Moderation,morals, and meat

Meat‐eating as a human practice has been under ethical attack from philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan on both utilitarian and deontological grounds. An organicist ethic, on the other hand, recognizes that all life other than the primary producers, the plants, must feed on life. This essay affirms, with many environmental ethicists, the moralconsiderability of biota other than the human, but denies that this enlargement of the moral community beyond Homo sapiens necessarily precludes our eating of meat. First, absolute deontological arguments against meat‐eating are disputed, then utilitarian‐hedonistic arguments are shown not to be sufficient to require ethical vegetarianism. Both sorts of arguments have strengths, however, that set us on guard against current abuses in the meat‐raising and slaughtering industries. If the principle of ‘due respect’ for beings with different degrees of intrinsic value is honored, then moderate meat‐eating under reformed social practices can be seen as licit. Two final problems then require investigation: the problem of dietary justice for poor humans and the problem of ‘speciesism’. Dealing with the latter requires discussion of cannibalism and the ethics of humans being eaten by still higher ‘aliens’.     

Why do right-wing adherents engage in more animal exploitation and meat consumption?

Despite the well-documented implications of right-wing ideological dispositions for human intergroup relations, surprisingly little is understood about the implications for human–animal relations. We investigate why right-wing ideologies – social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) – positively predict attitudes toward animal exploitation and meat consumption. Two survey studies conducted in heterogeneous community samples (Study 1, N = 260; Study 2, N = 489) demonstrated that right-wing ideologies predict greater acceptance of animal exploitation and more meat consumption through two explaining mechanisms: (a) perceived threat from non-exploitive ideologies to the dominant carnist ideology (for both SDO and RWA) and (b) belief in human superiority over animals (for SDO). These findings hold after controlling for hedonistic pleasure from eating meat. Right-wing adherents do not simply consume more animals because they enjoy the taste of meat, but because doing so supports dominance ideologies and resistance to cultural change. Psychological parallels between human intergroup relations and human–animal relations are considered.     

Should cultured meat be refused in the name of animal dignity?

Cultured meat, like any new technology, raises inevitable ethical issues. For example, on animal ethics grounds, it may be argued that reformed livestock farming in which animals’ lives are worth living constitutes a better alternative than cultured meat, which, along with veganism, implies the extinction of farm animals. Another ethical argument is that, just as we would undermine human dignity by producing and consuming meat that is grown from human cells, eating meat that is grown from nonhuman animal cells would violate animal dignity because it is a way to create an us and them, which would make veganism the only ethical option. The present study challenges this argument. First, I examine the fundamental issue of whether cultured meat provides such an attack on animal dignity. The second issue is whether, assuming that it is true that cultured meat undermines animal dignity, it would be acceptable to reject cultured meat even though this implies sacrificing nonhuman animals.     

Don't mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption

Many people like eating meat, but most are reluctant to harm things that have minds. The current three studies show that this dissonance motivates people to deny minds to animals. Study 1 demonstrates that animals considered appropriate for human consumption are ascribed diminished mental capacities. Study 2 shows that meat eaters are motivated to deny minds to food animals when they are reminded of the link between meat and animal suffering. Finally, Study 3 provides direct support for our dissonance hypothesis, showing that expectations regarding the immediate consumption of meat increase mind denial. Moreover, this mind denial in turn reduces negative affect associated with dissonance. The findings highlight the role of dissonance reduction in facilitating the practice of meat eating and protecting cultural commitments.     

Reconciling the Stoic and the Sceptic: Hume on Philosophy as a Way of Life and the Plurality of Happy Lives

On the one hand, Hume accepts the view – which he attributes primarily to Stoicism – that there exists a determinate best and happiest life for human beings, a way of life led by a figure whom Hume calls ‘the true philosopher’. On the other hand, Hume accepts that view – which he attributes to Scepticism – that there exists a vast plurality of good and happy lives, each potentially equally choiceworthy. In this paper, I reconcile Hume's apparently conflicting commitments: I argue that Hume's ‘Sceptical’ pluralism about the character of the happiest life need not conflict with his ‘Stoic’ advocacy of the supreme happiness of the true philosopher, given Hume's flexible understanding of how one might live as a true philosopher.     

Animal Rights and the Problem of r-Strategists

Wild animal reproduction poses an important moral problem for animal rights theorists. Many wild animals give birth to large numbers of uncared-for offspring, and thus child mortality rates are far higher in nature than they are among human beings. In light of this reproductive strategy – traditionally referred to as the ‘r-strategy’ – does concern for the interests of wild animals require us to intervene in nature? In this paper, I argue that animal rights theorists should embrace fallibility-constrained interventionism: the view that intervention in nature is desirable but should be constrained by our ignorance of the inner workings of ecosystems. Though authors sometimes assume that large-scale intervention requires turning nature into an enormous zoo, I suggest an alternative. With sufficient research, a new form of gene editing called CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats) promises to one day give us the capacity to intervene without perpetually interfering with wild animals’ liberties.     

