HAND IN GLOVE: EVALUATING THE FIT BETWEEN METHOD AND THEOLOGY IN VAN HUYSSTEEN'S INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN UNIQUENESS

Wentzel van Huyssteen's Alone in the World? (2006) presents an interpretation of human uniqueness in the form of a dialogue between classical Christian theological affirmations and cutting‐edge scientific understandings of the human and animal worlds. The sheer amount of information from different thinkers and fields that van Huyssteen absorbs and integrates makes this book extraordinary and, indeed, very rich as a work of interdisciplinary theology. The book commands respect and deserves close attention. In this essay I evaluate van Huyssteen's proposal as well as the method he uses to produce it. Special attention is given to the concept of embodiment. Van Huyssteen's concept of embodiment is substantially correct in most respects and largely consistent with the scientific and theological pictures of human nature. In a few respects, however, his interpretation of the bodily character of human life appears to be insufficiently thoroughgoing relative to our best contemporary knowledge of human nature from the natural sciences.     

UNIQUENESS,THE IMAGE OF GOD,AND THE PROBLEM OF METHOD: ENGAGING VAN HUYSSTEEN

Wentzel van Huyssteen's book Alone in the World? provides a thoughtful and nuanced account of human evolution from a theological perspective. Not only does his work provide what is perhaps the only sustained theological reflection specifically on human evolution, but his working through of many of the issues, particularly on the image of God literature in theology, has few parallels. Despite this, I focus on what I consider to be several weaknesses of the text, including areas of theological method, theological interpretation, and the central topic of human uniqueness. Addressing these weaknesses will, I propose, improve van Huyssteen's argument and lead in new and fruitful directions.     

PRIMATES AND RELIGION: A BIOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGIST'S RESPONSE TO J. WENTZEL VAN HUYSSTEEN'S ALONE IN THE WORLD?

For a biological anthropologist interested in the prehistory of religion, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen's book is welcome and resonant. Van Huyssteen's central thesis is that humans' capacity for spirituality emerges from a transformation of cognition and emotions that takes place in the symbolic realm, within Homo sapiens and apart from biology. To his thesis I bring to bear three areas of response: the abundant cognitive and emotional capacities of living apes and extinct hominids; the role of symbolic ritual in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens; and the closely intertwined nature of biology and culture in the workings of evolutionary change.     

Logic as a Universal Medium or Logic as a Calculus? Husserl and the Presuppositions of “the Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth Century Philosophy”

This paper discusses Jean van Heijenoort's (1967) and Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka's (1986, 1997) distinction between logic as a universal language and logic as a calculus, and its applicability to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Although it is argued that Husserl's phenomenology shares characteristics with both sides, his view of logic is closer to the model‐theoretical, logic‐as‐calculus view. However, Husserl's philosophy as transcendental philosophy is closer to the universalist view. This paper suggests that Husserl's position shows that holding a model‐theoretical view of logic does not necessarily imply a calculus view about the relations between language and the world. The situation calls for reflection about the distinction: It will be suggested that the applicability of the van Heijenoort and the Hintikkas distinction either has to be restricted to a particular philosopher's views about logic, in which case no implications about his or her more general philosophical views should be inferred from it; or the distinction turns into a question of whether our human predicament is inescapable or whether it is possible, presumably by means of model theory, to obtain neutral answers to philosophical questions. Thus the distinction ultimately turns into a question about the correct method for doing philosophy.     

On the Dynamics of Conversation

There is a longstanding debate in the literature about static versus dynamic approaches to meaning and conversation. A formal result due to van Benthem ( 1986 , 1996 ) is often thought to be important for understanding what, conceptually speaking, is at issue in the debate. We introduce the concept of a conversation system, and we use it to clarify the import of van Benthem's result. We then distinguish two classes of conversation systems, corresponding to two concepts of staticness. The first class corresponds to a generalization of the class of systems that van Benthem's result concerns. These are the strongly static conversation systems. The second class is broader, and allows for a certain commonly recognized form of context sensitivity. These are the weakly static conversation systems. In the vein of van Benthem's result, we supply representation theorems which independently characterize these two varieties of conversation system. We observe that some canonically dynamic semantic systems correspond to weakly static conversation systems. We close by discussing some hazards that arise in trying to bring our formal results to bear on natural language phenomena, and on the debate about whether the compositional semantics for natural language should take a dynamic shape.     

