The Nonworseness Claim and the Moral Permissibility of Better-Than-Permissible Acts

Grounded in what Alan Wertheimer terms the “nonworseness claim,” it is thought by some philosophers that what will be referred to herein as “better-than-permissible acts”—acts that, if undertaken, would make another or others better off than they would be were an alternative but morally permissible act to be undertaken—are necessarily morally permissible. What, other than a bout of irrationality, it may be thought, would lead one to hold that an act (such as outsourcing production to a “sweatshop” in a developing country) that produces more benefits for others than an act that is itself morally permissible (such as not doing business in the developing country at all) with respect to those same others, is not morally permissible? In this article, I argue that each of the two groups of philosophers that are most likely to accept the nonworseness claim—consequentialists and non-consequentialists—have reason to reject it, and thereby also have reason to reject the belief that better-than-permissible acts are necessarily morally permissible.     

The Case for the Moral Permissibility of Amnesties: An Argument from Social Moral Epistemology

This paper makes the case for the permissibility of post-conflict amnesties, although not on prudential grounds. It argues that amnesties of a certain scope, targeted to certain categories of perpetrators, and offered in certain contexts are morally permissible because they are an acknowledgment of the difficulty of attributing criminal responsibility in mass violence contexts. Based on this idea, the paper develops the further claim that deciding which amnesties are permissible and which ones are not should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Against what seems to be an increasingly popular assumption of some international actors, just as "blanket" amnesties (i.e. very broad and general amnesties that foreclose criminal prosecution for all kinds of perpetrators and all kinds of wrongdoing) are impermissible, so is an absolutist rejection of all types of amnesties.     

道德意识

绝大部分伦理学理论都面临其在现实世界中无效的困境,这由伦理学的理论性质本身所造成.人们的道德观和道德行为不是通过伦理学,而是通过许多其它不同的途径来获得和实现的.     

论道德意识的认知特征

道德作为一种实践意识 ,其认知特征主要有三 :一是人道为本 ,自觉觉他 ;二是“是”“应”同辙 ,智仁并举 ;三是情理交融 ,知行合一。     

Aggressive Hook Ups: Modeling Aggressive Casual Sex on BDSM for Moral Permissibility

Aggressive techniques within casual sex encounters, such as taking sexual liberties without permission or ignoring rejection, can, perhaps unintentionally, complicate consent. Passive recipients may acquiesce out of fear, which aggressors may not realize. Some philosophers argue that social norms are sufficiently well known to make this misunderstanding unlikely. However, the chance of aggression leading to non-consensual sex, even if not great, is high enough that aggressors should work diligently to avoid this potentially grave result. I consider how this problem plays out in the common mating ritual of hooking up. I argue that aggressive hook ups can only be permissible if they are modeled on BDSM encounters: the participants must obtain prior consent and prepare safe words for voiding that consent during the hook up. While this solution removes the spontaneity of aggressive sex, I argue that spontaneously aggressive hook ups with strangers cannot be permissible.     

Moral Development and Higher States of Consciousness

This paper discusses possible relationships between the cognitive–moral development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg and Charles Alexander's life-span model. Central to Alexander's model is the role which levels of mind and higher states of consciousness play throughout the general periods of development. Parallel to Kohlberg's cosmic perspective Stage 7—which goes beyond the representational logic and reasoning identified by Piaget's highest stage—are the postrepresentational stages of development, described by Vedic psychology and Alexander's model as "higher states of consciousness"—transcendental consciousness, cosmic consciousness, God consciousness, and unity consciousness. Research indicates that EEG brainwave coherence is associated with the development of higher states of consciousness and Kohlberg's Stage 7. Studies on the Transcendental Meditation (TM) and TM-Sidhi programs as effective technologies for promoting moral development are further discussed.     

Theravada Buddhism and Roman Catholicism on the Moral Permissibility of Palliative Sedation: A Blurred Demarcation Line

Journal of Religion and Health - Although Theravada Buddhism and Roman Catholicism agree on the moral justification for palliative sedation, they differ on the premises underlying the...     

