Seven Good Reasons Why Counselling Psychologists Should Listen to B. F. Skinner

Repetition is known to be an effective procedure for helping people to remember a message. B. F. Skinner is clearly aware of this, and he has, for many years, re-described and repeated the fundamentals of a science of behaviour. I will extract some of these basics and paraphrase them here in a manner which makes their relevance clear to counselling psychologists.     

Belief bias is stronger when reasoning is more difficult

Three studies examine the influence of varying the difficulty of reasoning on the extent of belief bias, while minimising the possibility that the manipulation would influence the way participants approach the task. Specifically, reasoning difficulty was manipulated by making variations in problem content, while maintaining all other aspects of the problems constant. In Study 1, 191 participants were presented with consistent and conflict problems varying in two levels of difficulty. The results showed a significant influence of problem difficulty on the extent of the belief bias, such that the effect of belief was more pronounced for difficult problems. This effect was stronger in Study 2 (73 participants) where the difference in the difficulty of the problems was purposely accentuated. The results of both studies stress the importance of controlling for problem difficulty when studying belief bias. Study 3 examined one consequence of this, i.e., the classic belief vs. logic interaction could be eliminated by manipulating problem difficulty. Theoretical implications for dual-process accounts of belief bias are also discussed.     

Skinner on cognition

One of the most controversial, if not the most controversial, aspect of behaviorism is its claims (actual and putative) concerning cognition. Part of this controversy is caused by egregious exegetical errors on the part of Skinner's critics. Critics can then easily refute behaviorism by attributing these problematic claims to Skinner. This paper attempts to faithfully describe Skinner's claims regarding cognition. Skinner advances several arguments regarding the role of cognitions in human behavior and in the science of human behavior. We suggest that there are two distinct kinds of claims in this web: 1) claims regarding the proper relation between science and cognitions and 2) claims regarding the status of cognitions as natural events. Due to the multiplicity and interdependence of many of these arguments, it is best to view Skinner's position on cognition as consisting of a web of interdependent claims.     

Why Evolution is Really Indeterministic

Leslie Graves, Barbara Horan and Alex Rosenberg (1999) have argued that the process of evolution is really deterministic, so we should be instrumentalists about our probabilistic evolutionary theory. I criticize the consistency of their view. I argue that because they are realists towards multiple theories (quantum mechanics and macrophysics) their arguments against realism for another scientific theory fail. The main point of this paper is critical, but in order to set up this criticism I explore the ramifications of realism for multiple theories. Finally, I offer a brief metaphysical justification for realism about multiple theories. This view justifies realism for evolutionary theory, which has been defended by Robert Brandon and Scott Carson (1996).     

为什么说风水是伪科学

风水,是认为所谓地气可以渗入死人骨骼从而影响生者祸福的一种巫术。它是传统方术的一种。风水术虽然在理论上搀和了古人的环境经验,但更多的是以低级有神论的世界观为核心的,与科学相去甚远。如果一定要把这样与科学八竿子打不着的东西标榜成科学,那这样的科学就是假冒科学,通常称为伪科     

Why positive psychology is necessary

The authors provide a definition of positive psychology and suggest that psychologists should try to cultivate a more appreciative perspective on human nature. Examples are given of a negative bias that seems to pervade much of theoretical psychology, which may limit psychologists' understanding of typical and successful human functioning. Finally, a preview of the articles in the special section is given.     

Why indeterminate probability is rational

This essay has two objectives: (1) To offer a general motivation for the use of sets of probabilities to represent states of credal probability judgment. Doubt as to which of rival answers to a given question is true is representable by the set of potential answers that have not ruled out as impossible. Doubt concerning probability is representable by the set of probability distributions over potential answers that are not ruled out as impermissible to use in delibration. (2) To defend a more specific thesis that the set of permissible probability distributions ought to be convex.     

Why it is difficult to see the anima as a helpful object: critique and clinical relevance of the theory of archetypes

This paper is divided into three parts. The first deals briefly with more general aspects of the theory of archetypes (as conceived by Jung); the second examines the anima archetype in rather more detail, because it is, apart from the self, the main archetype in Jung's thought; and the third discusses the clinical repercussions of the anima theory and of the theory of the archetypes in general. The various references to Jung himself and certain circumstances of his life are included here on the assumption that personal problems in his biography contributed decisively to the constitution of his theory, so that deeper insights accure if they are taken into account.