Reductionism in Fallacy Theory

(1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (4) the exact criteria for (argumentatively) valid and adequate arguments of the 'practical theory of argumentation' of the author are expounded. These criteria will be used as the positive basis for the following reduction. (5) In the main part of the paper a systematization, definition and explanation of the main types and many subforms of fallacies of argumentative validity and (6) adequacy is developed, following the list of positive conditions of validity and adequacy. In addition to many new types of fallacies, this systematization contains the most important of the traditionally known and named fallacies; these are explained and the criteria for some of them are corrected or put more precisely.     

聚焦思维结构的智力理论--林崇德的智力理论述评

林崇德的思维结构模型,是其智力理论的核心。因此,林崇德的智力理论,是一种聚焦思维结构的智力理论。不过,林崇德的智力理论,远不止其思维结构模型。他所提出的“智力结构是一个多元结构”的观点、“思维核心说”、“概括基础说”和“思维发展的模式”,也同样是其智力理论的重要内容。通观林崇德的智力理论,不难看出其四大特点:第一,理论性与实践性的有机统一;第二,两点论与重点论的有机统一;第三,智力培养与智力评价的有机统一;第四,不变性与可变性的有机统一。     

Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief

In this paper we compare Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief (Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 164:1338-1389, 2013; The Philosophical Review, 123:131-171, [2014]) and Spohn’s ranking-theoretic account of belief (Spohn, 1988, 2012). We discuss the two theories as solutions to the lottery paradox. To compare the two theories, we introduce a novel translation between ranking (mass) functions and probability (mass) functions. We draw some crucial consequences from this translation, in particular a new probabilistic belief notion. Based on this, we explore the logical relation between the two belief theories, showing that models of Leitgeb’s theory correspond to certain models of Spohn’s theory. The reverse is not true (or holds only under special constraints on the parameter of the translation). Finally, we discuss how these results raise new questions in belief theory. In particular, we raise the question whether stability (a key ingredient of Leitgeb’s theory) is rightly thought of as a property pertaining to belief (rather than to knowledge).     

Theory Choice,Theory Change,and Inductive Truth-Conduciveness

Studia Logica - (I) Synchronic norms of theory choice, a traditional concern in scientific methodology, restrict the theories one can choose in light of given information. (II) Diachronic norms of...     

Passionate Yearning Theory as a Theory of Meaning in Life

In this paper, I offer an original account of meaning in life, which I call the passionate yearning theory. Within the framework of the passionate yearning theory, meaning is understood as the intrinsically derived yearning, and passionate striving, for something (an ideal, or a state of affairs) that possesses some plausible objective claim to truth or facticity, which makes it worth pursuing for its own sake. To properly delineate the view, I present the various criteria that serve as the foundation for the passionate yearning view. These include the truth/facticity criterion, the lack of immorality, intrinsic subjectivity, passion, yearning and striving. I then show how these criteria coalesce into the passionate yearning theory and how exactly the theory works. Finally, I motivate the passionate yearning theory by addressing some possible criticisms and objections that can be raised against the view and also differentiate it from similar competing views.

     

Liberalization of Commodity Theory

Since its original formulation, commodity theory (Brock, 1968) has stimulated dozens of studies which have clarified its assumptions and extended its domain. A liberalization of the theory is proposed. The three key features are (a) extension of the domain from any conveyable and possessable objects (messages, experiences, and actual physical objects) to traits and skills, (b) extension to negative objects, and (c) identification of cognitive elaboration as a mediator between scarcity and evaluative polarization. In addition, conceptual clarification was attempted by showing that the bulk of independent variables studied in conjunction with unavailability are properly regarded as moderators rather than as mediators.     