学前儿童道德责任意识的发展研究

该文通过个别访谈的方法,考察了96名3～5岁幼儿依据允许性、可变性、权成依赖性以及规则依赖性四种判断标准对同伴、以及成人主人公的道德行为判断及其归因。结果显示,多数学前儿童都能根据不同的判断标准对主人公行为做出符合道德规则的判断,表现出较强的道德责任意识,且这一意识在3～4、5岁之间获得了较为显著的发展,尤其是在权威依赖性标准上。归因分析显示近1／4的幼儿明确采用相应的道德规则对主人公的行为作出解释。这些结果支持认知发展的领域特殊论,揭示出学前儿童很早就发展起来的道德责任,这对当前的道德教育和公民教育实践具有一定启示意义。     

Permissibility and Violable Rules

From a logical point of view, permissibility can be reduced to possibility by introducing demands which can be met. The alleged reduction is circular from a philosophical perspective, however, because demands are fundamentally deontic. This paper solves this problem by replacing demands which can be met with rules which can be satisfied and violated.

道德谱系学与道德意识现象学

一尼采于1887年发表《论道德的谱系》。此后谱系学的哲学著作便开始日趋增多。连胡塞尔这位在其一生中看起来从未与尼采发生直接联系的思想家①,也会在1933年有意无意地以逻辑谱系学研究为副标题,来发表他生前最后一部著作《经验与判断》,遑论眼下最重要的谱系哲学家福柯等     

教育变革语境中未成年人道德观念的错位与德育革新

当下教育变革中德育革新的乏力,引发了现时德育的虚弱与苍白。这种虚弱与苍白的德育现状一定程度上导致了未成年人道德观念的错位。要矫正未成年人的错误道德观念,要使错位恢复到原位,德育必须向真正的德育回归。真正德育的达致,必须革新德育。这种革新应沿着德育者形象、德育的内容、德育的方式三个维度展开。     

从道德强制到道德自觉:理念转变与路径选择

新中国的社会秩序,从政治秩序到经济秩序再到道德秩序,都建立在强力基础上,不仅建立的过程依赖强力,维系的过程也高度依赖强力.道德强制的优点是效率高,能够迅速迫使被教育者不得不遵守既定的道德规范,从而建立起某种教育者所偏好的理想道德秩序.但缺点也很明显,那就是维系成本很高,难以实现"服从"到"内化"的升华,从而达到理想化的道德自觉.从道德强制到道德自觉,意味着从理念到路径的双重变革.     

网络主体的道德意识培养

为了保证网络社会的健康运行 ,网络道德建设已成为无法回避重要的课题。在网络道德建设中 ,我们必须注重培养网络主体的道德意识 ;在培养网络道德意识的过程中 ,我们既要坚持对网络主体的道德灌输、提高其道德认识能力 ,又要锻炼其道德意志并加强道德修养。     

Intentions,Permissibility, and Choice

T. M. Scanlon has argued that the intentions with which one acts, or more specifically, one’s reasons for acting, are non-derivatively irrelevant to the moral permissibility of one’s actions. According to one of his arguments in favor of that thesis, it can be permissible to act for one reason rather than another only if one can choose to act for a reason but, since that choice is impossible since believing as will is impossible, one can be permitted to act but one cannot be permitted to act for a reason. This paper aims to show that that argument is unsound. It first argues that the assumption that choosing an action is necessary for it being an object of a moral duty or permission cannot be made consistent with Scanlon’s idea that the same does not hold for an action being an object of blame. It then argues that even if direct control over forming beliefs is impossible, it is not impossible to choose one’s reason for action and, therefore, to be permitted or forbidden to act for it.     

未成年人家庭责任观念与学校德育

未成年人家庭责任的养成是学校德育的重要任务,这是由学校德育的性质、内容和作用所决定的。当前学校的未成年人家庭责任养成教育需要解决学校德育与未成年人家庭教育等方面的关系,注重探索其发展规律和教育生活化的问题。     

Infanticide and the Right to Life

Michael Tooley defends infanticide by analysing ' A has a right to X' as roughly synonymous with 'If A desires X , then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him [or her] of it.' An infant who cannot conceive of himself or herself as a continuing subject of experiences cannot desire to continue existing. Hence, on Tooley's analysis, killing the infant is not impermissible, for it does not go against any of the infant's desires. However, Tooley's argument in support of his analysis seems to justify, instead, a slightly more subtle analysis—namely, ' A has a right to X ' is roughly extensionally equivalent with 'Unless A expresses his or her desire that not- X , then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him or her of X .' But given this analysis, the infant's purported lack of any capacity to conceive of himself or herself as a continuing subject of experiences implies that we cannot be released from any duty that we might have not to harm him or her. In short, Tooley's argument in support of his analysis actually implies that infanticide may well be impermissible.