Circulating emotions,beliefs and fantasies: The Middle East and the West1

Abstract

Much ink has been spilt analysing racism, ethnicity and ‘otherness’. These analyses are frequently sophisticated, nuanced and committed to delivering improved ethical, emotional and political relationships. As we have witnessed recently, however, emotions, beliefs and fantasies remain stubborn. We are all diminished (no matter our history) by these troublesome psychic processes, entrenched beliefs and unthinking assumptions that pulse away unchecked. Feelings of fear and hatred sit alongside complex identifications and disavowal of self and other. This contemporary political and social context is loaded with discourses of a ‘clash of civilization’, the otherness of Muslims and Islam and a dominant view which asserts that Western societies have to be protected from potential explosions of terrorism and the corrosion of Western values. These discourses impact on citizens and erode the possibilities of inter-connectedness and a sense of shared communality. This paper is an exploration of a specific example of intransigence.     

Religion and rights: Is there still room for Christianity at the table?

Drawing on recent discussions about issues relating to sexual and reproductive rights in the Jamaican print and broadcast media, this article highlights the interplay between Christianity, activism and rights talk. This interplay is being framed in the local print media as a debate between two dominating hegemonic forces: on the one hand, between more ‘conservative’ and ‘fundamentalist’ Christian theological beliefs and, on the other hand, those who subscribe to what may be characterised as more ‘liberal secular fundamentalist’ viewpoints. This polarisation ignores some conciliatory scenarios that exist within other segments of Caribbean societies, theology included, that provide beneficial approaches to rights talk and work. The endeavours of some Jamaican church folks have converged with those of progressive right defenders, or, where such endeavours predate contemporary rights activism or have no direct contact with it, they might at least be viewed as benign by those who espouse such activism.     

Blending Arendtian Exemplarity with Weberian Ideal-Typic Analysis: Arendt’s ‘Socrates’ as a Vehicle for Social Critique

Arendt uses the exemplary validity of Socrates to think and value the possibilities of joint philosophical and political orientations in our present juncture. In this way Arendt’s ‘Socrates’ is not a mythic, historic, or dramatic individual, but offers an example of the best of the human condition. Unfortunately, because Arendt held the social conditioning and constraining of Socrates’ possibilities at arm’s length, his status as an exemplar is problematic and he ends up referring to a historical rather than contemporary possibilities. While Arendt had resources in her notion of the ‘world’ to better ground her simultaneously analytic and normative construction of ‘Socrates’, the lack of a social grounding makes ‘Socrates’ a significantly unmoored and shifting signifier. After showing the vacillations of ‘Socrates’ in Arendt, I supplement her normatively laden account with a Weberian grounding. With this firmer social grounding, ‘Socrates’ can refer to the possibilities of joint philosophical and political orientations in ancient Athens and thereby highlight how our world makes a contemporary version unlikely or impossible. Yet, this Weberian grounding comes at a cost. The normative dimension essential in Arendt’s ‘Socrates’ is lost due to Weberian value-neutrality. ‘Socrates’ can name a contemporary unlikelihood or impossibility, but if the enveloping social order does not value what it renders impossible, Weberian ideal-types on their own are incapable of offering normative resources for critique. I conclude by blending a Weberian social mooring with Arendt’s value-laden framework for social analysis and thereby recuperate the missing normative dimension. In short, by accepting the relational, necessarily plural, and dynamic root of human action we can, much like Arendt’s intended use of ‘Socrates’, value orientations that best express these norms, and criticize contemporary conditions that constrain their realization.     

‘Pre-crime’, Prevent,and practices of exceptionalism: Psychotherapy and the new norm in the NHS

Section ’26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on local authorities and public sector institutions to have ‘due regard to the need to Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. Accordingly, NHS staff are now required to attend a Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP), ensuring they are trained to spot the ideological symptoms and psychosocial vulnerabilities thought to predict extremist activity. In this paper, I suggest that the insertion of counter-radicalisation duties into the work of psychotherapists and other mental health professionals is not simply to be understood as an attempt to forestall and avert extremist activity. Rather, drawing on the work of Georgio Agamben and Judith Butler, I argue it can be viewed as an innovative tactic of governmentality whose technologies of surveillance ensure a culture of conformity in the NHS through which a ‘state of exception’ can be established and normalised. I illuminate this by examining two interrelated aspects of the Prevent duty: one, the decision by the government to embed Prevent within the existing rhetoric and practice of ‘safeguarding vulnerable children and adults’; and two, its discursive representation of the consulting room as ‘pre-criminal space’. I conclude by suggesting that the government’s determination to allow ‘no ungoverned space in which extremism is allowed to flourish’ targets the limits of acceptable speech and so the very conditions for radical thought and critique on which psychotherapy depends.     

