Rethinking Same-Sex Sex in Natural Law Theory

Many prominent proponents of Old and New Natural Law morally condemn sexual acts between people of the same sex because those acts are incapable of reproduction; they each offer a distinct set of supporting reasons. While some New Natural Law philosophers have begun to distance themselves from this moral condemnation, there are not many similarly ameliorative efforts within Old Natural Law. I argue for the bold conclusion that Old Natural Law philosophers can accept the basic premises of Old Natural Law without also being committed to morally condemning sexual activity between people of the same sex. I develop an argument from analogy that shows how we can draw metaphysically distinct sub-categories based on someone's capacity to experience the unitive goods of sex. This unitive capacity constitutes the sub-category and provides a distinct principle for evaluating how members of that sub-category (X) act as members of that sub-category, rather than as acting as defective members of another category (Y). Even though my argument is ‘internal’ to Old Natural Law, I conclude by showing how these conclusions can also address some of the objections to same-sex sex in New Natural Law.     

THE THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF HERBERT McCABE, OP: A REVIEW ESSAY

Herbert Mc Cabe, OP (d. 2001), was a significant theological figure in England in the last century. A scholar of Aquinas, he was also influenced by Wittgenstein and Marx, his reading of whom helped him articulate a distinctive Thomistic account of human embodiment that serves as a critique of other dominant approaches in ethics. This article shows McCabe's contribution to moral theology by placing his work in conversation with other important approaches, namely, situation ethics, proportionalism, and the New Natural Law Theory.     

WHO CARES? THE EFFECT OF GENDER AND CONTEXT ON THE SELF AND MORAL REASONING

Theorists suggest that gender differences in moral reasoning are due to differences in the self-concept, with women feeling connected to others and using a care approach, whereas men feel separate from others and adopt a justice approach. Using a self-categorization analysis, the current research suggests that the nature of the self–other relationship, rather than gender, predicts moral reasoning. Study 1 found moral reasoning to be dependent upon the social distance between the self and others, with a care-based approach more likely when interacting with a friend than a stranger. Study 2 suggests that when individuals see others as ingroup members they are more likely to utilize care-based moral reasoning than when others are seen as outgroup members. Further, traditional gender differences in moral reasoning were found only when gender was made salient. These studies suggest that both the self and moral reasoning are better conceptualized as fluid and context dependent.     

The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral Knowledge

In Roman Catholic moral theology there is an ongoing debate between the proportionalist or revisionist school and the traditionalist school that has developed what is referred to as the ‘New Natural Law Theory’ or ‘Basic Goods Theory’ (BGT). The stakes in this debate have been raised with Pope John Paul II's encyclical Veritatis Splendor (1993) on fundamental moral theology that condemned ‘proportionalism’ or ‘teleologism’ as an ethical theory while utilizing many of the ideas, concepts, and terminology of the BGT, thereby implicitly endorsing that ethical theory. While absolute norms and intrinsically evil acts have frequently been the focus of debate between these two schools, what is it that divides them fundamentally, on the level of ethical method? It is the role and function of reason and experience as two sources of moral knowledge, in part, that distinguish these two versions of natural law on the most basic level. While the BGT has a strict hierarchy of the sources of moral knowledge that posits the hierarchical magisterium as the definitive interpreter of reason and experience, revisionists posit a more dialogical relationship between reason, experience, and the magisterium. On certain ethical issues (e.g., artificial birth control), the experience of the faithful as well as the rational arguments developed by revisionist Catholic moral theologians challenge some of the normative claims of the magisterium. This paper investigates the methodological use of reason and experience in each theory's interpretation of natural law and how and why these two sources of moral knowledge lead to fundamentally divergent normative claims on particular ethical issues.     

Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future

Scientists from various disciplines have begun to focus attention on the psychology and biology of human morality. One research program that has recently gained attention is universal moral grammar (UMG). UMG seeks to describe the nature and origin of moral knowledge by using concepts and models similar to those used in Chomsky's program in linguistics. This approach is thought to provide a fruitful perspective from which to investigate moral competence from computational, ontogenetic, behavioral, physiological and phylogenetic perspectives. In this article, I outline a framework for UMG and describe some of the evidence that supports it. I also propose a novel computational analysis of moral intuitions and argue that future research on this topic should draw more directly on legal theory.     

