Do the upright eyes have it?

Eye contact is crucial for social communication. A perceived direct gaze facilitates detection, whereas face inversion diminishes this facilitative effect (Senju, Hasegawa, & Tojo, 2005). In the present study, we adopted a visual search paradigm to investigate why a direct gaze facilitates detection in an upright face, but not in an upside-down face. Upright eyes were found to facilitate detection even when other parts of the face were inverted or absent, whereas inverted eyes had no effect on search performance. A critical role for the morphological information of upright eyes, which can be distorted by “eye inversion,” in direct gaze processing is suggested.     

Do the eyes have it? Cues to the direction of social attention

The face communicates an impressive amount of visual information. We use it to identify its owner, how they are feeling and to help us understand what they are saying. Models of face processing have considered how we extract such meaning from the face but have ignored another important signal - eye gaze. In this article we begin by reviewing evidence from recent neurophysiological studies that suggests that the eyes constitute a special stimulus in at least two senses. First, the structure of the eyes is such that it provides us with a particularly powerful signal to the direction of another person's gaze, and second, we may have evolved neural mechanisms devoted to gaze processing. As a result, gaze direction is analysed rapidly and automatically, and is able to trigger reflexive shifts of an observer's visual attention. However, understanding where another individual is directing their attention involves more than simply analysing their gaze direction. We go on to describe research with adult participants, children and non-human primates that suggests that other cues such as head orientation and pointing gestures make significant contributions to the computation of another's direction of attention.     

Do the bishops have it right on health care reform?

The National Conference of Catholic Bishops has argued for significant government involvement in health care in order to assure respect for what they regard as the right to health care. Critics charge that the bishops are wrong because health care is not a right. In this article, it is argued that these critics are correct in their claim that health care is not a right. However, it is also argued that the premise that health care is not a right does not imply that the market is the most equitable and just system for providing health care. Natural law arguments in the tradition of Roman Catholic social teaching lead to the conclusion that a just and prosperous society has a moral obligation to provide health care even if there is no such right. Further, there are strong moral grounds for concluding that the bishops are correct in their claim that health care ought not to be considered a market commodity. It is argued that if health care ought not to be considered a commodity, then national health insurance is the best available alternative for fulfilling the social obligation to distribute health care resources justly and fairly at this time in American history. The bishops' case for government involvement can be made on the strength of the Catholic tradition in theological argumentation, independent of the claim that health care is a right.     

Age differences in the control of looking behavior: do you know where your eyes have been?

Previous research has shown that during visual search young and old adults' eye movements are equivalently influenced by the appearance of task-irrelevant abrupt onsets. The finding of age-equivalent oculomotor capture is quite surprising in light of the abundant research suggesting that older adults exhibit poorer inhibitory control than young adults on a variety of different tasks. In the present study, we examined the hypothesis that oculomotor capture is age invariant when subjects' awareness of the appearance of task-irrelevant onsets is low, but that older adults will have more difficulty than young adults in inhibiting reflexive eye movements to task-irrelevant onsets when awareness of these objects is high. Our results were consistent with the level-of-awareness hypothesis. Young and old adults showed equivalent patterns of oculomotor capture with equiluminant onsets, but older adults misdirected their eyes to bright onsets more often than young adults did.     

Do the mentally retarded have poor memory?

The hypothesis that mentally retarded persons have a short-term memory deficit whixh is due to inadequate rehearsal strategies is reexamined. A reevaluation of results of a number of experiments suggests that normal and retarded persons differ on short-term memory tasks, and the superiority of normals is present from the time of initial stimulus exposure. While some evidence for slope differences in retention curves is found in a few tasks, it is not strong support for memory differences. The hypothesis that “memory” differences are due to differential encoding as a result of more adequate rehearsal by the normal subjects is unacceptable. If this were the case, some differences in slope of retention curves could be expected unless rehearsal beyond the encoding stage was totally precluded. The review points to a need for an empirical reevaluation of the issue with a full recognition that deficits in particular processes may characterize some retarded persons and not others.     