Fred Rogers and children’s spirituality: valuing the uniqueness of others and caring for others

Mister Rogers' Neighborhood was a safe haven advocating kindness, empathy, and caring for all children. Making everyone feel loved, Fred Rogers captured the attention and curiosity of young children across America with his compassionate manner, intentional listening skills, and respect for all individuals by encouraging children to feel good about themselves. This article explores the ministry of Fred Rogers and how his approach to children's spirituality focused on valuing the uniqueness of each individual, human connections through play, and caring for others by recognizing spiritual moments and teaching the whole child while appreciating the uniqueness of others. His genuine and patient presence had a healing quality, creating a world for children in which real learning and unconditional love could flourish. The messages of tolerance and acceptance by recognizing and respecting other's beliefs, and unconditional love and care, were beacons of hope for all.     

ARE SCIENCE AND HUMANISM SUITED TO ENTER THE ANCIENT QUEST OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY? A RESPONSE TO LLUÍS OVIEDO

This response reverses the title of Lluís Oviedo's essay (2006) while retaining the structure. In the pendulum swing between science and humanism, theology finds its uniqueness not in refuting either but in subverting them: subverting the scientific quest for certainty without denying its pursuit, and subverting the humanist quest for the unique dignity of the human by reducing it to the most despoiled creature, yet finding in it the presence of the divine. Theological pursuit is about reason and its limits, about brokenness and glory in it. Yet the engagement is unavoidable, for without the scientific pursuit of certainty, incompleteness could never be established; without the humanist search for the uniqueness of the human, its admixed and impure character would not be recognized. The concept of hybridity tries to convey that and is presented in three instantiations: the conflation of the human with machine (cyborg), of humans and other animals (oncomouse), and of the human and the divine. Following these ontological cases of hybridity, at the epistemological level theology becomes hybrid “science” in search of the mythos in the midst of logos, and conversely it is hybrid humanism, for it locates God in the greatest depravity of mammalian existence.     

Animals,humans and x-men: Human uniqueness and the meaning of personhood

Research in animal intelligence suggests to some that humans are different only in degree from animals, possibly eroding the traditional theological doctrine of the imago dei. In this paper, several critical boundary areas between humans and animals are examined for scientific evidence about human distinctiveness. These include communication and language capacity, cultural creativity, spirituality, and ethical capacity. Chimpanzee language studies and research in Neanderthal mentality are examined as the closest known natural approximations to human communication and intelligence. The implications of the findings are explored in relation to human culture, ethics, and spirituality in a context consistent with evolutionary continuity. Aspects of human uniqueness are apparent, can be fruitfully encompassed in the idea of personhood, and are coherent with Trinitarian theology's anthropological focus.     

Religion,Religiousness, and Narrative: Decoding Women's Practices in Senegalese Islamic Reform

Martin Riesebrodt argues that his theory of religion can help explain religion's enduring power in the contemporary globalizing and secularizing world. Although he emphasizes the necessity of objective categories for theorizing religion's purpose, adherents’ narratives about their religious practices reveal lived relationships between ideal‐typical liturgical texts (which help comprise religion) and their appropriations of them for navigating rapidly changing social contexts (religiousness). The validity of Riesebrodt's approach for explaining religion in empirical settings is demonstrated by using ethnographic interviews of Muslim reformist women in Dakar, Senegal. These female adherents’ discourses on the practices of veiling, prayer, and preaching the uniqueness of God highlight the ways religion's directives operate in a dialectical relationship with a religiousness that encompasses their dual efforts to achieve closeness to God and overtly critique other Muslim groups, contemporary urban life, and the state.     

Divergent Thinking and Evaluation Skills: Do They Always Go Together?

The aim of the present study was to explore the hypothesized relationship between divergent thinking (DT) and two types of evaluation: interpersonal (judgments about others' ideas) and intrapersonal (judgments about one's own ideas). Divergent thinking and evaluation skills were measured by means of a GenEva (Generation and Evaluation) task. There were two conditions of the task: intrapersonal and interpersonal, and two aspects of a given idea were assessed: originality and uniqueness. The main results suggest that (1) overall DT skill is positively related to intrapersonal evaluation of uniqueness; (2) the originality component of DT skill is negatively related to intrapersonal evaluation of uniqueness; (3) overall DT is negatively related to intrapersonal evaluation of originality; (4) underestimation of idea uniqueness is more salient in interpersonal evaluation, particularly in case of those with high DT skill. The results are discussed in terms of author's and observer's perspectives of judgment.     

