Priming a natural or human-made environment directs attention to context-congruent threatening stimuli

Research suggests that attention is attracted to evolutionary threats (e.g., snakes) due to an evolved “fear-module” that automatically detects biological threats to survival. However, recent evidence indicates that non-evolutionary threats (e.g., guns) capture and hold attention as well, suggesting a more general “threat-relevance” mechanism that directs attentional resources toward any potential danger in the environment. The current research measured how selective attentional resources were influenced both by the type of threat (e.g., snake vs. gun) and by the context in which the threat was encountered. Participants were primed with either natural or human-made environments to assess how these contexts influence attention to evolutionary and non-evolutionary threats, as measured by a spatial-cueing task. The results indicate that whether biological or non-biological threats receive greater attentional processing is determined by the context in which they are encountered.     

Priming a natural or human-made environment directs attention to context-congruent threatening stimuli

Research suggests that attention is attracted to evolutionary threats (e.g., snakes) due to an evolved "fear-module" that automatically detects biological threats to survival. However, recent evidence indicates that non-evolutionary threats (e.g., guns) capture and hold attention as well, suggesting a more general "threat-relevance" mechanism that directs attentional resources toward any potential danger in the environment. The current research measured how selective attentional resources were influenced both by the type of threat (e.g., snake vs. gun) and by the context in which the threat was encountered. Participants were primed with either natural or human-made environments to assess how these contexts influence attention to evolutionary and non-evolutionary threats, as measured by a spatial-cueing task. The results indicate that whether biological or non-biological threats receive greater attentional processing is determined by the context in which they are encountered.     

Predicting danger: the nature, consequences, and neural mechanisms of predictive fear learning

The ability to detect and learn about the predictive relations existing between events in the world is essential for adaptive behavior. It allows us to use past events to predict the future and to adjust our behavior accordingly. Pavlovian fear conditioning allows anticipation of sources of danger in the environment. It guides attention away from poorer predictors toward better predictors of danger and elicits defensive behavior appropriate to these threats. This article reviews the differences between learning about predictive relations and learning about contiguous relations in Pavlovian fear conditioning. It then describes behavioral approaches to the study of these differences and to the examination of subtle variations in the nature and consequences of predictive learning. Finally, it reviews recent data from rodent and human studies that have begun to identify the neural mechanisms for direct and indirect predictive fear learning.     

Renewal of fear and avoidance in humans to escalating threat: Implications for translational research on anxiety disorders

Exposure-based treatment for threat avoidance in anxiety disorders often results in fear renewal. However, little is known about renewal of avoidance. This multimodal laboratory-based treatment study used an ABA renewal design and an approach–avoidance (AP–AV) task to examine renewal of fear/threat and avoidance in twenty adults. In Context A, 9 visual cues paired with increases in probabilistic money loss (escalating threats) produced increases in ratings of feeling threatened and loss expectancies and skin-conductance responses (SCR). During the AP–AV task, a monetary reinforcer was available concurrently with threats. Approach produced the reinforcer or probabilistic loss, while avoidance prevented loss and forfeited reinforcement. Escalating threat produced increasing avoidance and ratings. In Context B with Pavlovian extinction, threats signaled no money loss and SCR declined. During the AP–AV task, avoidance and ratings also declined. In a return to Context A with Pavlovian threat extinction in effect during the AP–AV task, renewal was observed. Escalating threat was associated with increasing ratings and avoidance in most participants. SCR did not show renewal. These are the first translational findings to highlight renewal of avoidance in humans. Further research should identify individual difference variables and altered neural mechanisms that may confer increased risk of avoidance renewal.     

Impact of fearful expression on danger processing: The influence of the level of trait anxiety

Threat estimation is crucial for the adaptation of behavior to a dangerous situation. In anxiety, a bias to threat has been described as a core feature. Therefore, the sensitivity for threatening information in anxious individuals may have consequences for danger estimation. In this study, we used the affective priming paradigm to test the assumption that fearful expressions would facilitate danger detection in natural scenes in anxious individuals. Twenty-three high trait anxious individuals and 22 low trait anxious individuals participated in the study. They had to detect the potential threat of a target scene (neutral or threatening) following neutral or fearful face primes. High trait anxious participants detected threat more rapidly than low trait anxious participants, consistent with previous reports of emotional hypervigilance in anxiety. Furthermore, this effect was enhanced when the target scene followed a fearful expression: Only in anxious participants were reaction times shorter to detect danger following a fearful prime than a neutral prime. Our results tend to show that in anxiety, the hypervigilance to threat may be of an important value such as increasing the detection of a subsequent potential danger. Implication of attentional processes and attentional control is discussed.     

