Surprise: unfolding of facial expressions

Responses to surprising events are dynamic. We argue that initial responses are primarily driven by the unexpectedness of the surprising event and reflect an interrupted and surprised state in which the outcome does not make sense yet. Later responses, after sense-making, are more likely to incorporate the valence of the outcome itself. To identify initial and later responses to surprising stimuli, we conducted two repetition-change studies and coded the general valence of facial expressions using computerised facial coding and specific facial action using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Results partly supported our unfolding logic. The computerised coding showed that initial expressions to positive surprises were less positive than later expressions. Moreover, expressions to positive and negative surprises were initially similar, but after some time differentiated depending on the valence of the event. Importantly, these patterns were particularly pronounced in a subset of facially expressive participants, who also showed facial action in the FACS coding. The FACS data showed that the initial phase was characterised by limited facial action, whereas the later increase in positivity seems to be explained by smiling. Conceptual as well as methodological implications are discussed.     

Hume's Surprise and the Logic of Belief Changes

If the logic of belief changes is extended to cover belief states which contain both factual and normative beliefs, it is easily shown that a change of a factual belief (an 'Is') in a mixed belief state can imply a change of a normative belief (an 'Ought') in the same state. With regard to Hume's so-called 'Is-Ought problem', this means that one has to distinguish its statics from its dynamics. When this is done, it becomes clear that changes of factual beliefs can, for rational reasons, have far-reaching normative consequences. Similarly, a change of a factual belief can imply a change of a value belief. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Surprise in the Context of Achievement: The Role of Outcome Valence and Importance

Five experiments examined the eliciting conditions of surprise in achievement situations. The present research tested an extension of the commonly accepted approach of regarding surprise as an emotion elicited by the unexpectedness of events. Specifically, the present extension posits that outcome valence and importance have effects on expectancy formation and thereby on surprise if expectancies are disconfirmed. It is posited that an achievement outcome's valence, importance, and expectancy are confounded because positive valence and high importance of an outcome are correlated with high desirability, which in turn increases expectancy. Consequently, an important failure should contain the highest expectancy-disconfirmation and thus elicit the highest surprise. Furthermore, in contrast to a thesis proposed by Weiner, Russel, and Lerman (1978, 1979), surprise was expected to be independent of the attribution of an outcome to luck or chance. The results of all five studies supported the present reasoning in experiments using vignettes (Studies 1 to 4), as well as in an actual achievement situation (Study 5). All of these studies provide empirical evidence of the predicted interaction effect between outcome valence and importance on surprise elicitation via expectancy-disconfirmation and thus lend support to the present extension of the expectancy-disconfirmation approach. But contrary to the approach suggested by Weiner et al., no general or causal relationships were found between attributions and surprise.     

飞行中惊吓和惊奇的管理——拓展的Landman模型

在飞行活动中,飞行员的惊吓和惊奇反应是导致飞行失控的重要因素。惊吓和惊奇反应可能使飞行员熟练训练过的操作程序和技能被遗忘,取而代之的是不适当的直觉性的行为或草率的决策。现有的使用飞行模拟器的研究表明,Landman模型对减轻飞行员惊吓和惊奇的训练有重要价值。在Landman模型的基础上,我们加入了飞行员心理能力的个体间差别（即拓展的Landman模型）,因此拓展的Landman模型对于飞行员的选拔和训练将具有重要意义。     

An Illocutionary Logical Explanation of the Surprise Execution

This paper further develops the system of illocutionary logic presented in ‘Propositional logic of supposition and assertion’ (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1997, 38, 325-349) to accommodate an ‘I believe that’ operator and resolve Moore's Paradox. This resolution is accomplished by providing both a truth-conditional and a commitment-based semantics. An important feature of the logical system is that the correctness of some arguments depends on who it is that makes the argument. The paper then shows that the logical system can be expanded to resolve the surprise execution paradox puzzle. The prisoner's argument showing that he can't be executed by surprise is correct but his beliefs are incoherent. The judge's beliefs (and our beliefs) about this situation are not incoherent.     

Teacher Burnout and Lack of Reciprocity1

Results are presented of a study on burnout among 249 Dutch elementary and secondary school teachers. The current study considers burnout in terms of the exchange of investments and outcomes at interpersonal (teacher-student) and organizational (teacher-school) levels. In addition, demographic (age and gender) and work-related factors (school type, teaching experience, number of hours employed) are included. Findings show that when teachers invest more than they get back from their school, they report higher levels of emotional exhaustion. As expected, at the interpersonal level, low outcomes from students are related to higher burnout levels; whereas at the organizational level, low investments are related to higher burnout levels. These findings are discussed in terms of the extent to which psychological contact is more intimate or impersonal in both types of relationships.     

Accommodating Surprise in Taxonomic Tasks: The Role of Expertise

This paper reports a psychological study of human categorization that looked at the procedures used by expert scientists when dealing with puzzling items. Five professional botanists were asked to specify a category from a set of positive and negative instances. The target category in the study was defined by a feature that was unusual, hence situations of uncertainty and puzzlement were generated. Subjects were asked to think aloud while solving the tasks, and their verbal reports were analyzed. A number of problem solving strategies were identified, and subsequently integrated in a model of knowledge‐guided inductive categorization. Our model proposes that expert knowledge influences the subjects' reasoning in more complex ways than suggested by earlier investigations of scientific reasoning. As in previous studies, domain knowledge influenced our subjects' hypothesis generation and testing; but, additionally, it played a central role when subjects revised their hypotheses.     