Preference for Human (vs. Robotic) Labor is Stronger in Symbolic Consumption Contexts

Advances in robotics, automation, and artificial intelligence increasingly enable firms to replace human labor with technology, thereby fundamentally transforming how goods and services are produced. From both managerial and societal points of view, it is therefore important to understand demand‐side incentives for firms to employ human labor. We begin to address this question by examining for which products and services consumers are more likely to favor human (vs. robotic) labor. In six studies, we demonstrate that consumers prefer human (vs. robotic) labor more for products with higher (vs. lower) symbolic value (e.g., when expressing something about one's beliefs and personality is of greater importance). We theorize that this is because consumers have stronger uniqueness motives in more (vs. less) symbolic consumption contexts (and associate human labor more strongly with product uniqueness). In line with this account, we demonstrate that individual differences in need for uniqueness moderate the interaction between production mode and symbolic motives and that a measure of uniqueness motives mediates the effect of consumption context on preferences for human (vs. robotic) production.     

COMPARISON AND HISTORY IN THE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS: An Essay on Michael Cook's Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought1

Qur'an 3:104 speaks of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” as a constitutive feature of the Muslim community. Michael Cook's careful and comprehensive study provides a wealth of information about the ways Muslims in various contexts have understood this notion. Cook also makes a number of comparative observations, and suggests that “commanding” appears to be a uniquely Muslim practice. Scholars of religious ethics should read Cook's study with great appreciation. They will also have a number of questions about his comparative comments. In this article, I suggest that scholars of comparative ethics should think less about the “uniqueness” of the materials examined by Cook, and more about the ways groups of human beings discipline their members, thereby constituting and maintaining themselves as communities of virtue.     

Why talk about sin? Luther's understanding of sin and hopeful sin-talk in the 21st century

For Luther talking about sin and the sinful nature of human beings has a strong pastoral significance. His emphasis on the “bondage” of the human will is tightly connected to his insistence on the human sinful condition, and our inability to choose to be or not to be held captive by sin. My conclusion is that it is indeed important to continue to talk about sin if the Christian discourse about God's forgiveness and grace is to make sense. Furthermore, I believe Luther's understanding of sin as misplaced trust, the distinction he makes between sin and sins, and his idea of a justified sinner can indeed make a significant contribution to a hopeful sin-talk within Christian communities today. It is, however, necessary to pay attention to Luther's historical context and to reevaluate his understanding of human nature and human sinfulness from a feminist critical perspective. The sin-concept has gradually been losing its relevance within Christian communities. Therefore the question: why should we continue to talk about sin? The aim of this article is to explore Luther's understanding of sin and human sinfulness, in order to find out if, and then how, he might prove helpful when it comes to the interpretation of the concept of sin in the 21st century. The focus is on Luther's pastoral writings in The Small and The Large Catechism (1529), together with his Smalcald Articles (1537).     

Wolterstorff on Love and Justice

In Justice in Love, Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for a unique ethical orientation called “care‐agapism.” He offers it as an alternative to theories of benevolence‐agapism found in Christian ethics on the one hand and to the philosophical orientations of egoism, utilitarianism, and eudaimonism on the other. The purported uniqueness and superiority of his theory lies in its ability to account for the conceptual compatibility of love and justice while also positively incorporating self‐love. Yet in attempting to articulate a “bestowed worth” account of human dignity—in which dignity is given by divine love and respected in acts of justice—Wolterstorff leans on an unstable characterization of how love and the good are conceptually interwoven. As a result, his reader cannot be sure about the theoretical superiority of care‐agapism. Moreover, Wolterstorff's attempt to value self‐love and at the same time reject eudaimonism depends on a dubious interpretation of Augustine carried over from Justice: Rights and Wrongs, which itself further depends on a mischaracterization of the possible varieties of eudaimonism. This mistake is unfortunate because, on a closer reading of Augustine, one finds an agapistic account of eudaimonism that could have significantly helped Wolterstorff's overall account of the complementary relation of love and justice.     

Grounding Human Dignity

Abstract: What is the future of human dignity? Is there a limit on what can be done to human organisms? To approach such questions this article reviews some traditional understandings of human dignity and then offers a shift in perspective. Traditional areas in which human dignity has been grounded include the doctrine of the image of God, the notion of humanity as a reconciliation of opposites, the chronological place of humans in the process of creation, God's free grace, and the human capacity for union with the divine. Maintaining that dignity is reserved for the later stages of human development, the author suggests we shift our thinking from notions of dignity to those of value. A fertilized egg as a living organism is to be valued for its uniqueness and nature, but it does not acquire dignity until it individualizes within the larger process of embryogenesis.     

