Academics,practitioners and the Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology: Reflecting on the issues

Gelade's (2006) paper raises some very important points about the continuing role and development of JOOP that will encourage critical reflection and debate in our discipline. However, it also contains various assumptions that should be further explored before committing JOOP to action. Here I argue that we have to reflect more carefully on: the nature of the ‘problem’ with JOOP, and its causes; the characteristics of the claimed divide between ‘academics’ and ‘practitioners’, and its effects; and what constitutes ‘practical concerns’. I suggest that we need to investigate the current situation more systematically before committing to action but that any intervention should discourage the greater sedimentation of an academic‐practitioner divide. As an initial development, I recommend that we reflect more on the review process as this is the most direct influence on the nature of JOOP publications.     

On fundamental responsibility

Some psychological states—paradigmatically, beliefs and intentions—are rationally evaluable: they can be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Other states—e.g. sensations and gastrointestinal states—aren't: they're a‐rational. On a familiar but hard‐to‐make‐precise line of thought, at least part of what explains this difference is that we're somehow responsible for (having/being in) states of the former sort, in a way we're not for the others. But this responsibility can't be modeled on the responsibility we have for our (free, intentional) actions. So how should it be understood? In this paper I address that question. The overall shape of my answer is in line with tradition: I take the responsibility to be grounded in certain capacities for reflection and control. Answers in this family have recently been subjected to an interesting challenge. But the version I defend meets that challenge.     

DANCING WITH THE SACRED: EXCERPTS

Abstract. In excerpts from my Dancing with the Sacred (2002), I use ideas from modern science, our world's religions, and my own experience to highlight three themes of the book. First, working within the framework of a scientific worldview, I develop a concept of the sacred (or God) as the creative activity of nature, human history, and individual life. Second, I offer a relational understanding of human nature that I call our social‐ecological selves and suggest some general considerations about what it means to live meaningfully and morally in an evolutionary world. Third, I explore how we might be at home in a universe that is constantly changing and in which suffering and death are interwoven with life and new creation.     

ASTROTHEOLOGY: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL

As we envision constructive undertakings in the field of religion and science for the next decade, the emerging agenda of astrotheology is opening up a new theater for enquiry. Astrotheology provides a critical theological response to the field of astrobiology while critically assessing exciting new research on life in our solar system and the discovery of exoplanets. This article proposes four tasks for the astrotheologian: deliberate on (1) the scope of creation: is God's creation Earth‐centric or does it include the entire cosmos? (2) the question whether a single divine incarnation on Earth suffices for the cosmos or whether multiple incarnations—one for each inhabited planet—is required; (3) whether astrobiologists and other space scientists are sticking to their science or smuggling in ideology; and (4) readying terrestrial life for contact with extraterrestrial life by enumerating issues to be taken up by astroethics.     

Creation and the Symbiosis of Science and Judaism

It seems to me that the critical questions that science and natural philosophy raise for Jewish theology are the following: Does God evolve? Does the universe have or even need an interpretation, specifically with reference to the fact that most of the universe most of the time is uninhabitable, and there may be many more than one universe? Does the universe need a beginning? What is distinctive about human consciousness, intelligence, and ethics in the light of evidence for evolution from all of the life sciences? Finally, will both life and the universe end? These questions are not only modern. They contain all the primary issues that have dominated rabbinic thought. That agenda can be summarized in six topics: How should we model what we believe about (1) God, (2) the world, and (3) the human being; and how should we understand the relations between them, that is, between (4) God and the world (or, creation), (5) God and the human (or, revelation), and (6) the human and the world (or, redemption)? In this paper I focus on the fourth issue, creation. My answer is presented in detail in my Judaism and the Doctrine of Creation(Samuelson 1994). Here I shall summarize my conclusions there concerning science, Jewish texts, and the correlation between them.     

