There’s No Need to Rethink Desert: A Reply to Pummer

Pummer (Philosophical Review 123(1): 43–77, 2014) ingeniously wraps together issues from the personal identity literature with issues from the literature on desert. However, I wish to take issue with the main conclusion that he draws, namely, that we need to rethink the following principle: Desert.: When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. (Pummer Philosophical Review 123(1):43–77, 2014: 43–44) Pummer offers an argument that is intended to show that this principle, along with widely-held views about personal identity, entails an inconsistent triad of propositions. I agree. But I think Pummer's argument attacks a straw man. I believe that no-one holds Desert, at least as it is stated, and that once the principle is stated correctly it is easy to see that no inconsistent triad follows from it. So, Desert does not need rethinking. It just needs to be stated correctly.     

Incentive Inequalities and Talents: A Reply to Shiffrin

In a recent article, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers a distinctive egalitarian critique of the types of incentive inequalities that are permitted by John Rawls's difference principle. She argues that citizens of a well-ordered society, who publicly accept Rawls's two principles of justice and their justifications, may not demand incentives to employ their talents in productive ways since such demands are inconsistent with a major justification for the difference principle: the moral arbitrariness of talent. I argue that there is no such inconsistency. Citizens can publicly accept the claim that talent is morally arbitrary and accept incentives to employ their talents productively without inconsistency. In the standard case that Rawls envisions, citizens who do so take their preferences to be a reason for a higher salary, not their talents.     

Against Substitutive Harm

Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility (PSP) specifies a class of exceptions to the general rule not to kill as a means. The principle allows us to harm as a means some of those who would have been otherwise harmed as side effects. ‘For example, suppose it is impermissible to paralyze A's legs as a means to a greater good. It would still be permissible to do this as the alternative to permissibly killing A as a mere indirect side effect.’ I argue that, despite of its great appeal, PSP is incorrect; it is simply not true that the victims of substitutive harm are not worse off than they would otherwise permissibly have been. In fact, there is no moral difference between the purportedly substitutive harm licensed by PSP (and its extension) and the standard sort of harming as means repudiated by nonconsequentialists.     

INFINITE REGRESS ARGUMENTS

Abstract

Gerald Cohen's critique of John Rawls's theory of justice is that it is concerned only with the justice of social institutions, and must thus arbitrarily draw a line between those inequalities excluded and those allowed by the basic structure. Cohen claims that a proper concern with the interests of the least advantaged would rule out ‘incentives’ for ‘talented’ individuals. I argue that Rawls's assumption that the subject of justice is the basic structure of society does not arbitrarily restrict the concerns of political justice, as Cohen claims. Further, I argue that it does not allow ‘deep’ inequalities within a just basic structure. When properly understood, Rawls's theory of justice is strongly egalitarian, taken as a theory of fairness in the way the burdens and benefits of social cooperation are distributed, even if it is not as egalitarian as Cohen wishes.     

Arithmetic knowledge from the spontaneous attention to relations

Children's knowledge of arithmetic principles is a key aspect of early mathematics knowledge. Knowledge of arithmetic principles predicts how children approach solving arithmetic problems and the likelihood of their success. Prior work has begun to address how children might learn arithmetic principles in a classroom setting. Understanding of arithmetic principles involves understanding how numbers in arithmetic equations relate to another. For example, the Relation to Operands (RO) principle is that for subtracting natural numbers (A ? B = C), the difference (C) must be smaller than the minuend (A). In the current study we evaluate if individual differences in arithmetic principle knowledge (APK) can be predicted by the learners' spontaneous attention to relations (SAR) and if feedback can increase their attention to relations. Results suggest that participants’ Spontaneous Attention to Number (SAN) does not predict their knowledge of the RO principle for symbolic arithmetic. Feedback regarding the attention to relations did not show a significant effect on SAR or participants’ APK. We also did not find significant relations between reports of parent talk and the home environment with individual differences in SAN. The amount of parent's talk about relations was not significantly associated with learner's SAR and APK. We conclude that children's SAR with non‐symbolic number does not generalize to attention to relations with symbolic arithmetic.     

