In Defense of the Ideal of a Life Plan

Aristotle claims at Eudemian Ethics 1.2 that everyone who can live according to his own choice should adopt some goal for the good life, which he will keep in view in all his actions, for not to have done so is a sign of folly. This is an opinion shared by other ancients as well as some moderns. Others believe, however, that this view is false to the human condition, and provide a number of objections: (1) you can't plan love; (2) nor life's surprises; (3) planning a whole life is of no use since the world changes too much; (4) as do our values; and (5) planning a life is something only dreary people would do. The aim of this paper is to examine these objections, as part of a broader attempt to defend the relevance of a eudaimonistic approach to the question of how to live well.     

Re‐framing systemic paradigms for the art of learning

Thoughtful people are increasingly concerned that the current paradigms for social, corporate, and educational activities are in disgraceful disarray. The “problem‐solving” or analytical model, the competitive or game model, the commercial or consumer model, the bureaucratic or institutional model, and the disease or illness model which prevail in public discourse are proving to be especially unwholesome. We cannot, however, educate ourselves without paradigms. A credible educational paradigm must be generally accessible without being simplistic, informative without being monothematic, and accommodating as well as discriminating. Given our disquiet with the current cognitive situation, a renewing paradigm must be somehow novel; given the character of human nature, a sustaining paradigm must be somehow familiar.

For a very long time now, professional Sciences have committed themselves to paradigms about “reality out there,” while professional Arts have devoted themselves to expressing “imagination from within here.” The more these two worldviews polarize in opposition to one another, the more room there is—and the more human heed there becomes—for mediation by an applied philosophy which accommodates the “real” as well as the “imaginary” in a complementary way. Such a philosophy would address not only “what do you know?” and “how do you do?” but also “how do you know?” and “why do you do?” In earlier times, people would have been considered neither educated nor wise unless they appreciated the Sciences and the Arts whole. In our time, we may not survive unless we can re‐integrate our fractured perceptions. How might we proceed to do so? There may be a systemological way.     

Integrity and Fragmentation

The virtue of integrity does not appear explicitly in either the Aristotelian or the Judaeo-Christian list of virtues, but elements of both ethical systems implicitly acknowledge the importance of a unified and integrated life. This paper argues that integrity is indispensible for a good human life; the fragmented or compartmentalized life is always subject to instability, in so far as unresolved psychological conflicts and tensions may threaten to derail our ethical plans and projects. Achieving a stable and integrated life requires self-awareness; and (drawing on insights from the psychoanalytic tradition) it is suggested that self-awareness is not a simple matter, but requires a complex process of self-discovery. The paper's final section argues that although vitally necessary for the good life, integrity cannot be sufficient. Against the view of influential writers such as Bernard Williams and Harry Frankfurt, our commitment to our chosen projects, however authentic and integrated, cannot in itself give our lives meaning and value. The good and meaningful life cannot be a matter of authenticity alone, but requires us, whether we like it or not, to bring our projects into line with enduring objective values that we did not create, and which we cannot alter.     

Practical Skills and Practical Wisdom in Virtue

This paper challenges a frequent objection to conceptualizing virtues as skills, which is that skills are merely capacities to act well, while virtues additionally require being properly motivated to act well. I discuss several cases that purport to show the supposed motivational difference by drawing our attention to the differing intuitions we have about virtues and skills. However, this putative difference between virtue and skill disappears when we switch our focus in the skill examples from the performance to the performer. The ends of a practice can be used to judge not only the skilfulness of a performance, but also the motivational commitment of the performer. Being virtuous requires both acting well and being properly motivated to do so, which can be captured by viewing virtues as the moral subset of skills. In claiming this, though, I resist the idea that there is no element in virtue that is not found in other skills. Virtue requires being practically wise about how practices fit into a conception of the good life, but other skills do not. I further argue that this difference doesn't undermine the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis, as it's the connection between virtues and morality that requires practical wisdom.     

当代自由主义和社群主义之争:以公民资格为焦点

当代自由主义和社群主义之争涉及很多方面,但以公民资格为焦点来看,二者之间的主要差异表现为:自由主义以个体价值立论,重视个人自由和权利的保障,而社群主义则以群体价值立论,重视社会公共善的达成.这两种公民资格观所标榜的公民精神都在不同方面契合当代中国社会发展的需要.就我国当前现状而言,应从日常生活中的公民礼仪做起,培养和塑造以宽容尊重、平等交往为主要人格特征的新时代公民,由此,政治民主生活中负责任的好公民才可能产生.     

The Feasibility OF Collectives' Actions

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected.     

MAKING OUR OWN LUCK

It has been contended that we can never be truly responsible for anything we do: we do what we do because of the way we are, so we cannot be responsible for what we do unless we are responsible for the way we are; and we cannot be responsible for the way we are when we first make decisions in life, so we can never become responsible for the way we are later in life. This article argues that in our consciously chosen actions we respond rationally to whole ‘gestalt’ experiences in ways that cannot be pre‐determined by pre‐choice circumstances and laws of nature and/or computational rules; and that this means we are partly responsible for what we do, even if we are not responsible for the way we are.     