Historical Judgement, Transcendent Perspective and 'Resurrection Appearances'

Suppose one judges as a historian that after Jesus' death there was an occurrence during the careers of various individuals in which: they took it that Jesus was appearing, raised by God to Life; and a concept worked in their minds, ‘Already, Jesus has been raised to Life’. Assume also that before one are fuller statements proposed now as to what happened. Some themselves cite just inner-worldly, non-transcendent factors – delusion and so on. The ‘Encountered’ statement however runs: ‘A transcendent reality, Jesus raised by God to Life, was encountered by the individuals.’ At first glance it might seem that in principle one could say: ‘Whereas I have not been convinced by the statements citing inner-worldly factors alone, I do by contrast find the Encountered statement convincing and elucidatory.’ But on closer scrutiny, would it indeed be possible for one maturely to say that? Some commentators voice a quick ‘Yes’– an apologetic argument thus. On the other hand some press challenges that a priori one may never fittingly say that. We should be content neither with a swift ‘Yes’ nor with swift dismissiveness. How you think directly about ‘resurrection appearances’ depends much on your analysis apropos of a wide range of epistemological and other matters. Some challenges are that the Encountered statement is as such flawed. But these claims rest on premises which arguably we should judge misguided. Some challenges (Humean and Barthian) concern how one is placed when the Encountered statement lies adjacent to ‘inner-worldly’ statements. Now we should maintain a standpoint on which a person can reach, apart from regard to Jesus, a theistic outlook: yet not by ‘natural theology’. Where that person is oneself, no a priori obstacles prevent one's maturely saying, ‘The Encountered statement for me elucidates, in contrast to the others’. These points can be put without talk of ‘probability estimates’ or ‘explanation’.     

The theory of objects

The current debate over the rights of animals has not been wholly satisfactory. Those who believe that animals have no rights argue that it is not conceivable that creatures without human capabilities could possess rights. Those who defend the rights of animals argue that such claims are ‘speciesist’, resemble racist and sexist claims, and bear the marks of moral complacency. Both sides have assumed that the issue can ultimately be settled through an analysis of the concept of rights in isolation from other factors. In this paper I argue that the issue can be discussed more satisfactorily in the context of classical teleological ethical theory which provides a basis for favoring the maximum development of all the more highly organized beings consistent with the diversification of nature. The conclusion is that wild animals have the right not to be eaten and that we should discontinue the wasteful practice of domesticating animals for the purpose of meat production.     

Nonsense on Stilts? Wittgenstein,Ethics, and the Lives of Animals

Wittgenstein is often invoked in philosophical disputes over the ethical justifiability of our treatment of animals. Many protagonists believe that Wittgenstein's philosophy points to a quantum difference between human and animal nature that arises out of humans' linguistic capacity. For this reason – its alleged anthropocentrism – animal liberationists tend to dismiss Wittgenstein's philosophy, whereas, for the same reason, anti‐liberationists tend to embrace it. I endorse liberationist moral claims, but think that many on both sides of the dispute fail to grasp the import of Wittgenstein's philosophy. My argument proceeds through close engagement with Michael Leahy's Against Liberation, which makes extensive use of Wittgenstein's ‘notion of language‐games’ as an ‘essential methodological aid’ in its defence and justification of the moral status quo. Leahy's understanding and application of that method exemplifies an entrenched interpretative stance in the wider Wittgensteinian scholarship which I seek to counter. This enables me to show that far from entailing conservatism, as some of his critics and followers contend, Wittgenstein's philosophical method is just as conducive to radical moral and political critique as it is to any other normative position.     

Dependence on Wrongdoing in the Consumption of Meat: A Kantian Analysis

Kant's ethics is used by some as a defence of the exploitation of animals and is criticised by others for not recognising any moral relevance of the plight of animals. These appeals overlook the broad applicability of Kant's principles. In this article, I argue that Kant's ethics implies a duty to abstain from most meat and some other animal products derived from farming. I argue that there is a Kantian principle not to choose goods that have been derived from wrongdoing, with certain qualifications. This principle isolates the wrong of using others to commit wrongdoing on one's behalf. As has been argued by others, Kant's ethics implies that animal farming as we know it in our society almost universally involves wrongdoing and the slaughter of animals is especially tied to wrongdoing. I argue for a broad sense in which these ideas together imply that choosing farmed meat, and probably other animal products, is treating animal industry workers as mere means. Thus, we have a Kantian duty to abstain from these products.     

