Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings.     

Formal reasoning in Japanese older adults: The role of metacognitive strategy,task content,and social factors

This study investigated the availability of deductive reasoning competence in late adulthood. Forty-six Japanese older (mean age =71 years) and 58 Japanese young adults (mean age =19.6 years) were assessed for formal or deductive reasoning using Overton's (1990) revision of the four-card selection task. For older adults, metacognitive strategy—operating as a procedure designed to access reasoning competence—resulted in enhanced performance levels. When the semantic content of the reasoning task involved emotional issues, however, the metacognitive strategy failed to facilitate reasoning performance. This suggests that reasoning competence is available in late adulthood but that performance is susceptible to contextual variables. Social factors were not significantly related to older adults' reasoning performance. Thus, assessment of these factors may have been based on too broad a definition to describe adequately the status of the older adults. For the young, only semantic task content was related to reasoning performance.     

归纳推理和演绎推理的关系理论及其模型

推理是人类高级认知过程的一种,相关的心理学研究一般将其分为归纳推理和演绎推理两个方面。归纳推理是从特殊到一般的推理过程,与之相对的演绎推理则是从一般到特殊的过程。归纳推理和演绎推理的关系问题是当前心理推理研究领域的一个重点问题。这一问题主要有两种理论解释：一种是单过程理论,该理论认为归纳推理和演绎推理本质上是同一个认知过程,以单过程理论为基础构建的推理模型称为单维模型;另一种是双过程理论,认为归纳推理和演绎推理是两个不同的认知过程,并不同程度地受到启发和分析过程的影响。未来研究可多关注推理的时间进程,以及采用不同的研究方法对各自理论提供数据支持。     

Abstract reasoning and the interpretation of basic conditionals

Studies examining the interpretation that is given to if–then statementstypically use what are referred to as basic conditionals, which give contextless relations between two unrelated concrete terms (If the ball is blue, then the shape is square). However, there is some evidence that basic conditionals require a more abstract form of representation. In order to examine this, we presented participants with truth-table tasks involving either basic conditionals or conditionals referring to imaginary categories (If it is a bori, then it has red wings), and standard conditional inference tasks with abstract and familiar premises. As expected, fewer typical defective conditional interpretations were given to basic conditionals. In addition, partial correlations showed a unique relationship between the interpretation of basic conditionals and abstract inferential reasoning. Results suggest that people process basic conditionals as a form of abstract reasoning, and that the interpretation of conditionals must consider the semantic context.     

A threatening exchange: Gender and life history strategy predict perceptions and reasoning about sexual harassment

Sexual harassment is a serious societal issue, with extensive economic and psychological consequences, yet it is also an ill-defined construct fundamentally defined in terms of subjective perception. The current work was designed to examine the ways in which individual differences between people are systematically related to different perceptions of sexual harassment scenarios, as well as reasoning about those harassment situations. Participants (N = 460) read several possible harassment scenarios and rated how uncomfortable they would find them. They then also evaluated a quid pro quo sexual harassment situation in terms of their interpretation of it as a threat or a social exchange and completed a deductive reasoning task about the same situation. Females and individuals with slow life history strategies were more uncomfortable with potential harassment situations and were more likely to interpret the quid pro quo scenario as a threat. Further, interpreting the scenario as a threat was associated with poorer performance on the deductive logic task, compared to those who interpreted the scenario as a social exchange.     

Effects of perspective and belief on analytic reasoning in a scientific reasoning task

The purpose of these studies was to test the hypothesis that changing perspectives from one's own to another's promotes the engagement of analytic processing and, in turn, reduces the impact of beliefs. In two experiments participants evaluated research vignettes containing belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent conclusions, and indicated whether the data supported a correlation between two variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, the tendency to endorse correlations consistent with prior belief was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researcher's perspective relative to their own. We also administered the Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008), which did not predict belief effects on our task. We did however observe that the AOT was reliably associated with different response strategies: high AOT scorers were more inclined to choose ambiguous response options, such as “no conclusion is warranted”, whereas low scorers evinced a preference for more determinate options (e.g., there is no relationship between the two variables). We interpret our findings in the context of dual process theories of reasoning and from a Bayesian perspective.     

Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief

Although deductive reasoning is a closed system, one's beliefs about the world can influence validity judgements. To understand the associated functional neuroanatomy of this belief-bias we studied 14 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they performed reasoning tasks under neutral, facilitatory and inhibitory belief conditions. We found evidence for the engagement of a left temporal lobe system during belief-based reasoning and a bilateral parietal lobe system during belief-neutral reasoning. Activation of right lateral prefrontal cortex was evident when subjects inhibited a prepotent response associated with belief-bias and correctly completed a logical task, a finding consistent with its putative role in cognitive monitoring. By contrast, when logical reasoning was overcome by belief-bias, there was engagement of ventral medial prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in affective processing. This latter involvement suggests that belief-bias effects in reasoning may be mediated through an influence of emotional processes on reasoning.     