One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist: a selected overview of the psychoanalytic and group analytic study of terrorism

This paper is an attempt to understand the significant increase in terrorism worldwide following the 9/11 Al-Quaida bombings which triggered the Bush Administration’s “war on terror”, leading to two wars and ultimately to the emergence of Daesh. I explore the motivation for social violence as terrorism, which can be carried out by the state or by its citizens, and look at how one man’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist. The paper looks at why seemingly ordinary people are converted into ‘homegrown’ jihadists and how alienation and shame are the driving forces of violence. I give a selected overview of psychoanalytical ideas that try to make sense of the unconscious roots of aggression, hatred and violence. As terrorism is a social activity group analysis has an important contribution to make in understanding the violence of large groupings. The media has a crucial role to play as sensationalist coverage of violence provides terrorists with a free media platform. Both the media and terrorists need an audience and feed off each other. This paper will explore these themes.     

Picking Up and Defending the Faith: Activism and Radicalism Among Muslim Converts in the United States

Muslim converts tend to be overrepresented in terrorist activity compared to fellow nonconvert Muslims. However, due to the low base rate of terrorism activity, there is a significant risk that this overrepresentation is a “false positive.” We therefore tested the prevalence of far more common, but potentially antecedent, cognitions to terrorism—activism and radicalism––among convert and nonconvert Muslims. We surveyed 356 American Muslim adults, of which 177 were self-identified converts, with the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scale or ARIS. We found that converts as compared to nonconverts do demonstrate higher activism and radicalism intention scores. We also found that activism fully mediates the relationship between conversion and radicalism. This suggests that converts may be more likely to engage in radical behavior (such as terrorism) than nonconverts, but only because they are more likely to engage in activism than nonconverts. We discuss these findings in light of current psychology and political mobilization literature, then we offer suggestions for future research on the relationships between conversion, activism, radicalism, and terrorism.     

Strawson’s modest transcendental argument

Although Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was published over fifty years ago and has been widely discussed, its main argument is still notoriously difficult to pin down. The most common – but in my view, mistaken – interpretation of Strawson’s argument takes him to be providing a ‘relentlessly’ naturalistic framework for our responsibility practices. To rectify this mistake, I offer an alternative interpretation of Strawson’s argument. As I see it, rather than offering a relentlessly naturalistic framework for moral responsibility, Strawson actually develops a transcendental argument, which grounds our moral responsibility practices in the practical perspective of social agents. However, the aims of this essay are not purely interpretative. Strawson’s essay continues to have important implications for a number of issues that arise in the contemporary debates that concern free will and moral responsibility. In particular, it puts significant pressure on moral responsibility sceptics like Derk Pereboom [Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] who think that the truth of moral responsibility scepticism has no worrisome implications for our lives with others.     

From the Editors

This article examines the relationship between global poverty and terrorism. The approach is built around a concept of ‘social bandit’ developed by Eric Hobsbawm. By social bandits, Hobsbawm refers to those outlaws in pre-capitalist societies who robbed the rich, and gave (at least some of their loot) to the poor. What was common to social bandits is a myth that surrounded their activity, and a strong popular sympathy and support. This article uses Hobsbawm's notion of social bandit to deal with the fact that in today's international setting, particularly in the context of huge international inequality and widespread poverty in the non-western world, violence against western states, particularly the United States, enjoys significant sympathy elsewhere. This is not only an outcome of inequality and has to do with other factors, particularly certain political or military actions of the USA and other western states, but what is important to note here is that violence perpetrated by terrorists is directed at those who are seen as beneficiaries of the existing order, of international inequalities and injustices. In short, the operation of the international order, its asymmetries and inequalities, riches and wealth in developed countries and poverty and misery elsewhere, seems to play a role in the creation of such social bandits, and in providing them with support and legitimacy which they otherwise would not have had.     

The tripod of terrorism

Abstract

Violent attacks against innocent civilians occurring on an everyday and global basis have intensified the discourse on terrorism. However, like pornography, terrorism seems readily recognizable but hard to define. The designation is applied to the destructive acts of religious zealots, mentally unstable individuals, terror-inducing despots, separatist militia, and, at times, even legitimate freedom fighters. Ordinary language fails to define terrorism’s nosological circumference and is itself defiled in the process. While acknowledging this denotational conundrum, this paper will propose that the origins of the current mayhem by the radicalized few reside in three geopolitical realms. These include the long shadow of colonialism, the hypocrisy and violence of certain Western foreign policies, and some fundamental problems in the societies that form the crucible of such rage. As a result, ameliorative strategies need to be directed at (and require the collaboration of) all three parties at the root of this tragic and bloody scenario.     