Culturally Imposed Trauma: The Sleeping Dog Has Awakened. Will Psychoanalysis Take Heed?

This paper considers the scant attention psychoanalysis gives to cultural trauma. Three contributions to this deficiency are considered: (a) the continuing identification with our psychoanalytic forefathers’ silence regarding cultural trauma, (b) the authoritarian practices in psychoanalytic institutions that keep us overly focused on standard intrapsychic formulations to the near exclusion of cultural trauma, and (c) the fact that work with cultural trauma is difficult. To do this work requires us to “buck the system.” If we do so, we expose ourselves to toxic phenomena in a world still rife with cultural trauma. This paper, which includes clinical vignettes, is an invitation to do so.     

The structure of and changes to the life values of Japanese consumers

As the standard of living improves and the number of choices expands, consumer behavior shifts from meeting needs to realizing the specific life values of each consumer. A structural analysis of life values was performed to increase understanding of consumer behavior as a whole, so that effective marketing strategies can be prepared. The structural analysis of life values was conducted by plotting daily activities in an evaluation space, which was defined by "necessity,""attractiveness," and "ease of achievement," and also by factor analysis of these daily activities. Using this method, we measured the structure of the daily activities of Japanese consumers, and then examined the value structure of time-consuming activities, which our research suggests will be considered highly attractive in the future. Based on the results of the surveys, we discuss the development of the market for highly attractive activities and products. However, an improvement in life infrastructure is a prerequisite to realizing a market for highly attractive activities and products.     

The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism

Eudaimonists deny that eudaimonism is objectionably egoistic, but the way in which they do so commits them to eschewing an important insight that has been a central motivation for eudaimonism: the idea that an individual must, in the end, organize her life in such a way that it is good for her. In this paper I argue that the egoism objection prods eudaimonists to make a choice between (what we might roughly call) welfare‐prior and excellence‐prior eudaimonism, and I make some preliminary remarks on behalf of welfare‐prior eudaimonism.     

Psychological factors that influence car-following and car-following model development

This commentary on Brackstone and McDonald’s (1999) historical review of car-following models focuses primarily on five issues: (i) Why has so much effort been devoted to car-following models? (ii) What assumptions do car-following models make about driver behavior? (iii) What factors influence car-following? (iv) What improvements can be made to car-following models? and (v) Do we need a ‘normative’ model of driver behavior? The review concludes that differences between the approaches of traffic engineers and traffic psychologists to activities such as car-following have not led to a common understanding of behavior, which is required if the challenge of anticipating how people will drive in other circumstances with different in-car systems is to be successfully overcome.     

On wisdom

This article explores some of the features involved in making wise decisions in couples and family therapy. Delineating what qualities are involved in making wise decisions in life--so as to live the "good life" in the polis, and the necessary contributions of life experiences in this task--was first discussed by Aristotle. A major problem that therapists face today is that our society offers many different ways of living well--or for that matter, badly--and our theories do the same. Family therapy theories are not value free. I clarify that different family theories embody different values: clear boundaries, good attachments, the ability to communicate, and so on. If our theories foster certain values, then, as Isaiah Berlin has made clear, seeking to achieve a particular value leads to placing less value on another. The article concludes with some thoughts about values that therapists could appropriately follow in their work.     

How we think and act together

In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.     

Is happiness the supreme good? Some philosophical objections

Modern philosophy is characterised by various objections to the Aristotelian conception of happiness as the supreme good of human life. In this paper, I focus on the objections raised by two key thinkers of the modern period, namely Blaise Pascal and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both philosophers formulate important counter- arguments to the teleological claim that happiness is the highest good towards which all human beings naturally direct their efforts. Their target is not any specific definition of happiness as a particular kind of activity, or a particular kind of good. Instead, they express a more fundamental scepticism about the very possibility of happiness being the ultimate end of human life. As I show, Pascal's and Nietzsche's radical point is that, since reason alone can never answer for certain the question of whether or not happiness is the ultimate aim of human existence, philosophy should not concern itself with the question of happiness. The paper has three parts. I first sketch an outline of Pascal's sceptical argument with regard to happiness, and then present his positive definition of happiness, after which I do the same for Nietzsche. The third part is devoted to a critical assessment of their positions in light of an alternative argument developed by John Cottingham.     

'Deny Yourself and Take up Your Cross': John Calvin on the Christian Life

John Calvin's vision of the Christian life is guided by the fundamental insight that what distorts our lives more than anything else is our blind self-love. This self-love is the reason why we love to hear things that flatter us, and hate to hear things that truly reveal who we are. Our self-love also provides the driving engine behind our pride, ambition and arrogance, whereby we seek the meaning of our lives in power, wealth and honor, so that we may despise those we consider to be inferior to us. If we are to be transformed more and more into the image and likeness of God, so that we may at the end be united with God in eternal life, we must eradicate this blind self-love from our hearts. Although there is much in Calvin's vision of the Christian life that may strike us as odd or even as alien, it is hard to disagree with his insight that blind self-love is the primary reason our lives do not express the image and likeness of God.     