“I would have lost the respect of my friends and family if they knew I had bent the road rules”: Parents,peers, and the perilous behaviour of young drivers

Young novice drivers are at considerable risk of injury on the road. Their behaviour appears vulnerable to the social influence of their parents and friends. The nature and mechanisms of parent and peer influence on young novice driver (16–25 years) behaviour was explored via small group interviews (n = 21) and two surveys (n1 = 1170, n2 = 390) to inform more effective young driver countermeasures. Parental and peer influence occurred in pre-Licence, Learner, and Provisional (intermediate) periods. Pre-Licence and unsupervised Learner drivers reported their parents were less likely to punish risky driving (e.g., speeding). These drivers were more likely to imitate their parents and reported their parents were also risky drivers. Young novice drivers who experienced or expected social punishments from peers, including ‘being told off’ for risky driving, reported less riskiness. Conversely drivers who experienced or expected social rewards such as being ‘cheered on’ by friends – who were also more risky drivers – reported more risky driving including crashes and offences. Interventions enhancing positive influence and curtailing negative influence may improve road safety outcomes not only for young novice drivers, but for all persons who share the road with them. Parent-specific interventions warrant further development and evaluation including: modelling safe driving behaviour by parents; active monitoring of driving during novice licensure; and sharing the family vehicle during the intermediate phase. Peer-targeted interventions including modelling of safe driving behaviour and attitudes; minimisation of social reinforcement and promotion of social sanctions for risky driving also need further development and evaluation.     

Student driver propensity to engage with distractions – a self-report survey

This paper reports a survey of engagement with, and ratings of, driver distraction, for undergraduate student drivers. Survey data was collected using an anonymous online questionnaire. 530 respondents contributed to the survey during a seven-year data collection period.Results indicate that the three internal-to-vehicle behaviours rated as most distracting when driving were ‘writing text messages’, ‘internet use’, and ‘reading text messages’. The three most frequently undertaken distractions were, ‘(interactions with) adults’, ‘daydreaming’, and ‘eating, drinking or smoking’. Considering external-to-vehicle distractions, the top three rated were ‘environmental conditions’, ‘unexpected objects or events’, and ‘animals behaving unexpectedly’; while the most frequently experienced external distractions were ‘people (behaving normally), ‘busy roads’ and ‘official signage’. Some evidence was found that internal-to-vehicle distractions were relatively more distracting than external-to-vehicle ones, along with limited findings showing significant variation in the amount of engagement with distractions over time. Significant predictive models for engagement with distraction were calculated (for both work-related and non-work-related driving) and found to be broadly in agreement with previous research, although accounting for less variance in the models. Significantly greater engagement with distractions was found during non-work-related driving, when compared to work-related.The data present a picture of ongoing and substantial engagement with distracting behaviours for this population over the data collection period. For example, on a daily or weekly basis, more than three-fifths of respondents reported willingness to read text messages with the vehicle in motion; while just under half indicated that they typically write text messages in the same circumstances. However, the findings do offer some promise that interventions targeted towards non-work-related driving behaviours may be effective to reduce volitional engagement with distractions.     

Omnipotence

If asked to define ‘omnipotence,’ the man on the street would probably say that it’s the ability to do anything. That’s about it, he’d think; nothing more needs be said. Philosophers are never so easily satisfied. They take it as matter of professional duty to find serious problems in important concepts, and to suggest that the concept be rejected or that solutions are at hand. This paper falls into the latter camp. Beginning with a relatively simple definition of ‘omnipotence,’ increasingly complex definitions are proposed, problems are found with them, and newer, refined definitions are offered. In all, seven unsatisfactory definitions are examined before an adequate one is arrived at. Both traditional and new problems are addressed, and novel solutions are advanced. The definition argued to be adequate is itself novel, but also very much in keeping with our pre-reflective understanding of omnipotence. On the basis of the definition it’s concluded not only that an adequate definition of ‘omnipotence’ is possible, but that various problems alleged to attend attributing the notion to God can also be solved.     

Do animals dream?

The understanding of biological functions of sleep has improved recently, including an understanding of the deep evolutionary roots of sleep among animals. However, dreaming as an element of sleep may be particularly difficult to address in non-human animals because in humans dreaming involves a non-wakeful form of awareness typically identified through verbal report. Here, we argue that parallels that exist between the phenomenology, physiology, and sleep behaviors during human dreaming provide an avenue to investigate dreaming in non-human animals. We review three alternative measurements of human dreaming – neural correlates of dreaming, ‘replay’ of newly-acquired memories, and dream-enacting behaviors – and consider how these may be applied to non-human animal models. We suggest that while animals close in brain structure to humans (such as mammals and birds) may be optimal models for the first two of these measurements, cephalopods, especially octopuses, may be particularly good candidates for the third.     

