Getting the story right: a Reductionist narrative account of personal identity

A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, proponents of narrative accounts typically reject Reductionist metaphysics that (ontologically) reduce persons to aggregates of person stages. In contrast to this trend, we seek to develop a narrative account of personal identity from within Reductionist metaphysics: we think person stages are unified into persons in virtue of their narrative continuity with one another. We argue that this Reductionist version of the narrative account avoids some serious problems facing non-Reductionist versions of the narrative account.     

Folk concepts of person and identity: A response to Nichols and Bruno

Nichols and Bruno (2010) claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical evidence suggesting that the folk do not consider psychological continuity to be necessary for an individual to be categorized as a person or for ascribing identity over time and through transformations. In this, we assume, along with Nichols and Bruno, that folk judgments about identity can be read off the use of proper names. Furthermore, we raise some doubts about the ability of current experimental designs to adequately distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity judgments. We conclude that these claims give us a good reason to be skeptical about the prospects of using folk intuitions in philosophical theorizing about personal identity.     

Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence

The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for someone’s persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person’s entire past in his present being and potentiality.     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

Personal identity and the otherness of one’s own body

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person.

     

Advance directives and the personal identity problem

The value and authority of advance directives such as the living will and the durable power of attorney are discussed, as well as the dangers of loss of personal identity and psychological continuity that these directives present. Differing theories of the degree of psychological continuity necessary for the preservation of personal identity are examined, concluding with the author's "compromise position" that cases of permanent unconsciousness and neurological dementia destroy some of the preconditions for personhood and thereby negate the choice between respecting the wishes of the formerly competent person and the new, different person's life because such beings are not persons at all.     

Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival

The standard version of the psychological criterion or theory of personal identity takes it that psychological connectedness is not necessary for personal identity, or for what matters in survival. That is, a future person can be you, and/or have what matters in survival for you, even though there is no psychological connectedness between you and that future person. David Lewis, however, holds that psychological connectedness is necessary to both identity and what matters (which he takes to coincide). This entails, Lewis acknowledges, that if a human body were to live longer than connectedness lasts, then that body would 'embody' or 'constitute' a different person later on than it did to begin with. Moreover, Lewis accepts, a body may embody more than one person at any one time. Lewis claims that this can be reconciled to some degree with common sense if we count by person stages rather than by persons. I show, though, that Lewis' view cannot be salvaged in this way, and, moreover, that it leads to further absurdities. I conclude that as an account of identity and of what matters in survival, it is highly implausible, and most unsatisfactory.     

Words that touch2

In this paper the author examines her own use of language as a psychoanalyst and asks: what is the best way to help analysands to find the words to express not only what they are thinking but also what they are feeling and experiencing? In common with other psychoanalysts, the author has observed that each of us simultaneously utilises both advanced psychic mechanisms that are accessible to symbolism and more archaic ones, which are less so. However, she draws a distinction between people who are able to tolerate the perception of their own heterogeneity, even if it is sometimes a source of suffering, and those whom she terms ‘heterogeneous patients’. Patients in the latter category, whose lack of internal cohesion causes them anxiety, are afraid of losing their sense of identity. The author asks how we can understand their language and how we should speak to them. She uses several clinical examples to demonstrate that ‘heterogeneous patients’ need to be touched with a language that does not confine itself to imparting thoughts verbally but also conveys feelings and the sensations that accompany those feelings. It is also an ‘incarnated’ language because the words pronounced by the analyst can awaken, or reawaken, bodily fantasies in the patient. These words may enable him to find an emotional meaning in forgotten sensory or bodily experiences, which may then become a starting point for his work of thinking and of symbolisation.     

Temporal Phase Pluralism*

Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person‐stages or the practices of communities. This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity. ‘Temporal Phase Pluralism’ solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when persons have to choose between different life‐altering choices.     

Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity

Abstract

Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity.     