CLASSIC INVARIANTISM, RELEVANCE AND WARRANTED ASSERTABILITY MANŒVRES

Jessica Brown contends that Keith DeRose's latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism's chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if their position has not been ruled out, classic invariantists must offer considerations in favour of their position if they are to show that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability manœvre that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this manœvre is not as effective as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability manœvre, which utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength, affords a more successful defence of classic invariantism, and helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism.     

Can Luck Egalitarianism Justify the Fact that Some are Worse Off than Others?

According to luck egalitarianism it is bad or unjust if someone is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own. This article argues that there is a tension in standard luck egalitarian theory between justifying absolute and comparative welfare levels. If a person responsibly acts in a way that brings her welfare level below that of others, this is justified according to the theory. However, even if we can say that the person's new welfare level is justified in absolute terms, it is less clear that her now being worse off than others, is justified (a similar idea is explored by Susan Hurley). The reason is that while she has in one sense chosen her (new) welfare level, she has not chosen to be worse off than others. Her relative standing, something with which egalitarians ought to be concerned, is determined by her choices in conjunction with the choices of all others. But no individual controls the choices of all others. Hence, for any one individual it is the case that her relative standing is beyond her control. Some responses to this problem are available. It is doubtful, however, that these are entirely successful.     

JUSTICE,INCENTIVES AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen reiterates his critique of John Rawls's difference principle as a justification for inequality‐generating incentives, and also argues that Rawls's ambition to provide a constructivist defence of the first principles of justice is doomed. Cohen's arguments also suggest a natural response to my earlier attempt to defend the basic structure objection to Cohen's critique, which I term the alien factors reply. This paper criticises the reply, and Cohen's more general argument against Rawls's constructivism. 1     

How does crime pay? The differentiation of criminal specialisms by fundamental incentive

Most attempts to determine offence specialisms have not benefited from any formal psychological framework of behavioural differentiation. Bandura's framework (Social foundations of thought and action, 1986) of the fundamental incentives to human action offers an interesting perspective on what might underlie differential patterns of offending. The framework draws attention to the distinction between Material, Power/Status, and Sensory incentives, leading to the hypotheses that crimes which share any one of these incentives will be more likely to be committed by the same person, as revealed through high inter‐correlations, but be less highly correlated with crimes with different fundamental incentives. To test these hypotheses the correlations between 42 offending behaviours as self‐reported by 185 convicted young offenders were examined. A Multidimensional Scaling analysis of the inter‐correlations revealed three distinct styles of offending that could be related to Bandura's Material (Cronbach's α = 0.94), Power/Status (α = 0.90) and Sensory (α = 0.76) incentives. The identification of this psychological basis for the differentiation of criminal styles provides a model for considering offenders' patterns of specialisation which is of value both in clarifying the aetiology of different types of crime and in considering which crimes may be behaviourally equivalent when trying to link them to a common offender or infer offender characteristics from crime scene information. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?

On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utilityare not empirically meaningful, and ``hence' impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws onthe parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguisticmeaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empiricallyunderdetermined and, if we also deny any appropriate truth of the matter, indeterminate. However, the underdeterminationcan be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certainstates of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection between certain empirically observable proxies and utility.I conclude that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not empirically meaningful, they are not in principle impossible.     

How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality

In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well‐defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework‐internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first‐order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not itself constrained by these (framework‐internal) standards. However, even if choosing a framework is a practical matter, we would nevertheless expect the process of framework selection to be subject to rational norms. But which norms might those be? And where do they come from? I begin by showing that these questions are crucial to the success of Carnap's entire philosophical project. I then offer a response on behalf of the Carnapian which guarantees the rationality of the process of framework selection, while remaining true to Carnap's firm commitment to tolerance.     

Against Fallibilism

In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ‘infallibilism’, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power than fallibilism. In particular, I argue that an infallibilist can easily explain why assertions of ‘p, but possibly not-p’ (where the ‘possibly’ is read as referring to epistemic possibility) is infelicitous in terms of the knowledge rule of assertion. But a fallibilist cannot. Furthermore, an infallibilist can explain the infelicity of utterances of ‘p, but I don't know that p’ and ‘p might be true, but I'm not willing to say that for all I know, p is true’, and why when a speaker thinks p is epistemically possible for her, she will agree (if asked) that for all she knows, p is true. The simplest explanation of these facts entails infallibilism. Fallibilists have tried and failed to explain the infelicity of ‘p, but I don't know that p’, but have not even attempted to explain the last two facts. I close by considering two facts that seem to pose a problem for infallibilism, and argue that they don't.     

