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《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2012,55(6):622-654
Abstract In this paper, I respond to three commentators on my book Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel Kierkegaard. Anne Margaret Baxley focuses on my treatment of Kant, Dean Moyar on my treatment of Hegel, and William Bristow on my treatment of Kierkegaard. In this reply, I try to show how the critical points that they raise can be addressed. 相似文献
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MARÍA PÍA LARA 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》2000,15(3):182-186
My text is written to answer the questions asked at the APA Meeting's presentation of the book Moral Textures: Feminist Narratives in the Public Sphere by professors María Lugones and Eduardo Mendieta. The answer seeks to clarify that Lugones's infrapolitics position is not so distant from mine. I also address Mendieta's question directed more to the aesthetic domain. There, I seek to show how my position could be taken as a creative effort to extend some of Habermas's early work on the public sphere, and to develop the thesis of the important relations between the aesthetic and the moral realms. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Charles L. Griswold 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):457-473
In this essay I offer a detailed reply to three critics (whose commentaries are included in this issue of Philosophia) of my Forgiveness: a Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The topics explored include the nature and limits of forgiveness; its unconditional
or conditional character; the problem of distinguishing between central and marginal cases; the analysis of political apology;
and questions of philosophical methodology. 相似文献
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I... 相似文献
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Ishtiyaque Haji 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(2):175-209
This paper highlights and discusses some key positions on free will and moral responsibility that I have defended. I begin with reflections on a Strawsonian analysis of moral responsibility. Then I take up objections to the view that there is an asymmetry in freedom requirements for moral responsibility and moral obligation: obligation but not responsibility requires that we could have done otherwise. I follow with some thoughts on the viability of different sorts of semi-compatibilism. Next, I turn to defending the ??luck objection?? to a popular libertarian account of the control that responsibility requires. This is, roughly, the objection that when our decisions are indeterministically caused, their occurrence is a matter of responsibility-undermining luck. Finally, I comment on Frankfurt examples. 相似文献
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David Benatar 《The Journal of Ethics》2013,17(1-2):121-151
In Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky. 相似文献
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Jeff Speaks 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2017,95(2):492-506
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Agustín Rayo 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2014,57(4):498-534
AbstractCameron, Eklund, Hofweber, Linnebo, Russell and Sider have written critical essays on my book, The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Here I offer some replies. 相似文献
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Michael Ruse 《Zygon》2002,37(2):457-460
My critics make serious and sensible points, all of which are undoubtedly true but not all of which I feel that I can accept. 相似文献
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John Hyman 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2018,97(1):249-261
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In response to critical discussion of my book, A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion, I clarify and develop various aspects of my analysis of jealousy in particular and affectivity in general. In relation to jealousy, I explore the nature of pathology, the role of fantasy and of the rival, and the place of examples and of evolutionary theory. In relation to affectivity, I emphasize the difference between distinguishing emotions from other psychological states and distinguishing among, within and between, particular emotions (where affectivity may not be central). In addition, I emphasize the dangers of a version of G.E. Moore's error in demanding a nonreductive analysis of good in parallel demands for a nonreductive analysis of affectivity. 相似文献