道德与良知：临床道德危机与德性伦理诉求

构建和谐医疗环境是广大民众的共识和愿望,但临床实践仍面临诸多困境。资本垄断医学导致道德沦丧;技术统治医疗导致伦理缺失;利益吞噬人性导致人性亏损,任何完善的机制、体制、规范也难以完全规范医生的诊疗行为。德性伦理兴起是化解道德危机的迫切诉求,也是医学道德建设永恒的主题。摆脱医学道德危机,不仅需要伦理规范的约束,更需要道德与良知的支撑。务必要重视德性伦理在临床实践中的作用,让道德的力量唤醒被麻醉的良知,从而超越资本逻辑、超越技术理性、超越自我意识,让现代医学真正为人类健康造福。     

Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck

Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral blame in favour of judgements of ethical deplorability. Finally this paper defends an alternative solution to the problem of moral luck, which focuses on judgements of probability, but which has been rejected by Slote.     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND ETHICS: THE BOYLE LECTURE 2019

How do we and should we decide what is morally right and what is morally wrong? For much of human history, the teachings of religion were presumed to provide either the answer, or much of the answer. Over time, two developments challenged this. The first was the establishment of the discipline of moral philosophy. Foundational texts, such as Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the growth of coherent, nonreligious approaches to ethics, notably utilitarianism, served to marginalize the role of religion. And then, second, the twentieth century saw the rapid growth of evolutionary biology with an enthusiastic presumption that biology was the source of ethics. Here, I begin by discussing these developments and then examine the extent to which religion is still needed for a coherent account of ethics.     

Saintliness and the Moral Life

Drawing on the work of Raimond Gaita, the paper considers the role that may be played by the lives of the saints, both in alerting us to the moral standing of other human beings, and in helping us to articulate the concept of “humanity” understood in a morally rich sense. The paper considers whether Gaita's treatment of these themes presents something like a natural law ethic, in the sense of supplying arguments which favour broadly Christian conclusions without depending upon explicitly Christian premises. It also considers whether Gaita's view, contrary to his own belief, invites extrapolation in the direction of a more religiously engaged stance. In these ways, the paper aims to address the question of the relationship between religious and moral understanding in terms that are arguably more fruitful than those suggested by the dominant ethical theories.     

Moral Courage and Facing Others

Abstract

Moral courage involves acting in the service of one’s convictions, in spite of the risk of retaliation or punishment. I suggest that moral courage also involves a capacity to face others as moral agents, and thus in a manner that does not objectify them. A moral stand can only be taken toward another moral agent. Often, we find ourselves unable to face others in this way, because to do so is frightening, or because we are consumed by blinding anger. But without facing others as moral subjects, we risk moral cowardice on the one hand and moral fanaticism on the other.     

Moral Foundations Theory and Its Implications for Counseling

Moral foundations theory has recently emerged from the field of social psychology as a means for understanding cultural, political, and religious differences between individuals and groups. The authors review the moral foundations theory literature to help counselors in understanding the roots of their clients' and their own moral belief systems and how these systems contribute to decision-making pertaining to morally laden topics. Lastly, the authors present a model for self-awareness around moral issues along with a fictional case study intended to illustrate the use of the model.     

美德复兴的历程与医学美德的复苏

美德伦理的复兴是20世纪伦理学研究的重要转向和理论图景,国外美德伦理研究以麦金太尔为代表,迈克尔•斯洛特的情感主义美德伦理学最具代表性,国内在译介国外研究的基础上提出美德与规范的互补。在医学领域也开始复兴美德伦理,内因在于美德伴随医学的产生,比规范伦理有更悠久的历史,外因在于扭转社会的去道德化倾向,美德伦理与规范伦理同样重要,甚至某些情况下更重要。但在美德伦理的复兴过程中,也面临着内在与外在的阻力,美德伦理复兴任重而道远。

     

Morality, Self-Interest, and Two Kinds of Prudential Practical Rationality

In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (morality) and PPR (self-interest).

Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue

Contemporary virtue ethicists widely accept thethesis that a virtuous agent's feelings shouldbe in harmony with her judgments about what sheshould do and that she should find virtuousaction easy and pleasant. Conflict between anagent's feelings and her actions, by contrast,is thought to indicate mere continence – amoral deficiency. This ``harmony thesis' isgenerally taken to be a fundamental element ofAristotelian virtue ethics.I argue that the harmony thesis, understoodthis way, is mistaken, because there areoccasions where a virtuous agent will findright action painful and difficult. What thismeans is that the generally accepteddistinction between continence and virtue isunsupportable. This conclusion affects severalwell-known accounts of virtuous action,including those of Philippa Foot and JohnMcDowell. A closer look at Aristotle, however, providesanother way of distinguishing betweencontinence and virtue, based in hiscategorization of goods as noble or base. Iargue that virtue is exhibited when anagent's feelings harmonize with his correctjudgments of value, while discrepancies betweenfeelings and correct judgments of valueindicate continence. This understanding ofcontinence and virtue enables us to accommodatethe problem cases I raise.     

儒家伦理的基德和荣格的道德观

作为中国传统文化之主体的儒家伦理,已经确立了中国传统文化的"基德"或"母德",这是在长达2000多年历史发展中形成的,经过先秦时期的百家争鸣,形成了独树一帜的儒家思想,董仲舒提出"抑黜百家、独尊儒术"的建议,确立了儒家在中国社会的统治地位。经过以后历代的兼收并蓄和对立融合,发展成为儒、道、佛融合一体的宋明理学,近代中国社会对儒家思想的批判性发展,促使人们对儒家伦理思想进行时代的反思。荣格的分析心理学思想为东西方道德观的比较提供了一种独特的研究视角。     

生命伦理学中原则主义的局限、批判与反思

原则主义是生命伦理学领域最具影响力的理论,但它不是一个通用的工具,而是需要因文化而异。它的核心设计是共同道德和反思平衡,前者旨在保证原则的普遍适用性,后者则旨在保证各个原则在具体应用时不至于冲突,两个方面共同保证了原则主义作为一种中间原理的实用性特点。然而,原则主义并没有澄清共同道德在描述性和规范性方面的普遍性依据,也没有解释清楚如何在原则发生冲突时形成反思平衡。批判原则主义并不是对它的彻底否定,而是旨在通过考察其局限性与优点,在结合有益的批判观点及德性伦理学的反思基础上,发展一种特定文化版本的原则主义。

     

Mindful Virtue, Mindful Reverence

How does one talk about moral thought and moral action as a religious naturalist? We explore this question by considering two human capacities: the capacity for mindfulness, and the capacity for virtue. We suggest that mindfulness is deeply enhanced by an understanding of the scientific worldview and that the four cardinal virtues—courage, fairmindedness, humaneness, and reverence—are rendered coherent by mindful reflection. We focus on the concept of mindful reverence and propose that the mindful reverence elicited by the evolutionary narrative is at the heart of religious naturalism. Religious education, we suggest, entails the cultivation of mindful virtue, in ourselves and in our children.     

科技时代的替代经验与道德的个人亲证问题

人对自己生活于其中的科技时代的批判,是与人的自我意识一同发生的。当今世界,科技已越来越被当作自主的、异在于人的并沿着非人性化的惯性而展开的过程。如何对这一过程重新进行人化?如何使现代人具有科技进步时代的人的内容的清醒意识?这是每一个人文学者必须给予严肃关注的问题。从道德本性的角度视之,科技社会所制造的大量的替代经验对道德实践基础的蚕食和颠覆,具有根本的决定性的作用。因此,在科技社会中如何确立实践智慧、个人亲证在道德领域里的独立性,对于避免当代人的“道德孤儿”的命运,便具有头等重要的意义。     

范式转换与道德生活史的研究

伦理学就是一种生活观。伦理思想史的研究需要范式的转换,即由思想史转向道德生活史,研究社会变迁视野中的道德变迁,研究具体历史条件下的社会伦理关系,研究民众层面的日常道德生活。     