Vices of Inattention

abstract Why do we routinely betray moral commitments that, in some sense, we authentically embrace? One explanation involves inattention: failure to attend to morally important aspects of our lives. Inattention ranges from an unmotivated lack of focus, or “simple” inattention, to more purposeful and wilful self‐deception. Self‐deception has received exhaustive and insightful treatment by philosophers and psychologists; what remains unexamined is the less complex, but more pervasive phenomenon of simple inattention. Since inattention is at least equally important in accounting for our routine moral failures, this gap is an important one to fill. In this essay I examine moral dimensions of inattention: what makes it problematic, what vices it reflects, what duties we have to overcome it, and how we might try to do that. I argue that inattention obscures responsibilities to prevent harm, erodes autonomy, manifests a lack of virtue, and undermines integrity. For these reasons, we have obligations of attentiveness. I propose that we should attend (at least) to apparent violations of our moral values in which we are personally implicated, which we have power to affect, and to which we have been directed by clues that something is amiss. I end with practical suggestions for enhancing our attentiveness.     

Intimacies: An Integrative Multicultural Framework for Couple Therapy

Implicitly or explicitly, our ideas about intimacy are the most fundamental notions giving direction to the process of couple therapy. Yet, as a field, we have spent little time conceptualizing intimacy and even less time considering the diversity of priorities and meanings couples bring to our offices. In Part One, Varieties of Intimacy, I describe a kaleidoscope of contexts—socio‐historical, cultural, gender, life cycle, and developmental—that inform our ideas and expectations for intimacy in couples’ relationships. I highlight different spheres in which intimacy may take place such as the emotional, sexual, intellectual, or familial. I propose a starting point in which the therapist, in a collaborative manner, helps the partners articulate their yearnings and priorities in order to negotiate a shared vision. In Part Two, Conceptualizing Intimacy, I suggest an experiential definition that gives room for each partner's subjective meanings, yet consider diverse relational processes that may need to be addressed for a resilient ebb and flow of intimate experiences. In Part Three , Sexual Intimacy, I outline conditions in which sex is more likely to be experienced as intimate rather than nonintimate. Finally, in Part Four, I describe Therapeutic Principles to guide the therapist in taking couples from reactivity to dialogue to negotiations of intimacy. The integrative framework proposed here discourages monolithic a priori notions of intimacy and highlights instead: nuanced meanings, relational processes to be considered differentially, present and past emotional blocks, and a flexible clinical approach to foster conditions for the creation and resilience of intimate experiences.     

THE DIVINE CONJECTURES: A CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT OF HUMAN ORIGINS AND DESTINY

Six “divine conjectures” frame the place of Theóne (The One to Whom we pray) in the creation of our universe and for its continuing development in five subsequent stages into a loving universe. The first stage, the cosmological universe, establishes the laws of nature, understood by scientists as the “standard model”. The second stage introduces life and death into the universe by a process we are only now beginning to understand. Stage 3 requires certain life forms to become conscious with a subset of those life‐forms acquiring language that results in that subset becoming self‐conscious. The next stage, Conjecture 4, identifies certain persons who become addicted to learning in their unrelenting effort to learn as much of what can be known as possible. The fifth conjecture requires individual persons to act as agents of Theóne in achieving Conjecture 6—a universe that is both loving and lawful. During the course of the exposition subsidiary discussions of the concepts of conjecture and hypothesis explicate the function of each in the advancement of knowledge and understanding. There are brief discussions of prayer and purpose in relation to the Divine.     

THE KENOSIS OF THE CREATOR AND OF THE CREATED CO-CREATOR

Abstract I comment on moral and theological aspects of human technology, which I consider as an evolutionary moment of our cultural and genetic variation. It is an important moment both scientifically and theologically. Starting from Philip Hefner's theological program of the human being as created co‐creator, I distinguish between the limitations and responsibilities of the human being as a created agent and the possibilities and ideals as a co‐creator. I develop the idea of the kenosis (self‐emptying) of the Creator, which as the root of God's love principle should be reenacted by the created co‐creators. I analyze elements of this kenosis presented by Jürgen Moltmann in relation to creation and eschatology.     