意外考试悖论的博弈分析

本文从博弈的角度分析了意外考试悖论,指出了以往解决方案的不足,给出了一种新的方案。根据这个新方案,考试悖论的推理中使用了倒推法和弱下策反复剔除法。本文接着讨论了这些博弈推理方法的不足。然后把这个新的博弈方案用到卡片悖论和方格悖论这些考试悖论的变种里。最后指出,在考试悖论里,比起倒推法,弱下策剔除法是引起悖论的更根本的原因。     

Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise

This paper uses newly available evidence to shed light on the circumstances and causes of the 6 October 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli positions at the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. The evidence suggests that an important circumstance that accounts for the surprise effect these actions managed to produce, despite ample warning signs, is traceable to a high need for cognitive closure among major figures in the Israeli intelligence establishment. Such a need may have prompted leading intelligence analysts to "freeze" on the conventional wisdom that an attack was unlikely and to become impervious to information suggesting that it was imminent. The discussion considers the psychological forces affecting intelligence operations in predicting the initiation of hostile enemy activities, and it describes possible avenues of dealing with the psychological impediments to open–mindedness that may pervasively characterize such circumstances.     

Conditional Probabilities, Potential Surprise, and the Conjunction Fallacy

Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found that a relationship of positive conditional dependence between the components of a conjunction of two events increases the prevalence of the conjunction fallacy. Consistent with this finding, the results of two experiments reveal that dependence leads to higher estimates for the conjunctive probability and a higher incidence of the fallacy. However, contrary to the theoretical account proposed by Tversky and Kahneman, the actual magnitude of the conditional relationship does not directly affect the extent of the fallacy; all that is necessary is for a positive conditional relationship to exist. The pattern of results obtained can be accounted for in terms of Shackle's (1969) 'potential surprise' theory of subjective probability. Surprise theory predicts that the impact of the conditional event will be at its maximum where the relationship is a negative one. Tversky and Kahneman's model, on the other hand, predicts the maximum effect when the relationship is positive. In all 12 scenarios tested, multiple regression analysis revealed that the standardized beta weight associated with the conditional event was greater when the relationship was a negative one. Thus the outcome was supportive of the surprise model rather than Tversky and Kahneman's account.     

You'll Never Believe This: Irony and Hyperbole in Expressing Surprise

Three experiments compared how people comprehend irony and hyperbole as expressing surprise. Experiment 1 demonstrated that, when irony and hyperbole are used together, they express more surprise than if either is used alone. There was no difference between the degree of surprise expressed by hyperbole and irony, although both expressed more surprise than literal commentary. Experiment 2 revealed that, when a speaker has exaggerated about some unexpected event, as much surprise is expressed by very slight, realistically possible hyperbole as by outlandish, impossible hyperbole. In a third experiment the range of possible levels of hyperbole tested in Experiment 2 was shown to cause differences in how easy it was to determine that a speaker was surprised at some turn of events. The results are discussed in terms of theories of irony and hyperbole comprehension.     

Moments of Spontaneity and Surprise: The Nonlinear Road to Something More

Moments of spontaneity and surprise create opportunities for change to occur through perturbations in the analyst-analysand system. These moments of authentic person-to-person contact violate anticipated patterns of intersubjective engagement. Mutative potential arises from the coconstruction of new relational configurations and the resultant modifications in the procedural memory system of both members of the analytic dyad. Three moments of spontaneity and surprise from the analysis of a man with a rigid character structure are presented and discussed.     

Significance Testing with No Alternative Hypothesis: A Measure of Surprise

A pure significance test would check the agreement of a statistical model with the observed data even when no alternative model was available. The paper proposes the use of a modified p-value to make such a test. The model will be rejected if something surprising is observed (relative to what else might have been observed). It is shown that the relation between this measure of surprise (the s-value) and the surprise indices of Weaver and Good is similar to the relationship between a p-value, a corresponding odds-ratio, and a logit or log-odds statistic. The s-value is always larger than the corresponding p-value, and is not uniformly distributed. Difficulties with the whole approach are discussed.     

Toward a Process Analysis of Emotions: The Case of Surprise

Based on an earlier model of the processes elicited by surprising events, the present studies provide evidence for one of these processes, the evaluation of the surprising event's relevance for ongoing activities (action-relevance check). The central prediction tested was that, if unexpected events elicit among other processes an action-relevance check, then response delay on a concurrent task will be more pronounced in a condition where this process is more elaborate and hence takes more time. In accord with this prediction, Experiment 1 found that an unexpected appearance change of the imperative stimulus in a choice reaction time (RT) task caused greater response delay than an equivalent appearance change of a distractor stimulus. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and tested several additional predictions that concerned the effects on response delay of a second appearance change of either the imperative or the distractor stimuli. These predictions, which were also mostly confirmed, were derived by combining the logic underlying the first study with the assumption that once made, appraisals of unexpected events are stored as part of the situational schema and are reused when the same or similar events reoccur leading to an abbreviation of appraisal processes. Experiment 3 once more replicated the basic finding of the previous studies and ruled out a possible alternative explanation. It is suggested that the proposed RT method of process verification may be of broader interest as a tool to study appraisal processes in emotion.