Six-and-a-half-month-old children positively attribute goals to human action and to humanoid-robot motion

Recent infant studies indicate that goal attribution (understanding of goal-directed action) is present very early in infancy. We examined whether 6.5-month-olds attribute goals to agents and whether infants change the interpretation of goal-directed action according to the kind of agent. We conducted three experiments using the visual habituation paradigm. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether 6.5-month-olds attribute goals to human action. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether 6.5-month-olds attribute goals to humanoid-robot motion. In Experiment 3, we tested whether infants attribute goals to a moving box. The agent used in Experiment 3 had no human-like appearance. The results of the three experiments show that infants positively attribute goals to both human action (Experiment 1) and humanoid motion (Experiment 2) but not to a moving box (Experiment 3). These results suggest that 6.5-month-olds tend to interpret certain actions in terms of goals, their reasoning about these actions is based on a sophisticated teleological representation, and that human-like appearance of agents may influence this teleological reasoning in early infancy.     

Children's understanding of death as the cessation of agency: a test using sleep versus death

An important problem faced by children is discriminating between entities capable of goal-directed action, i.e. intentional agents, and non-agents. In the case of discriminating between living and dead animals, including humans, this problem is particularly difficult, because of the large number of perceptual cues that living and dead animals share. However, there are potential costs of failing to discriminate between living and dead animals, including unnecessary vigilance and lost opportunities from failing to realize that an animal, such as an animal killed for food, is dead. This might have led to the evolution of mechanisms specifically for distinguishing between living and dead animals in terms of their ability to act. Here we test this hypothesis by examining patterns of inferences about sleeping and dead organisms by Shuar and German children between 3 and 5-years old. The results show that by age 4, causal cues to death block agency attributions to animals and people, whereas cues to sleep do not. The developmental trajectory of this pattern of inferences is identical across cultures, consistent with the hypothesis of a living/dead discrimination mechanism as a reliably developing part of core cognitive architecture.     

The self in action: lessons from delusions of control

Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of it. Most of the time we are not aware of the sensory consequences of our actions or of the various subtle corrections that we make during the course of goal-directed actions. We know that we are agents and that we are successfully causing the world to change. But as actors we move through the world like shadows glimpsed only occasional from the corner of an eye.     

I didn't think of that

Consider cases in which an agent simply doesn.t think to do a certain thing, or doesn't think of a crucial consideration favoring doing a certain thing, or intends to do a certain thing but forgets to do it. In such a case, is the agent able to do the thing that she fails to do? Assume that commonly we all-in can do things that we do not do. Here I argue that, given this assumption, in the cases under consideration, too, commonly agents all-in can do the things they fail to do.     

Chasing vs. stalking: interrupting the perception of animacy

Visual experience involves not only physical features such as color and shape, but also higher-level properties such as animacy and goal-directedness. Perceiving animacy is an inherently dynamic experience, in part because agents' goal-directed behavior may be frequently in flux-unlike many of their physical properties. How does the visual system maintain and update representations of agents' animate and goal-directed behavior over time and motion? The present study explored this question in the context of a particularly salient form of perceived animacy: chasing, in which one shape (the "wolf") pursues another shape (the "sheep"). Here the participants themselves controlled the movement of the sheep, and the perception of chasing was assessed in terms of their ability to avoid being caught by the wolf-which looked identical to many moving distractors, and so could be identified only by its motion. The wolf's pursuit was frequently interrupted by periods in which it was static, jiggling in place, or moving randomly (amidst distractors that behaved similarly). Only the latter condition greatly impaired the detection of chasing-and only when the random motion was grouped into temporally extended chunks. These results reveal (1) how the detection of chasing is determined by the character and temporal grouping (rather than just the brute amount) of "pursuit" over time; and (2) how these temporal dynamics can lead the visual system to either construct or actively reject interpretations of chasing.     

Identifying living and sentient kinds from dynamic information: the case of goal-directed versus aimless autonomous movement in conceptual change

To reason competently about novel entities, people must discover whether the entity is alive and/or sentient. Exactly how people make this discovery is unknown, although past researchers have proposed that young children--unlike adults--rely chiefly on whether the object can move itself. This study examined the effect of goal-directed versus aimless autonomous movement on children's and adults' attributions of biological and psychological capacities in an effort to test whether goal-directedness affects inferences across documented periods of change in biological reasoning. Half of the participants (adults, and 4-, 5-, 7-, and 10-year-olds; Ns=32) were shown videos of unfamiliar blobs moving independently and aimlessly, and the other half were shown videos of identical blobs moving identically but toward a goal. No age group was likely to attribute biological or psychological capacities to the aimless self-moving blobs. However, for 5-year-olds through adults, goal-directed movement reliably elicited life judgments, and it elicited more biological and psychological attributions overall. Adults differed from children in that goal-directed movement affected their attributions of biological properties more than their attributions of psychological properties. The results suggest that both young children and adults consider the capacity for goal-directed movement to be a decisive factor in determining whether something unfamiliar is alive, though other factors may be important in deciding whether the thing is sentient.     

