What place does religion have in the ethical thinking of scientists and engineers?

Religion, defined as ‘the idea of a state that transcends ourselves and our world and the working out of the consequences of that idea’, may influence the ethical thinking of scientists and engineers in two ways. The first is at the level of the individual and how personal beliefs affect the choice of research, design or development projects, relationships with other researchers and the understandings of the consequences of research on other aspects of life. The second level is that of the social and cultural setting in which scientists and engineers work; how society decides which research to sponsor, how to apply the results of scientific discovery and which technology it chooses to develop and for what purposes. In neither of these areas is religious belief a necessary condition for scientists and engineers to pursue one course of action rather than another. The existence of religious belief within the individual and society is, though, part of the ethical framework in which scientist and engineers work and therefore something to which attention should be paid. Religion provides a particular perspective on what should be. Conversely science and technology provide information on the nature of the person and the universe in which we live, which must be taken into account when theologians and religious moralists apply their ethical norms and principles.     

Moral paternalism,virtue, and autonomy

According to colour irrealism, material objects do not have colour; they only appear to have colour. The appeal of this view, prominent among philosophers and scientists alike, stems in large part from the conviction that scientific explanations of colour facts do not ascribe colour to material objects. To explain why objects appear to have colour, for instance, we need only appeal to surface reflectance properties, properties of light, the neurophysiology of observers, etc.

Typically attending colour irrealism is the error theory of ordinary colour judgement: ordinary judgements in which colour is ascribed to a material object are, strictly speaking, false. In this paper, I claim that colour irrealists who endorse the error theory cannot explain how we acquire colour concepts (yellow, green, etc.), concepts they must acknowledge we do possess. Our basic colour concepts, I argue, could not be phenomenal concepts that we acquire by attending to the colour properties of our experience. And, I explain, all other plausible explanations render colour concepts such that our ordinary colour judgements involving them are often true. Given the explanatory considerations upon which the irrealist's position is based, this is a severe problem for colour irrealism.     

Research Trails and the Creative Spirit: Can Historical Case Studies Integrate the Short and Long Timescales of Creative Activity?

In the study of scientific creativity, the purposes of cognitive scientists and of historians of science overlap but are far from congruent. Historical cases are only one of many forms of evidence that cognitive scientists bring together to arrive at general conclusions about the creative processes. Historians seek to reconstruct the investigative enterprises of particular scientists. Generalizations about creativity are useful to historians mainly as one of various means to interpret the work of those particular scientists. This article presents the argument that the extent to which these two goals can be complementary depends largely (a) on how large the gap is between the duration of the thought processes that cognitive scientists examine and the limits of resolution to which historians can penetrate in following the temporal progression of a subject's thought and work and (b) on the level of temporal organization of these thoughts and actions most revealing of their creative nature.     

Scientific Uncertainty in News Coverage of Cancer Research: Effects of Hedging on Scientists’ and Journalists’ Credibility

News reports of scientific research are rarely hedged; in other words, the reports do not contain caveats, limitations, or other indicators of scientific uncertainty. Some have suggested that hedging may influence news consumers’ perceptions of scientists’ and journalists’ credibility (perceptions that may be related to support for scientific research and/or adoption of scientific recommendations). But whether hedging does affect audience perceptions is unknown. A multiple‐message experiment (N= 601) found that across five messages, both scientists and journalists were viewed as more trustworthy (a) when news coverage of cancer research was hedged (e.g., study limitations were reported) and (b) when the hedging was attributed to the scientists responsible for the research (as opposed to scientists unaffiliated with the research).     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

Terminated Seed: Death,Proprietary Kinship and the Production of (Bio)Wealth

What is mental disorder and how can it be identified? These are complex and multifaceted questions, given the multiple ambiguities that centre on the psychopathological concepts employed within contemporary psychiatry and psychology. Yet, scientists investigating mental disorders must successfully resolve these uncertainties if research is to continue. For neuroscientists studying the contested conditions antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, psychiatric and psychological classifications and concepts are used to substantiate one another. This co-produces epistemological and ontological un/certainties, without wholly resolving philosophical and methodological questions regarding what mental disorders are and how they can be recognised. Indeed, these ambiguities are rendered (relatively) unimportant. This kind of practical uncertainty work is thus an important aspect of the investigative process, performing an essential role in the continuation of scientific knowledge production, the legitimation of professional orientations, and the validation of psychopathological concepts.     

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these structures. Recent experimental research in cognitive science has considerably refined the theory of concepts. Drawing upon the results of that research, philosophers can construct more concrete and empirically defensible representations of conceptual systems. I will suggest that this research supports a modest and useful sense of both normal and revolutionary science, not as epistemological continuities or discontinuities, but as particular patterns of conceptual change.     