The humanity of what we eat: Conceptions of human uniqueness among vegetarians and omnivores

Studies on dehumanization demonstrated that denying certain human characteristics might serve as a strategy for moral disengagement. Meat consumption—especially in the times of cruel animal farming—is related to the exclusion of animals from the human scope of justice. In the present research, it was hypothesized that the conception of human uniqueness (denying animals certain psychological characteristics) might be a strategy of meat‐eaters' moral disengagement. Three studies compared the extent to which vegetarians and omnivores attribute psychological characteristics to humans versus animals. In Study 1, vegetarian participants ascribed more secondary (uniquely human) emotions to animals than did the omnivores; however, there were no differences in primary (animalistic) emotions. Study 2 showed that omnivores distinguish human characteristics from animalistic ones more sharply than vegetarians do, while both groups do not differ in distinguishing human characteristics from mechanistic ones. Study 3 confirmed the results by showing that omnivores ascribed less secondary emotions to traditionally edible animals than to the non‐edible species, while vegetarians did not differentiate these animals. These results support the claim that the lay conceptions of ‘human uniqueness’ are strategies of moral disengagement. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

KILLING ON THE FRONTIER: MEAT EATING AS AN EXTREME CASE FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS

This article argues that killing animals for food represents an extreme case within Christian moral thinking comparable to Karl Barth's Grenzfall argument against such violent acts as suicide, abortion, killing in self‐defense, capital punishment, and war. This position is in contrast to the view of many environmental philosophers who hold human hunting to be comparable to animal predation. It also disputes the language of substitutionary sacrifice prevalent in some Christian discussions of meat eating.     

Transcultural validation and reliability of the Spanish version of the behaviour of young novice drivers scale (BYNDS) in a Colombian young driver population

The overrepresentation of young drivers in road crashes, and the fatalities and injuries arising from those crashes, is an intractable problem around the world. A plethora of research has led to the development and application of a range of research tools, including self-report survey instruments. One such instrument, the five-factor Behaviour of Young Novice Driver Scale (BYNDS), was developed in an Australian young driver population, and has recently been validated in a New Zealand young driver population. The current study aimed to validate the BYNDS in a Colombian young driver population, the first application of the instrument in a developing country. Translation from English to Spanish, and back translation from Spanish to English, in addition to culturally-appropriate modifications (such as changing ‘right hand side’ to ‘left hand side’) resulted in a Spanish version of the BYNDS (BYNDS-Sp). The BYNDS-Sp was administered to a sample of 392 young drivers aged 16–24 years (n = 353 aged 19–24 years) with a valid driver’s licence. An exploratory factor analysis revealed a six factor structure using 40 of the original 44 BYNDS-Sp items, accounting for 58.5% of the variance in self-reported risky driving behaviour. Ninety-three percent of participants reported having ready access to their own vehicle (42% owned their own vehicle), with Colombian young drivers most likely to report driving at night and on the weekend. The majority of participants reported driving in excess of posted speed limits (e.g., only one third of participants reported never driving 10–20 km/h over the speed limit), and driving in response to their mood (e.g., only one third of participants reported they never drove faster if in a bad mood). As such, the BYNDS-Sp can reveal patterns of problematic behaviours (such as risky driving exposure), in addition to specific behaviours of concern (such as carrying passengers at night, and driving when tired), guiding the development and implementation of interventions targeting the risky driving behaviour of young drivers in Colombia. In addition, the BYNDS-Sp can be used as a measure of intervention success if used as a baseline and as a follow-up tool. Further research can investigate the utility and applicability of the BYNDS-Sp in other Spanish-speaking countries, such as Spain and Mexico.     

A Response To H. O. Mounce

Wittgenstein: “If a lion could speak, we could not understand him.” (PI, p. 223) Wittgenstein bids us to be wary of trying to explain or interpret language and its use, instead of limiting ourselves – with a rigorous discipline – to describing such use as comprehensively and clearly as we can. This injunction, it seems to me, is important even when discussing ‘normal’, ‘everyday’ uses of language by fully sentient human beings, but even more so in such unique cases of sentient disability as Helen Keller’s. As the above quote suggests, explanatory extrapolation from the behaviour of animals risks even greater philosophical confusion.     

‘In human shape to become the very beast!’ – Henry More on animals

ABSTRACT

Animals – both tame and wild, as metaphors and as real presences – populate many of More’s works. In this essay, I show that, from the early Psychodia Platonica to the Divine Dialogues, animals are at the core of key metaphysical issues that reverberate on the levels of psychology and ethics. In particular I discuss three main aspects: (1) the role of animals in More’s critique of atheism, both as safeguard for the body–soul interaction and as proofs of divine providence in nature; (2) the problem of evil in the universe, and how to justify the existence of ‘evil’ animals in particular; (3) the differentiation between animals and humans, especially on the basis of their respective possibility of attaining happiness. In all three cases, I argue that More attempts to ‘tame’ the nature of animals, and yet that he is aware that ‘animality’ remains partly untamed.