Loomingness and the Fear of AIDS: Perceptions of Motion and Menace

The authors examined the role of "perceived loomingness" in fear of HIV. Perceived loomingness refers to perceptions of rapid forward movement and instantaneous changes in the distance and danger of a potential threat (Riskind, 1992). One hundred and twenty undergraduates rated vignettes of two public encounters with an HIV-positive stranger. High-HIV fear subjects perceived greater loomingness and danger in these vignettes than did low-HIV fear subjects. Regression analyses that tested for a mediated model confirmed that the perceptions of loomingness may spark threat cognitions (such as the probability and imminence of harm), which, in turn, lead to fear. As predicted by the harm-looming model, loomingness also had some effects on fear that were not mediated by such standard threat cognitions.     

On the Prioritized Processing of Threat in a Dual Implicit Process Model of Evaluation

Dual-process models of attitudes distinguish between implicit and explicit processes in which the valence (i.e., positivity or negativity) of a stimulus influences judgments and behavior toward the stimulus. Developing parallel to the dual-process literature has been a threat detection literature suggesting that the mind is preferentially attuned to threats to immediate bodily harm. That literature reveals early privileged responses (e.g., shorter latency of detection, stronger reflexive reactions, and faster and stronger physiological responses) to threatening stimuli relative to negative, neutral, and positive stimuli. By integrating those literatures, we develop the dual implicit process model that postulates two functionally distinct and serially linked automatic processes in which an implicit threat process precedes (and potentially influences) an implicit valence process (positive vs. negative), which precedes (and potentially influences) explicit processes. In addition to explicating the nature of the model, we examine insights it offers various research areas, and conclude by identifying open questions regarding the model.     

Benefits,Entitlements and Non‐Responsible Threats

This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non‐responsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some argue that a non‐responsible threat – a person who threatens another through no fault or choice – is required to bear a greater burden to avert the threat than a bystander. I argue that previous attempts to explain this asymmetry are either incorrect or incomplete, since they either implausibly suggest that agents who do not benefit from their bodily resources, or whose bodily resources primarily benefit third parties, are liable to greater costs than a bystander, or fail to accommodate such cases. Instead, the asymmetry (when it exists) is explained either by virtue of the fact that the non‐responsible threat has a beneficiary status with respect to the threatening object, or possesses distribution‐limiting entitlements over the threatening object.     

Anxiety and the dynamic self as defined by the prospection and mental simulation of looming future threats

A more dynamic perspective of threats to the self may contribute to an enhanced understanding of the processes that develop and maintain anxiety and thus, potentially inform psychological interventions. This article presents the looming vulnerability model of anxiety, which stresses the threat or risk prospection and dynamic mental simulation of the course of threat. Individuals do not become anxious simply because they picture distant or static possible threats that represent threats to the self. Rather, their anxiety results from interpreting potential threats as dynamic, growing, and approaching. Following a review of a wide range of literature from clinical, personality, and social psychology, we present the looming vulnerability model and its underpinnings in evolution and examine its applications to cognitive vulnerability to anxiety and its therapeutic alleviation [Correction added on 6 August 2019, after first online publication: Abstract text has been corrected to ‘looming vulnerability model’ in two places.]. We also address the associations of the model to other self-related concepts that are involved in anxiety.     

The nature of intrusive memories after trauma: the warning signal hypothesis

Individuals who had experienced a range of different traumas were asked to describe the quality and content of their intrusive memories. Visual intrusions were the most common, and thoughts were uncommon. Intrusion quality varied little with type of trauma. Intrusive memories commonly consisted of stimuli that were present immediately before the traumatic event happened or shortly before the moments that had the largest emotional impact (i.e., when the meaning of the event became more traumatic). It is suggested that intrusive memories are about stimuli that through temporal association with the trauma acquired the status of warning signals, i.e., stimuli that if encountered again would indicate impending danger. This explains why intrusive memories are accompanied by a sense of serious current threat. The warning signal hypothesis may be useful in guiding therapists in identifying the moments with the largest emotional impact that will need reprocessing in treatment, and in educating patients about the nature of reexperiencing symptoms.     