Counseling Theory: The Problem of Definition

It is proposed that (a) research in counseling and counseling practice do not generally make explicit their roots in counseling theory, (b) this lack of connectedness to theory may represent a weakness in our theories for failing to be useful, (c) this fault may be a function of our current definitions of theory, and (d) we should focus upon philosophical premises at this time. The philosophical premise of syntony is used to illustrate how many of the commonly accepted assumptions which set our standards are not necessarily so, and how the broadening of such assumptions may encourage more activity in theory development. Counseling approaches which do not qualify as theory must at least qualify in the realm of rationale by making explicit their philosophical or value premises.     

Belief and the Error Theory

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.     

Evidence for Cognitive Load Theory

Dixon (1991) and Goldman (1991) have provided thoughtful commentaries on Chandler and Sweller (1991). The general issue they raise concerns the scientific procedures we should use when conducting research in cognition and instruction. It is an issue of great importance, and we welcome the opportunity provided by their criticisms to discuss the techniques we use. To clarify the findings based on cognitive load theory, we begin by indicating the essential characteristics of a theory concerned with cognition and instruction, followed by a brief history of cognitive load theory to make clear that it has these characteristics. These statements will then be used to address specific comments made by Goldman and Dixon.     

组织支持理论及其研究

该文介绍了Eisenberger等人1986年提出的组织支持理论的诞生背景,并对组织支持感受这一独立建构的概念,及其与领导一成员交换、心理契约概念的关系进行了总结。文章还分析了有关组织支持感受研究中的前因变量、结果变量和调节变量。最后归纳了我国开展组织支持理论研究的现状,并对组织支持理论未来的研究方向提出了建议。     

推理与决策的双加工理论研究简评

决策与推理的双加工理论是一个颇有影响力的理论,通过对两个加工系统的基本特点、区别点以及基本关系、推理错误原因等几个方面进行分析阐述,发现目前在该理论的一些基本问题的认识上还存在诸多问题。主要表现在以下几方面：（1）两个加工系统的关键区别点不在于工作记忆有无绝对参与;（2）对于推理和决策错误的原因,不同的双加工理论给出了不一致的解释;（3）今后有待从情绪与推理决策的关系、影响等方面加深对推理与决策错误的理解     

Game Theory in Philosophy

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism is reviewed. Game theory is shown at work in discussions about epistemological dependence (prisoner’s dilemma), liberalism and efficiency (Nash equilibrium), Hume’s concept of convention (correlated equilibrium), morality and rationality (bargaining games), and distributive justice and egalitarianism (evolutionary game theory). A guide to the literature provides hints at applications in collective intentionality, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and political philosophy.     

Enhancing Empathy and Theory of Mind

Social cognitive skills such as empathy and theory of mind are crucial for everyday interactions, cooperation, and cultural learning, and deficits in these skills have been implicated in pathologies such as autism spectrum disorder, sociopathy, and nonverbal learning disorders. Little research has examined how these skills develop after early childhood and how they may be trained. We tested the hypothesis that experience in acting, an activity in which one must step into the shoes of others, leads to growth in both empathy and theory of mind. In two studies, we followed children (elementary school aged) and adolescents (high school freshmen) receiving 1 year of either acting or other arts training (visual arts, music) and assessed empathy and theory of mind before and after training. In both studies, those receiving acting (but not other arts) training showed significant gains in empathy scores; in Study 2, adolescents receiving acting training also showed significant gains on a naturalistic measure of theory of mind, the Empathic Accuracy Paradigm. These findings demonstrate plasticity in empathy and theory of mind long past the watershed age of 3 to 4 years and suggest that both capacities are enhanced by role-playing.     

Aggregate Theory Versus Set Theory

Maddy's (1990) arguments against Aggregate Theory were undermined by the shift in her position in 1997. The present paper considers Aggregate Theory in the light of this, and the recent search for `New Axioms for Mathematics'. If Set Theory is the part-whole theory of singletons, then identifying singletons with their single members collapses Set Theory into Aggregate Theory. But if singletons are not identical to their single members, then they are not extensional objects and so are not a basis for Science. Either way, the Continuum Hypothesis has no physical interest.     