TRANSCENDING OUR BIOLOGY: A VIRTUE ETHICS INTERPRETATION OF THE APPEAL TO NATURE IN TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

“Arguments from nature” are used, and have historically been used, in popular responses to advances in technology and to environmental issues—there is a widely shared body of ethical intuitions that nature, or perhaps human nature, sets some limits on the kinds of ends that we should seek, the kinds of things that we should do, or the kinds of lives that we should lead. Virtue ethics can provide the context for a defensible form of the argument from nature, and one that makes proper sense of its enduring role in debates concerning our relationship to technology and the environment. However, the notion of an ethics founded upon an account of the essential features of human nature is controversial. On the one hand, contemporary biological science no longer defines species by their essential characteristics, so from a biological point of view there just are no essential characteristics of human beings. On the other hand, it might be argued that humans have, in some sense, “transcended our biology,” so an understanding of humans as a biological species is extraneous to ethical questions. In this article, I examine and defend the argument from nature, as a way to ground an ethic of virtue, from some of the more common criticisms that are made against it. I argue that, properly interpreted as an appeal to an evaluative account of human nature, the argument from nature is defensible with the context of virtue ethics and, in this light, I show how arguments from nature made in popular responses to technological and environmental issues are best understood.     

The Empirical Case for Moral Beauty

Although formative of modern value theory, the moral beauty view—which states that moral virtue is beautiful and moral vice is ugly—is now mostly neglected by (analytic) philosophers. The two contemporary defences of the view mostly capitalize on its intuitive attractiveness, but to little avail: such considerations hardly convince sceptics of what is nowadays a rather unpopular view. Historically, the view was supported by thought experiments; and although these greatly increase its plausibility, they also raise empirical questions, which they leave unanswered. Here, I offer a novel defence of the moral beauty view, capitalizing on empirical evidence and arguing via an inference to the best explanation.     

Meditation and the cultivation of virtue

In recent decades, social psychology has produced an expansive array of studies wherein introducing a seemingly morally innocuous feature into the situation a subject inhabits often yields morally questionable, dubious, or even appalling behavior. Several fascinating lines of philosophical enquiry issue from this research, but the most pragmatically salient question concerns how we ought most effectively to develop and maintain the virtues so that such putatively morally problematic behavior is less likely to occur. In this paper, I examine four empirically embedded accounts of virtue cultivation: Hagop Sarkissian’s social signaling, Mark Alfano’s virtue labeling, Nancy Snow’s self-punishment, and Peter Railton’s implementation intentions. But none of these accounts of virtue cultivation provides adequate resources for regulating our affective states, whose attention-constricting and behavior-priming functional roles are likely at the root of much of our less than virtuous behavior. Instead, I defend an account of virtue cultivation that proceeds via meditation, which can help us to identify and regulate our emotions and moods. Further, meditation enables us to develop the attentional focus, emotional intelligence, and sense of social connection that ground (many of) the virtues and, thus, our virtuous behavior.     

Navigating Moral Struggle: Toward a Social Model of Exemplarity

Exemplars have the power to help people navigate various levels of moral struggle, from the relatively straightforward problem of lacking motivation to the much deeper problem of failing to see the moral realities that surround us. But there are also serious moral risks in the appeal to exemplars: we romanticize them, we make use of them in authoritarian ways, and we tend to forget how our choice of exemplars is conditioned by oppressive cultural formations. I argue that we need to develop a social model of exemplarity, attuned to social contexts of our exemplars themselves as well as the social processes of constructing and appealing to exemplars. More particularly, I argue that we need to develop space for thinking about exemplary groups, not just exemplary individuals, in order to develop the strengths and avoid the weaknesses in exemplarist moral theories.     

西方政治伦理思想的历史流变及其启示

自古至今,西哲们紧跟时代的脚步,不断把西方的政治伦理观推陈出新:美德政治伦理、神性政治伦理、非道德主义的政治伦理、权利政治伦理。全面、系统地梳理和展现西方政治伦理思想的演变及其价值诉求,对于理解和把握政治伦理学中的一些重要理论问题具有重大的启迪意义。