Development of hierarchical structures for actions and motor imagery: a constructivist view from synthetic neuro-robotics study

The current paper shows a neuro-robotics experiment on developmental learning of goal-directed actions. The robot was trained to predict visuo-proprioceptive flow of achieving a set of goal-directed behaviors through iterative tutor training processes. The learning was conducted by employing a dynamic neural network model which is characterized by their multiple time-scale dynamics. The experimental results showed that functional hierarchical structures emerge through stages of developments where behavior primitives are generated in earlier stages and their sequences of achieving goals appear in later stages. It was also observed that motor imagery is generated in earlier stages compared to actual behaviors. Our claim that manipulatable inner representation should emerge through the sensory–motor interactions is corresponded to Piaget’s constructivist view.     

Children's understandings of the attributes of life

Previous investigations of children's understandings of the life concept have focused on their classifications of the life status of familiar objects. In this study, we attempted to examine more directly the processes by which children infer life status by examining their reasoning about unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were asked to name attributes of living things to establish which attributes they associated most closely with life. Children age 7 and younger most often named attributes true only of animals but not of plants; older children more often named attributes true of both animals and plants. However, movement was the single attribute cited most frequently by children of all ages tested. In Experiment 2, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were presented information about attributes of imaginary objects on a distant planet and were asked to infer if those objects were alive. Again, young children relied relatively heavily on qualities true only of animals but not of plants, whereas older children relied more on attributes true of both plants and animals. Also as before, movement was viewed as indicative of life at all ages tested. In Experiment 3, we examined the hypothesis that children discriminate among different types of motion and that the types of motion they associate with life are in fact typical of living things. Children ranging from age 5 through 11 were found to discriminate among different types of motion and to infer that objects were alive only when they showed the types of motion typical of living beings. The results of Experiment 3 allowed interpretation of seemingly conflicting results that have arisen in previous studies, as well as in Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study.     

Causal perception of action-and-reaction sequences in 8- to 10-month-olds

Four experiments with 202 8- to 10-month-old infants studied their sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance in schematic events seen as goal-directed action and reaction by adults and whether this depends on attributes associated with animate agents. In Experiment 1, a red square moved toward a blue square without making contact; in “reaction” events blue moved away while red was approaching, whereas in “delay” events blue started after red stopped. Infants were habituated to one event and then tested on its reversal. Spatiotemporal features reversed for both events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. Infants dishabituated more to reversed reaction events than to reversed delay events. Squares moved rigidly or in a nonrigid animal-like fashion. Infants discriminated these, but motion pattern did not affect responses to reversal. Infants also discriminated reactions from launching and dishabituated to reversed reactions lacking self-initiated motion. These results suggest that sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance depends on the event structure but not pattern or onset typical of animal motion.     

Differences in postural control and movement performance during goal directed reaching in children with developmental coordination disorder

Poor upper-limb coordination is a common difficulty for children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD). One hypothesis is that deviant muscle timing in proximal muscle groups results in poor postural and movement control. The relationship between muscle timing, arm motion and children's upper-limb coordination deficits has not previously been studied. The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between functional difficulties with upper-limb motor skills and neuromuscular components of postural stability and coordination. Sixty-four children aged 8-10 years, 32 with DCD and 32 without DCD, participated in the study. The study investigated timing of muscle activity and resultant arm movement during a rapid, voluntary, goal-directed arm movement. Results showed that compared to children without DCD, children with DCD took significantly longer to respond to visual signals and longer to complete the goal-directed movement. Children with DCD also demonstrated altered activity in postural muscles. In particular, shoulder muscles, except for serratus anterior, and posterior trunk muscles demonstrated early activation. Further, anterior trunk muscles demonstrated delayed activation. In children with DCD, anticipatory function was not present in three of the four anterior trunk muscles. These differences support the hypothesis that in children with DCD, altered postural muscle activity may contribute to poor proximal stability and consequently poor arm movement control when performing goal-directed movement. These results have educational and functional implications for children at school and during activities of daily living and leisure activities and for clinicians assessing and treating children with DCD.     