元认知监控的机制:认知灵活性的调节作用

元认知监控作为元认知的核心成分,是内隐程度较高的心理活动。研究采用认知操作法,以MasterMind游戏任务为载体,从执行功能中认知灵活性的角度,探讨了元认知监控的内部机制。结果发现:元认知监测对元认知控制的作用受到认知灵活性的调节作用。对于高认知灵活性的学生,元认知监测水平越高,元认知控制越好;对于低认知灵活性的学生,元认知监测水平的高低不会引起元认知控制水平的显著变化。研究结果表明,高认知灵活性的学生能根据元认知监测进行有效元认知控制,而低认知灵活性的学生其元认知监测水平的提高没有影响元认知控制。结合元认知监控与执行功能进行了讨论。     

Multiple layers of information processing in deductive reasoning: combining dual strategy and dual-source approaches to reasoning

The idea that inferential performance cannot be analyzed within a single model has been suggested within two theoretical contexts. The dual strategy model suggests that people reason using different approaches to processing statistical information. The dual-source model suggests that people reason probabilistically using both statistical information and some intuition about logical form. Each model suggests that people have different approaches to processing information while making inferences. The following studies examined whether these different forms of information processing were equally present during reasoning. Participants were given a series of problems designed to distinguish counterexample from statistical reasoners. They were then given a series of MP or AC inferences for which identical statistical information was provided. Results show that MP inferences were considered to be deductively valid more often than equivalent AC inferences. The effect of logical form was independent of reasoning strategy, and of relatively equivalent size for both counterexample and statistical reasoners. The second study examined explicitly probabilistic inferences, and showed smaller effects of logical form and of reasoning strategy, although with a complex set of interactions. These results show that understanding the way that people use information when making inferences requires a multidimensional approach.     

Perspective-taking and depth of theory-of-mind reasoning in sequential-move games

Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual's mental states to plan one's action and to anticipate others' actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated or planned Player II's strategy at the second step, and then determined Player I's optimal strategy at the first step. Participants more readily used predictive reasoning as Player II (i.e., planning one's own move) than as Player I (i.e., anticipating an opponent's move), although they did not differ when translating reasoning outcome about the second step to optimal action in the first step. Perspective-taking influenced likelihood of predictive reasoning, but it did not affect the rate at which participants acquired it during the experimental block. We conclude that the depth of ToM recursion (related to perspective-taking mechanisms) and rational application of belief-desire to action (instrumental rationality) constitute separate cognitive processes in ToM reasoning.     

The ethic of care development: a longitudinal study of moral reasoning among practical-nursing, social-work and law-enforcement students

The study investigated changes in care-based moral reasoning, in the context of justice development over the 2-year period among practical-nursing, bachelor-degree social-work and law-enforcement students (N = 59). Main measures were Skoe's Ethic of Care Interview and Colby et al.'s Moral Judgment Interview. Of the participants 34% progressed in care reasoning, and 48% in justice reasoning. Social-work and nursing students progressed in care reasoning, and all groups progressed in justice reasoning. One participant (1.7%) regressed in care reasoning. Care and justice reasoning were parallel in terms of internal consistency, and they were positively related to each other. Findings suggest that care reasoning follows a developmental sequence, involving three main and two transitional levels, as suggested by Gilligan (1982). Main levels include self-concern (Level 1), caring for others (Level 2), and balanced caring for self and others (Level 3).     

State–trait anxiety and existential fear: an empirical analysis

The Fear Checklist consists of 18 items (e.g. intimacy, loss of control, failure) a respondent checks to signify areas that have been or currently are personal sources of concern and/or apprehension. Total scores on the Fear Checklist, along with scores on each of its three subscales (Social, Control, Identity), were correlated with the state (A-State) and trait (A-Trait) anxiety scales of the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). Both the A-State and A-Trait scales demonstrated significant association with the total Fear Checklist score (r_stat =0.48, r_trait=0.50) and each of its three subscales in a group of 135 male federal prisoners. Despite substantial overlap between the A-State and A-Trait scales (r=0.76), each achieved significant partial correlations with the total Fear Checklist score when the other scale was controlled (i.e. the A-Trait score was controlled in the state anxiety–fear relationship and the A-State score was controlled in the trait anxiety–fear relationship). These results lend preliminary support to the notion that existential fear, as measured by the Fear Checklist, is sensitive to both dispositionally (A-Trait) and situationally (A-State) based anxiety, although the majority of variance shared by the STAI and Fear Checklist was common to both STAI scales.     