Do infants have a sense of fairness?

Two experiments examined infants' expectations about how an experimenter should distribute resources and rewards to other individuals. In Experiment 1, 19-month-olds expected an experimenter to divide two items equally, as opposed to unequally, between two individuals. The infants held no particular expectation when the individuals were replaced with inanimate objects, or when the experimenter simply removed covers in front of the individuals to reveal the items (instead of distributing them). In Experiment 2, 21-month-olds expected an experimenter to give a reward to each of two individuals when both had worked to complete an assigned chore, but not when one of the individuals had done all the work while the other played. The infants held this expectation only when the experimenter could determine through visual inspection who had worked and who had not. Together, these results provide converging evidence that infants in the 2nd year of life already possess context-sensitive expectations relevant to fairness.     

Do corporations have minds of their own?

Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in which the collectively accepted function is expressed in part through its occupier’s intentional expression of her agency in that role (where the occupier is part of the group whose collective acceptance underwrites her having the relevant function in social transactions). I identify institutions as systems of status roles and show how this is compatible with seeing the agency of institutions generally, even over time periods in which there is complete change in role occupiers, as a matter of the contributions only of individual agents. I explain how the reduction of the institution to its members is compatible with its potentially having had a completely different membership. I show in the case of the corporation in particular that, once we see its origins and function, the surface features of legal discourse about corporate agency are misleading and are compatible with a deflationary account of corporate agency. I show in connection with this that the corporation is to be identified with its shareholders, and that where a corporation separates ownership and control, its managers and employees are proxy agents of the shareholders doing business under the corporate form. Finally, I canvass the legitimate ways of construing ordinary talk about corporate intention, belief, and so on, in light of this, none of which support the attribution of genuine agency or intentionality to any group per se associated with the corporation.     

Change Detection Without Awareness: Do Explicit Reports Underestimate the Representation of Change in the Visual System?

Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on the redeployment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene perception, and propose a reinterpretation of the role of attention in representing change.     

Visual perception in fencing: Do the eye movements of fencers represent their information pickup?

The present study examined whether results of athletes' eye movements while they observe fencing attacks reflect their actual information pickup by comparing these results with others gained with temporal and spatial occlusion and cuing techniques. Fifteen top-ranking expert fencers, 15 advanced fencers, and 32 sport students predicted the target region of 405 fencing attacks on a computer monitor. Results of eye movement recordings showed a stronger foveal fixation on the opponent's trunk and weapon in the two fencer groups. Top-ranking expert fencers fixated particularly on the upper trunk. This matched their performance decrements in the spatial occlusion condition. However, when the upper trunk was occluded, participants also shifted eye movements to neighboring body regions. Adding cues to the video material had no positive effects on prediction performance. We conclude that gaze behavior does not necessarily represent information pickup, but that studies applying the spatial occlusion paradigm should also register eye movements to avoid underestimating the information contributed by occluded regions.     

Jung's understanding of schizophrenia: is it still relevant in the ‘era of the brain’?

Jung was highly committed to grasping the meaning of psychotic thinking, and left behind precious insights to treatment scattered through his works written between 1906 and 1958. The tendency of today's psychiatry is to attribute the psychotic process to alteration in the brain's anatomy, biochemistry and electrophysiology, thus exempting the subject, i.e. the afflicted person, from responsibility for attachment to reality and their sanity. Jung understood schizophrenia as an ‘abaissement du niveau mental’, a similar phenomenon to the one encountered in dreams, and caused by a peculiar ‘faiblesse de la volonté’. He contested that complexes in schizophrenia, in contrast with neurotic disorders, are disconnected and can either never reintegrate to the psychic totality or can only join together in remission ‘like a mirror broke into splinters’ (Jung 1939 , para. 507). Accordingly, a person who does not fight for the supremacy of ego consciousness and has let themself be swayed by the intrusion of alien contents arising from the unconscious (even to the point of becoming fascinated by regression) is exposed to the danger of schizophrenia. The contemporary relevance of these notions and their necessity in understanding the psychotic process in the light of modern scientific findings are discussed.     

