CREATION AND DISCOVERY IN MUSICAL WORKS

I argue that entities which best fill the role of musical works are discovered and not created. I begin by distinguishing two senses of ‘create.’ I then examine what our ordinary talk of musical works commits us to, paying special attention to this distinction. Finally, I look at Renée Cox's arguments for the creation view of musical works. One of her reasons actually supports the discovery position. Her other claims are consistent with the view that musical works are discovered. I conclude that though our ordinary talk concerning musical works is often ambiguous, the discovery view is superior.     

The Ontology of Musical Versions: Introducing the Hypothesis of Nested Types

This article explores the ontological nature of musical versions. I assume the widespread view that type/token ontologies offer the best explanation of the repeatable nature of works of music. However, I show that traditional type/token theories, which distinguish only between two levels of objects, face two problems when applied to the phenomenon of musical versions. First, they are not able to accommodate the familiar intuition of our musical practices that the work versioned is repeated in its versions’ performances. Second, they are not able to distinguish between two different phenomena of our practices: the phenomenon of a work's versions and the phenomenon of works inspired by, or derived from, other works. These undesirable consequences are entailed, under traditional two‐level type/token theories, by the nature of types as ontologically thin entities. I defend that the hypothesis of nested types, a multiple‐level type/token theory, can avoid these two problems while preserving the theoretical virtues of traditional two‐level type/token theories and structural monism—the most widely shared view about the individuation of musical works, according to which musical works are individuated by one, and only one, sound structure.     

The Metaphysics of Mash‐Ups

Accounts of the ontology of musical works seek to uncover what metaphysically speaking a musical work is and how we should identify instances of musical works. In this article, I examine the curious case of the mash‐up and seek to address two questions: are mash‐ups musical works in their own right and what is the relationship between the mash‐up and its source materials? As mash‐ups are part of the broader tradition of rock, I situate this discussion within an ontology of rock as defended by Theodore Gracyk and Stephen Davies and offer some interpretation as to what their positions might be in regard to mash‐ups. Finally, I argue that the account of mash‐ups that best makes sense of our evaluative practices would hold that they are emergent musical works that are distinct in their own right and yet also happen to be cases of musical works that instantiate parts of other musical works.     

Fictionalism about musical works

The debate concerning the ontological status of musical works is perhaps the most animated debate in contemporary analytic philosophy of music. In my view, progress requires a piecemeal approach. So in this article I hone in on one particular musical work concept – that of the classical Western art musical work; that is, the work concept that regulates classical art-musical practice. I defend a fictionalist analysis – a strategy recently suggested by Andrew Kania as potentially fruitful – and I develop a version of such an analysis in line with a broad commitment to philosophical naturalism.     

Contextualizing Platonism and Decontextualizing Aristotelianism in the Ontology of Music

This article argues against a widespread view that links musical Platonism and Aristotelianism with opposite ways of individuating musical works. This view assumes that Platonism is bound to individuate works of music in sonicist and noncontextualist terms, while Aristotelianism is tied to instrumentalist and contextualist accounts on work-individuation. I argue that this assumption is wrong. I provide an argument that shows that the differences between musical Platonism and Aristotelianism concern the existence conditions of musical works qua types, but not their identity conditions. Assuming that the existence and individuation conditions of types are given by their associated properties, I defend that the disagreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism is about the principle of instantiation of properties, regardless if these properties are monadic (sonicism and noncontextualism) or relational (instrumentalism and contextualism).     

Jazz and Musical Works: Hypnotized by the Wrong Model

It is difficult to place jazz within a philosophy of music dominated by the concepts and practices of classical music. One key puzzle concerns the nature and role, if any, of musical works in jazz. I briefly describe the debate between those who deny that there are musical works in jazz (Andrew Kania) and those who affirm that there are such (Julian Dodd and others), and I distinguish between claiming that there are no musical works in the jazz tradition and the more provocative claim that they are not performed in jazz performances. I argue that each side of this debate is partially right and that the first step toward resolving the puzzle is to reject inappropriate concepts of a musical work. In particular, Kania's and Lydia Goehr's accounts, derived from classical music practice, are rejected as general accounts of musical works. I then contrast the norms governing work performance in classical music (the werktreue ideal) with the practices governing performances of works in jazz, which I call realization or staging. Finally, I propose a model of jazz appreciation that incorporates a role for jazz works and that fundamentally differs from the way that classical musical performances are appreciated.     

