共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Gerald K. Harrison 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):555-568
Cases involving certain kinds of manipulation seem to challenge compatibilism about responsibility-grounding free will. To
deal with such cases many compatibilists give what has become known as a ‘soft line’ reply. In this paper I present a challenge
to the soft line reply. I argue that any relevant case involving manipulation—and to which a compatibilist might wish to give
a soft line reply—can be transformed into one supporting a degree of moral responsibility through the addition of libertarian
elements (such as alternative possibilities of a kind unavailable under determinism and executive control of the sort commonly
associated with agent-causation). From a compatibilist’s perspective the subtraction of libertarian elements should make no
difference to any assessment of the agent’s responsibility. The compatibilist should therefore judge the agent morally responsible
after the removal of the libertarian elements. Yet removal of the libertarian elements returns the case to its original form
and thus what started out as a soft line has now collapsed into a hard line reply. Various ways of resisting my argument are
considered, but each is shown to carry important burdens. 相似文献
2.
Stefaan E. Cuypers 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):171-196
In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is
as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy
in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition
of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first
appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve the CNC manipulation problem. After briefly reflecting on the present
status of responses to the manipulation problem in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists of various stripes,
I will draw the over-all pessimistic conclusion that no party deals with this problem satisfactorily. 相似文献
3.
Saul Smilansky 《Philosophical Studies》2003,115(3):257-282
The compatibility question lies at the center of the free will problem. Compatibilists think that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and the concomitant notions, while incompatibilists think that it is not. The topic of this paper is a particular form of charge against compatibilism: that it is shallow. This is not the typical sort of argument against compatibilism: most of the debate has attempted to discredit compatibilism completely. The Argument From Shallowness maintains that the compatibilists do have a case. However, this case is only partial, and shallow. This limited aim proves itself more powerful against compatibilists than previous all-or-nothing attempts. It connects to the valid instincts of compatibilists, making room for them, and hence is harder for compatibilists to ignore. 相似文献
4.
Ned Markosian 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(3):383-398
In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists
should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition
that one can’t be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen’s modal
argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability
to do otherwise is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) “manipulation arguments,” involving cases in which an agent is
manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist’s
favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not
fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that
action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that
problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise. 相似文献
5.
Michael Barnwell 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2017,82(1):29-46
In the elaboration of his soul-making theodicy, John Hick agrees with a controversial point made by compatibilists Antony Flew and John Mackie against the free will defense. Namely, Hick grants that God could have created humans such that they would be free to sin but would, in fact, never do so. In this paper, I identify three previously unrecognized problems that arise from his initial concession to, and ultimate rejection of, compatibilism. The first problem stems from the fact that in two important texts, Hick rejects compatibilism (after having endorsed it as effective against the free will defense) for different and seemingly contradictory reasons. His various explanations of soul-making theodicy’s relationship to compatibilism are therefore in conflict. The second problem is closely related to the first. It turns out that when Hick’s concession to compatibilism is closely examined, soul-making theodicy appears unable to explain the existence of moral evil. The final problem consists in understanding why Hick would have made any concessions to compatibilism in the first place given that he ultimately opts for incompatibilist free will. After identifying these three problems, I develop a distinctive way in which to interpret Hick’s soul-making theodicy that solves the first two. This distinctive interpretation, moreover, has the added benefit of solving another, well-recognized problem that has long plagued Hick’s exposition: the problem of the hypnotist metaphor. Finally, I address the third problem by suggesting a rationale for Hick’s initial concession to the compatibilists. 相似文献
6.
Garrett Pendergraft 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):249-266
Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism
obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle
that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological
principle, arguing that it is not always capable of explaining our inability to do otherwise. In response to this challenge,
I point out that this principle is part of a defense against the charge that local miracle compatibilists are committed to
outlandish claims. Thus it is not surprising that the principle, by itself, will often fail to explain our inability to do
otherwise. I then suggest that in many situations in which we are unable to do otherwise, this can be explained by the compatibilist’s
analysis of ability, or his criteria for the truth of ability claims. Thus, the failure of his nomological principle to explain
the falsity of certain ability claims is no strike against local miracle compatibilism. 相似文献
7.
Hilary Kornblith 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):337-349
Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC),
allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of
nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s
criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument
against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism
of the Consequence Argument fails. 相似文献
8.
Michael McKenna 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(2):145-174
Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does not act freely and is not morally responsible for what she does. It is then claimed that any agent??s coming to be in the same psychic state through a deterministic process is no different in any relevant respect from the pertinent manner of manipulation. Hence, it is concluded that compatibilists?? proposed sufficient conditions for free will and moral responsibility are inadequate, and that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. One way for compatibilists to resist certain manipulation arguments is by appealing to historical requirements that, they contend, relevant manipulated agents lack. While a growing number of compatibilists advance an historical thesis, in this paper, I redouble my efforts to show, in defense of nonhistorical compatibilists like Harry Frankfurt, that there is still life left in a nonhistorical view. The historical compatibilists, I contend, have fallen shy of discrediting their nonhistorical compatibilist rivals. 相似文献
9.
The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has
taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is
false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians
have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that
PAP is false, but that it is explanatorily irrelevant. Derk Pereboom and David Hunt’s buffer cases are tailor made to establish
this conclusion. In this paper I come to the aid of PAP, showing that buffer cases provide no reason for doubting either its
truth or relevance with respect to explaining an agent’s moral responsibility. 相似文献
10.
Kevin Timpe 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(2):337-368
One well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples is the ‘flicker-of-freedom strategy’. The flicker
strategy claims that even in a Frankfurt-style counterexample, there are still morally relevant alternative possibilities.