Anxiety: Proximate Processes and Ultimate Functions

Anxiety is a universal feature of human existence. Anxiety is associated with a range of cognitive processes such as attention to threat, appraisals of uncertainty and lack of control, pessimistic judgments, and risk-avoidant decision making. The current paper presents a framework for understanding these processes as a set of domain-specific mechanisms designed to face specific challenges encountered by humans throughout evolutionary history (e.g., avoiding forms of physical harm and contagious disease, maintaining social acceptance and close romantic relationships, and navigating status hierarchies). Anxiety involves a functionally organized constellation of adaptive processes designed to help people face recurrent psychological, social, and physical threats. The integration of psychological and evolutionary perspectives provides a basis for understanding anxiety's proximate processes, as well as its underlying adaptive functions.     

From stereotype threat to stereotype threats: implications of a multi-threat framework for causes, moderators, mediators, consequences, and interventions.

More than 100 articles have examined the construct of stereotype threat and its implications. However, stereotype threat seems to mean different things to different researchers and has been employed to describe and explain processes and phenomena that appear to be fundamentally distinct. Complementing existing models, the authors posit a Multi-Threat Framework in which six qualitatively distinct stereotype threats arise from the intersection of two dimensions--the target of the threat (the self/one's group) and the source of the threat (the self/outgroup others/ingroup others). The authors propose that these threats constitute the core of the broader stereotype threat construct and provide the foundation for understanding additional, as of yet uncharacterized, stereotype threats. The proposed threats likely differentially peril those with different stigmatizable characteristics, have different eliciting conditions and moderators, are mediated by somewhat different processes, are coped with and compensated for in different ways, and require different interventions to overcome.     

Threats,Bluffs, and Disclaimers in Negotiations

In a buyer-seller simulation within two negotiation periods, we examined the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of variations in the communication of threats. Specifically, we examined the consequences of receiving no threat or a threat stated with, versus without, a disclaimer. In addition, we examined changes in subjects′ evaluations of their partner and negotiation outcomes after some were led to believe their partner had stated a false threat (a "bluff"). As expected, we found that while negotiators who used threats were perceived as more powerful, they were also perceived as less cooperative and achieved less integrative agreements than those who did not use threats. In addition, when information (allegedly from a constituent) identified the threat as a bluff, we found that the disclaimer lessened the negativity of re-evaluations of the negotiation partner. Taken together, our findings suggest that current theory regarding the effect of threats and bluffs in negotiation needs to be qualified by how these tactics are stated. Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.     

Emotion- and intrusion-based reasoning in Vietnam veterans with and without chronic posttraumatic stress disorder.

Patients suffering from anxiety disorders other than posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) interpret anxiety responses themselves as evidence that threat is impending: "if anxiety, then threat" (Arntz, Rauner, & van den Hout, 1995, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 917-925). This "emotion-based reasoning" (ER) may render a disorder self-perpetuating. Analogous to ER, danger might also be inferred from the presence of intrusions: "intrusion-based reasoning" (IR). The aims of this study were to test whether ER and IR are involved in chronic PTSD. Vietnam combat veterans with or without PTSD or other anxiety disorders rated perceived danger of brief scenarios in which information about objective danger (danger vs safety) and response (anxiety/intrusions vs non-distressing emotion) was systematically varied. Two series were administered: ER-scenarios were non-specific for PTSD and IR-scenarios were specific for PTSD. Relative to control participants, PTSD patients engaged in both ER and IR: whereas veterans without PTSD inferred the danger of scenarios from objective stimulus information, veterans with PTSD also inferred danger from the presence of anxiety or intrusions. Further analyses showed that these effects were largely mediated by perceived uncontrollability.     

Ovarian steroids and cognitive function

The ovarian steroids, estrogen and progesterone, not only govern reproductive events in mammalian females but also influence an array of other processes. Of particular clinical interest is the potential of ovarian steroids to facilitate storage of new memories and to protect neurons from various threats. Research during the past decade confirms that estrogen and progesterone influence the biochemical, electrical, and structural properties of neurons in brain regions that subserve learning and memory. These mechanisms form the biological foundations for the complex effects of ovarian steroids on cognitive functions in various species, including humans. Despite significant progress in our understanding of the roles of hormonal factors in cognitive function and neuronal survival, the value of hormone replacement as a treatment and deterrent for cognitive impairments associated with age, disease, and injury remains uncertain as we enter the new century.     

