Rorschach and pain characteristics of patients with low back pain and "conversion V" MMPI profiles

Two studies examined the relationship between Rorschach determinants, MMPI scale scores, and pain reports in order to clarify the meaning of the MPI "conversion V" pattern among patients with low back pain. Study I showed that patients without demonstrable organic disease of the back produce Rorschach response summaries marked by lower F+%, lower Sum C, and higher F% than patients with demonstrable organic disease. Study 2 showed that only the increase in F% was associated with significant elevations of the MMPI Hs and Hy scales. The results suggest that elevated MMPI "conversion V" profiles are indicative of psychological disturbance among patients with low back pain. It is unlikely, however, that the disturbance is hysterical. Instead, the psychopathology is probably marked by tension and constraint rather than the over-reactivity of hysteria. The implications of these findings for diagnosis are discussed.     

A contribution to "stiff man" syndrome

A patient with the clinical symptoms of the "Stiff-man"-syndrome, but an atypical course was introduced. Symptoms and course were compared with similar cases mentioned in literature. The "Stiff-man"-syndrome is probably a disease of central origin affecting the relationship between inhibitory and excitatory regulation of the muscle tonus, especially the exteroceptive reflex mechanisms. Several pathological processes of the CNS can be held responsible for the disturbance of the balance in this regulatory system.     

从“行政主导”到“有限政府”——中国政府改革的方向与路径

政治理论和政治实践表明,"有限政府"作为"宪政"的核心概念,是善治良政的重要条件和原则。然而,行政主导下的全能政治一直被认为是中国政府政治的主要特点。本文在梳理"有限政府"理论的基础上,简要分析了中国宪政发展的历程,总结了中国法治建设的成就,指出了目前距离宪政目标的差距,从"有限政府"与"有效政府"的关系出发,论证了"有限政府"作为中国政府改革目标的合理性,并从限制政府自由裁量权、确立针对政府政治的有效监督、建立公共财政制度三个方面,说明了这一改革的基本路径。     

"Homogeneity" and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity Conflicts through Group Rights

In this article I explore some ancient issues of political theory in the light of some contemporary social and cultural issues. After developing a check list of the virtues and vulnerabilities of constitutional democracy (Section I), I go on to discuss some types and symptoms of difference, conflict, fragmentation and heterogeneity (Section II). I then proceed to a critical review of a particular set of strategies and institutional solutions—political group rights—that are often thought promising devices for strengthening the virtues and overcoming the vulnerabilities of the constitutional democratic form of regime (Section III).
Much of the contemporary philosophical and political discussion of these issues is enchanted by the post-modern spirit of "multiculturalism,""diversity" and "identity." It tends to neglect issues of citizenship and social justice. It also tends to fixate on North American examples, neglecting some of the less benign West European and, in particular, Central East European varieties of identity politics. The discussion here, while mostly raising questions rather than claiming to provide definitive answers, nevertheless tries to overcome some of these biases.     

A Property of Peculiar Value: Land,Religion and the Constitution

In 1792, James Madison wrote that a man's ‘property of peculiar value [is] in his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them’.1 1. James Madison in the National Gazette (27 March 1792). Quoted in Hall (1998 Hall T 1998 Separating church and state: Roger Williams and religious liberty Champaign, IL University of Illinois Press  , 135). View all notes In view of the ensuing 200 years, the phrase is telling in ways Madison would not have anticipated. For it is in relation to land and private property that the constitutional concept of religion—a concept designed in significant part by Madison himself—arose and is now in decline. This article traces the origins, development and decline of religion as a constitutional concept in relation to land and private property. The experience of Native Americans is a particularly important illustration of this history, because it is in response to them that the constitutional relations of land and religion have been debated in most detail. I begin therefore with the unsuccessful efforts of Native Americans in 1988 to claim Free Exercise protection for lands they regard as sacred. The second section briefly explores the joint origins of private land ownership and the modern Western concept of religion, which in turn impacted the European treatment of the land and religions of conquered and colonised peoples. Moving into the American constitutional period, the third section sketches the inter-related notions of land and religion that appeared in key framers, which again had profound implications for indigenous peoples. Arriving at the present day, the fourth section outlines the deterioration of the constitutional concept of religion, along with the democratic public sphere itself, in the age of privatisation. The final section, using the Faith-Based Initiatives movement as an illustration, argues that new and supposedly public roles for religion actually advance and protect privatisation. In conclusion, I will review and assess very briefly the prospects for religion as a constitutional construct.     

