefs that work to constrain aggressive action and conflict. Violence does take place in Tonga but there is active discouragement of any behavior that may be socially disruptive. Tongan women in particular are allowed only a limited number of contexts in which acceptable expression of aggression can take place. In response, Tongan women rely on rather covert forms of aggression in processes of competition and conflict. A speech given during an inter-denominational religious feast controlled by the women of one village provides an example of a woman aggressively empowering herself through discourse clothed within the language of Tongan charity and Christian love.     

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Temporal Dynamics of Cooperation

Parties in real-world conflicts often attempt to punish each other's behavior. If this strategy fails to produce mutual cooperation, they may increase punishment magnitude. The present experiment investigated whether delay-reduction - potentially less harmful than magnitude increase - would generate mutual cooperation as interactions are repeated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy, cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. For half of the participants, the delay between their choice and the computer's next choice was long relative to the delay between the computer's choice and their next choice. For the other half, long and short delays were reversed. The tit-for-tat contingency reinforces the other player's cooperation (by cooperating) and punishes the other player's defection (by defecting). Both rewards and punishers are discounted by delay. Consistent with delay discounting, participants cooperated more when the delay between their choice and the computer's cooperation (reward) or defection (punishment) was relatively short. These results suggest that, in real-world tit-for-tat conflicts, decreasing delay of reciprocation or retaliation may foster mutual cooperation as effectively as (or more effectively than) the more usual tactic of increasing magnitude of reciprocation or retaliation.     

Minority influence: The effect of majority reactionaries and defectors,and minority and majority compromisers,upon majority opinion and attraction

The effects of shifting opinions within a group upon majority opinion, communication between members and perceived attractiveness of other members were studied. Each subject perceived himself to be a member of the majority in a group whose opinion was divided 6–2 on an important issue. But later one to three group members changed their vote. Six conditions of change were established: Control, majority reactionary, majority compromise, majority defection (5-3), minority compromise, minority compromise plus majority reactionary. Only majority compromise or defection affected majority opinion (private and public). Majority members were disliked when they deviated from majority opinion, but particularly so when they shifted toward minority opinion. Minority members were liked most when they induced a majority member to compromise (but not defect). Majority communication to minority occurred most when the minority was compromising, but most disagreement with minority opinion was expressed when a majority member had either compromised or defected.     

Familiarity breeds contempt: perceived service and sales complacency in business-to-business relationships

Relationship marketing and its strategic focus on long-term exchanges is an engrained practice in today’s business-to-business (B2B) environment. B2B relationships are important given the reciprocating benefits they offer to offset the resource-intensive investments necessary for relationship initiation and maintenance. However, the reality of the marketplace shows customer defection rates remain a concern, dark side relationship mechanisms emerge as exchanges persist, and suppliers shirk on investing the effort necessary to service their customers. Research is needed to better understand customer defections and the nuanced assessment of perceived supplier complacency in B2B service relationships. To inform this research agenda, the authors assess depth interviews with 56 executive participants across 35 post-mortem customer defection cases. Findings identify thematic representations of perceived supplier complacency within the customer-supplier service provision (i.e. service complacency), as well as during the sales renewal process (i.e. sales complacency).     

第三方惩罚对合作的溢出效应：基于社会规范的解释

第三方惩罚对合作的维系可能来自经济功能或规范提示功能。先前研究没有区分这两种功能, 因而未能回答：当惩罚不足以影响违规收益时, 是否还能促进合作?实验1 (N = 252)发现即使第三方惩罚无法降低违规收益, 依然能抑制自利行为。实验2 (N = 179)发现受过惩罚的违规者在其后的独裁者博弈表现出了更高的合作水平。2(是否旁观惩罚)×2(旁观前后)设计的实验3 (N = 179)显示, 旁观惩罚后被试的合作水平显著高于旁观前, 也高于未旁观惩罚的被试。后两个实验中, 社会规范在惩罚与合作之间均起中介作用。这进一步证实惩罚对合作的促进在很大程度上是通过规范激活来实现的, 并存在两种溢出效应：惩罚抑制了曾经的违规者(纵向溢出效应)和旁观者(横向溢出效应)在新博弈情境下的自私行为。这两种溢出效应的发现补充了文献中占主导地位的经济学解释, 并为理解人类社会长时间、大规模的合作提供了新视角。     

Personal Selling and Sales Management Abstracts

The purpose of this study is to develop and test a customer defection model describing an organizational buyer’s propensity to stop purchasing from a supplier within a multisource buyer–seller relationship. A total of 168 employees who worked in purchasing using multiple suppliers in procurement were used for this study. Findings provide strategies for the salesperson to utilize in order to reduce the customer’s perception of available alternatives (e.g., increase trust in the salesperson) and defection (e.g., increase customer satisfaction and commitment). Findings also show that the relationship between satisfaction and commitment is fully mediated by trust within a multisource relationship.     