Death and the Evolution of Language

My hypothesis is that the cognitive challenge posed by death might have had a co-evolutionary role in the development of linguistic faculties. First, I claim that mirror neurons, which enable us to understand others’ actions and emotions, not only activate when we directly observe someone, but can also be triggered by language: words make us feel bodily sensations. Second, I argue that the death of another individual cannot be understood by virtue of the mirror neuron mechanism, since the dead provide no neural pattern for mirroring: this cognitive task requires symbolic thought, which in turn involves emotions. Third, I describe the symbolic leap of the human species as a cognitive detachment from the here and now, allowing displaced reference: through symbols the human mind can refer to what is absent, possible, or even impossible (like the presence of a dead person). Such a detachment has had a huge adaptive impact: adopting a coevolutionary standpoint can help explain why language is as effective as environmental inputs in order to stimulate our bodily experience. In the end I suggest a further coevolutionary “reversal”: if language is necessary to understand the death of the other, it might also be true that the peculiar cognitive problem posed by the death of the other (the corpse is present, but the other is absent) has contributed to the crucial transition from an indexical sign system to the symbolic level, i.e., the “cognitive detachment”. Death and language, as Heidegger claimed, have an essential relation for humans, both from an evolutionary and a phenomenological perspective: they have shaped the symbolic consciousness that make us conceive of them.     

Room for a view: on the metaphysical subject of personal identity

Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity, leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications, is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry, provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,” “self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself.     

Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit

In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs.     

Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem

Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.     

自我同一性理论与经验研究

ErikErikson首先提出自我同一性的问题,并从多个角度对其进行描述,但没有对其进行实证研究。而Marcia则从复杂的自我同一性概念中析出两个维度,从而对自我同一性进行实证研究成为可能。随后的很多研究都把同一性发展归于个人因素,但这很难解释倒退现象,于是情境因素就被引入到同一性发展中来,现在许多研究者对于影响同一性发展的因素既有情境因素又有个人因素这一点已达成共识,并提出一些理论模型。与此同时,另有一些研究者希望探求到自我同一性这一构念与其它构念间的关系。同一性构念效度及其发展机制以及同一性构念与其它构念之间的关系仍是未来研究方向     

A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity

The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views.     

An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons

A typical human person has privileged epistemic access to its identity over time in virtue of having a first-person point of view. In explaining this phenomenon in terms of an intimate relation of self-attribution or the like, I infer that a typical human person has direct consciousness of itself through inner awareness or personal memory. Direct consciousness of oneself is consciousness of oneself, but not by consciousness of something else . Yet, a perduring human person, S_p , i.e., a human person with temporal parts, is identical with the complete series of its temporal parts. I argue that because S_p is diverse from any incomplete series of its S_p cannot be conscious of all of its temporal parts through inner awareness or personal memory, S_p cannot have direct consciousness of itself. I conclude that a human person endures , i.e., wholly exists at each of the times it exists.     

Breaking the Borders/Violating the Norms: An Archaeological Survey of an Intersex in a Traditional Society, Bam (South Eastern Iran)

How does breaking boundaries and passing identity red lines affect social and personal life? How do people with contradictory identities experience life in a traditional society? What will happen if the material and bodily identity of an individual goes against social norms? This research is a narration of some parts of an intersex life, an individual with a vague, unknown identity who contradicts the common norms of the society. In a traditional society, where gender and sexual identity act as a taboo and a powerful source of identity, people with uncommon (gender and sexual) identities suffer from an unstable social status. The story of Setareh/Saman’s life is told based on the archaeological remains from the debris of destroyed layers of a house in Bam. This is the story of transforming from female to male, the story of limitations, social inequalities and pressures on the individuals and the minorities who are condemned because of who they are.     

Personal identity and brain death: a critical response

The authors contend that there are logical inconsistencies in a theory put forth by Michael Green and Daniel Wikler ("Brain death and personal identity," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1980 Winter; 9(2): 105-133) to justify the brain death concept of death. Green and Wikler had asserted that individuals cease to exist and are dead when the criteria for continuity in their personal identity are not met. Having argued that the theory of personal identity is misguided, Agich and Jones suggest that further research into the ontological foundation of brain death concepts should begin, not by rejecting medical or moral considerations, but by carefully defining the main competing concepts of brain death as brain stem death, cerebral death, death of the brain as a whole, and whole brain death, and then by relating these concepts to the ontological conditions for being a live individual or person.