In defence of fact-dependency

G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1^?1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Dutch Conference for Practical Philosophy, the practical philosophy seminar at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the seminar of the Horizon research group at Utrecht University. I am grateful for the comments and questions I received on these occasions.     

In defence of folk psychology

Conclusion Our argument has been that a commonsense functionalist approach to our folk conception of beliefs and desires shows that it is very likely that they exist, where commonsense functionalism is understood as implicitly defined by our folk practice in moving back and forth between behaviour, situations, and beliefs and desires. Completed neuroscience will indeed provide a complete story about when and why we do what we do, but will incorporate rather than eliminate beliefs and desires in this complete story. The irony is that our defence uses an account of folk psychology fully in accord with that provided by eliminativism's sympathizers when they insist that folk psychology is a theory. They see this insistence as opening the way for serious consideration of the possibility that folk psychology is radically mistaken. Any theory can be radically mistaken. But, of course, folk psychology is radically mistaken for a great many objects — the Taj Mahal, for instance. The Taj Mahal does not have beliefs and desires precisely because it does not satisfy the theory. Our point is that because the theory is a purely functional theory, the evidence that we satisfy it (and for that matter that the Taj Mahal does not) is peculiarly strong evidence.     

In defence of error theory

Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against error theories.     

In defence of modal essentialism

Kit Fine’s arguments in Essence and Modality are widely accepted as being a decisive blow against modal essentialism. A selection of replies exist that have done little to counter the general view that modally construed essence is out of touch with what we really mean when we make essentialist claims. I argue that Fine’s arguments fail to strike a decisive blow, and I suggest a new interpretation of the debate that shows why Fine’s arguments fall short of achieving their goal.     

In defence of iconic memory

According to a model of visual information-processing which originated with Sperling (1960), and which currently enjoys wide acceptance, the contents of brief alphanumeric displays are initially held in a high-capacity fast-decay visual-information store (“iconic memory”). Some of these items are subsequently transferred to a more durable form of storage; the remaining non-transferred items are lost. Observers can select which items are to be transferred on the basis of physical characteristics of the items (such as colour, location, size, shape or brightness).

This model has recently been attacked by Holding (1970, 1971, 1972, 1973), sometimes by claiming that iconic memory does not exist, and at other times by claiming that transfer from iconic memory cannot be selectively controlled by the observer. We argue in this paper that Holding's criticisms are incorrect, and that, even if they were correct, the experiment we report would not be open to objections he has raised concerning previous studies of iconic memory. Despite this, evidence fully supporting the orthodox model was obtained, and we therefore conclude that this model remains tenable.     

In defence of single-premise closure

It’s often thought that the phenomenon of risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure but not for single-premise closure (either with respect to knowledge or with respect to justified belief). But recently, Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter have challenged this thought. Lasonen-Aarnio argues that, insofar as risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure, it poses a similar problem for single-premise closure. For she thinks that, there being such a thing as deductive risk, risk may aggregate over a single premise and the deduction itself. Schechter argues that single-premise closure succumbs to risk aggregation outright. For he thinks that there could be a long sequence of competent single-premise deductions such that, even though we are justified in believing the initial premise of the sequence, intutively, we are not justified in believing the final conclusion. This intuition, Schechter thinks, vitiates single-premise closure. In this paper, I defend single-premise closure against the arguments offered by Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter.     

In defence of causal bases

C. B. Martin's finkish cases raise one of the most serious objections to conditional analyses of dispositions. David Lewis's reformed analysis is widely considered the most promising response to the objection. Despite its sophistication, however, the reformed analysis still provokes questions concerning its ability to handle finkish cases. They focus on the applicability of the analysis to ‘baseless’ dispositions. After sketching Martin's objection and the reformed analysis, I argue that all dispositions have causal bases which the analysis can unproblematically invoke.     

In defence of virtue epistemology

In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology’s central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard’s objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.     

In defence of global egalitarianism

This essay argues that David Miller's criticisms of global egalitarianism do not undermine the view where it is stated in one of its stronger, luck egalitarian forms. The claim that global egalitarianism cannot specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage, implicitly assumes that cultural understandings are the only legitimate way of identifying what counts as advantage. But that is an assumption always or almost always rejected by global egalitarianism. The claim that global egalitarianism demands either too little redistribution, leaving the unborn and dissenters burdened with their societies' imprudent choices, or too much redistribution, creating perverse incentives by punishing prudent decisions, only presents a problem for global luck egalitarianism on the assumption that nations can legitimately inherit assets from earlier generations – again, an assumption very much at odds with global egalitarian assumptions.     

In defence of utterly indiscernible entities

Philosophical Studies - Are there entities which are just distinct, with no discerning property or relation? Although the existence of such utterly indiscernible entities is ensured by mathematical...