A Comparative Clinical Investigation of the "How" and "Charlie" MMPI Subtypes

We studied the thought and affective disturbance of Megargee and Bohn's (1979) most psychopathological Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) subtypes, the "How" and "Charlie" profiles. 75 subjects, consisting of three groups of How and Charlie subtypes in inpatient and outpatient forensic settings and two control groups, are tested using the Whitaker Index of Schizophrenic Thinking (WIST) and Profile of Mood States (POMS). Results indicate both Flow and Charlie subtypes have mild formal thought disorder, with the former showing greater variance of thought disorder. Charlie subtypes, however, are more angry, less depressed, more vigorous, and more constricted and defensive than the How subtypes. We conclude that the Flow subtype needs further actuarial refinement to be diagnostically useful.     

Defending the “private” in constitutional privacy

Conclusion Suppose we agree to reject the view that privacy has narrow scope and consequently is irrelevant to the constitutional privacy cases. We then have (at least) these two options: (1) We might further emphasize and draw out similarities between tort and constitutional privacy claims in order to develop a notion of privacy fundamental to informational and Fourth Amendment privacy concerns as well as the constitutional cases. We can cite examples indicating this is a promising position. Consider consenting homosexuality conducted in one's home, for instance. We view it as a private matter, whether the state is seeking to regulate the behavior, or if others are attempting to gain or exploit information about it. I believe basic conceptual similarities between tort and constitutional interests can be identified by showing that there is a range of similar reasons for protecting both tort and constitutional privacy concerns. We might worry, however, that a comprehensive concept of privacy may be too general to be very useful, given that privacy violations can be so diverse, and can arise, for example, from misuse of confidential information, from conduct that is intrusive even if no information is gained or disclosed, from disturbance of an intimate relationship, or from disruption of various other important aspects of one's life.(2) We could concede that whatever privacy means in the tort and Fourth Amendment cases, it means something different in the constitutional cases. Nevertheless, we might take that something else seriously as a distinct but legitimate use of the term which is not spurious but is reflected in our ordinary language. This appears to me to be a fruitful alternative. After all, contrary to Henkin's view that tort privacy is what most people mean by privacy, the term is often used in contexts beyond informational privacy and clearly related to the interests at stake in the constitutional cases. Thus, for example, in a pamphlet explaining how to protect children by teaching them how to say No! to strangers without making them paranoid or antisocial, parents and teachers are told, Children have a right to privacy. Teach it. Reinforce it. One of the ways to help children prevent sexual assault is to encourage them to develop a sense of physical integrity. A sense that they have a right to their own body space and privacy. Just as we allow them to close the door when they use the bathroom, we must allow them to say no to any unwanted physical affection and touch. Unfortunately, the most obvious starting point for identifying the sense of private relevant to the constitutional cases is extremely worrisome. The Court itself has said ... only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental...are included in this guarantee of personal privacy...the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage...procreation...contraception...family relationships... and child rearing and education. The difficulty, of course, is that little more is offered by way of explanation of which rights are personal or fundamental or both. Focusing on marriage makes Roe v. Wade difficult to understand given that Ms. Roe was unmarried, and attending only to family issues does not help us make sense of the Stanley case protecting one's right to view pornography in one's home. It is perhaps more problematic that decisions such as what color shoes to wear are reasonably viewed as personal, yet are far from fundamental enough to warrant protection. And regulations governing the draft and employment, for example, are not viewed as privacy invasions although they might be said to interfere with matters of one's life that are both fundamental and personal in the vague sense described.Before we give up in frustration, however, I would urge that we recall that even in tort law the notion of privacy has been evolving through a constellation of judgments. Although there is no fixed way of using the term which we then proceed to analyze, the concept of privacy has not in those cases been taken to be meaningless or empty. Similarly, there is reason to believe that the scope of a personal and fundamental notion of privacy relevant to the constitutional cases can be further delineated through a consideration of cases, especially since it seems to me that in many cases application of the term is clear and unproblematic. A decision to have a vasectomy, for example, can uncontroversially be said to be a personal and fundamental one, and it is in that sense private. We fail to acknowledge the personal significance in an individual's life of forcing or refusing him the operation if we deny that this important sense of privacy is relevant to such a decision merely because an interest in determining for oneself what one ought to do is also at risk.Of course, once it is settled that something is a private matter, it is a separate issue to decide whether or not, in some social context, an invasion of it can be justified. Thus, I would claim, a mandatory sterilization program for male recidivists or for those in a country suffering grave poverty and overpopulation does invade privacy, and the social or legal question is whether or not the invasion can, in the particular circumstances, be justified. Although all will agree that both individual and social interests must be balanced by moral philosophers as well as the courts, in conflicts we will not always agree on the weight to be accorded individual claims.I have not provided a constitutional defense for citing privacy as one right at stake in the constitutional privacy cases. Nor have I attempted to enter the debate about how strictly to interpret the Constitution. But if I am correct, then we can agree there is an important interest in privacy at issue in those cases without merely conflating privacy and autonomy or liberty, and can continue the process of marking out its boundaries. If we reach such agreement, we will have made considerable progress. Moreover, the implications of this view are significant. Current constitutional standards, controversial though they may be, require strict scrutiny for cases concerning fundamental values, and privacy has been judged to be one such value. Thus these privacy claims have a greater chance of being protected when they conflict with other rights or general interests than they would have if only liberty, or freedom from governmental interference, were involved.

