Developmental change and the nature of learning in childhood

How do children acquire humankind's remarkable cognitive skills? Why are the abilities children acquire readily, such as native-language fluency, harder for adults? Although attitudes to these questions span the continuum from nativism to learning theory, answers remain elusive. We relate a recent model of language acquisition in childhood to advances in the neuroscience of adult cognitive control, to propose a domain-general shift in the architecture of learning in childhood. The timing of this supports children's imitative, unsupervised learning of social and linguistic conventions before the maturation of cognitive control gives individuals greater self-direction, which causes learning to become less conventionalized and more idiosyncratic. These changes might represent an important adaptation supporting the development and learning of cultural and linguistic conventions.     

THE ACQUISITION OF CONSERVATION OF SUBSTANCE AND WEIGHT IN CHILDREN: II.External reinforcement of conservation of weight and of the operations of addition and subtraction

S medslund , J. The acquisition of conservation of substance and weight in children. II. External reinforcement of conservation of weight and of the operations of addition and subtraction. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1961, 2 , 71–84. —The subjects were 5–7 years old. Group I was allowed to observe empirical conservation of weight on a balance. Group II practised on additions and subtractions of material with controls on the scales. Group III took only the pre- and posttests. The data show no appreciable differences in frequency of acquisition of conservation between the three groups. It is concluded that none of the experimental conditions were necessary or sufficient for the acquisition of principles of conservation. The hypothesis is advanced that cognitive conflict may be the crucial factor involved.     

THE ACQUISITION OF CONSERVATION OF SUBSTANCE AND WEIGHT IN CHILDREN

Smedslund, J. The acquisition of conservation of substance and weight in children. VII. Conservation of discontinuous quantity and the operations of adding and taking away. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1962, 3 , 69–77.—In Exp. I a test of conservation and highly different items of addition and subtraction were given. Conservation was closely related only to an item involving a subtraction of a piece and a subsequent addition of the same piece (- + sequence), followed by an addition of a piece and the subsequent subtraction of the same piece (+ - sequence). In Exp. II a test of conservation was given together with items involving various combinations of simple - + and + - sequences. It is concluded that - +, + -, and conservation seem to form a genetic sequence in this order, thus strengthening the hypothesis that a concept of conservation reflects a complete reversibility of the operations of + and -.     

The draughtsman's contract

This commentary on Feldman and Fowler's The Nature(s) of developmental change addresses three issues. First, it discusses the concept of a “portfolio theory” and argues that the authors' nonuniversal developmental theory is such a theory and that it adds relevant insights to the existing conceptualizations of development. Second, it discusses a potential problem in such theories, namely oversimplification of the relationships implied by the available theoretical concepts (irrespective of the issue of whether those concepts are sufficiently clearly defined). The point is illustrated with an analysis of the structure of relationships based on a simple model of development and learning. Third, Feldman and Fowler's notion of equilibration as a mechanism is criticized and replaced by equilibration as a process based on various mechanisms. These mechanisms have an underlying abstract form which has been transformed into a computational dynamic systems model capable of explaining a host of distinct patterns of change, learning and development.     

The performance of attention-deficit-disordered and normal children on conservation tasks

The present study was designed to investigate whether a specific subgroup of learning-disabled children (attention-deficit-disordered, ADD) differed from their normal counterparts on Piagetian tasks of conservation. The subjects were 34 third-and fourth-grade children. Seventeen children had been diagnosed as ADD; the remaining half were designated as normal. The two groups were equivalent in chronological age, mental age, and intelligence. The results indicated significant differences between the two groups on tasks tapping conservation of substance and number. These results may support the theory of a lag in the development of conservation in children with specific learning disabilities (ADD). Implications of the present research for therapeutic and remedial programs that serve ADD children are also discussed.     

The Performance of Attention-Deficit-Disordered and Normal Children on Conservation Tasks

The present study was designed to investigate whether a specific subgroup of learning-disabled children (attention-deficit-disordered, ADD) differed from their normal counterparts on Piagetian tasks of conservation. The subjects were 34 third- and fourth-grade children. Seventeen children had been diagnosed as ADD; the remaining half were designated as normal. The two groups were equivalent in chronological age, mental age, and intelligence. The results indicated significant differences between the two groups on tasks tapping conservation of substance and number. These results may support the theory of a lag in the development of conservation in children with specific learning disabilities (ADD). Implications of the present research for therapeutic and remedial programs that serve ADD children are also discussed.     

