Evolutionary Psychology, Cognitive Science, and Dynamical Systems: Building an Integrative Paradigm

Cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and dynamical systems theory have all been proposed as frameworks for linking the diverse subdisciplines of psychology with one another, and with other scientific disciplines. Traditional cognitive science focused on content-free general processing and deemphasized motivation. An evolutionary perspective emphasizes the centrality of motivational systems and the specificity of mechanisms designed to solve particular recurrent problems. The evolutionary perspective provides a set of broad general principles linking diverse behaviors in humans as well as other species. The dynamic approach seeks even broader principles, searching for emergent patterns in all complex systems, whether animate or inanimate. Natural selection is itself one such broad principle, as is the broader principle of self-organization, which helps explain dynamic equilibria found in groups of humans and in diverse species linked together within ecosystems. Proponents of the major contending interdisciplines will need to build more bridges if the dream of a unifying paradigm is to be realized. This review samples some of the reasons why evolutionary psychologists, dynamical systems theorists, and traditional cognitive scientists need one another.     

Evolution and Personality: What Should a Comprehensive Theory Address and How?

Personality is arguably the most integrative area of psychology; yet, it is an area about which evolutionary psychologists have had comparatively little to say. This is unfortunate because evolutionary theory holds great potential as a framework that can link together the disparate aspects that make up a person. We suggest that progress in evolutionary personality psychology will be helped by clarification of precisely what an evolutionary theory of personality would need to address. To this end, we first describe and assess some extant contributions by theorists attempting to understand personality from an evolutionary perspective. Next, we endorse a working definition of what personality entails and outline three types of personality differences – character traits, goals/motives, and selves/identities – that any comprehensive evolutionary theory of personality should address. Finally, we suggest an approach forward, one where evolved species‐typical motives orient people toward adaptive ends and result in the differentiation of individuals’ unique selves.     

Evolutionary psychology from a developmental systems perspective: comment on Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003)

Although agreeing with R. Lickliter and H. Honeycutt (2003) that evolutionary psychology lacks and should adopt a coherent developmental model to explain how evolved mechanisms become expressed in phenotypes, it is argued that adhering to the principles of developmental systems theory, despite enhancing evolutionary psychology, would not change appreciably its basic focus. The concepts of innateness and modularity, what is inherited and what evolves, as well as the possible role of developmental plasticity in the evolution of human cognition are discussed. It is proposed that evolutionary psychology can incorporate the developmental systems perspective into its theorizing, with the end result being a science that more closely reflects human nature.     

Contributors

Abstract

This paper studies the interaction of the clinical theories of two major British theorists, Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott. Through three clinical examples, we see how the “Klein-Winnicott dialectic” operates in a significantly developmental fashion to advance and fulfill clinical work. Winnicott’s “object survival” is looked at in developmental conjunction with Klein’s “mourning” as a primary clinical and developmental process. This interaction also captures the essence of working with the aggression of a self that has been traumatically disrupted within its early development. This paper demonstrates how such work leads to the assimilation and grieving of primal object loss, evolving into a “developmental mourning process.” This developmental mourning includes the working-through of an “abandonment depression” in the character-disordered patient. A clinical example in a 1989 essay on “psychic pain” by Betty Joseph is used to set up the clinical challenge of going beyond the symptomatic clinging behavior of developmental arrest, into full psychic birth as a separate other, an Other who can relate to an Other. Conclusively, the subjective visceral affect noted and monitored in its clinical dimensions here is that of human “heartache,” which can also include regret.     

Archetypes Reconsidered as Emergent Outcomes of Cognitive Complexity and Evolved Motivational Systems

Advances in contemporary cognitive science suggest that our internal representational systems are powerfully shaped by interacting evolutionary, developmental, and neuro-computational processes. Although Jung’s archetypes of the collective unconscious are largely dismissed by modern psychological science, something very much like them emerges from the intersection of these perspectives. Functional analysis suggests that a variety of conserved systems—basic biological ones, like self-protection and mating, as well as more complex social ones, like cheater-detection—need to make use of more general representational systems (like face perception) to simulate and predict adaptive responses to recurring environmental problems. Furthermore, analogous to the capacity to develop language, these systems depend on specific input at critical developmental stages. Archetypes reflect the interaction of domain-specific challenges and domain-general simulations. They are dynamic patterns of perception, memory, and action, resonating with ancient motivational and emotional systems. They shed light on how the symbolic emerges from the subsymbolic. Archetypes are thus the natural consequence of our fundamental social goals playing out in three nested dynamics: the online representation of reality by mental simulation systems, the history of personal experiences that build a particular instantiation of these systems, and the evolutionary dynamics that selected the web of cognitive and affective capacities that all normally developing humans share. This modern elaboration of the idea of archetypes fuses disparate conceptual perspectives, provokes methodological reorientations, generates novel hypotheses, and will likely open whole new lines of integrative inquiry.     