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One-year follow-up of patients with cluster C personality disorders: a prospective study comparing patients with "pure" and comorbid conditions within cluster C, and "pure" C with "pure" cluster A or B conditions.

This one-year, post-treatment prospective study of consecutively admitted patients to a national psychiatric in-patient clinic, compares patients belonging to four subgroups of DSM-III-R personality disorder (PDs): "pure cluster A (N = 21), "pure" B (N = 67), "pure" C (N = 251), and Axis II "comorbid" C (N = 138). Outcome was measured by SCl-90 and occupational status. Axis I disorders were controlled for in all analyses. Contrary to our hypothesis, patients in pure cluster C had no better outcome than either Axis II comorbid cluster C patients or patients with pure cluster A or B. Although pure C patients relapsed in symptom distress after discharge, comorbid C patients did not. C patients with an additional Histrionic PD were less at risk to be a case at follow up (GSI level > 1.00). Cluster C disorders as a whole had negative impact upon outcome in the total sample. These findings suggest the need for better treatment of patients with cluster C conditions.     

Beyond LFT and Discomfort Disturbance: The Case for the Term “Non-Ego Disturbance”

In this paper, a case is made for the term non-ego disturbance to replace LFT and discomfort disturbance as the generic alternative to ego disturbance in REBT theory. The issues of valence and varying levels of non-disturbance are introduced and discussed and an initial version of a taxonomy of non-ego disturbance is presented. Finally, a plea is made for the development of a scale to measure non-ego disturbance.     

Psychic tonus, body schema and the parietal lobes: a multiple lesion case analysis

The psychic tonus model (Braun and colleagues, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2006) states that the left hemisphere is a "booster" of internal experience and behavior in general, and that the right hemisphere is a "dampener". Twenty-five patients with a "positive" extreme disturbance of body schema (somatoparaphrenia) and 37 patients with a "negative" disturbance of body schema (autotopagnosia or Gerstmann's syndrome), all following a unilateral parietal lesion, were found in the literature and were analyzed to test predictions from Braun's "psychic tonus" model. As expected, patients with a positive syndrome had a right hemisphere lesion significantly more frequently, and those with a negative syndrome had a left hemisphere lesion significantly more frequently. Thus the psychic tonus model of hemispheric specialization, previously supported with regard to psychomotor baseline, libido, talkativeness, memory, auditory and visual perceptual tonus, now incorporates the tonus of representation of the body (body schema) in the parietal lobes.     