Evolving research misconduct policies and their significance for physical scientists

Scientific misconduct includes the fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism (FFP) of concepts, data or ideas; some institutions in the United States have expanded this concept to include “other serious deviations (OSD) from accepted research practice.” It is the absence of this OSD clause that distinguishes scientific misconduct policies of the past from the “research misconduct” policies that should be the basis of future federal policy in this area. This paper introduces a standard for judging whether an action should be considered research misconduct as distinguished from scientific misconduct: by this standard, research misconduct must involve activities unique to the practice of science and must have the potential to negatively affect the scientific record. Although the number of cases of scientific misconduct is uncertain (only the NIH and the NSF keep formal records), the costs are high in terms of the integrity of the scientific record, diversions from research to investigate allegations, ruined careers of those eventually exonerated, and erosion of public confidence in science. Existing scientific misconduct policies vary from institution to institution and from government agency to government agency; some have highly developed guidelines that include OSD, others have no guidelines at all. One result has been that the federal False Claims Act has been used to pursue allegations of scientific misconduct. As a consequence, such allegations have been adjudicated in federal courts, rather than judged by scientific peers. The federal government is now establishing a first-ever research misconduct policy that would apply to all research funded by the federal government regardless of which agency funded the research or whether the research was carried out in a government, industrial or university laboratory. Physical scientists, who up to now have only infrequently been the subject of scientific misconduct allegations, must nonetheless become active in the debate over research misconduct policies and how they are implemented since they will now be explicitly covered by this new federal wide policy. Disclaimer: The authors are grateful for the support for conduct of this research provided by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and were formed and expressed without reference to positions taken by DOE or the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The views of the authors are not intended either to reflect or imply positions of DOE or PNNL.     

EXPERIENCING AND INTERPRETING NATURE IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract. I trace three paths from nature to religious interpretation. The first starts from religious experience in the context of nature; examples are drawn from nature poets, reflective scientists, and exponents of creation spirituality. The second,„Natural Theology”uses scientific findings concerning cosmology or evolution to develop an argument from design–or alternatively to defend evolutionary naturalism. The third,„Theology of Nature”starts from traditional religious beliefs about God and human nature and reformulates them in the light of current science. I point to examples of each of these paths in papers by other participants in this symposium, and suggest that all three paths can contribute to the task of relating science and religion today.     

THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE WARS: WHO OWNS HUMAN NATURE?

Lluís Oviedo examines in his article the current conflict over human nature and the role of the sciences in the debate, suggesting that there may be a role for theology to play as well. In this essay I examine and respond to some aspects of Oviedo's article and suggest that the nature of the conflict needs to be nuanced to understand it as a conflict not between scientific and philosophical/social‐scientific views of human nature but among scientists, social scientists, and philosophers over the role of science in thinking about human nature. I analyze some of the obstacles for theology's becoming involved and propose that thinking about what are distinctively theological questions as opposed to scientific ones may be an appropriate starting point.     

Difference in scientists' discourse about scientific fraud and impropriety

Fifty-one practising scientists made Q-sorts of 90 statements relating to scientific fraud and impropriety. Principal components analysis identified two major groups. Members of the first group (N=18) seemed to support the standard, or received, view about the nature of science and to interpret scientific fraud and impropriety in terms of the individual shortcomings of deviant scientists. Members of the second group (N=7) seemed to adopt a more critical position about the nature of science and were more likely to construe scientific fraud and impropriety as anticipated aspects of the operation of a human social institution. Some implications of these findings for an understanding of the current debate on scientific fraud and impropriety are considered.     

Evidentiary Symbiosis: On Paraethnography in Human–Microbe Relations

Though microbial infections are central concerns for public health workers in urban Nicaragua, health workers there rarely if ever speak of the existence of a ‘microbiome’ when they address such problems. Among scientists and the public in the United States, on the other hand, the microbiome, seen as the ‘internal ecosystem’ that regulates the workings of human guts, is a regular topic of conversation. This raises questions about how one might go about doing a social study of the microbiome in places where it does not (yet) exist as a category of expert practice or public discourse. Evidence from Nicaragua and the United States highlights two sites at which experts engage people in research and discussion about microbial ecologies. In their work, U.S. microbiome scientists and Nicaraguan public health workers both engage in ‘paraethnography,’ the practice of collecting and analyzing qualitative information that does not fit into statistical or other kinds of scientific models. In the United States, paraethnography has driven both traditional scientific experiments on the microbiome and online, crowd-sourced experimental platforms for collecting and analyzing information about gut microbes. In Nicaragua, hygienists generate paraethnographic evidence through word-of-mouth, radio, and print media. A comparison between the work of U.S. scientists and that of Nicaraguan hygienists suggests three different ways (commensal, parasitic, and mutualistic) in which the cultural/interpretive evidence of paraethnography interfaces symbiotically with the quantitative/statistical evidence of bioscience. Attention to evidentiary symbiosis provides insights into the operations of publicly oriented science under conditions of bodily and planetary uncertainty.     