Anti-Christelike ‘ateïsme’ en anti-Semitisme by Friedrich Nietzsche

Die werke van Renan, Stöcker en Dühring het 'n belangrike rol in die vestiging van anti-Semitisme in Duitsland gespeel. Nietzsche neem aan die politieke debat van sy tyd deel deur swaarde met hierdie drie te kruis. Teen die agtergrond hiervan word in hierdie artikel die standpunt verdedig dat Nietzsche se ateïsme 'n totale afwysing van die anti-Semitisme behels—of daardie anti-Semitisme nou in 'n ‘Christelike’ of 'nie-Christelike' gewaad geklee was. In sy Genealogy of morals en Anti-Christ, maak hy gebruik van 'n genealogiese strategie waarmee hy die standpunt dat die anti-Semitisme, die Christendom en die Judaïsme van die priesters 'n familie-verwantskap het, verdedig. Hulle word gekenmerk deur ressentiment, oftewel 'n gemeenskaplike morele verwysingsraamwerk. Sy ateïsme is 'n poging om verby (anderkant) hierdie verwysingsraamwerk te beweeg.     

A RECONSIDERATION OF KIERKEGAARD'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE HUMAN OTHER: The Hidden Ethics of Soteriology

In this article, I embark on an analysis of Søren Kierkegaard's view of human otherness in strict correlation to his Christian philosophy. More specifically, my aim is to show that Kierkegaard's thought is essentially informed by a decisive appropriation of the soteriological category of sin which has momentous implications for Kierkegaard's views of selfhood and intersubjectivity. The main argument is that both Kierkegaard's negative evaluation of human otherness and his acerbic indictments of any collectivist interference in salvific matters cohere with his appropriation of the doctrine of the Fall. At the same time, I show in what sense Kierkegaard deems human alterity to be indispensable to one's spiritual self‐becoming expressed through the Christian imperative of loving the other as neighbor. Seen thus, agape, while supplementing Kierkegaard's creationistic psychology, actually becomes the necessary restorative opposite of sinfulness in the self's encounters with the distinct uniqueness of the human other.     

Critical Afrikaner Intellectuals and Apartheid, 1943–1958

Apartheid dominated the political thinking of two generations of Afrikaner intellectuals from its first conceptualizations in the early 1940s to its disintegration as an ideology during the 1980s. Western Cape politicians, academics, journalists and church leaders were the main contributors to the Sauer Report, which was the greatest influence on the apartheid plank of the National Party's 1948 platform. Although apartheid as a policy did not clinch the NP victory, it won steady support in the course of the 1950s. The article discusses the work of four Afrikaner critics of apartheid as it was conceptualized and implemented in the first decade of NP rule. The most striking observations were those of the ambivalent figure of the poet and essayist N.P. van Wyk Louw, who has remained an important moral voice in the Afrikaner political tradition. André du Toit's Die Sondes van die Vaders (1983) built on some key arguments of Louw in arguing for the abandonment of apartheid as a way of securing Afrikaner survival.     

Response to Strenger

Despite certain apparently common values, Strenger's critique is addressed largely to an inaccurate account of my views. It is also internally contradictory in various ways. On one hand, for example, Strenger favors a dialectic of science and the humanities as they bear on psychoanalysis; on the other hand, he declares science to be the exclusive psychoanalytic “metaphysic.” Remarkably, he claims that my critique of technical rationality is tantamount to advocating a passive reflective stance on the analyst's part, precluding anything akin to “coaching” to foster change. But I've written consistently about the dialectic of proactive therapeutic influence and critical reflection on that very influence and its implications. What's unacceptable about technical rationality is its positivist confidence about the effectiveness of prescribed interventions based on allegedly scientific evidence. With his lengthy survey of extra-analytic studies, Strenger evades engaging my specific arguments since they are strictly about the unwarranted privileging of the findings of psychoanalytic process and outcome research relative to clinical experience. He mistakenly equates my repudiation of such privileging with rejection of the value of “science” altogether for psychoanalysis. Finally, Strenger's claim that my “dialectical constructivism” eschews formulating universal truths about human nature ignores my consideration of human potentials for both denying and confronting mortality and the associated challenge of human agency. Embracing that challenge constitutes a moral position for psychoanalysis that is unequivocally opposed to uncritical compliance with culturally shaped demands for various types of therapeutic services.