Pleasure and Aversion: Challenging the Conventional Dichotomy

Philosophy and its descendents in the behavioral sciences have traditionally divided incentives into those that are sought and those that are avoided. Positive incentives are held to be both attractive and memorable because of the direct effects of pleasure. Negative incentives are held to be unattractive but still memorable (the problem of pain) because they force unpleasant emotions on an individual by an unmotivated process, either a hardwired response (unconditioned response) or one substituted by association (conditioned response). Negative incentives are divided into those that are always avoided and those that are avoided only by higher mental processes—archetypically the passions, which are also thought of as hardwired or conditioned. Newer dichotomies within the negative have been proposed, hinging on whether a negative incentive is nevertheless sought (“wanted but not liked”) or on an incentive's being negative only because it is confining (the product of “rule worship”). The newer dichotomies have lacked motivational explanations, and there is reason to question conditioning in the motivational mechanism for the older ones.

Both experimental findings and the examination of common experience indicate that even the most aversive experiences, such as pain and panic, do not prevail in reflex fashion, but because of an urge to attend to them. The well-established hyperbolic curve in which prospective rewards are discounted implies a mechanism for such an urge, as well as for the “lower” incentives in the other dichotomies. The properties of these lower incentives are predicted by particular durations of temporary preferences on a continuum that stretches from fractions of a second to years.     

FOUNDATIONS OF A KANTIAN THEORY OF PUNISHMENT

It has recently been argued that there is probably no theory of punishment to be found in Immanuel Kant's writings, but that “if one selects carefully among the many remarks and insights that Kant has left us about crime and punishment, one might even be able to build such an edifice from the bricks provided.”¹ In this paper, I seek to provide part of a foundation of a Kantian theory of punishment, one which is consistent with many, if not all, of Kant's own insights on justice. Finally, I assess the plausibility of Kant's view.     

No One Wants to Look Cheap: Trade‐Offs Between Social Disincentives and the Economic and Psychological Incentives to Redeem Coupons

Existing research on price deals has largely demonstrated positive financial and nonfinancial consequences of obtaining a deal. In contrast, the research reported here suggests that certain price deals—in this case, coupons—can also produce negative social consequences, such as creating an impression of cheapness or stinginess. Decisions to redeem coupons are shown to involve a trade‐off between the social incentives to avoid coupons and competing economic and psychological incentives to redeem coupons. Consumers strategically adjusted their decision in response to factors that changed the relative strength of these incentives; specifically, they avoided coupons when they were concerned that coupon use would lead to negative social consequences but redeemed coupons when the circumstances reduced these concerns. Although decisions to refuse a coupon might violate principles of economic rationality, it is argued that such decisions are nevertheless functional as they serve important social goals. In this sense, it can be smarter for consumers to forgo a deal rather than obtain one.     

Two Dogmatists

Grice and Strawson's ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ is admired even by revisionist Quineans such as Putnam (1962) who should know better. The analytic/synthetic distinction they defend is distinct from that which Putnam successfully rehabilitates. Theirs is the post‐positivist distinction bounding a grossly enlarged analytic. It is not, as they claim, the sanctified product of a long philosophic tradition, but the cast‐off of a defunct philosophy ‐ logical positivism. The fact that the distinction can be communally drawn does not show that it is based on a real difference. Sub‐categories that can be grouped together by enumeration will do the trick. Quine's polemical tactic (against which Grice and Strawson protest) of questioning the intelligibility of the distinction is indeed objectionable, but his argument can be revived once it is realized that ‘analytic’ et al. are theoretic terms, and there is no extant theory to make sense of them. Grice and Strawson's paradigm of logical impossibility is, in fact, possible. Their attempt to define synonymy in Quinean terms is a failure, nor can they retain analyticity along with the Quinean thesis of universal revisability. The dogma, in short, is indefensible.     