Facilitation by Variation: Right-to-Left Learning of English Yes/No Questions

This study advances the hypothesis that optional structural variation in language facilitates syntactic learning (facilitation‐by‐variation). Support for this is provided by a right‐to‐left‐elaboration acquisition model for English yes/no questions (YNQs). Previous studies have focused on the acquisition of ‘‘inverted’’ YNQs, a cornerstone of nativist theories of language development. Data from five American children (1;3 to 5;1) and their parents show that children hear a range of adult questions (Coming?You coming?Are you coming?), not all inverted. These variants are ordered from structurally least complex noncanonical forms to complex canonical inverted forms. I use state‐of‐the‐art econometric techniques to estimate breakpoints in YNQ time series and show that noncanonical questions emerge early in children’s speech and facilitate acquisition of canonical ones. This incremental structure‐building process relies on an adjunction strategy that augments noncanonical questions with initial auxiliaries and subjects. Development proceeds incrementally from right to left to derive auxiliary‐initial structures.     

ASTROBIOLOGY AND ASTROCHRISTOLOGY

Astrochristology, as a subfield within the more comprehensive astrotheology, speculates on the implications of what astrobiology and related space sciences learn about our future space neighbors. Confirmation of the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent civilizations living on exoplanets will force Christian theologians to decide on two issues. The first issue deals with the question: should Christians expect many incarnations, one for each inhabited exoplanet; or will the single incarnation in terrestrial history suffice? The second issue deals with the question: why is there an incarnation in the first place? Does the divine presence in the historical Jesus mark a divine attempt to fix a broken creation or does it mark a divine self‐communication that would occur with or without creation's fall into sin and death? Sorting these issues out is one task for astrochristology. My own position is to affirm both a single incarnation on Earth valid for cosmic redemption from the brokenness of creation in its present state.     

Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique

Additive theories of rationality, as I use the term, are theories that hold that an account of our capacity to reflect on perceptually‐given reasons for belief and desire‐based reasons for action can begin with an account of what it is to perceive and desire, in terms that do not presuppose any connection to the capacity to reflect on reasons, and then can add an account of the capacity for rational reflection, conceived as an independent capacity to ‘monitor’ and ‘regulate’ our believing‐on‐the‐basis‐of‐perception and our acting‐on‐the‐basis‐of‐desire. I show that a number of recent discussions of human rationality are committed to an additive approach, and I raise two difficulties for this approach, each analogous to a classic problem for Cartesian dualism. The interaction problem concerns how capacities conceived as intrinsically independent of the power of reason can interact with this power in what is intuitively the right way. The unity problem concerns how an additive theorist can explain a rational subject's entitlement to conceive of the animal whose perceptual and desiderative life he or she oversees as ‘I’ rather than ‘it’. I argue that these difficulties motivate a general skepticism about the additive approach, and I sketch an alternative, ‘transformative’ framework in which to think about the cognitive and practical capacities of a rational animal.     

Aretaic Appraisal and Practical Reasons

When we criticize someone for being unjust, deceitful, or imprudent—or commend him as just, truthful, or wise—what is the content of our evaluation? On one way of thinking, evaluating agents in terms that employ aretaic concepts evaluates how they regulate their actions (and judgment‐sensitive attitudes) in light of the reasons that bear on them. On this virtue‐centered view of practical reasons appraisal, evaluations of agents in terms of ethical virtues (and vices) are, inter alia, evaluations of them as practical reasoners. Here I consider and respond to an objection that threatens to debunk the virtue‐centered view.     