Sartre's Theory of Motivation

The aim of this article is to offer a novel reconstruction of Sartre's theory of motivation. I argue for four related claims: (a) Sartre's theory of motivation revolves around the Schelerian‐inspired notion of affectivity and the peculiar way affectivity provides us access to evaluative properties of the objects in our environment; (b) according to Sartre, the structure of intentional action, and in particular the act of choice and commitment to projects, is inextricably linked with “affectivity”; (c) the inextricable link between intentional action and affectivity is to be analyzed in terms of the fundamental structure of consciousness as being self‐present, thus making the agent nonpositionally aware of her choices and commitments; (d) an agent is motivated to act when her affective disclosure of value is in part constituted by the awareness of her commitments to relevant projects.     

The Property Theory of Musical Works

The property theory of musical works says that each musical work is a property that is instantiated by its occurrences, that is, the work's performances and playings. The property theory provides ontological explanations very similar to those given by its popular cousin, the type/token theory of musical works, but it is both simpler and stronger. However, type/token theorists often dismiss the property theory. In this essay, I formulate a version of the property theory that identifies each type (thus, each musical work) with a unique property. I then scrutinize the arguments offered for thinking that types, including musical works, are distinct from properties. I respond that no such argument is forceful and conclude that the property theory of musical works is superior to the type/token theory.     

Theory use in social predictions

In a commentary to our article on the role of theory and simulation in social predictions, Krueger (2012) argues that the role of theory is neglected in social psychology for a good reason. He considers evidence indicating that people readily generalize from themselves to others. In response, we stress the role of theoretical knowledge in predicting other people’s behavior. Importantly, prediction by simulation and prediction by theory can lead to high as well as to low correlations between own and predicted behavior. This renders correlations largely useless for identifying the prediction strategy. We argue that prediction by theory is a serious alternative to prediction by simulation, and that reliance on correlation has led to a bias toward simulation.     

Quasi-Truth In Quasi-Set Theory

Throughout the last two decades, Newton da Costa and his collaborators have developed some frameworks to help the interpretation of science. Two of them are particularly noteworthy: partial structures and quasi-truth (that provide a way of accommodating the openness and partiality of scientific activity), and quasi-set theory (that allows one to take seriously the idea, put forward by several physicists, that we can't meaningfully apply the notion of identity to quantum particles). In this paper I explore the interconnection between these two frameworks. After reviewing the extant formulations of quasi-truth and quasi-set theory, I suggest a way of combining them, advancing a formulation of quasi-truth in quasi-set theory. In this way, a good sense can be made of the idea that quantum mechanics, if not true, is at least quasi-true. I then explore an application of this combined framework, arguing that it provides a conceptual setting appropriate to overcome two (philosophical) difficulties in van Fraassen's modal interpretation of quantum mechanics.     

Rational Choice and Moral Theory

Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as a continuation of this older tradition. I then go on to argue for a controversial three-fold thesis: (1) that grounding a theory of morality in terms of rational self-interest is the only epistemologically respectable way to proceed with the justification of moral principles; (2) that despite this, most of the contemporary explorations of rational choice foundations for moral principles do not work—that the models of rational choice to which they appeal yield less than the substantial results that they are intended to yield; but (3) that if one rethinks just what it means to be rational, one can find in fact a promising way to connect the two—specifically through the development of a theory of genuinely cooperative activity.     

强化敏感性人格理论述评

Gray的强化敏感性理论尝试从人类神经生理机制的角度来解释人格差异。该理论认为,在中枢神经系统内存在一些子系统,分别对奖励和惩罚的刺激信号敏感,并通过强化效应调节人们的行为和动机。目前研究者已开发出强化敏感性的测量方法,并进行了一系列实证研究。但随着研究的深入,该理论的局限逐渐暴露出来。针对这些局限,未来的研究应致力于：（1）用生理指标来验证理论假设;（2）探讨反映强化敏感性的特质;（3）考察认知因素与生物因素的交互作用