It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore,it isn't

I want to suggest that it would be bad if compatibilism were true, and that this gives us good reason to think that it isn't. This is, you might think, an outlandish argument, and the considerable burden of this paper is to convince you otherwise. There are two key elements at stake in this argument. The first is that it would be - in a distinctive sense to be explained - bad if compatibilism were true. The thought here is that compatibilism ultimately presents us with a picture on which, in principle, powerful manipulators can effectively guarantee that finite moral agents should become blameworthy. To my mind, this isn't just false - though I think that it is - it is also such that it would be bad (unfortunate, undesirable…) if it were true. The second is that the fact that it would be - in this sense - bad if true gives us reason to think that it isn't. It may be bad that there is no afterlife. But that, in itself, hardly gives us reason to think that there is an afterlife. That is true, but - as others before me have suggested - when the object of the relevant badness is morality itself, the inference seems secure. A more general aim of the paper is to investigate the nature of this very form of argument in itself, and I compare my argument (inter alia) to a recent argument from Sayre–McCord against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas.     

The relevance of Rawls' principle of justice for research on cognitively impaired patients

An ethical conflict arises when we must performresearch in the interest of future patients,but that this may occasionally injure theinterests of today's patients.In the case of cognitively impaired persons, thequestion arises whether it is compatible withhumane healthcare not only to treat, but alsoto use these patients for research purposes.Some bioethicists and theologians haveformulated a general duty of solidarity, alsopertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as ajustification for research on these persons. Ifone examines this thesis from the theory ofjustice according to John Rawls, it is revealedthat such a duty of solidarity cannotnecessarily be extrapolated from Rawls'conception of justice. This is at least true ofRawls' difference principle, because accordingto the difference principle only those measuresare justifiable which serve the interest of therespective least well off. Those measures whichwould engender additional injury for the leastwell off could not be balanced by any utilityaccording to Rawls.However, John Rawls' difference principleis subordinate to the first principle,which is that each person has an equalright to the most extensive basic libertycompatible with the same liberty for others.These primary goods are determined by thefreedom and integrity of the person.This integrity of decisionally impaired personswould be in danger if one would abstain fromresearch and thus forego the increase inknowledge related to their disease. Thus onecould conclude, at least from Rawls' firstprinciple, that society must take on a duty toguarantee the degrees of freedom forcognitively impaired persons and thus alsosupport the efforts for their healing.     

How Satisficers Get Away with Murder

Traditional Consequentialism is based on a demanding principle of impartial maximization. Michael Slote's 'Satisficing Consequentialism' aims to reduce the demands of Consequentialism, by no longer requiring us to bring about the best possible outcome. This paper presents a new objection to Satisficing Consequentialism. We begin with a simple thought experiment, in which an agent must choose whether to save the lives of ten innocent people by using a sand bag or by killing an innocent person. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that, if it is to avoid making unreasonable demands, Satisficing Consequentialism must allow such an agent to kill. It is argued that this result is much more counter-intuitive than the fact that Maximizing Consequentialism permits agents to kill in order to produce the best consequences. The conclusion is that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable moral theory.     

Prioritarianism for Global Health Investments: Identifying the Worst Off

The available resources for global health assistance are far outstripped by need. In the face of such scarcity, many people endorse a principle according to which highest priority should be given to the worst off. However, in order for this prioritarian principle to be useful for allocation decisions, policy‐makers need to know what it means to be badly off. In this article, we outline a conception of disadvantage suitable for identifying the worst off for the purpose of making health resource allocation decisions. According to our total advantage view: (1) the worst off are those who have the greatest total lifetime disadvantage; (2) advantage foregone due to premature death should be treated in the same way as other ways of being disadvantaged at a time; (3) how badly off someone is depends on the actual outcomes that will befall her without intervention, not her prospects at a time; and (4) all significant forms of disadvantage count for determining who is worst off, not just disadvantage relating to health. We conclude by noting two important implications of the total advantage view: first, that those who die young are among the globally worst off, and second, that the epidemiological shift in the global burden of disease from communicable to non‐communicable diseases should not lead to a corresponding shift in global health spending priorities.