Being,belonging, and borders: Scandinavian creation theology as political theology

Desire for life and protecting lives has come to the fore during the pandemic. Borders have been closed to stop the spread of Covid‐19. The virus does not respect borders, yet physical distance is crucial. Three things have become clear. One is the level of uncertainty about which measures are most efficient. The other is that the neo‐liberal philosophy with “just in time” deliveries on a global market has made everyone vulnerable and invited national protectionism rather than collaboration. A third insight is that the lack of borders between wild and tame animals and human beings is connected to the emergence of the virus itself, where rain forests are exploited for short sighted profit. In the midst of this, a cry for Being, for Life, and Human Flourishing, can be heard as an underlying drumbeat. In relation to this I ponder Being in relation to Belonging and to Borders. I first describe a political landscape where neo‐nationalist, and neo‐atheist, claims for belonging, have emerged all over the world, and hence emphasized strong borders between different people, but not for capital. Secondly, I draw on resources from Scandinavian Creation Theology, especially Grundtvig, Aulén, and Wingren to paint a planetary vision with porous borders, beyond patriarchy, populism, and protectionism. In the long run there is no opting out of the planetary vulnerability. I launch the term eschatological creation theology for a creation theology that allows creation to be inspired by the Kin‐dom to come with righteousness and life in abundance.     

Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis‐à‐vis large‐scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed, and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense.     

Testing for negligible interaction: A coherent and robust approach

Researchers often want to demonstrate a lack of interaction between two categorical predictors on an outcome. To justify a lack of interaction, researchers typically accept the null hypothesis of no interaction from a conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA). This method is inappropriate as failure to reject the null hypothesis does not provide statistical evidence to support a lack of interaction. This study proposes a bootstrap‐based intersection–union test for negligible interaction that provides coherent decisions between the omnibus test and post hoc interaction contrast tests and is robust to violations of the normality and variance homogeneity assumptions. Further, a multiple comparison strategy for testing interaction contrasts following a non‐significant omnibus test is proposed. Our simulation study compared the Type I error control, omnibus power and per‐contrast power of the proposed approach to the non‐centrality‐based negligible interaction test of Cheng and Shao (2007, Statistica Sinica, 17, 1441). For 2 × 2 designs, the empirical Type I error rates of the Cheng and Shao test were very close to the nominal α level when the normality and variance homogeneity assumptions were satisfied; however, only our proposed bootstrapping approach was satisfactory under non‐normality and/or variance heterogeneity. In general a × b designs, although the omnibus Cheng and Shao test, as expected, is the most powerful, it is not robust to assumption violation and results in incoherent omnibus and interaction contrast decisions that are not possible with the intersection–union approach.     

Is there a logic of incoherence?

What should we do when we discover that our assessment of probabilities is incoherent? I explore the hypothesis that there is a logic of incoherence—a set of universally valid rules that specify how incoherent probability assessments are to be repaired. I examine a pair of candidate‐rules of incoherence logic that have been employed in philosophical reconstructions of scientific arguments. Despite their intuitive plausibility, both rules turn out to be invalid. There are presently no viable candidate‐rules for an incoherence logic on the table. Other ways of dealing with incoherence are surveyed, and found either to be unsatisfactory or to rely on a logic of incoherence in the end. The resolution of these antagonistic conclusions is left to future researchers.     

Faith and the practising analyst

Abstract: In this brief essay, I reflect on three questions: What is ‘faith’ in a modern and post‐modern cultural context? Do I, a Jungian analyst, have ‘faith’ or do I not? Does having ‘faith’ or not make a difference in the practice of analysis? I make reference to Jung's understanding of ‘faith’ and his frequent disclaimers about making metaphysical claims. I conclude that a post‐credal ‘faith’ is possible for contemporary Jungian analysts, that I do have such a faith personally, and that in my experience this makes a significant difference in analytic practice at least with some patients. Traditional faith statements must be translated into depth psychological terms, however, in order for them to be applicable in post‐modern, multicultural contexts.     

Naturalizing Subjective Character

When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this “bluish way it is like for me”: (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for‐me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for‐me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for‐me‐ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth.