Moray revisited: High-priority affective stimuli and visual search

Previous research offers conflicting suggestions about whether “high-priority” verbal stimuli such as an individual's own name or emotionally charged words automatically grab attention and/or can be detected without the usual capacity limitations. Nine experiments investigated this issue, using visual search through displays of words. In speeded search tasks, the subject's own name was detected more quickly than other targets, but in no case were search slopes flat enough to suggest parallel search or “pop-out”. Further, names were not found to be unusually potent distractors. Emotionally charged words were neither more readily detected as targets nor more potent as distractors than neutral words. Acomparison of observers' accuracy in searching briefly exposed simultaneous vs. successive displays provided further evidence that search for “high-priority” word targets is subject to the same severe capacity limitations as those that are found with search for neutral words.     

The effect of an irrelevant dimension on “same-different” judgements of multi-dimensional stimuli

Subjects made “same”-“different” judgements of simultaneously presented pairs of visual stimuli which could vary either in shape and colour independently, or in shape alone. In both conditions only shape was relevant to the “same”-“different” judgement. In the former condition “same” and “different” reaction times (RTs) were shorter when the states (“same” or “different”) of the relevant and the irrelevant dimension, colour, were the same. This result is interpreted as support for either a perceptual or a response interference hypothesis. The presence of an irrelevant dimension did not appear to affect differentially “same” and “different” judgements. The need for a re-evaluation of the results from other studies of multi-dimensional stimulus discrimination is discussed.     

Naming and equivalence: Response latencies for emergent relations

In an attempt to distinguish between associative network and verbal mediation accounts of equivalence formation, three experiments were carried out in which conditional stimulus relations were established and response latencies assessed during tests for emergent relations. In Experiment 1, three groups of adults were trained with six three-member classes of visual stimuli, using different kinds of stimuli for each group: readily nameable pictograms, which were “preassociated” (Group 1); equally nameable but “non-associated” pictograms (Group 2); or non-associated “abstract” stimuli, designed to discourage the use of verbal mediators (Group 3). For those trained with pictograms, equal response latencies were observed on all tested relations, viz. trained associations, symmetry, transitivity, and transitivity with symmetry, but for subjects given abstract stimuli response latencies were greater on tests requiring transitivity. In Experiment 2 this result was replicated with methodological refinements, using only groups trained with preassociated pictograms or abstract stimuli. In Experiment 3 subjects were pretrained to label abstract stimuli with either individual names or class names. Latencies were longer for tests involving transitivity in the case of those subjects using individual names, but equal response latencies were observed on all four types of test for those using class names. The results suggest that equivalence classesMaybe supported by either an associative network or by verbal mediation, depending on stimulus conditions and the subsequent strategies employed by subjects.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

Memory of a speaker's voice: Reaction time to same- or different-voiced letters

Subjects were presented with a sequence of two letters, each letter spoken in either a male or female voice. On each trial, the subject was required to indicate, as quickly as possible, whether the two letters had the same name. Reaction times (RTs) were faster for letters spoken in the same voice for both “same” and “different” responses, even when letters were separated by 8 s. These results are incompatible with the notion of physical and name codes in auditory memory since a “different” response should always be based on a comparison of letter names and should not be influenced by voice quality. It was also found that RTs were not influenced by the phonemic distinctive feature similarity of the letters.     

Phonological encoding and ideographic reading by the disconnected right hemisphere: Two case studies

The mute disconnected right hemispheres (RHs) of two commissurotomy patients are able to understand spoken words and read printed words by matching them with pictures of the objects named. In this paper we report the results of five experiments. The RH of one patient could “evoke the sound image” of a word to the extent of matching two pictures with homonymous names (experiment 1) or with rhyming names (experiment 2) without being able to name either one. This transformation of picture to covert sound does not depend on orthographic similarity of word ends as a clue to homonymy or rhyme, nor does it improve with short-term learning. Yet neither RH can translate print into sound by matching a spelled word with a picture that has a rhyming name (experiment 3) or by matching two orthographically dissimilar rhymes, be they meaningful (experiment 4) or nonsense words (experiment 5). We suggest that these RHs read “ideographically,” recognizing words directly as visual gestalts without intermediate phonetic recoding or grapheme-to-phoneme translation.     

Why naming takes longer than reading? The special case of Arabic numbers

Since the work of Cattell, 1885 and Cattell, 1886, it is known that the time to name an object (or a color, a geometric figure, a drawing) is longer than the time to read the name of that object. This result has been confirmed by many authors but the explanation of this phenomenon is still lacking. One good explanation of the reading–naming time difference is the uncertainty factor. Whereas words are associated with a single response name, pictures are linked to several names (the so-called “uncertainty hypothesis”). Another good explanation of this difference is the obligatory retrieval of meaning for pictures but not for words (the so-called “semantic hypothesis”). In the present experiments, subjects had to name Arabic numbers and their corresponding written names. By using Arabic numbers and their corresponding written names, we contrasted these two hypotheses proposed to explain the reading–naming time difference. We exploited the fact that Arabic numbers share a very important attribute with their corresponding written names: their uncertainty is null. Indeed, there is only one way to name 5 and five. Our results suggest that the main factor responsible for this reading–naming time difference is the uncertainty factor, since uncertainty being equal, this difference disappeared completely throughout ten (Experiment 1) and five repeated sessions (Experiment 2).     

The effect of orthographic structure and lexical meaning on “same-different” judgments

Pairs of high frequency English words, orthographically acceptable pseudo-words, and non-word letter strings were presented in a “same”-“different” task. The mean reaction times for “same” judgments were ordered; real words were faster than pseudo-words, and pseudo-words were faster than non-words. The RTs for the “different”, judgments showed no differences among the three types of words, except in the first two days of practice in a blocked presentation condition when the difference between the real words and non-words was marginally significant. These and other results suggest that “same” judgments are based upon a comparison process which efficiently uses higher order semantic and orthographic information in words, whereas “different” judgments are based upon comparison process which performs a self-terminating search of the graphemic information in words. The results were also discussed with reference to hierarchical models of word perception and reading.     

Discrimination of “W” and “V” shapes by goldfish

Goldfish were trained to discriminate between “W” and “V” shapes; different groups were trained with the shapes in different orientations. Transfer tests were given after training and the following conclusions were drawn. Animals learned to discriminate between the training shapes by detecting the difference in the number of points present in each; they learned the difference in the relative number of points rather than the absolute number present in each shape; the subjects transferred well to pairs of shapes bearing points facing in different directions from those on the training shapes; knobs were treated as practically equivalent to points; animals relied more heavily on differences at the tops of the shapes than on differences in the bottom halves.     

A study of the effect of structural information and familiarity in form perception

Two experiments were carried out to investigate the influence of structural information and familiarity on the processing of visual forms. Pairs of “well” structured and nameable and “poorly” structured and non-nameable fragmented forms were employed as stimuli. The effects of structure and familiarity were assessed by manipulating the visual hemifield of presentation and the task. In Experiment 1 stimuli were judged as being either in the same orientation or mirror-reversed, a task that does not require high-level semantic information to be processed. Experiment 2 required physically identical forms to be matched, which may use either physical or name information. In Experiment 1 “same” judgements were equivalent for both types of stimuli, and “different' judgements were longer for the “poorly” structured (non-nameable) forms. In Experiment 2 there was little overall difference between “well” and “poorly” structured forms, though response times to “well” structured (nameable) forms were slowed for right-visual-field presentations. It is suggested that familiarity may not be sufficient to provide a perceptual advantage for nameable forms, as the advantage for nameable stimuli was confined to “same” judgements in Experiment 1 and response times were shorter for non-nameable stimuli in Experiment 2. Rather, performance depends upon factors such as the computation of global shape (due to structural properties of collinearity and closure) and on the use of different kinds or representations (physical versus name) in matching.     

like and cross modality recognition in subnormal children

The ability of mentally subnormal children to recognize previously presented visual or verbal stimuli was compared. In “like-modality” procedures they had to recognize words or pictures in the modality in which they had originally been presented. In “cross-modality” procedures the stimulus they had to recognize was in the opposite modality from that which had been used for the first presentation.

In every recognition test the items had to be recognized from among an equal number of novel stimuli. Cross-modality procedures resulted in higher recognition scores. The hypothesis is advanced that this could be accounted for by the necessary translation from one type of sensory image to another in the cross-modality trials, which might minimize over-generalization.     

Effects of age on the ability to remember common and rare proper names

Difficulties in remembering proper nouns increase with age. One factor is that names are arbitrary labels. Another is that because many people share the same names, mutual discriminability between names is less than than that between other words. Discriminability between names may reduce as the number of acquaintances increases. Also, most people have both a first and a second name. These have to be learned as a pair, but they may be of unequal distinctiveness and so be unequally well remembered. An experiment was designed to evaluate the relative effects of distinctiveness of first and second names on free and cued recall.

Subjects (aged 60-69 or 70-79 years, matched on Mill-Hill vocabulary score) were asked to remember one of four lists of 16 names. Each was presented four times. The names were either common, rare, or a combination of the two--a common first name with a rare surname, or vice versa. Subjects first freely recalled the names. They were next cued by either first name or surname to recall the remaining half of name pairs. Interactions between effects on recall of subjects' ages and of the relative distinctiveness of first and second names provide partial support for a model incorporating “relative distinctiveness” as a factor in failures of name recall in old age.     

An unusual case of after-imagery following fixation of an “imaginary” visual pattern

The case of a healthy normal subject is described in which negative after-images were reported to follow fixation of an “imaginary” pattern. The size of the after-image was measured at various distances and found to agree closely with the size of an after-image induced by fixation of a “real” visual pattern, and to conform roughly with Emmert's Law. No evidence for chromatic after-images was obtained. Two controls were conducted, one indicating that the results could not be attributed to after-images resulting from objective aids used to maintain an “imaginary” pattern of constant size; the other discounting the possibility of the subject's having guessed the correct values. Similar phenomena reported in the early literature are briefly mentioned, and some theoretical implications discussed.     

Elaborative processing of pictures in verbal domains

Four experiments were performed to evaluate the effect of semantic and nonsemantic verbal elaboration of the names of pictures on free recall, picture-name recognition, and picture recognition. Elaboration was manipulated by having subjects decide if the names of pictures contained two letters, rhymed with another word, or were appropriate in a sentence frame. Semantic elaboration of the names of pictures in sentence contexts requiring positive responses resulted in better name recall (Experiment 1) and name recognition (Experiments 1 and 2) than did nonsemantic elaborations (rhyme- and letter-identification tasks). However, the effects of elaborating pictures-names were greatly reduced for picture recognition (Experiments 3 and 4). The results are described in terms of elaborative processing after semantic access. Following initial semantic access, the names of pictures may be further elaborated. Semantic elaboration of the names of pictures typically leads to better retention than does nonsemantic elaboration. However, perceptual records about the appearance of objects may be relatively independent of orienting tasks that elaborate pictures- names.     

Spatial cueing and the relation between the accuracy of “where” and “what” decisions in visual search

To study the processes underlying selective attention in visual search, the relation between the accuracy of “where” (location) and “what” (same/different orientation matching) decisions was analysed under various display conditions. Target-non-target discriminability was varied by contrasting single and multiple element displays; further, attention was directly manipulated by spatial cueing. In Experiment 1, analyses for both single and multiple displays showed that localization accuracy remained above chance when same/different matching failed; the inverse also obtained. It seems that accurate matching is not a prerequisite for target localization, nor is accurate localization a prerequisite for same/different matching. However, localization is a prerequisite for the accurate recognition of target orientation (Experiment 2). In this case, it seems that features critical for localization “call” attention to a particular candidate location. This facilitates further (shape) analysis of the stimulus that is found there. This orienting process is by-passed if attention is cued to the location in advance.     

Unimpaired short-term memory and rhyme judgement in congenitally speechless individuals: Implications for the notion of “articulatory coding”

In normal adults, concurrent articulation impairs short-term memory, abolishing both the phonological similarity effect and the word length effect when visual presentation is used. It also interferes with ability to judge whether visually presented words rhyme. It is generally assumed that concurrent articulation impairs performance because it prevents people from recoding material into an articulatory form. If this is the explanation, then individuals who are congenitally speechless (anarthric) or speech-impaired (dysarthric) should show the same impairments as normal individuals who are concurrently articulating—i.e. they should have reduced memory spans, fail to show word length and phonological similarity effects in short-term memory, and find rhyme judgement difficult. These predictions were tested in a study of 48 cerebral palsied individuals: 12 anarthric, 12 dysarthric, and 24 controls individually matched to the speech-impaired subjects. There was no impairment of memory span in speech-impaired subjects, who showed normal phonological similarity and word-length effects in short-term memory. Speech-impaired subjects did not differ from their controls in ability to tell whether names of pairs of pictures rhymed. These results challenge the notion that “articulatory coding” is implicated in short-term memory and rhyme judgement and suggests that processes such as rehearsal and phonemic segmentation involve generation of a more abstract central phonological code.     

The development of socialization skills in an electively mute child

In a booth designed especially for work with both autistic and electively mute children, a 4-yr-old girl named Dolly, who had no communicative speech or imitative skills, was given a preliminary session in which her verbal output was assessed. To elicit sounds from Dolly, an instrument called a “color organ” was used as a positive reinforcer. After this baseline assessment, in 40 half-hour sessions, Dolly was taught to make eye contact with E, and to obey instructions—although it was first necessary to extinguish her disruptive behavior, particularly her opérant crying. In addition, she learned non-verbal imitative behavior, such as hand clapping; and verbal imitative behavior, such as saying “Hi!” Social (play) sessions were begun after session 21, and continued for the remaining time. These were helpful in generalizing Dolly's learned skills to an environment other than the booth; and to other tasks, such as singing “Ee-eye-ee-eye-oh” in the refrain of the song, “Old McDonald”; and pointing to E's eyes, saying “ice”.     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.