Metaphor and ‘career’

This article provides a series of readings of a young man’s career—a career that was shared in the context of a research project. Although similar, each reading is qualitatively different in the sense that new material is introduced on each occasion. This, in turn, highlights the limitations of the word as a form of representation. The article argues that in order to encapsulate the irreducible hermeneutic characteristic of a ‘career,’ a non-linear form of representation is required. The article moves on to show how metaphor can be utilized to represent ‘career’ in both words and images. This includes a detailed examination of the notion of metaphorisation—a constructionist term that denotes the relationship between metaphor and consciousness. The article concludes with a discussion of the methodological possibilities offered by metaphor for conducting research.     

The embodied cognition theory and the motor component of “yes” and “no” verbal responses

Most of the experiments which give theories of embodied cognition their empirical anchorage only take into consideration the motor responses induced by the task or the motor component of the visual stimulus. And yet, these motor responses are often associated with a linguistic answer. Our hypothesis is that “YES” and “NO” verbal responses have a motor component. In a first experiment we showed that producing a verbal response (YES vs. NO) involves motor planning (pushing vs. pulling): participants push a lever more quickly when they have to answer “yes” than “no”, and conversely, they pull a lever more quickly when they have to answer “no” than “yes”. Moreover, in a second experiment, we showed that perceiving the words “YES” and “NO”, on its own, leads to the same motor planning than when “yes” and “no” answers actually have to be produced. Participants detect the word “YES” faster when they have to push a lever than when they have to pull it and conversely they detect the word “NO” faster when they have to pull the lever than when they have to push it down. These results are discussed in reference to “online” and “offline embodiment” concepts and to the cognitive linguistic theories.     

Peter Winch on ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Socratic’ Reasoning

Peter Winch often returned to questions about the nature of logic. In the context of his work on Wittgenstein and political philosophy in the 1990s, Winch described a contrast between ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Socratic’ reasoning. Aristotelian conceptions of reasoning, attributed to Frege and Russell, would see logic as a formal science and rationality as consistency with pre‐existent rules of inference. The Socratic conception, attributed to Wittgenstein, understands rational argument as a form of socially embedded dialogue that involves moral relationships and a dimension of depth. Rational persuasion may also involve use of persuasive images and examples.     

‘Feeling for’ and ‘feeling with’: developmental and neuroscientific perspectives on intersubjectivity and empathy

This paper discusses research by Beatrice Beebe, Bessel van der Kolk and others, exploring the interpersonal processes that underpin early relational trauma and how this contributes to adult psychopathology. An essential feature of early relational trauma, the infant's experience of being unable to evoke an empathic response from the caregiver and the feelings of shame this gives rise to, is discussed and its implications for psychotherapy are considered. The neuroscience that underpins two forms of empathy in the therapeutic relationship, of ‘feeling for’ and ‘feeling with’ the patient is discussed and explored in relation to the concordant and complementary countertransference. I argue that when therapists respond to the projection on to them of the abuser by an increasingly determined adherence to analytic technique, this may become a complementary countertransference identification with the abuser and an enactment of the abusive relationship.     

At‐one‐ment,intuition and ‘suchness’1

Many senses exist for perceiving sensory experience; there are in turn others which make it possible to perceive emotional experience: intuition is one of these. The author, using W. R. Bion's work, studies intuition psychoanalytically, considering it to be a powerful ‘sense’ in clinical work. He describes the metapsychology of intuition, and proposes models that make it possible to think—from different perspectives— about how to make use of it in an analysis. To this end, he examines a series of useful processes and concepts: growth, tolerance, ‘suchness’, suffering and courage. The author defi nes the intuitive mechanism as a derivation of the renunciation of memory, desire and understanding; such a renunciation, learning from the experience of suffering the pain of facing the Truth in at‐one‐ment, makes it possible to tolerate the frustrations associated with observing the analysand ‘such‐as‐he‐is’. Finally, once immersed in the intelligence of intuition, the author considers ways in which intuition might be linked with concepts, with a view to interpreting the facts that must be transformed in the analysis.