Every Performance Is a Stage: Musical Stage Theory as a Novel Account for the Ontology of Musical Works

This article defends Musical Stage Theory as a novel account of the ontology of musical works. Its main claim is that a musical work is a performance. The significance of this argument is twofold. First, it demonstrates the availability of an alternative, and ontologically tenable, view to well‐established positions in the current debate on musical metaphysics. Second, it shows how the revisionary approach of Musical Stage Theory actually provides a better account of the ontological status of musical works.     

The Property Theory of Musical Works

The property theory of musical works says that each musical work is a property that is instantiated by its occurrences, that is, the work's performances and playings. The property theory provides ontological explanations very similar to those given by its popular cousin, the type/token theory of musical works, but it is both simpler and stronger. However, type/token theorists often dismiss the property theory. In this essay, I formulate a version of the property theory that identifies each type (thus, each musical work) with a unique property. I then scrutinize the arguments offered for thinking that types, including musical works, are distinct from properties. I respond that no such argument is forceful and conclude that the property theory of musical works is superior to the type/token theory.     

Moral Perception

Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately addressed. The first objection is that the moral perception view has implausible commitments concerning the morally blind, people who would claim not to perceive wrongness. The second objection is that the moral perception view is not really compatible with a wide range of the main candidate moral theories. I argue that the moral empiricist has plausible responses to both of these objections. I then address three residual concerns that my defense raises.     

Types,Tokens, and Talk about Musical Works

It has recently been suggested that the type/token theorist concerning musical works cannot come up with an adequate semantic theory of those sentences in which we purport to talk about such works. Specifically, it has been claimed that, since types are abstract entities, a type/token theorist can only account for the truth of sentences such as “The 1812 Overture is very loud” and “Bach's Two Part Invention in C has an F‐sharp in its fourth measure” by adopting an untenable semantic claim: namely, that the predicates in such sentences, once applied to musical works, undergo a systematic shift in their meanings. This article is a sustained explanation of why our talk about musical works in fact provides no problem for the type/token theorist. First, we demonstrate that the aforementioned “meaning shift” approach to the sentences’ predicates is well motivated and very credible. Second, we explain how the type/token theorist can adopt the best available version of an alternative, generic quantificational approach to such sentences. Third, we establish that other semantic theories, presented as undermining the type/token theory by giving us a reason for adopting eliminativism about types, are much less theoretically virtuous than the two theories that a type/token theorist can freely adopt.     

The Ontology of Musical Works and the Role of Intuitions: An Experimental Study

Philosophers of music often appeal to intuition to defend ontological theories of musical works. This practice is worrisome as it is rather unclear just how widely shared are the intuitions that philosophers appeal to. In this paper, I will first offer a brief overview of the debate over the ontology of musical works. I will argue that this debate is driven by a conflict between two seemingly plausible intuitions—the repeatability intuition and the creatability intuition—both of which may be defended on the grounds that they are reflective of our actual musical practices. The problem facing philosophers within this debate is that there is no clear way to determine which of the two conflicting intuitions is more reflective of our musical practices. Finally, I offer discussion of an experimental study that was designed to test participants' intuitions regarding the repeatability of musical works. The evidence presented there suggests that the participants broadly accept the repeatability of musical works, but in a much narrower way than philosophers would likely accept.     

Looks and Perceptual Justification

Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public. They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks‐related reasons.     

The ontology of musical works: A philosophical pseudo-problem

A bewildering array of accounts of the ontology of musical works is available. Philosophers have held that works of music are sets of performances, abstract, eternal sound-event types, initiated types, compositional action types, compositional action tokens, ideas in a composer’s mind and continuants that perdure. This paper maintains that questions in the ontology of music are, in Rudolf Carnap’s sense of the term, pseudo-problems. That is, there is no alethic basis for choosing between rival musical ontologies. While we have no alethic basis for choosing any ontology of music, pragmatic reasons can be given for favoring certain ontologies of musical works over others.     

