HOW FAR SHOULD WE GENERALIZE?

Abstract— A conceptual model based on staffing theory was applied to previously collected survey data from a representative sample of American workers The model links organizational size, workload, work experience variables (felt responsibility and involvement, assessments of work associates), and work outcomes (job satisfaction, work self-esteem, stress symptoms) Path analyses indicated that the model fit data from all waged and salaried workers relatively well When the model was applied to subsamples of new and established employees and of employees from two contrasting occupational groups (professional-technical workers and operative workers), somewhat different patterns emerged The study illustrates the benefits of applying psychological theories across subdisciplines, as well as the limitations of generalizing research findings across different categories of workers We suggest that localized theories and fine-grained analyses of workplace events could help to make research more applicable to work settings     

SHOULD WE FEAR QUANTUM TORMENT?

The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1     

SHOULD WE DE‐MORALIZE ETHICAL THEORY?

Some philosophers, such as Roger Crisp and Alastair Norcross, have recently argued that the traditional moral categories of wrongness, permissibility and obligation should be avoided when doing ethical theory. I argue that even if morality does not itself provide reasons for action, the moral categories nevertheless have a central role to play in ethical theory: they allow us to make crucial judgements about how to feel about, and react to, agents who behave in anti‐social ways, and they help motivate us to act altruistically.     

HOW SHALL WE EXPLAIN THE DELAYED-JUDGMENT-OFLEARNING EFFECT?

Abstract —Spellman and Bjork (this issue) have proposed an explanation of our earlier findings in which people's accuracy at predicting their subsequent recall proved greater when their judgments of learning (JOLs) were delayed until shortly after study than when made immediately after study (the delayed-JOL effect) The empirically testable portion of Spellman and Bjork's explanation does not account for three relevant kinds of data (some already published and some newly presented here), including one replicated finding that disconfirms their core assumption Nevertheless, Spellman and Bjork s commentary has helped us sharpen our ideas both about what wilt have to be explained and about what form of explanation wilt be needed At present, there is not yet an adequate scientific explanation for the delayed-JOL effect     

HOW SHOULD WE BEHAVE? A REVIEW OF REASONS AND PERSONS BY DEREK PARFIT

In this book Parfit attempts to develop a rational, non-religious ethics. Instead of asking, “What does God tell us to do?” he asks, “What does reason tell us to do?” Given a set of simple assumptions, he considers whether it is possible to be consistently selfish or consistently good. Analyses of personal dilemmas (problems of self-control) and moral dilemmas (problems of social cooperation) show that neither consistent selfishness nor consistent goodness is logically possible. Instead, a fine balance must be maintained between, on the one hand, our immediate versus long-term good and, on the other, our own good versus that of other people. Ultimately Parfit fails to develop a formula by which such a balance may be struck. Parfit''s analysis is consistent with behavioral analysis in its reductionistic view of the self and the parallel it draws between relations with other people and relations with oneself at other times. Parfit''s analysis is inconsistent with behaviorism in its view of the mind as internal, available to introspection, and able to cause behavior. His nonfunctional mentalism leads Parfit to inconsistencies and blocks the path to a consistent ethics. Teleological behaviorism''s view of the mind in terms of patterns of overt behavior is not hampered by these inconsistencies and may lead to a functional rather than purely rational ethics.     

LINNAEUS AS A SECOND ADAM? TAXONOMY AND THE RELIGIOUS VOCATION

Swedish naturalist Carl von Linné (1707–1778) became known during his lifetime as a “second Adam” because of his taxonomic endeavors. The significance of this epithet was that in Genesis Adam was reported to have named the beasts—an episode that was usually interpreted to mean that Adam possessed a scientific knowledge of nature and a perfect taxonomy. Linnaeus's soubriquet exemplifies the way in which the Genesis narratives of creation were used in the early modern period to give religious legitimacy to scientific activities and to taxonomy in particular. Allusions to Adam's work in the Garden of Eden thus became a way of investing the vocation of the naturalist with religious significance.     

WHITHER INTERNALISM? HOW INTERNALISTS SHOULD RESPOND TO THE EXTENDED MIND HYPOTHESIS

Abstract: A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit one that most internalists have adhered to. I show that internalism is entirely compatible with the EMH. This view should prompt us to reconsider the characterization of internalism, and in conclusion I make some brief remarks about how that project might proceed.     