Lead Us (Not) into Temptation: Testing the Motivational Mechanisms Linking Honesty–Humility to Cooperation

Over the past decades, there has been considerable interest in individual differences in cooperative behaviour and how these can be explained. Whereas the Honesty–Humility dimension from the HEXACO model of personality has been identified as a consistent predictor of cooperation, the underlying motivational mechanisms of this association have remained unclear—especially given the confound between the temptation to exploit others and the fear of being exploited as motivational drivers of defection in social dilemmas. In a reanalysis and a new experiment, we tease apart these mechanisms by manipulating the rank order of pay‐offs in a symmetric two‐person game paradigm, essentially implementing the classic prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken games. Results revealed that Honesty–Humility predicted cooperation specifically in the games in which temptation was a potential motivator of defection, whereas it did not account for cooperation in those games in which only fear implied defection. Our findings thereby shed light on the underlying motivational mechanisms of the Honesty–Humility–cooperation link and, more generally, demonstrate how economic games can be used to disentangle such mechanisms. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Somatic and autonomic indexes of recovery from electroconvulsive shock-induced amnesia in rats

Autonomic response indexes of experimental amnesia have recently been found to have higher electroconvulsive shock (ECS) intensity thresholds and steeper retrograde gradients than have traditional somatic indexes. The present studies examined the hypothesis that recovery from somatically indexed experimental amnesia depends upon the existence of autonomically available residual memory. In a between-subjects design, a 200-mA ECS was used to produce amnesia for a tone-footshock pairing as indicated by lick suppression, defection, and bradycardia. The next day, these amnesic animals received a reminder footshock outside of the training apparatus, which was found to restore memory on a test trial 24 hr later. The behavior of control groups indicated that this reminder effect was due to the restoration of specific memory rather than systemic consequences of treatment. With a within-subjects design, a second experiment obtained a reminder effect in animals individually shown to be "fully" amnesic by all three response indexes monitored. A third experiment varied the intensity of the reminder footshock and revealed that the different memory indexes examined do not have reminder-footshock thresholds inversely related to their initial resistance to amnesia. The results support a retrieval-failure view of experimental amnesia and suggest that the same fundamental physiological processes underlie both autonomically indexed memory and somatically indexed memory.     

信任及其对公共财物两难博弈中合作行为影响

社会两难的行为动机研究认为,害怕和贪婪是人们选择不合作的原因。信任的心理学研究为社会两难的合作行为提供了另一种观点,即害怕被利用的背后实际上体现了博弈者对对方的信任的缺失。鉴于传统社会两难范式存在难以区分信任和合作两个因素的问题,本研究设计了“信任一合作”二阶段模拟实验,通过操作重复信托博弈中的信息反馈,研究虚拟多人信托博弈中初始信任和基于经验的信任对随后的公共财物两难博弈中合作行为的影响,结果发现：（1）初始信任对基于经验的信任的建立具有一定的积极影响,但是它对合作行为的作用远不如随后的基于经验的信任;（2）基于经验的信任水平高的被试在随后的公共财物两难博弈中也表现出较高的合作行为。     

Evidential reasoning in the prisoner's dilemma

Classic game theory considers defection to be the rational choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Although defection maximizes a player's gain regardless of the opponent's choice, many players cooperate. We suggest that cooperation can be explained in part by expectations of reciprocal behavior, that is, by the belief that players facing the same situation probably will come to the same decision. In Experiment 1, expectations of reciprocity were experimentally manipulated. As predicted, cooperation increased monotonically with these expectations. In Experiment 2, experimentally manipulated expectations of opponent cooperation were not associated with higher rates of cooperation. These findings are interpreted in light of a general model of payoff maximization, and implications for other models (e.g., social value orientation) are discussed.     

The paradox of power sharing: Participative charismatic leaders have subordinates with more instead of less need for leadership

Although charismatic and participative leaders have been noted for their positive effects on criteria such as performance, job satisfaction, and commitment, few studies have looked at the relations with subordinates' leadership needs. In this study, the relations between charismatic and participative leadership, team outcomes, and a team's need for leadership were investigated. The sample consisted of South Pacific CEOs and their top-level management teams from Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. Results showed that charismatic leadership was related to both group-level need for leadership and positive team outcomes. However, team outcomes did not mediate the relations between leadership and a team's need for leadership. Additionally, a moderator effect was found between participative leadership and charismatic leadership in explaining a team's need for leadership, implying that teams of subordinates with participative charismatic leaders need more instead of less leadership from their CEOs.