Pure misallocation of "0" in number transcoding: a new symptom of right cerebral dysfunction

To account for the mechanism of number transcoding, many authors have proposed various models, for example, semantic-abstract model, lexical-semantic model, triple-code model, and so on. However, almost all of them are based on the symptoms of patients with left cerebral damage. Previously, I reported two Japanese patients with right posterior cerebral infarction showing pure misallocation of "0" (omission: "40,265"-->"4,265," addition: "107"-->"1,007," transposition: "4,072"-->"4,702") both in writing and oral reading of Arabic numerals. To examine whether the pure misallocation of "0" is commonly observed in patients with right cerebral damage, I investigated writing and oral reading of Arabic numerals in 18 patients with right cerebral damage and 16 healthy controls. All patients with right cerebral damage showed pure misallocation of "0" both in writing and reading. The pure misallocation of "0" due to right cerebral damage cannot be explained by current models. It may be more useful to explain the phenomenon by regarding an Arabic numeral as graph on a two-dimensional plane composed of two axes (place-holding values and digits).     

Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant

Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is that it issues from the person's constitution, and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This in turn implies an account of what makes an action good: what makes an action good is that it is deliberated upon and chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Through deliberative action we constitute ourselves as unified agents. Platonic justice and Kant's categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are principles of self-constitution.     

"Good and bad, I defined these terms, quite clear no doubt somehow": Neuroimaging and competency to be executed after Panetti

There has been little consideration, in either the caselaw or the scholarly literature, of the potential impact of neuroimaging on cases assessing whether a seriously mentally disabled death row defendant is competent to be executed. The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Panetti v. Quarterman significantly expanded its jurisprudence by ruling that such a defendant had a constitutional right to make a showing that his mental illness "obstruct[ed] a rational understanding of the State's reason for his execution." This article considers the impact of neuroimaging testimony on post-Panetti competency determination hearings, and looks at multiple questions of admissibility of evidence, adequacy of counsel, availability of expert assistance, juror attitudes, trial tactics, and application of the Daubert doctrine, and also considers the implications of the lesser-known Panetti holding (that enhances the role of expert witnesses in all competency-to-be-executed inquiries). It warns that the power of the testimony in question has the capacity to inappropriately affect fact-finders in ways that may lead "to outcomes that are both factually and legally inaccurate and constitutionally flawed."     

Integration of the pleasant events and activity restriction models: development and validation of a "PEAR" model of negative outcomes in Alzheimer's caregivers

This study examined an activity restriction/pleasurable activities mismatch model for psychosocial and health-related outcomes. A total of 108 spousal caregivers of patients with Alzheimer's Disease (AD) were assessed for their experience of social and recreational activities over the past month as well as their perception of how restricted they were for engaging in social and recreational activities. Participants were divided into three groups based on their reported activities and activity restriction: HPLR = High Pleasant Events + Low Activity Restriction (i.e., reference group; N = 28); HPHR/LPLR = Either High Pleasant Events + High Activity Restriction or Low Pleasant Events + Low Activity Restriction (N = 43); LPHR = Low Pleasant Events + High Activity Restriction (N = 37). We hypothesized that participants reporting low pleasant events combined with high activity restriction (LPHR) would demonstrate greater disturbance relative to other two groups in multiple outcome domains, including: (a) greater mood disturbance, (b) greater use of negative coping factors, (c) reduced use of positive coping strategies, (d) reduced report of psychological resource factors (e.g., personal mastery, self-efficacy), and (e) increased report of subjective health difficulties (e.g., sleep disturbance). Results generally supported our hypotheses, suggesting that assessment of both constructs is important for best predicting quality of well-being in AD caregivers, and potentially for establishing maximal effect in behavior therapy for caregivers.     