A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content

This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results is incompatible with naturalistic accounts of concept learning. This cost can be avoided, and concept learning accounted for if nonconceptual content of experience is admitted.     

Issues in the study and explanation of language behavior

A number of major issues raised in the study of language are examined from the standpoint of the requirements of an empirical science of language. In an effort to critically evaluate some of the basic assumptions and explanatory concepts of nativism in the study of language, the following five issues are examined: (1) What is nativism? (2) Can the creative aspect of language be explained in terms of nativism? (3) What is the explanatory status of nativist concepts? (4) What is the nature of nativist evidence? and (5) Do evaluative statements challenge alternative positions? The discussion points out various objections to and inconsistencies of nativism as well as the inadequacy of the explanatory status of nativist concepts.     

GROUP TRAINING OF CONSERVATION SKILLS WITH CHILDREN FROM A NON-TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE*

Group training of conservation of length was undertaken with primary school children in Botswana. Each group contained 10 subjects of mixed academic ability. Three methods of training were used: (1) teacher demonstration accompanied by responsive group recitation, (2) limited manipulation of training materials by students, (3) full manipulation of training materials by students. The three training methods were effective in producing learning, retention, and generalization of conservation. The results are discussed in terms of Piaget's views on the role of environmental influences and the function of action in the development of cognitive structures. The value of Piagetian concepts for non-technological societies also is discussed.     

A theory-based approach to teaching young children about health: A recipe for understanding

The theory-theory account of conceptual development posits that children's concepts are integrated into theories. Concept learning studies have documented the central role that theories play in children's learning of experimenter-defined categories, but have yet to extensively examine complex, real-world concepts such as health. The present study examined whether providing young children with coherent and causally-related information in a theory-based lesson would facilitate their learning about the concept of health. This study used a pre-test/lesson/post-test design, plus a five month follow-up. Children were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: theory (i.e., 20 children received a theory-based lesson); nontheory (i.e., 20 children received a nontheory-based lesson); and control (i.e., 20 children received no lesson). Overall, the results showed that children in the theory condition had a more accurate conception of health than children in the nontheory and control conditions, suggesting the importance of theories in children's learning of complex, real-world concepts.     

Bootstrapping Processes in the Development of Students' Commonsense Matter Theories: Using Analogical Mappings,Thought Experiments,and Learning to Measure to Promote Conceptual Restructuring

This study explores whether the development of students' understanding of matter as something that occupies space and has weight involves conceptual change and restructuring rather than only simple belief revision. Based on an analysis of how the concepts in students' initial matter theory (henceforth MT1) may differ from the concepts in the matter theory that is a target of middle school instruction (MT2), I propose ways that concepts in a given theory cohere with each other and identify the sources of the new ideas in MT2 and the learning processes by which those new ideas can be acquired. I test implications of these analyses by designing a curriculum unit that exploits these learning mechanisms, by using the curriculum with 4 classes of eighth-grade Earth Science students, and by assessing 42 students' thinking about matter, object size, and weight (via individual interviews and written tests) before and after the teaching unit. Consistent with the hypothesis of conceptual restructuring, the data not only show coherencies in students' thinking about matter, size, and weight before and after teaching, but also coordinated patterns of change. The implications for the design of science instruction are discussed.     

The nativist-empiricist controversy in the context of recent research on spatial and quantitative development

Demonstrations of cognitive competence in preschool children and infants played an important role in the waning influence of Piagetian theory and the rise of nativism. Arguments and data favoring modularity have further buttressed the case for nativism. This article reviews evidence concerning early competence and modularity in the spatial and quantitative domains, as well as the role of experience in development. This evidence provides little reason to support nativist claims in either domain.     

Radical concept nativism

Radical concept nativism is the thesis that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. Notoriously endorsed by Jerry Fodor, radical concept nativism has had few supporters. However, it has proven difficult to say exactly what's wrong with Fodor's argument. We show that previous responses are inadequate on a number of grounds. Chief among these is that they typically do not achieve sufficient distance from Fodor's dialectic, and, as a result, they do not illuminate the central question of how new primitive concepts are acquired. To achieve a fully satisfactory response to Fodor's argument, one has to juxtapose questions about conceptual content with questions about cognitive development. To this end, we formulate a general schema for thinking about how concepts are acquired and then present a detailed illustration.     

Are most of our concepts innate?