Science,Religious Naturalism,and Biblical Theology: Ground for the Emergence of Sustainable Living

During this century, humans must learn to live in ways that are sustainable, both ecologically and morally. The global community already consumes more ecological resources than Earth can generate; population growth and increasing development are widening that gap. We suggest that paths to sustainability can be found by mindful reflection on meanings discerned in the convergence of a scientific understanding of nature, religious naturalism, and biblical understandings of creation. The patterns of ecological sustainability observed in natural systems and the wise ways of relating to the land discerned in the Hebrew Bible suggest that sustainability must be grounded in social and ecological justice and that just ways of living can emerge from a deep sense of the ways in which nature and all of humanity are interdependent. We conclude that the twentieth-century emphasis on individual control of our future must make room for the emergence of a new understanding of mutuality. There can be no flourishing apart from mutual flourishing.     

Why a feminist approach to bioethics?

Many have asked how and why feminist theory makes a distinctive contribution to bioethics. In this essay, I outline two ways in which feminist reflection can enrich bioethical studies. First, feminist theory may expose certain themes of androcentric reasoning that can affect, in sometimes crude but often subtle ways, the substantive analysis of topics in bioethics; second, it can unearth the gendered nature of certain basic philosohical concepts that form the working tools of ethical theory.     

Scientists Negotiate Boundaries Between Religion and Science

Analysis of interviews with 275 natural and social scientists at 21 elite U.S. research universities suggests that only a minority of scientists see religion and science as always in conflict. Scientists selectively employ different cultural strategies with regards to the religion‐science relationship: redefining categories (the use of institutional resources from religion and from science), integration models (scientists strategically employ the views of major scientific actors to legitimate a more symbiotic relationship between science and religion), and intentional talk (scientists actively engage in discussions about the boundaries between science and religion). Such results challenge narrow conceptions of secularization theory and the sociology of science literature by describing ways science intersects with other knowledge categories. Most broadly the ways that institutions and ideologies shape one another through the agency of individual actors within those institutions is explored.     

Analytic change: Assessing ways of being in a psychoanalytic follow‐up interview

The article argues that the concepts of relational scenario, structuralized affect and actualized affect are proposed candidates for observation of changes in relational ways of being as it is expressed in transference. A psychoanalytic follow‐up interview of a former analytic patient is presented in order to illustrate how change in relational ways of being may be registered and studied. By triangulating the patient's verbal report of change with nonverbal information and transference–countertransference dynamics, one may grasp qualitative changes in relational ways of being. The case presented illustrates a former patient's on‐going process of working towards representing aggression in a more direct manner and how this process is made observable with the aid of the proposed concepts in the interview situation. The proposed concepts of relational scenario, structuralized and actualized affect discussed are compared to the concept of transference used in studies of core conflictual relationship theme (CCRT).     

Avoiding heterosexist bias in psychological research

The authors describe various ways that heterosexist bias can occur in scientific research and suggest ways that social and behavioral scientists can avoid it. Heterosexist bias is defined as conceptualizing human experience in strictly heterosexual terms and consequently ignoring, invalidating, or derogating homosexual behaviors and sexual orientation, and lesbian, gay male, and bisexual relationships and lifestyles. The deleterious scientific, social, and ethical consequences of such biases are discussed. Questions are provided for researchers to use in evaluating how heterosexist bias might affect their own selection of research questions, sampling, operationalization of variables, data collection, protection of participants, and dissemination of results. Suggestions also are offered for reducing heterosexist bias in academic journals, in textbooks, and in colleges and universities.     

Five Key Topics on the Frontier of Theology and Science Today

Abstract : This article explores the creative mutual interaction between Christian theology and the natural sciences through five key issues: (1) the relation between creation ex nihilo and Big Bang cosmology; (2) biological evolution and continuous creation; (3) the search for non‐interventionist objective divine action in light of physics and biology; (4) the problem of suffering in nature and with it the turn to redemption theology via the bodily Resurrection of Jesus; and (5) the challenge raised for its eschatological implications by scientific predictions for the future of the universe. The article concludes with a brief suggestion for the ways Christian theology, reformulated in light of these sciences, might offer creative suggestions for future scientific research, and, in doing so, complete the loop promised by the phrase “mutual creative interaction.”     

A lexicon of attention: from cognitive science to phenomenology

This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work of phenomenologist and Gestalt philosopher Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). As a conclusion, I discuss the nature of subjectivity in attention and attention research, and whether attention might be the same as consciousness.