A Self‐Categorization Explanation for the Third‐Person Effect

Three studies tested a self‐categorization theory explanation for the third‐person effect. In Study 1 (N= 49) undergraduate students judged the influence of the National Enquirer, Wall Street Journal, and TV show Friends on themselves, relative to low‐ and high‐status outgroup members, and other undergraduate students. The profile of first‐ and third‐person perceptions was largely consistent with predictions, and the size of the third‐person effect decreased as perceived similarity to target others increased—but only for media that were normative for comparison others. Study 2 (N= 49) provided evidence for this process with different media and showed that the profile of first‐ and third‐person perceptions matched closely with perceived norms of media consumption—but not the social desirability of those media. Study 3 (N= 64) showed that the third‐person effect for the same media and target other shifts with the frame of reference in which the judgment is made. Taken together, the findings are consistent with self‐categorization theory and difficult to reconcile with other explanations.     

Perception from the First‐Person Perspective

This paper develops a view of the content of perceptual states that reflects the cognitive significance those states have for the subject. Perhaps the most important datum for such a theory is the intuition that experiences are ‘transparent’, an intuition promoted by philosophers as diverse as Sartre and Dretske. This paper distinguishes several different transparency theses, and considers which ones are truly supported by the phenomenological data. It is argued that the only thesis supported by the data is much weaker than those typically considered in the literature, and has no obvious implications for the existence of sensory intermediaries. It does, however, have implications for the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that combining the first personal project with the transparency intuition yields an error theory of perception. The counterintuitive implications of this error theory are mitigated, however, by an account of perceptual beliefs which allows for them to be true even if the perceptual states are non‐veridical.     

A Critical Test of Self‐Enhancement,Exposure, and Self‐Categorization Explanations for First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

The third‐person perception is the tendency for people to believe that others are more influenced by media content than themselves (W. P. Davison, 1983 ). The current study provides a critical test of self‐enhancement, exposure, and self‐categorization explanations for first‐ (i.e., self more influenced than others) and third‐person perceptions. Male and female participants (N = 323) judged the extent to which pornography elicited“aroused and excited” (i.e., male normative) versus“repulsed and offended” (i.e., female normative) reactions in themselves relative to average men and women. Men perceived an average woman to be more repulsed and offended by pornography than themselves, and women perceived an average man to be more aroused and excited than themselves (i.e., large third‐person perceptions). Further, men perceived themselves to be more aroused and excited by pornography than an average woman (independent of the degree to which pornography was judged as antisocial), and women perceived themselves to be more repulsed and offended than an average man (i.e., large first‐person perceptions). There were relatively small effects for same sex comparisons independent of norm. The pattern and magnitude of first‐ and third‐person perceptions are consistent with self‐categorization theory, irreconcilable with the exposure hypothesis, and difficult to reconcile with the self‐enhancement explanation.     

Self‐Enhancement on a Self‐Categorization Leash: Evidence for a Dual‐Process Model of First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

Research suggests that first‐ and third‐person perceptions are driven by the motive to self‐enhance and cognitive processes involving the perception of social norms. This article proposes and tests a dual‐process model that predicts an interaction between cognition and motivation. Consistent with the model, Experiment 1 (N = 112) showed that self‐enhancement drove influence judgments when messages were normatively neutral—people reported first‐person perceptions for in‐group‐favoring messages and third‐person perceptions for out‐group‐favoring messages. Experiment 2 (N = 208) showed an additive effect when social norms were also in‐group‐enhancing, but showed a decreased effect when social norms and group‐enhancement were discordant. The findings are hard to reconcile with pure motivational or cognitive explanations, but are consistent with the proposed dual‐process model.     

First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement

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Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style

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