Fearful faces drive gaze‐cueing and threat bias effects in children on the lookout for danger

Most developmental studies of face emotion processing show faces in isolation, in the absence of any broader context. Here we investigate two types of interactions between expression and threat contexts. First, in adults, following of another person's direction of social attention is increased when that person shows fear and the context requires vigilance for danger. We investigate whether this also occurs in children. Using a Posner‐style eye‐gaze cueing paradigm, we tested whether children would show greater gaze‐cueing from fearful than happy expressions when the task was to be vigilant for possible dangerous animals. Testing across the 8–12‐year‐old age range, we found this fear priority effect was absent in the youngest children but developed to reach adult levels in the oldest children. However, even the oldest children were unable to sustain fear‐prioritization when the onset of the target was delayed. Second, we addressed the development of ‘threat bias’ – namely faster identification of dangerous animals than safe animals – in the social context provided by expressive faces. In our non‐anxious samples (i.e. with typical‐population levels of anxiety), adults showed a threat bias regardless of the expression or looking direction of the just‐seen cue face whereas 8–12‐year‐olds only showed a threat bias when the just‐seen cue face displayed fear. Overall, the results argue that some, but not all, aspects of expression–context interactions are mature by 12 years of age.     

Group identity as a source of threat and means of compensation: Establishing personal control through group identification and ideology

Compensatory control theory proposes that individuals can assuage threatened personal control by endorsing external systems or agents that provide a sense that the world is meaningfully ordered. Recent research drawing on this perspective finds that one means by which individuals can compensate for a loss of control is adherence to ideological beliefs about the social world. This prior work, however, has largely neglected the role of social groups in defining either the nature of control threat or the means by which individuals compensate for these threats. In four experiments (N = 466), we test the possibility that group‐based threats to personal control can be effectively managed by defensively identifying with the threatened group and its values. We provide evidence for the specificity of these effects by demonstrating that defensive identification and ideology endorsement are specific to the content of the group‐based threat.     

“Tell Me Who Your Enemies Are”: Government Reports About the “Cult” Phenomenon in Israel

Between 1982 and 2011, four Israeli governmental reports addressing ostensible dangers from “cults” (new religious movements, or NRMs) were issued. The 1980s reports use a collectivist discourse, in which the state sees itself as defending the collective's borders from external threats and representing various sectors while seeking consensual values. The 1990s report marks an interim stage in which the state tries to balance individual liberties with sectoral interests. The 2011 report focuses solely on harm to individuals and is the harshest of the four. The reports reflect milestones in three processes of change that have taken place in Israeli society: from a collectivist‐hegemonic ethos to a multisectoral one; from a focus upon society to a focus on the individual; and from nationalistic values to universalistic ones. At every point in time, NRMs represented a different perceived threat to Israeli society. We explain how multisectoralism brings about both tolerance toward new religious phenomena and fierce anti‐cultic activity.     

Dangerous Enough: Moderating Racial Bias with Contextual Threat Cues

Research shows that participants shoot armed Blacks more frequently and quickly than armed Whites, but make don't-shoot responses more frequently and quickly for unarmed Whites than unarmed Blacks. We argue that this bias reflects the perception of threat — specifically, threat associated with Black males. Other danger cues (not just race) may create a similar predisposition to shoot, and if these cues promote shooting when the target is White, they should attenuate racial bias. We embedded targets in threatening and safe backgrounds. Racial bias was evident in safe contexts but disappeared when context signaled danger, and this reduction was largely due to an increased tendency to shoot White targets.     

Causal Contribution in War

Revisionist approaches to the ethics of war seem to imply that civilians on the unjust side of a conflict can be legitimate targets of defensive attack. In response, some authors have argued that although civilians do often causally contribute to unjustified global threats – by voting for war, writing propaganda articles, or manufacturing munitions, for example – their contributions are usually too ‘small’, or ‘remote’, to make them liable to be intentionally killed to avert the threat. What defenders of this view lack, however, is a theory of causal contribution. This article sketches and defends a theory of causal contribution. We then apply it to the kinds of situation that defenders of the view are interested in. We argue, however, that since degrees of causal contribution turn out to be sensitive to particular features of the situation that are extrinsic to the agent's action, whether an agent makes a small or a large contribution to a threat may not only be very difficult to discern but in many cases may not line up very well with the kinds of intuition about liability that defenders of the view want to uphold.