Why People Join Terrorist Groups in Kuwait: A Qualitative Examination

Qualitative interviews were conducted with nine members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda currently incarcerated in Kuwait's Central Prison. The semistructured interviews attempted to understand psychosocial factors in Kuwait that contributed to their decision to join extremist organizations. Interviews were analyzed using Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and the emergent themes identified the following core themes explaining their involvement: (1) religious identity development; (2) personal connections; (3) propaganda; (4) defense of Islam; and (5) social marginalization. Participants described a process whereby their religion became a central part of their personal identity. As their religious identity developed, they became involved in Islamic organizations where they met people involved with ISIS or Al-Qaeda. These social connections exposed them to jihadi propaganda which, in addition to increased military conflict in the Middle East, crystallized their beliefs that Islam is under attack, and they were religiously obligated to defend it. The results also identified societal factors that increased the probability of engaging in terrorism including relatively low levels of education, coming from low socioeconomic groups in Kuwait, and feeling socially marginalized by broader Kuwaiti society.     

Differentiation of international terrorism: attack as threat,means, and violence

This study examined whether international terrorism could be differentiated into different behavioural themes related to the way of using force. The sample consisted of 217 international terrorist organisations that had perpetrated five or more terrorist incidents. A non‐metric multidimensional scaling analysis revealed that all of the terrorist incidents could be assigned to one of three themes reflecting different styles of the use of force: ‘attack as threat’, ‘attack as means’, and ‘attack as violence’. In the current sample, 189 of the terrorist organisations repeated one theme in more than 50% of their series of incidents, suggesting their preference for one of the three themes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Ethical Challenge of Touraine's ‘Living Together’

In Can We Live Together? Alain Touraine combines a consummate analysis of crucial social tensions in contemporary societies with a strong normative appeal for a new emancipatory ‘Subject’ capable of overcoming the twin threats of atomisation or authoritarianism. He calls for a move from ‘politics to ethics’ and then from ethics back to politics to enable the new Subject to make a reality out of the goals of democracy and solidarity. However, he has little to say about the nature of such an ethics. This article argues that this lacuna could usefully be filled by adopting a form of radical humanism found in the work of Erich Fromm. It defies convention in the social sciences by operating from an explicit view of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ of common human nature, specifying reason, love and productive work as the qualities to be realised if we are to move closer to human solidarity. Although there remain significant philosophical and political differences between the two positions, particularly on the role to be played by ‘the nation’, their juxtaposition opens new lines of inquiry in the field of cosmopolitan ethics.     

Small acts,kind words and “not too much fuss”: Implicit activisms

In this paper, we suggest that social scientists' accounts of ‘activism’ have too often tended to foreground and romanticise the grandiose, the iconic, and the unquestionably meaning-ful, to the exclusion of different kinds of ‘activism’. Thus, while there is a rich social-scientific literature chronicling a social history of insurrectionary protests and key figures/thinkers, we suggest that there is more to ‘activism’ (and there are more kinds of ‘activism’) than this. In short, we argue that much can be learnt from what we term implicit activisms which – being small-scale, personal, quotidian and proceeding with little fanfare – have typically gone uncharted in social-scientific understanding of ‘activism’. This paper will reflect upon one example of this kind of ‘implicit’ activism, by re-presenting findings from interviews undertaken with 150 parents/carers, during an evaluation of a ‘Sure Start’ Centre in the East Midlands, UK. From these interviews emerged a sense of how the Centre (and the parents/carers, staff and material facilities therein) had come to matter profoundly to these parents/carers. We suggest that these interviews extend and unsettle many social-scientific accounts of ‘activism’ in three key senses. First: in evoking the specific kinds of everyday, personal, affective bonds which lead people to care. Second: in evoking the kinds of small acts, words and gestures which can instigate and reciprocate/reproduce such care. And third: in suggesting how such everyday, affective bonds and acts can ultimately constitute political activism and commitment, albeit of a kind which seeks to proceed with ‘not too much fuss’.     

Scandalous subwomen and sublime superwomen: exploring portrayals of female suicide bombers’ agency

When the terms ‘women’ and ‘violence’ are used, it is usually in the context of women as victims and rarely as perpetrators of violence, and yet women do behave aggressively – for instance, as female suicide bombers. An ethical analysis of this role, however, has tended to be somewhat overlooked, partly because of the gender stereotypes at play, with little (or spurious) focus on the agency and autonomy of the women. This has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the unique ways in which societies treat female political aggressions, and the consequences of this for their agency. This paper seeks to redress these issues by evaluating two different societal portrayals of female suicide bombers; that of the ‘scandalous subwoman’ and the ‘sublime superwoman’. It argues that violent women's agency is often distorted to extremes beyond that of their male counterparts, and that it is imperative to avoid misrepresenting them either as agentless victims (‘subwomen’) or wholly agentic (‘superwomen’) since, even in times of political instability, they can rarely be dichotomised in this binary way.     

