Ambivalence and Self‐Deception: Reframing the Debate

A multitude of scholars have recently argued that inherently ambivalent reactions ought to be accepted, and our drive toward overcoming them resisted, in order to preserve a reflectively accurate account of oneself. By contrast, I argue that a genuine commitment to overcome ambivalence aims less at avoiding than acknowledging and understanding, as well as possibly resolving, whatever conflicts led us to become ambivalent in the first place. On the other hand, certain forms of ‘reflective ambivalence’ are especially vulnerable to the very kind of self‐deception they aim to prevent.     

A Law of One's Own: Self‐Legislation and Radical Kantian Constructivism

Radical constructivists appeal to self‐legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self‐legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self‐legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O'Neill anchors self‐legislation more firmly to the self‐disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self‐legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self‐legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self‐legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.     

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement

Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self‐conscious adherence to epistemic norms requires the ability to self‐consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well‐supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self‐conscious process of changing one's mind.     

A Rule of One's Own: Reply to Commentaries

I respond to two key issues raised by Bernstein and Frankel. One concerns the complex and potentially useful impact of misdemeanors on the treatment process. Without, however, minimizing this dimension of misdemeanors, I focus instead on how we deal with instances when we fail our patients by deliberately placing our own needs ahead of theirs. Bernstein raises the possibility that we are most likely to commit misdemeanors when we embrace an idealized Winnicottian model. I disagree, suggesting that all theoretical positions exclude some aspect of the analyst's personhood. Ultimately, we cannot escape the conflict between the analytic ideal and the reality of our nonideal humanity.     

Faulty Self‐Assessment: Why Evaluating One's Own Competence Is an Intrinsically Difficult Task

People's perception of their competence often diverges from their true level of competence. We argue that people have such erroneous view of their competence because self‐evaluation is an intrinsically difficult task. People live in an information environment that does not contain all the data they need for accurate self‐evaluation. The information environment is insufficient in two ways. First, when making self‐judgments, people lack crucial categories of information necessary to reach accurate evaluations. Second, although people receive feedback over time that could correct faulty self‐assessments, this feedback is often biased, difficult to recognize, or otherwise flawed. Because of the difficulty in making inferences based on such limited and misleading data, it is unreasonable to expect that people will prove accurate in judgments of their skills.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Peace,Self‐Determination and Reckoning with the Past: A Reply to Butt,Lippert‐Rasmussen,Pasternak, Wellman and Stemplowska

In this article, I offer responses to five commentaries on my recently published book, Cosmopolitan Peace. Those articles address my conception of individual and collective agency, my account of self‐determination (and its implication for the problem of annexation during and after the war), and my accounts of, respectively, reparations and remembrance after war. I revise or provide further defences of those accounts in the light of my commentators’ probing remarks.     

Reflective Self‐Control in Self‐Control Scholarship: A Peircean Analysis

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (this issue) present an important critique of much self‐control research, highlighting some of the ways that our customary operationalizations and methods may have created more confusion than clarity. Their insights, rooted in past literature and new data, offer recommendations that will undoubtedly help us improve our research in consumption self‐control. In this commentary, I frame their work using the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher, mathematician, and logician whose frustration with the management of the self‐control construct and subsequent revision parallels Vosgerau et al's in many ways. Further, his thought proposes that their thought traces the boundary of another type of self‐control problem, which I'll refer to as “reflective self‐control.” Taking together consumption self‐control and reflective self‐control, we're able to address a wide range of human experiences and connect self‐control to ethics, consistent with a long tradition bridging the two. Perhaps most importantly, though, a Peircean analysis suggests that Vosgerau et al's paper—whether we agree or disagree with its conclusions—exemplifies the kind of scholarly self‐control we need to display to make scientific progress, regardless of our specific domain of study.     

Positive Self‐regard and Claim to Leadership: Two Fundamental Forms of Self‐evaluation

The present article examines the common factor structure of various self‐evaluative personality constructs. Consistent with previous research, we found considerable redundancy between constructs. Two basic forms of self‐evaluation could be distinguished: Positive Self‐regard (PSR) reflects people's contentedness with themselves in comparison with their own standards. Constructs such as depression, self‐esteem and neuroticism have very high loadings on this factor. In contrast, Claim to Leadership (CTL) reflects the subjective conviction that one is called to take charge and lead others. This conviction is often called ‘narcissism’. PSR mainly reflects an intra‐personal kind of self‐evaluation, whereas CTL reflects an inter‐personal kind. Both forms of self‐evaluation independently predict intellectual self‐enhancement, but only one of them (PSR) also predicts self‐reported mental health. Moreover, the two forms of self‐evaluation are differentially associated with self‐reported and peer‐reported inter‐personal traits (Dominance and Affiliation). Finally, the concepts of ‘Grandiosity’ and ‘Vulnerability’ from narcissism research may easily be reframed in terms of CTL and PSR. The two‐dimensional framework may help overcome the conceptual confusion that exists around different forms of self‐evaluation and streamline the field for future research. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Self‐Esteem: A Human Solution to the Problem of Death

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that the need for self‐esteem develops out of the socialization process in which children learn to abide by parental and, eventually, societal standards of ‘goodness’ to feel securely embedded in a cultural belief system. According to TMT, feeling safely immersed in a meaningful conception of reality (i.e., the cultural worldview) ultimately functions to protect people from anxiety due to the uniquely human capacity to be cognizant of their eventual death. After presenting the basic tenets of this perspective, we review several lines of research supporting it and then address some common questions and criticisms of the theory such as how is a TMT view of anxiety consistent with evolutionary principles, why do people commit suicide, and how is self‐esteem pursued in non‐Western, self‐effacing cultures? Finally, we discuss some implications of TMT for understanding social problems and for pursuing meaning and self‐esteem in healthier, more socially productive ways.