Content-blind norms, no norms, or good norms? A reply to Vranas

In the psychology of thinking, little thought is given to what constitutes good thinking. Instead, normative solutions to problems have been accepted at face value, thereby determining what counts as a reasoning fallacy. I applaud Vranas (Cognition 76 (2000) 179) for thinking seriously about norms. I do, however, disagree with his attempt to provide post hoc justifications for supposed reasoning fallacies in terms of 'content-neutral' norms. Norms need to be constructed for a specific situation, not imposed upon it in a content-blind way. The reason is that content-blind norms disregard relevant structural properties of the given situation, including polysemy, reference classes, and sampling. I also show that content-blind norms can, unwittingly, lead to double standards: the norm in one problem is the fallacy in the next. The alternative to content-blind norms is not no norms, but rather carefully designed norms.     

Moral reasoning in autistic individuals: a theoretical review / El razonamiento moral en personas con Trastorno del Espectro Autista: una revisión teórica

Abstract

Individuals diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) often find it difficult to attribute mental states to others and to understand their own and others’ behaviour (Theory of Mind, [ToM]/social cognition). These difficulties can affect their moral judgements. The present article focuses on evidence on moral reasoning and ToM, with the aim of analysing theoretical and review research into autism. The weight intention has in moral reasoning and the causal relation between mental states, actions and outcomes is an essential part of this study. Evidence in the field of autism reports how autistic people would not be able to make moral judgements based on the agent’s intention. Instead, they would reason based on the outcomes of the action. For example, this can be translated into misunderstandings, malicious judgements or ‘over-blaming’ in accidental situations (ambiguous valences). These impairments can confirm the association between ToM and moral reasoning.     

Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise

We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms.     

中国佛教伦理的社会意义

中国佛教伦理的社会意义值得探究 ,我们拟从三个方面来分析。首先以孝道为例来论述中国佛教是怎样与中国重家庭、重孝道的礼法制度相协调 ,使中国人认同佛教也是讲孝的 ;其次是着重通过对佛教道德规范内涵的分析 ,揭示其所包含的丰富的社会意义 ;再次是阐述中国佛教伦理对现代人类社会的三大矛盾 ,即人与自我、人与他人、人与自然的矛盾的缓解、转化作用 ,从而肯定其内在具有的现代社会意义。     

Toward a further understanding of the intuitive personologists: Some critical evidence on the diabolical quality of subjective psychometrics

Despite significant advances over the past three decades in our understanding of the implicit dangers in ad hoc psychometric procedures, some important questions remain, particularly as regards the nature of the underlying reasoning process by which subjectively meaningful theoretical impressions are formulated and expressed. The present article seeks to address this issue, with particular attention being given to the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical reasoning. Evidence is offered to show that, at least under certain conditions, intuitive psychometricians formulate and express theoretical impressions on the basis of a reasoning process that is essentially dialectical in nature. Some major implications of this point of view for the study of personality theory are discussed. The limitations of the evidence presented, and the need for further research, are forgone.     

Toward a further understanding of the intuitive personologist: Some preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions

Despite significant advances over the past three decades in our understanding of the implicit personality theorist, some important questions remain, particularly as regards the nature of the underlying reasoning process by which subjectively meaningful personality impressions are formulated and expressed. The present article seeks to address this issue, with particular attention being given to the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical reasoning. Preliminary empirical evidence is offered to suggest that, at least under certain conditions, lay persons formulate and express subjective personality impressions on the basis of a reasoning process that is essentially dialectical in nature. Some major implications of this point of view for the study of the intuitive personologist are discussed. The limitations of the evidence presented, and the need for further research are also noted.     

Triune ethics: The neurobiological roots of our multiple moralities

Triune Ethics Theory (TET) is a psychological theory developed to meet three goals. First, it attempts to harvest critical findings from neurobiology, affective neuroscience, and cognitive science and to integrate them into moral psychology for the purpose of informing psychological research on the moral life of persons. In contrast to dominant theories that focus on top-down, deliberative reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg), TET is a bottom-up theory that focuses on motivational orientations that are rooted in evolved unconscious emotional systems shaped by experience that predispose one to react to and act on events in particular ways. Second, it seeks to explain differences in moral functioning through a person by context interaction. Individuals differ in early emotional experiences that influence personality formation and behavior in context, while at the same time situations can evoke particular reactions, which vary with personality. Third, it suggests the initial conditions for optimal human moral development.     