A Third Principle of Justice

In this paper I argue that in order to secure the commitment of believers in reasonable comprehensive doctrines to political liberalism a third principle of justice needs to be adopted in the Original Position. Rawls acknowledges that neutral legislation by the liberal state may negatively affect some reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and I offer a third principle of justice to help alleviate this problem. This principle, which I believe is in keeping with the United States constitutional history especially where church-state relations are concerned, maintains that a constitutional regime should, insofar as possible, avoid adopting rules with harmful effects upon those comprehensive doctrines which satisfy the conditions of reasonable pluralism.     

Can we shield ourselves from task disturbance by emotion-laden stimulation?

Emotion-laden stimuli can disturb information processing in an unrelated cognitive task. We investigated the possibilities and limitations for shielding from such disturbance. Participants performed a simple categorization task while being simultaneously exposed to negative, neutral, and positive pictures. Performance dropped with negative pictures, relative to positive and neutral stimuli. Unlike Stroop or Simon interference effects, this negativity-based disturbance did not reduce as a function of previous experience of disturbance (Exp. 1) or of announcement of such disturbance on a trial-by-trial basis (Exps. 2 and 3). We found hints of a reduction of negativity-based disturbance, however, when negative stimulation occurred with high list-wide probability (Exp. 4). These observations suggest that the control of negativity-based task disturbance might be possible in a sustained manner, but that it is severely limited when operating in a transient, moment-to-moment manner.     

Relationship between self-reported intensity of headache and magnitude of surface EMG

The study was designed to examine the relationship between self-reported intensity of headache and surface EMG. 98 patients, diagnosed by their neurologists with "muscle-contraction headaches" (tension-type headaches) were referred to evaluate their suitability for biofeedback therapy. At the time of examination, they were asked to rate their average headache intensity on a 10-point scale. Surface EMG data were collected to assess actual muscle contraction. Analysis indicated that among patients diagnosed with muscle contraction headache, there is a positive significant correlation between self-reported intensity of headache and actual muscle-contraction. The current data lend support to the hypothesis that the tension in the headaches currently described as "tension-type" may in fact refer to actual muscular tension or contraction.     

Terrorism Between "Syndrome" and "Tool"

ABSTRACT— Two psychological views of terrorism are described, approaching it as a "syndrome" and as a "tool" respectively. Research thus far found little support for the syndrome view. The heterogeneity of terrorism's users is consistent with the tool view, affording an analysis of terrorism in terms of goal–means psychology.     

Moral Expertise?: Constitutional Narratives and Philosophical Argument

Using the bench trial of Colorado's Amendment 2 as an example, this article focuses on the more general question of expert testimony in moral philosophy. It argues that there is indeed expertise in moral philosophy but argues against admitting such expert testimony in cases dealing with what John Rawls terms "constitutional essentials" and 'matters of basic justice." Developing the idea of public reason inherent in the Rawlsian concept of political liberalism, the article argues that philosophers can and should speak out on public issues, if they do so with due respect for certain restrictions, but that they should not serve as expert witnesses on core constitutional questions, since doing so suggests that they claim a type of authority that would require fellow citizens to defer to their views. Such claims to authority in basic ethical matters threaten the mutual respect for divergent comprehensive doctrines that lies at the core of political liberalism. Philosophers have a duty to serve the public good, and they perform this service in fruitful ways. But they should refuse a public role that appears incompatible with equal respect for the committed ethical searching of their fellow citizens.     

A neuroengineering solution to the optimal tracking problem

A mathematical solution is developed for an optimal sensory-to-motor transformation. This specifies a unique vector of motor command signals for goal-directed upper limb movement, conditional on cost of muscular effort vs. performance accuracy. Derivation is based on a realistic model of visual tracking, incorporating characteristics of external tracking system, target and disturbance as well as multivariable, nonlinear, time-varying characteristics of neuromuscular and biomechanical systems internal to the human operator. The optimal transformation removes redundancy in a 58-dimensional muscle system to give a two-dimensional response, thus solving the degrees-of-freedom problem. While adaptive filter neural networks are required to implement the general solution, an instructive linear matrix approximation reveals computational modules with observable behavioural correlates such as prediction, synergy generation and speed–accuracy compromise.PsycINFO classification: 2330