Do animals have rights?

A right, unlike an interest, is a valid claim, or potential claim, made by a moral agent, under principles that govern both the claimant and the target of the claim. Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in and has force within a human moral world.     

Change detection in the flicker paradigm: Do faces have an advantage?

Changes to a scene that occur during an eye movement, image flicker, or movie cut are difficult to detect. One way to measure change detection performance is with the flicker paradigm, where changes between two images are introduced during a brief blank screen, which causes the images to “flicker”. Ro, Russell, and Lavie (2001) presented flickering displays consisting of one face and five different common objects. They found that changes to faces were detected both more rapidly and more accurately than changes to objects and suggested that faces capture attention due to their biological significance. In the present studies, we found that changes to objects were more readily detected than changes to faces when displays consisted of an object among a number of faces. That is, a change detection advantage was observed for the “odd-one-out” in the array, regardless of its significance. Therefore, faces may not have a special status for change detection.     

Modeling the word recognition data of Vitevitch and Luce (1998): Is it ARTful?

Vitevitch and Luce (1998) showed that the probability with which phonemes co-occur in the language (phonotactic probability) affects the speed with which words and nonwords are named. Words with high phonotactic probabilities between phonemes were named more slowly than words with low probabilities, whereas with nonwords, just the opposite was found. To reproduce this reversal in performance, a model would seem to require not merely sublexical representations, but sublexical representations that are relatively independent of lexical representations. ARTphone (Grossberg, Boardman, & Cohen, 1997) is designed to meet these requirements. In this study, we used a technique called parameter space partitioning to analyze ARTphone’s behavior and to learn if it can mimic human behavior and, if so, to understand how. To perform best, differences in sublexical node probabilities must be amplified relative to lexical node probabilities to offset the additional source of inhibition (from top-down masking) that is found at the sublexical level.     

Intelligence and inspection time: Do high-IQ subjects use cognitive strategies?

It has been suggested that ‘inspection time’ (IT) can be aided by specific strategies, and that high-IQ Ss would therefore be advantaged on this task. However consideration of previously published findings from university students suggest that such strategies cannot currently be taught with any degree of success, and that strategy use may disrupt rather than explain the IT-IQ relationship. Correlations between IT and IQ for high-IQ Ss not using strategies are consistent with previously observed data, perhaps from -0.3 to -0.6. Despite considerable variation in the IT technique used, similar results are being obtained by different researchers. It is not possible to prove that no strategies at all have been used by Ss, but re-interpretation of current evidence suggests that this source of bias is overstressed. By applying Baron's formal criteria for identifying strategies, it becomes possible to test whether strategies have been used or not. Failing a clear statement of what counts as evidence of strategy use, particular strategies must be examined for their impact on IT when Ss have been fully trained in their use.     

Judgement of control revisited: Are the depressed realistic or pessimistic?

The study, firstly, examined the depressive realism postulate in relation to control judgments. A group of depressed and nondepressed undergraduates were exposed to a total of six judgement of control tasks (from 0% control tio 100% control). Depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in their control judgements. Secondlym, an attempt is made to classify subjects on the basis of these six judgements of control tasks as optimisticm, realistic and pessimistic in perceived control judgements.It was found that pessimistic rather than realistic subjects, had higher depressive symptomatology. Lastly, pessimism about control predicted the depressive symptomatology as assessed three months later. The results are discussed in relation to the phenomenon of depressive realism and the hopelessness theory of depression.     

The Rorschach: does it have a future?

Recent evidence suggests that in spite of an increasingly critical attitude by many clinicians towards the use of projective techniques, the use of these techniques has not faltered over the years. Insofar as the Rorschach continues to be the most popular projective instrument, its scientific status is critically examined in the present paper. The problems inherent in examining an instrument which has engendered a number of quite distinct scoring systems are noted, and the conclusion is advanced that notwithstanding such problems there seems little likelihood that the Rorschach will experience any significantly diminished popularity in the future.