The construct of the ‘mana personality’ in Jung’s works: a historic-hermeneutic perspective. Part II

This is the second part of an article that tries to provide a framework of understanding of, and a seminal reflection on, a highly interesting yet little explored psychological construct of Jung’s analytical psychology, namely the ‘mana personality’. Here I take into consideration some issues around the ‘saviour complex’, discussed in Jung’s seminar on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, concerning both the psychological analysis of the individual and the socio-political level related to the collective horizon of the 1930s. Moreover, I consider the continuity of Jung’s analysis of such issues in other works such as ‘Psychology and national problems’ (1936), Symbols of Transformation (1952), and Aion (1950). I finally make some suggestions concerning Jung’s apparent hermeneutic tendency to apply the construct of the mana personality to collective historical phenomena.     

For all we Know: Clinical Creativity as a Dialectic Between Knowledge and Unknownness

Musical thought is an essential instrument for grasping the most secret stirrings of the human heart. Contemporary psychoanalysis has been exploring implicit communication for some time now; I believe that the way in which music communicates is remarkably connected with these matters issues. I speak of musical thought to indicate the ways in which music thinks. In this article I offer a contribution in which I could dare to use musical thought as an essential element of the clinical relationship between my patient Ernesto and me.     

Wittgenstein,Theories of Meaning,and Linguistic Disjunctivism

This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later works, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non‐circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions.     

A Return to Musical Idealism

In disputes about the ontology of music, musical idealism—that is, the view that musical compositions are ideas—has proven to be rather unpopular. We argue that, once we have a better grip on the ontology of ideas, we can formulate a version of musical idealism that is not only defensible, but plausible and attractive. We conclude that compositions are a particular kind of idea: they are completed ideas for musical manifestation.     

‘KEEPING THE FAITH ALIVE': TEACHING SIKH KIRTAN IN AMERICA

Since the large influx of Sikhs to the USA beginning with immigration reform in the 1960s, Sikhism has continued to come into view as an American religion. Throughout the USA today, Sikhs are devoting vast amounts of time and effort toward keeping continued generations of Sikh Americans connected with Sikh communities, traditions, history, and ways of being and knowing. One of the primary ways that many communities are teaching younger generations how to be Sikh in America is through teaching the performance of the Sikh sacred musical tradition, Gurbani kirtan (musical performance of the Word of the Gurus and Bhagats of Sikhism found within the Guru Granth Sahib). This article will explore observations from my field research and interviews among people who are teaching the Gurbani kirtan tradition in the USA, and their students. I will discuss how those teaching the tradition fall into several groups: organized kirtan academies, well-known kirtaniyas (Sikh sacred musicians) who hold periodic workshops, professional music teachers, and volunteer instructors within gurdwara communities. I will present insights from my interviews conducted with interviewees from each group about their pedagogical methods, reasons for teaching, and hopes and concerns for the future. Finally, I will conclude with some observations on the role of Gurbani kirtan in the emergence of Sikhism as an American religion.     

Identity Politics and Dialectical Reason: Beyond an Epistemology of Provenance

Identity politics is important within feminism. However, it often presupposes an overly subjectivist theory of knowledge that I term an epistemology of provenance. I explore some works of feminist standpoint theory that begin to address the difficulties of such an epistemology. I then bring Sartre's account of knowledge in the Critique of Dialectical Reason to bear on these difficulties, arguing that his work offers tools for addressing them more adequately.     

Conceptual Art,Ideas, and Ontology

Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens have recently articulated the Idea Idea, the thesis that “in conceptual art, there is no physical medium: the medium is the idea.” But what is an idea, and in the case of works such as Duchamp's Fountain, how does the idea relate to the urinal? In answering these questions, it becomes apparent that the Idea Idea should be rejected. After showing this, I offer a new ontology of conceptual art, according to which such artworks are not ideas but artifacts imbued with ideas. After defending this view from objections, I briefly discuss some implications it has for the ontology of art in general.