Fodor has argued that, because concept acquisition relies on the use of concepts already possessed by the learner, all concepts that cannot be definitionally reduced are innate. Since very few reductive definitions are available, it appears that most concepts are innate. After noting the reasons why we find such radical concept nativism implausible, I explicate Fodor's argument, showing that anyone who is committed to mentalistic explanation should take it seriously. Three attempts at avoiding the conclusion are examined and found to be unsuccessful. I then present an alternative way around Fodor's nativism; I maintain that concepts at a given level of explanation can be semantically primitive, yet at least partially acquired if some of the conditions at a lower level of explanation that are responsible for the concept's presence are themselves acquired.Thanks are due to Jerry Samet and to Bob Shope for detailed and very helpful comments. I am also indebted to Ned Block, Susan Carey, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Thomas Kuhn, Georges Rey, and Bob Stalnaker for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions on an earlier work, out of which this essay evolved.     

Proxytypes and Linguistic Nativism

Prinz (Perceptual the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis, MIT Press, 2002) presents a new species of concept empiricism, under which concepts are off-line long-term memory networks of representations that are ‘copies’ of perceptual representations – proxytypes. An apparent obstacle to any such empiricism is the prevailing nativism of generative linguistics. The paper critically assesses Prinz’s attempt to overcome this obstacle. The paper argues that, prima facie, proxytypes are as incapable of accounting for the structure of the linguistic mind as are the more traditional species of empiricism. This position is then confirmed by looking in detail at two suggestions (one derived from recent connectionist research) from Prinz of how certain aspects of syntactic structure might be accommodated by the proxytype theory. It is shown that the suggestions fail to come to terms with both the data and theory of contemporary linguistics.     

Formal models of language learning

Research is reviewed that addresses itself to human language learning by developing precise, mechanistic models that are capable in principle of acquiring languages on the basis of exposure to linguistic data. Such research includes theorems on language learnability from mathematical linguistics, computer models of language acquisition from cognitive simulation and artificial intelligence, and models of transformational grammar acquisition from theoretical linguistics. It is argued that such research bears strongly on major issues in developmental psycholinguistics, in particular, nativism and empiricism, the role of semantics and pragmatics in language learning, cognitive development, and the importance of the simplified speech addressed to children.     

The nature(s) of developmental change: Piaget,Vygotsky, and the transition process

This essay proposes (1) that more than one kind of large-scale developmental change exists; and (2) that more than one kind of developmental change mechanism is needed to explain them. These proposals are supported by work in nonuniversal theory which states that intellectual development should be characterized neither as domain-general nor as domainspecific, but as a spectrum of developmental domains that range from the universal to the unique. The current article extends nonuniversal theory by positing and then describing (1) a sixth region of development—a pancultural region: and (2) five basic change mechanisms (maturation, domain-specific structures, technologies, instruction, and equilibration) that differentially influence developmental change at particular points along the universal-to-unique continuum. The contributions of each of the five change mechanisms is illustrated by an analysis of children's ability to draw maps. The value of the universal to unique framework is demonstrated by showing how it helps resolve Piaget's and Vygotsky's seemingly contradictory views on the relationship between learning and development.     

Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation

It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other 'nearby' traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity, though it is consistent with both. In this paper, we seek to show that rather weak assumptions about innateness and modularity are consistent with evolutionary explanations of cognitive capacities. Evolutionary pressures can affect the degree to which the development of a capacity is canalized by biasing acquisition/learning in ways that favor development of concepts and capacities that proved adaptive to an organism's ancestors.     

The Innateness Hypothesis and Mathematical Concepts

In historical claims for nativism, mathematics is a paradigmatic example of innate knowledge. Claims by contemporary developmental psychologists of elementary mathematical skills in human infants are a legacy of this. However, the connection between these skills and more formal mathematical concepts and methods remains unclear. This paper assesses the current debates surrounding nativism and mathematical knowledge by teasing them apart into two distinct claims. First, in what way does the experimental evidence from infants, nonhuman animals and neuropsychology support the nativist hypothesis? Second, granting that infants have some elementary mathematical skills, does this mean that such skills play an important role in the development of mathematical knowledge?     

Equilibration as cognitive conflict

The suitability of taking cognitive conflict as an operational definition of equilibration is examined along with the implications for conservation training. Exceptions are taken to the B. J. Zimmerman and D. E. Blom (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 18–38) analysis of conservation and some qualifying empirical results presented. It is concluded that cognitive conflict is sufficient, but not necessary, to bring about cognitive change.