ARE WE CLOSER TO FREE MARKET EUGENICS? THE CRISPR CONTROVERSY

Might the 2018 birth of two designer babies in China write the opening paragraph for the next chapter in the history of eugenics? The worldwide scientific community has tacitly put a moratorium on human clinical application of CRISPR gene editing, waiting until unknown risks can become known. But this ethical agreement has been breached, and calls are now being heard for more rigorous regulations. Perhaps religious and spiritual leaders can join the bioethical chant: the yellow light of caution is flashing.     

WHAT EPISTEMIC VALUES SHOULD WE RECLAIM FOR RELIGION AND SCIENCE? A RESPONSE TO J. WESLEY ROBBINS

Abstract. Postmodernism in science rejects and deconstructs the cultural dominance of especially the natural sciences in our time. Although it presents the debate between religion and science with a promising epistemological holism, it also seriously challenges attempts to develop a meaningful relationship between science and religion. A neopragmatist perspective on religion and science is part of this important challenge and eminently reveals the problems and reduction that arise when pragmatist criteria alone are used to construct a holism that renounces any demarcation between different areas of rationality. In this pragmatist vision for a holist culture, the cognitive resources of rationality are bypassed in such a way that a meaningful interaction between theology and science becomes impossible.     

HOW SHOULD THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION BE WRITTEN? SOME REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE DISCIPLINE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THERECEPTION OF OUR WORK

How should history of education be written? To put the question is far more easier than to provide a concrete answer. In contemporary research, there continue to be pedagogistic complaints about finding answers to present-day educational problems via history. In our view, such an ahistorical utilitarianism as well as the legitimizing and/or mythologizing belief in a particular pedagogical system, in which the history of this field is so rich since the institutionalization of the discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, should be avoided at all costs. But the danger of presentism lurks around the corner as a sine qua non condition in any form of historical research. As can be found out via the comments on our own work, much of the criticism goes back to old conceptions of the discipline, conceived as “historical pedagogy” rather than as history of education. Apparently, in the field of pedagogy people are still convinced that the history of education, even if it does not provide edifying examples and useful lessons, must in any case have a training value for professionals – which in the light of modern, advanced research is rather a difficult idea to defend.     

PATERNAL FUNCTION AND THIRDNESS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND LEGEND: HAS THE FUTURE BEEN FORETOLD?

This paper examines the Akedah, the biblical narrative of the Binding of Isaac, and suggests that this story may be interpreted as inaugurating paternal function and thirdness. It marks the passage from the narcissistic father to the symbolic, dead father, and the institution of the Law that forbids all killings, opening up the succession of the generations. The author suggests that time is an essential element in establishing thirdness, creating a link between the here and now and the there and then in the après coup of the psychoanalytic process. The author also briefly reviews the psychoanalytic literature on thirdness and indicates this paper's contribution to it.     

SHOULD INSTITUTIONS PRIORITIZE RECTIFICATION OVER AID?

Should an institutional scheme prioritize the rectification or compensation of harms it has wrongfully caused over provision of aid to persons it has not harmed? Some who think so rely on an analogy with the view that persons should give higher priority to rectification than to aid. Inference from the personal view to the institutional view would be warranted if either (i) the correct moral principles for institutional assessment are nearest possible equivalents of the correct personal moral principles, or (ii) the moral principles which ground the personal view also ground the institutional view. Neither claim can be justified. I briefly assess some alternative ways of defending the view that institutions should prioritize rectification over aid.     

IF ATTITUDES AFFECT HOW STIMULI ARE PROCESSED, SHOULD THEY NOT AFFECT THE EVENT-RELATED BRAIN POTENTIAL?

Abstract— In Experiment 1, subjects completed an attitude survey to identify items toward which they held positive and negative attitudes. Subsequently, subjects were instructed to count the number of positive (or negative) stimuli in a series. Each series contained six attitude stimuli from a given semantic category (e.g., fruits), and the structure of the series was varied so that positive and negative stimuli, as indexed by subjects' idiosyncratic attitudes, were evaluatively consistent or inconsistent within the series. In Experiment 2, subjects were exposed to personality traits that were positive or negative in series of six. Again, the structure of the series was varied so that positive and negative traits were evaluatively consistent or inconsistent within the series. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that although the event-related brain potential did not differ as a function of stimulus valence per se, evaluatively inconsistent, in contrast to consistent, stimuli evoked a larger amplitude late P300-like positive component that was maximal over the centroparietal region.