Affective facilitation and inhibition of cultural influences on reasoning

Research in South Korea and the United States examined how affective states facilitate or inhibit culturally dominant styles of reasoning. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, affective cues of mood influence judgements by serving as embodied information about the value of accessible inclinations and cognitions. Extending this line of research to culture, we hypothesised that positive affect should promote (and negative affect should inhibit) culturally normative reasoning. The results of two studies of causal reasoning supported this hypothesis. Positive and negative affect functioned like “go” and “stop” signals, respectively, for culturally typical reasoning styles. Thus, in happy (compared to sad) moods, Koreans engaged in more holistic reasoning, whereas Americans engaged in more analytic reasoning.     

Measuring the ability of transitive reasoning,using product and strategy information

Cognitive theories disagree about the processes and the number of abilities involved in transitive reasoning. This led to controversies about the influence of task characteristics on individuals' performance and the development of transitive reasoning. In this study, a computer test was constructed containing 16 transitive reasoning tasks having different characteristics with respect to presentation form, task format, and task content. Both product and strategy information were analyzed to measure the performance of 6- to 13-year-old children. Three methods (MSP, DETECT, and Improved DIMTEST) were used to determine the number of abilities involved and to test the assumptions imposed on the data by item response models. Nonparametric IRT models were used to construct a scale for transitive reasoning. Multiple regression was used to determine the influence of task characteristics on the difficulty level of the tasks. It was concluded that: (1) the qualitatively distinct abilities predicted by Piaget's theory could not be distinguished by means of different dimensions in the data structure; (2) transitive reasoning could be described by one ability, and some task characteristics influenced the difficulty of a task; and (3) strategy information provided a stronger scale than product information.     

The effect of perspective-taking on reasoning about strong and weak belief-relevant arguments

This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

Investigative psychology and law: towards collaboration by focusing on evidence and inferential reasoning

Introducing a special issue of this journal, Youngs discussed the desirability of, but problems in realising, greater collaboration between psychology and the criminal investigation and trial processes. This paper acknowledges the value of investigative psychology's potential contribution but argues that the alleged incompatibilities, between psychology and law, are based upon too narrow a conception of law and legal action. A direct approach, with considerable potential for productive, principled, and practical research, already exists. It involves focusing on the evidence, assessing it along each of its three credentials, and identifying the nature of the inferential reasoning involved. This paper identifies a number of ways in which practical, inter‐disciplinary and collaboration could and should be developed to ensure that the courts receive quality evidence. It also argues that more attention should be paid to abductive inferential reasoning, both by researchers and courts. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential involvement of left prefrontal cortex in inductive and deductive reasoning

While inductive and deductive reasoning are considered distinct logical and psychological processes, little is known about their respective neural basis. To address this issue we scanned 16 subjects with fMRI, using an event-related design, while they engaged in inductive and deductive reasoning tasks. Both types of reasoning were characterized by activation of left lateral prefrontal and bilateral dorsal frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices. Neural responses unique to each type of reasoning determined from the Reasoning Type (deduction and induction) by Task (reasoning and baseline) interaction indicated greater involvement of left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) in deduction than induction, while left dorsolateral (BA 8/9) prefrontal gyrus showed greater activity during induction than deduction. This pattern suggests a dissociation within prefrontal cortex for deductive and inductive reasoning.     

An ERP investigation of conditional reasoning with emotional and neutral contents

In two experiments we investigate conditional reasoning using event-related potentials (ERPs). Our goal was to examine the time course of inference making in two conditional forms, one logically valid (Modus Ponens, MP) and one logically invalid (Affirming the Consequent, AC). We focus particularly on the involvement of semantically-based inferential processes potentially marked by modulations of the N400. We also compared reasoning about emotional and neutral contents with separate sets of stimuli of differing linguistic complexity across the two experiments. Both MP and AC modulated the N400 component, suggesting the involvement of a semantically-based inferential mechanism common across different logical forms, content types, and linguistic features of the problems. Emotion did not have an effect on early components, and did not interact with components related to inference making. There was a main effect of emotion in the 800–1050 ms time window, consistent with an effect on sustained attention. The results suggest that conditional reasoning is not a purely formal process but that it importantly implicates semantic processing, and that the effect of emotion on reasoning does not primarily operate through a modulation of early automatic stages of information processing.