Margaret F. Washburn (1871–1939): First Woman Ph.D. in Psychology

Margaret Floy Washburn was one of the first generation of leading psychologists trained in America and became an eminent and influential psychologist during the first third of the 20th century. She was recognized for significant contributions in theory development, experimental work, teaching, and professional service, but this paper focuses on her activities as director of the psychology program at Vassar College and author of the classic text in comparative psychology, The Animal Mind . Although full biographical details are not given, a listing of bibliographic sources is provided so that scholars might more readily obtain access to information omitted from the paper. The discussion also considers Washburn's professional life and personal characteristics and how she might be viewed as a role model.
"Nothing in the world is so compelling to the emotions as the mind of another human being" (Washburn, 1916b, p. 606). This statement, tucked away in an essay on the psychology of esthetic experience in music, provides an insightful clue to one of the motivations which sustained Margaret Floy Washburn's significant career as one of the most influential psychologists in psychology's first half–century as a distinct discipline. She held a life long fascination with the minds of humans and animals and was convinced that experimental psychology provided the appropriate methodology for exploring the topic. She devoted her unflagging energy and outstanding ability to the newly evolving science throughout a 43–year career which covered the period 1894–1937.     

The emotional health of the clergy

Summary and conclusions The health we seek is creative growth through all the relationships of life. We need an elastic concept of health, with a capacity to accept limitations and to do our best with these limitations in creative efforts to keep growing.We need to be aware of the particular hazards in this vocation, which may endanger the emotional health of the clergyman. Seeing these more clearly we can better prepare to cope with them.We must know to whom we belong, and learn to be at home with those persons and groups who become our living, working, and reciprocal community of outgoing care and forgiving love.If we can see emotional health as a dynamic process of ever-growing outreach and integration, we will value the stresses of our life and work. The pains as well as the joys contribute to the challenge and fulfillment of persons who grow through creative encounter with other persons.Continuing education will be needed for this crucial vocation of ministering to others, as it is in every serving profession where the complexities of life are so baffling. Academic courses and library study, though needed, will not suffice to prepare for effective work with other persons in face-to-face relations. There will be constant need for supervised evaluation of what we are and seek to become to others in the critical moments of meeting, listening, and responding as person to person in the ultimate concerns of our life in community.He is also a member of the Academy.     

Enhancement and ethics

Now suppose we could use genetic engineering, regenerative medicine or drugs --chemical enhancers, or reproductive technology or nanotechnology to produce healthier, fitter and more intelligent individuals, what should our reaction be? Would it be unethical to do so? Would it be ethical not to do so? Our question is this: If the goal of enhanced intelligence, increased powers and capacities and better health is something that we might strive to produce through education, including of course the more general health education of the community; why should we not produce these goals, if we can do so safely, through enhancement technologies or procedures? If these are legitimate aims of education could they be illegitimate as the aims of medical or life science, as opposed to educational science?     

Countertransference and the Erotic

Eros is like a huge spark that ignites our passion and then confronts us with the problem of living out this fire in ordinary space and time. What do we each know of this spark, this flame? Who or what was it’s object? Where have we felt this force for unity in ourselves, with another person, with life itself? Where are we unlived erotically? Where are the chinks in our erotic life? In focusing on the erotic in clinical work, we usually begin with the analysand’s transference. I want to explore eros in the life of the analyst for our relation to eros influences the clinical work we do. When eros is constellated, two possibilities of relationship present themselves: to an actual other who must be reckoned with as real, and to a psychic content, equally real, which we do not invent or control. How do we experience this electricity? What is our desire like? What does it take us back to, and toward what unseen purpose does it propel us? Eros brings with it a sense of purpose, of going somewhere important, something that enlists body, soul, and spirit.     

Mask-wearing increases present-mindedness

Besides health consequences, in what subtle ways do mask-wearing affect our psychology? In this research, we explored whether the experience of mask-wearing, like other disruptive visceral states (e.g., hunger), affects our time perspective. In two experiments (total N = 596), we examined if mask-wearing temporarily generates present-mindedness (more focus on present than future). Study 1 found that mask-wearing (vs. no-mask) lowered considerations about the future, which was mediated by a sense of stuffiness. Study 2 extended this finding and examined whether the effect spillovers to other time-relevant judgments, such as ideals about a good life. Again, when experiencing stuffiness because of mask-wearing, people were more likely to favor pleasure in current life than future life meaning. Our finding implies that concrete visceral experience (stuffiness) linked with the pandemic may shape our mind in subtle, unforeseen ways.