Cognitive developmental biology: history, process and fortune's wheel

Biological contributions to cognitive development continue to be conceived predominantly along deterministic lines, with proponents of different positions arguing about the preponderance of gene-based versus experience-based influences that organize brain circuits irreversibly during prenatal or early postnatal life, and evolutionary influences acting through selection on small numbers of genes. This article discusses evolutionary, mechanistic and probabilistic aspects of developmental processes that cognitive scientists need to better integrate. Developmental processes inseparably fuse experience-dependent and experience-independent components, have important stochastic contributions, and exhibit a greater degree of mechanistic continuity between developing and adult nervous systems than previously thought. Their balanced integration leads to new models for "critical or sensitive" period phenomena and behavioral biases. A general understanding of behavioral development - cognitive developmental biology--will require better coordination between comparative animal and human developmental research programs.     

Children,childhood, and development in evolutionary perspective

We examine children, childhood, and development from an evolutionary perspective. We begin by reviewing major assumptions of evolutionary–developmental psychology, including the integration of “soft” developmental systems theory with ideas from mainstream evolutionary psychology. We then discuss the concept of adaptive developmental plasticity and describe the core evolutionary concept of developmental programming and some of its applications to human development, as instantiated in life history theory and the theory of differential susceptibility to environmental influence. We then discuss the concept of adaptation from an evolutionary–developmental perspective, including ontogenetic and deferred adaptations, and examine the development of some adaptations of infancy and childhood from the domains of folk psychology and folk physics. We conclude that evolutionary theory can serve as a metatheory for developmental science.     

Cabinets and culture: Victorian anthropology and the museum context

Collections of material artifacts played a central institutional and intellectual role in Victorian anthropology. Ethnological theory argued that evolution in material technology recapitulated broader patterns of social evolution. Arrangement of artifacts into developmental typologies thereby provided heuristic exemplars by which theorists could chart the path of broader institutional change. Museums, in consequence, became centers for professional research and advancement. The central theoretical and disciplinary role of collections was tied to evolutionary theory. As the latter lost its preeminence in the first quarter of the twentieth century, so did museum settings decline in significance.     

Archetypes and the ‘Impoverished Genome’ argument: updates from evolutionary genetics

Throughout his career, Jung felt the psyche had ‘ancestral layers’ that contained elements of an individual’s species history, and clinical experience has shown that this idea can be an aid to psychological healing and emotional well-being. Thus, some later thinkers have attempted to link such theoretical constructs to the genome, as Jung had little knowledge of genetics in his day. But in the early 2000s, genome studies suggested that the genome might contain too little content to be capable of encoding symbolic information. This opinion gave rise to an oft-repeated ‘impoverished genome’ argument, i.e. that the genome could not provide a significant contribution to the collective unconscious, prompting theorists to propose other sources for it, or to argue that it doesn’t exist. Today, however, developments in evolutionary neurogenetics calls the impoverished genome argument into question for a number of independent reasons. These developments re-open the idea that the genome may be worth reconsidering as the biological substrate for the collective unconscious.     

Reuse and body-formatted representations in simulation theory

I review the shifting definitions of simulation as found in recent versions of the simulation theory (ST) of social cognition. I focus on two concepts that have become central to recent ST in the work of a number of simulation theorists: the notion of reuse and the notion of B-formatted representations. I point out specific limitations or problems involved in these concepts. Although the reuse hypothesis provides an interesting evolutionary account of how neural mechanisms may adapt to new tasks, it doesn’t offer an explanation of how these mechanisms work. In contrast to the genuinely embodied account that simulation theorists seek, an explanation of social cognition in terms of B-formatted representations not only remains disembodied, but also ignores social interaction and remains solipsistic. I conclude by briefly outlining a non-simulationist enactivist account that can incorporate the reuse hypothesis.     

The relation between implicit theories of personality and forgiveness

This research examined the effect of implicit theories of personality on interpersonal forgiveness and the mediating mechanism underlying this effect. Two experiments show that incremental personality theorists are less forgiving than entity personality theorists and that this difference can be explained by the incremental theorists’ stronger tendency to appraise the transgressor as responsible for causing the hurtful event. The same findings were obtained regardless of whether forgiveness was measured by self‐report or assessed as responses to anger words in a latency response task.     

Psychoanalysis and Child Rearing

In this article we suggest that current controversies around the psychoanalytic concepts of narcissism, omnipotence, specialness, and so forth derive from reliance on a single-track developmental model. A single-track model, used implicitly or explicitly by almost all psychoanalytic theorists, posits that normal infants and children function in ways that would be considered pathological in later life. This way of thinking is contradicted by modern infant and developmental research. Additionally, it contradicts common-sense experience and is, therefore, not a useful model for parenting. On the other hand, Freud and many other writers also posited a dual-track model, which simultaneously allows for both healthy and pathological choices throughout life. In this article, we describe some of the ways in which a dual-track model, which we have elaborated as two systems of self-regulation, can be usefully applied to theory, technique, and applications with all those involved with children.     

Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability

This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low‐level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low‐level properties (textures, shapes, colors), ‘high‐level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high‐level properties (functional properties, causal relations, etc.), while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high‐level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high‐level view.     

Queering Bem: Theoretical Intersections Between Sandra Bem’s Scholarship and Queer Theory

Sandra Bem revolutionized psychology with her research on gender, androgyny, and gender schematicity, which culminated in her book, The Lenses of Gender. Her work also provides a model for how to cross inter-disciplinary lines to enhance scholarship and reach political goals. We analyze similarities and differences between Bem’s scholarship and scholarship in queer theory, a theoretical movement in the humanities that analyzes discourses that construct man/woman and straight/gay binaries. There are important overlaps between Bem’s lenses of gender (biological essentialism, gender polarization, and androcentrism) and the ideas of many queer theorists. There are also several interesting differences between Bem’s ideas and queer theory: attention to the intrapsychic processes that make up gender, the extent to which individuals can be liberated from gender, proliferating versus contesting gender, intersectionality, and epistemology and methodology. By assessing the similarities and differences between Bem and queer theorists, we show that the two complement each other, affording a better understanding of gender and sexuality. Additionally, both Bem and queer theory lend insight into feminist and queer activism. The theoretical and political advances that can be made by integrating Bem’s ideas and those of queer theorists serve as examples for why it is worthwhile to cross disciplinary lines.     

Are Computational Transitions Sensitive to Semantics?

The formal conception of computation (FCC) holds that computational processes are not sensitive to semantic properties. FCC is popular, but it faces well-known difficulties. Accordingly, authors such as Block and Peacocke pursue a ‘semantically-laden’ alternative, according to which computation can be sensitive to semantics. I argue that computation is insensitive to semantics within a wide range of computational systems, including any system with ‘derived’ rather than ‘original’ intentionality. FCC yields the correct verdict for these systems. I conclude that there is only one promising strategy for semantically-laden theorists: identify special computational systems that help generate their own semantic properties, and then show that computation within those systems is semantically-laden. Unfortunately, the few existing discussions that pursue this strategy are problematic.     

Oppressive Things*

In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also shape psychological and social components of racism. Indeed, while our initial focus is on racism and racist things, we contend that our framework is also applicable to other oppressive systems, including sexism, classism, and ableism. This is because racist things are part of a broader class of oppressive things, which are material artifacts and spatial environments that are in congruence with an oppressive system.     

Evolutionary computation comes of age

Evolutionary computation is a field of study of computational systems which uses ideas and gets inspirations from natural evolution and adaptation. Although the history of evolutionary computation can be traced back to 1950s, it was only in the last decade or so that the field started to grow rapidly. In recent years, there have been many successful applications of various evolutionary computation techniques in artificial intelligence, machine learning, numerical optimization, combinatorial optimization, etc. The theory of evolutionary computation has also been enriched greatly. There is a much better understanding of why and how evolutionary computation techniques work (or do not work) than five or six years ago. This article reports some of the latest developments presented at the recent 1999 Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC '99).     

The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals

So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form of moral realism. While accepting the presuppositions of the evolutionary error theorist, I argue that contract-based approaches to morality can be sensitive to those presuppositions while still vindicating morality. Invoking Stephen Darwall’s distinction between contractualism and contractarianism, I go on to offer an evolutionary-based contractarianism.