Understanding ‘relevance’ in psychology

Since the 1970s, psychologists around the world have questioned the ‘social relevance’ of psychology in their societies. Curiously, the matter of ‘social relevance’ is under-theorized in the discipline, a state of affairs this paper attempts to correct. First, it describes how disagreements about psychology's cognitive interest – and subject matter – create an environment in which accusations of ‘social irrelevance’ can flourish. Second, it asserts that applied psychology's reliance on basic psychology for its scientific authority makes debates about ‘social relevance’ inevitable. And third, it claims that the discipline's longstanding antithesis to the social domain leaves it vulnerable to these debates – particularly in recent decades that have witnessed rapid social change. The paper reflects further on the rise of ‘market relevance’ in the global academy and its significance for psychology today.     

Racial Inequality

In societies with a history of racial oppression, present-day relations between members of different racialised groups are often difficult, tense, prone to escalate into open hostility. This can partly be put down to the persistence of racist beliefs and sentiments. But it is plausible to think there are also non-racist ways in which societal relations between members of different racialised groups go seriously wrong. This is not to downplay the extent to which racism persists: rather, the point is that there exist forms of race-based interaction which, though not racist, are objectionable in their own right. Social equality theory—which understands the ideal of equality not distributively but relationally—can help us to identify and delineate some of these. Taking a social egalitarian approach, I argue that one can identify at least three types of distinctively race-based social inequality, besides racism, which need to be overcome before a society of equals can be realised: ‘racial stigma’, ‘racial discomfort’ and ‘race-based inequality of moral stature’. These forms of race-based social inequality, or ‘racial inequality’, are qualitatively different and call for different types of remedy. Delineating these forms of racial inequality also sheds light on the issue of whether racialised identities should be conserved.     

Mettābhāvanā in Traditional and Popular Buddhist Contexts

Some have referred to relatively recent forms of popular Buddhism as an ‘engaged’ Buddhism that has revived or redirected traditional Buddhist ideas and practices found in meditation texts to reflect a greater social or worldly emphasis than suggested in earlier historical moments. One of these ideas is the quadripartite framework of the ‘immeasurable states’ (aprameya/appameya) or ‘divine abidings’ (brahmavihāra), the most prominent of which in popular Buddhism is mettā (friendliness/loving-kindness). This article traces the philosophy of the ‘immeasurable states’ found in meditation texts from various Indic traditions (Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu) and then presents the ways in which these traditional ideas (especially mettā) have informed popular Buddhist movements in the twentieth century. Points of discussion include: ‘engaged’ Buddhism's relationship with traditional Buddhist ethics; arguments concerning the coalescence of monastic-centred meditation practices with popular Buddhist notions of social service; and the distinct utilization of mettā in contemporary Buddhist societies in contrast to the mobilizing impulses of comparable religious communities (Hindu and Jain) with a similar heritage of mettā discourse in South Asia.     

The Morality of Terrorism

In this paper (a sequel to ‘What Is Terrorism?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 7 [ 1990]) I discuss both consequentialist and deontological justifications of terrorism. In the consequentialist context, I look in particular into Leon Trotsky’s classic defence of the ‘red terror’, based on the argument of continuity of war, revolution, and terrorism, and the claim that the distinction between the guilty and the innocent, combatants and noncombatants, is not relevant to modern warfare. On the deontological side, I discuss Virginia Held’s recent attempt at justifying terrorism in terms of basic human rights and distributive justice. The conclusion reached is that terrorism remains almost absolutely morally impermissible.     

Primoratz on Terrorism

ABSTRACT In ‘What is Terrorism?’ Igor Primoratz defines terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they would not otherwise take”. In this article I argue that Primoratz is wrong (a) to posit a necessary connection between terrorism and terror or intimidation, (b) to argue that terrorism is directed solely against people, and not, for example, property, and (c) to argue that the targets of terrorism proper are ‘the innocent’.     

The criminalization of money laundering and terrorism in global contexts: a hybrid solution

What obligations do global actors have to prevent terrorism? Is consent required to create an international obligation, or does the correctness of its goals ground its legitimacy? In this paper, I consider these questions with respect to a subset of international law often overlooked: anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). AML/CFT comprises peaceful response to violence and terrorism, making it a significant component of international justice and diplomacy. First, I present the current legal framework for AML/CFT institutions and identify two conflicting sources of justification: objective value and consent. The fix for this problem, I argue, does not come from either component alone. Objective value cannot provide the sole source of justification because it cannot settle the choice between multiple competing norms that would achieve the same objective goods were we to follow them (‘the choice problem’). Consent cannot provide the sole source of justification (‘the constraint problem’) for two reasons: some contracts that people agree to are morally abhorrent and others are morally required but people do not agree to them. But objective value and consent can be combined consistently, and I articulate this hybrid as a sound basis for evaluating and reforming AML/CFT laws and institutions.