共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 10 毫秒
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Travis Dumsday 《Ratio》2013,26(2):134-147
Laws of nature are properly (if controversially) conceived as abstract entities playing a governing role in the physical universe. Dispositionalists typically hold that laws of nature are not real, or at least are not fundamental, and that regularities in the physical universe are grounded in the causal powers of objects. By contrast, I argue that dispositionalism implies nomic realism: since at least some dispositions have ceteris paribus clauses incorporating uninstantiated universals, and these ceteris paribus clauses help to determine their dispositions' ranges of manifestation, there are indeed abstracta which play a governing role in the physical universe. After addressing several objections (including the objection that such ‘laws’ lack sufficient independence/externality from the dispositions to count as genuinely governing), I go on to consider some broader implications of this conclusion for other debates in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. 1 相似文献
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THE CIRCLE OF SECURITY INTERVENTION: ENHANCING ATTACHMENT IN EARLY PARENT–CHILD RELATIONSHIPS. By
Bert
Powell,
Glen
Cooper,
Kent
Hoffman,and
Bob
Marvin. The Guilford Press,New York,NY, 2014. pp. 396. Price $**. ISBN 978‐1‐59385‐314‐3. 下载免费PDF全文
Jenna Slutsky 《Infant and child development》2014,23(4):455-456
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Theresa Yugar 《Teaching Theology & Religion》2014,17(1):92-93
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Steven L. Reynolds 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2006,40(3):468-494
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Mohan Matthen 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2009,43(1):94-115
Standard biological and philosophical treatments assume that dramatic genotypic or phenotypic change constitutes instantaneous speciation, and that barring such saltation, speciation is gradual evolutionary change in individual properties. Both propositions appear to be incongruent with standard theoretical perspectives on species themselves, since these perspectives are (a) non‐pheneticist, and (b) tend to disregard intermediate cases. After reviewing certain key elements of such perspectives, it is proposed that species‐membership is mediated by membership in a population. Species‐membership depends, therefore, not on intrinsic characteristics of an organism, but on relationship of an organism to others. A new definition of speciation is proposed in the spirit of this proposal. This definition implies that dramatic change is neither necessary nor sufficient for speciation. It also implies, surprisingly, that an organism can change species during its lifetime. 相似文献
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