The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion

My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.

Affective intentionality and the feeling body

This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind.

Self-representationalism and phenomenology

To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism.

Memory and time

The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having.

Moral judgment and self-reported moral events in adulthood

As part of a 13-year study of the development of reasoning about the Good Life and moral judgment, 29 middle-class, well-educated adults, ranging in age from 18 to 80 years, were interviewed twice, 4 years apart on Standard Form Moral Judgment interviews and were asked to describe their own moral events that occurred recently. Both times, the average moral judgment score on the hypothetical dilemmas was about stage 4. The reasoning in the spontaneously reported moral events was significantly lower, although the two scores were highly correlated. Difference scores between the two were not related to scores on the hypothetical dilemmas. While there were no significant gender differences in scores on the hypothetical dilemmas, there were in scores on spontaneously reported events favoring males. The philosophic quality of the reported events could be easily categorized by traditional moral-philosophic categories; about half of the events contained traditional deontic moral content (moral right); the other half contained material defined as the moral good. The context of most events was interpersonal as opposed to societal. The most frequent issue discussed concerned honesty about financial issues, particularly income tax evasion. Ways to expand the research on adult moral experience are discussed.     

Moral phenomenology and a moral ontology of the human person

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unifed subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the very foundations of moral experience or what I call a moral ontology of the human person. I attempt to partially outline such an ontology by engaging with Robert Sokolowski's phenomenology of the human person from a moral perspective. My analysis of Sokolowski's thought leads me to five core ideas of a moral ontology of the human person: well-being, virtue, freedom, responsibility, and phronesis. Though I do not by any means boast a complete moral ontology of the human person, I go on to demonstrate how the account I have presented, or something like it, can go a long way to helping moral phenomenology meet the criteria it requires to be a viable and worthwhile pursuit.     

The intentionality bias and schizotypy

The “intentionality bias” refers to our automatic tendency to judge other people's actions to be intentional. In this experiment we extended research on this effect in two key ways. First, we developed a novel nonlinguistic task for assessing the intentionality bias. This task used video stimuli of ambiguous movements. Second, we investigated the relationship between the strength of this bias and schizotypy (schizophrenia-like symptoms in healthy individuals). Our results showed that the intentionality bias was replicated for the video stimuli and also that this bias is stronger in those individuals scoring higher on the schizotypy rating scales. Overall these findings lend further support for the existence of the intentionality bias. We also discuss the possible relevance of these findings for our understanding of certain symptoms of schizophrenic illness.     

Variability and moral phenomenology

Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which moral phenomenology can constitute a reason to favor one moral theory over another. Phenomenology may not be able to serve as a pre-theoretic starting point or anchor in the consideration of rival moral theories because moral phenomenology may itself be theory-laden. These doubts are illustrated through an examination of how moral phenomenology is used in the thought of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Søren Kierkegaard.     

Judgments of cause and blame: the effects of intentionality and foreseeability

What are the factors that influence everyday attributions of cause and blame? The current studies focus on sequences of events that lead to adverse outcomes, and examine people's cause and blame ratings for key events in these sequences. Experiment 1 manipulated the intentional status of candidate causes and their location in a causal chain. Participants rated intentional actions as more causal, and more blameworthy, than unintentional actions or physical events. There was also an overall effect of location, with later events assigned higher ratings than earlier events. Experiment 2 manipulated both intentionality and foreseeability. The preference for intentional actions was replicated, and there was a strong influence of foreseeability: actions were rated as more causal and more blameworthy when they were highly foreseeable. These findings are interpreted within two prominent theories of blame, [Shaver, K. G. (1985). The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness. New York: Springer-Verlag] and [Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 556-574]. Overall, it is argued that the data are more consistent with Alicke's model of culpable control.     

Affective intentionality and self-consciousness

We elaborate and defend the claim that human affective states (“feelings”) are, among other things, self-disclosing. We will show why affective intentionality has to be considered in order to understand human self-consciousness. One specific class of affective states, so-called existential feelings, although often neglected in philosophical treatments of emotions, will prove central. These feelings importantly pre-structure affective and other intentional relations to the world. Our main thesis is that existential feelings are an important manifestation of self-consciousness and figure prominently in human self-understanding. We offer an ordering of four levels of existential feelings and also give considerations in favour of the essential bodily nature of these feelings.     

Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett

In Consciousness Explained and other works, Daniel Dennett uses the concept of phenomenology (along with his variant, called heterophenomenology) in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy. Yet it can be argued that many of the most important ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others (and not just the idea of intentionality) reappear in Dennett's work in only slightly altered form. In this article I try to show this in two ways, first by talking in a general way about Dennett's phenomenology, and second by examining his treatment of the concept of the self. In both cases I argue that Dennett should have read his Husserl and Merleau-Ponty more carefully, since in the end his (hetero-) phenomenology is methodologically incoherent and suffers from something like a weakness of will. This emerges especially in his use of the notion of fiction.     

Memory,past and self

The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next, I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence.     

Internalism,externalism, and transcendental idealism

The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation.     

Syntax and intentionality: An automatic link between language and theory-of-mind

Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unintentionality bias). In Experiment 2, participants made an intentionality judgment about one of the two actors in a partially symmetric sentence (e.g., “John exchanged products with Susan”). The results revealed a tendency to treat the grammatical subject as acting more intentionally than the grammatical object. In Experiment 3 participants were encouraged to think about the events that such sentences typically refer to, and the tendency was significantly reduced. These results suggest a privileged relationship between language and central theory-of-mind concepts. More specifically, there may be two ways of determining intentionality judgments: (1) an automatic verbal bias to treat grammatical subjects (but not objects) as intentional (2) a deeper, more careful consideration of the events typically described by a sentence.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

A critical review of the physicalistic approaches of the mind and consciousness

The aim of this paper is to construct a critical evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of the physicalistic theory concerning mental phenomena and consciousness. Physicalism can, better than other theories, explain mental phenomena, such as intentionality and reasonability of human beings and other biological organisms. Modern neuroscience corroborates the conviction that the brain is a physical mind capable of giving meaning to, evaluating and further cognitively and behaviorally transforming complex aspects of the world. On the other hand, the emergence of consciousness from brain states seems to be a paradoxical, intransparent, physical coincidence hardly explained by the mental function of the brain at the physical level. Moreover, the intentionality and reasonability of psychic phenomena per se cannot be explained as a repercussion of the same attributes characterizing the brain function. In conclusion, the old debate between physicalism and other philosophical theories remains open. It can be expected that the progress of sciences will inspire novel approaches to the problem of the relations between matter, mind and consciousness.     

The affective interval: An investigation of the peaks and valleys during high- and moderate-intensity interval exercise in regular exercisers

Evidence supports the notion that people generally feel worse during high(er) intensity exercise but experience an affective rebound immediately following cessation that often exceeds pre-exercise feeling states. Considering rest/recovery is an integral part of interval exercise, it is of interest to determine the degree of affective reactivity and recovery that may occur during interval exercise of different intensities. The purpose of the present study was to examine affective reactivity to and recovery from an acute bout of moderate-intensity (MIIE) and high-intensity interval exercise (HIIE). Participants (N = 25, 13 females, 23.3 ± 4.0 yrs, BMI = 25.7 ± 4.1 kg m⁻²) completed 4 sessions at the same time of day with at least 24-h between each session: a baseline session to record resting affect, a graded exercise test on a stationary bike (cycle ramp protocol 25 W·min-1) to volitional exhaustion, and then completed a high- (HIIE) and moderate-intensity interval exercise (MIIE) session where affect was recorded prior to, during, and up to 30-min post exercise. Participants reported more negative feeling states during the HIIE session compared to the MIIE session, but these states recovered similarly as early as 5-min post-exercise. In addition, while affective change (reactivity and rebounds) were relatively equal during the MIIE, declines in affect during the HIIE outweighed the affective rebounds associated with rest, resulting in a large decline in affective state from pre-exercise.     

Correlates and phenomenology of first and third person memories

Worry as a trait is an individual's general tendency to become worried, which in severe cases is associated with the diagnosis Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability to mentally project oneself into one's personal past or future, in terms of memories of personal past events or projections of possible events in the personal future. MTT can be voluntarily initiated or occur involuntarily. The current exploratory study investigated involuntary and voluntary MTT in the context of trait worry, thereby bringing together research on worry and MTT. High (N=20) and low (N=16) worriers recorded involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories and future projections using a structured diary method. We predicted that MTT in high worriers would show signs of cognitive avoidance, such as reduced emotional intensity, more observer perspective, less visual imagery, or coming up with overgeneral or less self-relevant events. We found only partial support for our hypotheses in that high worriers rated personal memories and future projections lower on measures of self-relevance than did low worriers.     

Consciousness,self-consciousness,and meditation

Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence of this presence.