In the present paper, I differentiate between two distinct understandings of the flicker strategy, as the failure to differentiate
these two versions has led some philosophers to argue at cross-purposes. I also explore the respective dialectic roles that
the two versions of the flicker strategy play in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Building on this
discussion, I then suggest a reason why the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate has reached a stalemate. 相似文献
11.
Jill Graper Hernandez 《Sophia》2010,49(1):1-13
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably
so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form
of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need
not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is contingent on God’s will (a dimension of divine omnipotence),
with the result that even though it is necessary that God exerts his will, there are particular products of his will that
are contingent and unnecessary—including human moral evil. If there are instances of evil which are contingent on God’s will
and yet unnecessary, then the problematic conclusion for Leibniz’s view must be that human evil depends upon divine concurrence,
not just for its possibility in the world (which is necessary) but for its instance (which is contingent). If the form/matter
defense of omnipotence contains a true paradox, then God concurs in the form as well as the matter of evil. To assuage this
difficulty for Leibniz, I will argue that he could either give up an Augustinian notion of evil, or rely upon a distinction
between *potenta absoluta* and *potenta ordinate*, which was popular among important thinkers in the medieval period. 相似文献
12.
In a recent paper, Peter Singer suggests that some interesting new findings in experimental moral psychology support what
he has contended all along—namely that intuitions should play little or no role in adequate justifications of normative ethical
positions. Not only this but, according to Singer, these findings point to a central flaw in the method (or epistemological
theory) of reflective equilibrium used by many contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we try to defend reflective equilibrium from Singer’s attack
and, in part, we do this by discussing Singer’s own favoured moral methodology as outlined in his Practical Ethics. Although basing ethics solely on (certain kinds of) intuitions certainly is problematic, we argue, basing it solely on ‘reason’
gives rise to similar problems. The best solution would arguably be one which could strike a balance between the two—but,
we suggest, this is precisely what reflective equilibrium is all about. 相似文献
13.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
14.
Some philosophers have recently argued that luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists and libertarians alike. But conceptual ambiguity regarding deterministic luck at the time of decision – henceforth C-luck – has obscured recognition of the problem C-luck poses to compatibilism. This paper clarifies C-luck and distinguishes it from present luck, showing that the former arises from contingent factors at the time of decision instead of presupposed free will requirements. We then argue that empirical findings confirm the existence of C-luck thereby raising a fundamental challenge to compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility. 相似文献
15.
Nora Hämäläinen 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):539-553
In this paper I discuss the viability of the claim that at least some forms of moral theory are harmful for sound moral thought
and practice. This claim was put forward by e.g. Elisabeth Anscombe (1981(1958)) and by Annette Baier, Peter Winch, D.Z Phillips and Bernard Williams in the 1970’s–1980’s. To this day aspects of it have
found resonance in both post-Wittgensteinian and virtue ethical quarters. The criticism has on one hand contributed to a substantial
change and broadening of the scope of analytic moral philosophy. On the other hand it is, at least in its most strongly anti-theoretical
formulations, now broadly considered outdated and—to the extent that it is still defended—insensitive to the changes that
have occurred within the field in the last 20–30 years. The task of this paper is to relocate the anti-theoretical critique
into the field of analytic ethics today. 相似文献
16.
BILL WRINGE 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2012,93(2):125-136
Saul Smilansky holds that there is a widespread intuition to the effect that pre‐punishment – the practice of punishing individuals for crimes which they have not committed, but which we are in a position to know that they are going to commit – is morally objectionable. Smilanksy has argued that this intuition can be explained by our recognition of the importance of respecting the autonomy of potential criminals. ( Smilansky, 1994 ) More recently he has suggested that this account of the intuition only vindicates it if determinism is false, and argues that this presents a problem for compatibilists, who, he says, are committed to thinking that the truth of determinism makes no moral difference ( Smilansky, 2007 ). In this paper I argue that the intuitions Smilansky refers to can be explained and vindicated as consequences of the truth of a communicative conception of punishment. Since the viability of the communicative conception does not depend on the falsity of determinism, our intuitions about pre‐punishment do not clash with (what Smilanksy calls) compatibilism. And if the communicative theory of punishment is – as Duff (2001 ) suggests – a form of retributivism, the account also meets New's (1992 ) challenge to retributivists to explain what is wrong with pre‐punishment. 相似文献
17.
Hayden Ramsay 《Sophia》2001,40(2):15-29
The paper presents Aquinas’s account of conscience, and argues that key elements of this account are key elements too of Aristotle’s
moral theory. The paper’s purpose is to encourage debate over conscience as not only a Stoic/Christian concept but one with
deeper— and more widespread—roots in western ethical tradition. 相似文献
18.
Peter Brian Barry 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(1):5-21
Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally
responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth
of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed
to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers
sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons
into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being
evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents. 相似文献
19.
In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’.
According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable
stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I
seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes
compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise. 相似文献
20.
Compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Natural compatibilism is the view that in ordinary social cognition, people are compatibilists. Researchers have recently debated whether natural compatibilism is true. This paper presents six experiments (N = 909) that advance this debate. The results provide the best evidence to date for natural compatibilism, avoiding the main methodological problems faced by previous work supporting the view. In response to simple scenarios about familiar activities, people judged that agents had moral responsibilities to perform actions that they were unable to perform (Experiment 1), were morally responsible for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 2), were to blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiments 3–4), deserved blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 5), and should suffer consequences for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 6). These findings advance our understanding of moral psychology and philosophical debates that depend partly on patterns in commonsense morality. 相似文献