INTENTIONAL ACTION AND THE UNINTENTIONAL FALLACY

Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention‐based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility.     

NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY AND FOUNDATIONAL SEXUAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES: A CRITIQUE AND A PROPOSAL

The New Natural Law Theory (NNLT) argues against the morality (and legality) of same sex‐unions on the basis that homosexual (and non‐reproductive heterosexual) acts are unnatural, unreasonable, and therefore immoral. In this paper, we explore and critique the foundational principles – biological and personal complementarity, their subcategories, and the interrelationship between them – that the NNLT uses to justify its claim. We propose alternative principles – orientation, personal, and genital‐biological complementarity, with a distinct interrelationship – to argue that homosexual couples can engage in sexual acts that are natural, reasonable, and therefore moral. Our study clearly demonstrates that for the NNLT genital complementarity, a subcategory of biological complementarity, is the sine qua non for personal complementarity. In other words, personal complementarity within a sexual act is only possible if there is genital complementarity between male and female. We believe that the NNLT's foundational principles reflect too narrow an understanding of the human person and human sexuality. Instead, we propose “holistic complementarity” as the fully human integration of orientation, personal, and genital‐biological complementarity. What defines a natural, reasonable, and moral sexual act is not genital complementarity as the foundational principle, but a dialectic between these three principles of complementarity.     

Addressing moral problems through practical reasoning

In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.     

Using Stars for Moral Navigation: An Ethical Exploration into Celebrity

What role do celebrities play in our moral lives? Philosophers have explored the potential for celebrities to function as moral exemplars and role models. We argue that there are more ways in which celebrities play a role in helping us navigate our moral lives. First, gossiping about celebrities helps us negotiate our moral norms and identify competing styles of life. Second, fandom for celebrities serves as the basis for the development of distinct moral communities and identities. Third, celebrities possess high levels of epistemic power which can be used to help change and adapt our moral norms. We will then investigate two kinds of problems that arise from using celebrities in this way. Firstly, harm is done to celebrities because they are used in the ways explained in the first part of the article; secondly, celebrity life has a distinctive nature that can affect the moral agency of celebrities. Fame, we suggest, might lead to a morally unhealthy asymmetry in human relationships. We end by discussing the ethical implications of our analysis and conclude that when using stars for moral navigation, we should take into account the harm this does to them and the distinctive nature of their lives.     

From a fixation on sports to an exploration of mechanism: The past,present, and future of hot hand research

We review the literature on the hot hand fallacy by highlighting the positive and negative aspects of hot hand research over the past 20 years, and suggesting new avenues of research. Many researchers have focused on criticising Gilovich et al.'s claim that the hot hand fallacy exists in basketball and other sports, instead of exploring the general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human cognition and probabilistic reasoning. Noting that researchers have shown that people perceive hot streaks in a gambling domain in which systematic streaks cannot possibly exist, we suggest that researchers have paid too much attention to investigating the independence of outcomes in various sporting domains. Instead, we advocate a domain-general mechanistic approach to understanding the hot hand fallacy, and conclude by suggesting approaches that might refocus the literature on the important general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human probabilistic reasoning.     

RETRACTED: UNDERSTANDING SUBJECT(S): THE SELF AS CORPORATION

This paper aims to make a contribution to work concerning the nature of the subject. The article pays special attention to the work of Parfit but will also cover the work of Hume and Locke. The article seeks to develop an ontological account of persons with important implications to the way in which we distinguish associations, groups and persons in both philosophy and moral theory.     

Competing Conceptions of Justice: Faculty Moral Reasoning About Affirmative Action

College faculty (N = 115) were recruited to investigate the influence of moral reasoning on hiring decisions about affirmative action dilemmas. Participants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a standard test of moral reasoning, a measure that presented two hypothetical moral dilemmas about affirmative action that manipulated candidates' race and moral issues, and a scale evaluating the use of external norms versus self-chosen principles. Results indicated that moral issue but not race of a minority candidate affected hiring decisions. Faculty used greater percentages of principled reasoning when solving the more salient affirmative action dilemmas than when solving the hypothetical dilemmas of the DIT. Higher scores on the DIT were related to the use of principles rather than norms when making hiring decisions. Findings suggest that faculty decisions about hiring a hypothetical affirmative action candidate are more influenced by moral reasoning level and competing conceptions of justice than racial bias or ambivalence.