4~7岁儿童对生物目的指向性的认知发展模式

采用结构式访谈法,通过计算机模拟真实情景的动画方式,系统探查4~7岁儿童在目的指向性维度上的本体区分、因果认知发展模式以及在此维度上的朴素生物学“理论”的形成。结果表明：（1）4~7岁儿童在目的指向性维度上进行本体区分的认知发展模式,经历了从低到高的4个发展水平,即目的论模式——基于动物模式——基于生物模式——基于本体区分模式;（2）4~7岁儿童对目的指向性的因果认知与本体区分表现出一致性发展模式,表明学前儿童在目的指向性维度上逐渐形成了朴素生物学“理论”;（3）5~6岁是儿童对目的指向性认知的快速发展期,领域知识对儿童的认知发展具有明显的促进作用,但是受年龄和领域任务的影响     

Even simple forms of social learning rely on intention attribution in marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus)

Intention attribution guides the cognitively most demanding forms of social learning, such as imitation, thereby scaffolding cumulative cultural evolution. However, it is not thought to be necessary for more basic forms of social learning. Here we present evidence that in marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus) even most basic forms of social learning such as enhancement depend on intention attribution. Marmosets perceived the behavior of a conspecific and a conspecific-like robot, but not that of a moving black box, as goal directed. Their subsequent choice behavior was shaped by social facilitation and stimulus enhancement, that is, by very simple forms of social learning, but only when exposed to the conspecific and robot, which they previously had perceived as intentional agents. We discuss the implications of this finding for contemporary debates about social learning, including emulation learning and ghost control studies, the necessity of goal-directed copying for cumulative cultural evolution, and the limits of current classification systems of social learning for the evolution of social and asocial learning.     

Who is this?: Identity and presence in robot-mediated communication

Because a telepresence robot is intended for use in telecommunications, conveying the presence of a remote sender is an important issue. Even though certain characteristics of robots such as identity could be effective at generating a sense of presence, this risks yielding a distortion of presence in the remote sender. Thus, in order to find effective ways to increase presence, we executed an experiment comparing a telepresence robot with high identity and a telepresence robot with low identity. The 60 participants in this study engaged in a video call with a remote sender using either a telepresence robot with high identity or a telepresence robot with low identity. The results showed that participants felt more remote sender presence when interacting with the telepresence robot with low identity than they did with the one with high identity. On the other hand, when a telepresence robot has high identity, participants felt more presence toward the robot than they did toward the one with low identity. In the second study (N = 72), participants experienced two types of telepresence robots (identity level: a telepresence robot with high identity vs. a telepresence robot with low identity) with two types of remote senders (number of remote senders: single remote sender vs. multiple remote senders). The identity level of the robot and the number of remote senders affected the presence of the remote sender, telepresence, and the presence of the robot. We discuss in detail the implications for the design of telepresence robots in terms of increasing presence.     

Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants

Human infants' tendency to attribute goals to observed actions may help us to understand where people's obsession with goals originates from. While one-year-old infants liberally interpret the behaviour of many kinds of agents as goal-directed, a recent report [Kamewari, K., Kato, M., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., & Hiraki, K. (2005). Six-and-a-half-month-old children positively attribute goals to human action and to humanoid-robot motion. Cognitive Development, 20, 303-320] suggested that younger infants restrict goal attribution to humans and human-like creatures. The present experiment tested whether 6.5-month-old infants would be willing to attribute a goal to a moving inanimate box if it slightly varied its goal approach within the range of the available efficient actions. The results were positive, demonstrating that featural identification of agents is not a necessary precondition of goal attribution in young infants and that the single most important behavioural cue for identifying a goal-directed agent is variability of behaviour. This result supports the view that the bias to give teleological interpretation to actions is not entirely derived from infants' experience.     

Why People are Atypical Agents

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the traditional philosophical approach of taking cognitively and emotionally competent adult people to be the prototypical instances of agency should be revised in light of current work in the behavioral sciences. Logical consistency in application is better served by taking simple goal-directed and feedback-governed systems such as insects as the prototypes of the concept of agency, with people being agents ‘by extension’ in the same sense as countries or corporations.     

Infants' Grasp of Others' Intentions

ABSTRACT— The perception of others as intentional agents is fundamental to human experience and foundational to development. Recent research reveals that this cornerstone of social perception has its roots early in infancy, and that it is influenced by the universal, early-emerging human experience of engaging in goal-directed action. Infants' own action capabilities correlate with their emerging tendency to view others' actions as organized by goals. Moreover, interventions that facilitate new goal-directed actions alter infants' perception of those same actions in others. These effects seem to depend on the first-person aspects of infants' experience. These findings open new questions about how doing leads to knowing in the social domain.     

The informational properties of the throwing arm for anticipation of goal-directed action

We examined the informational value of biological motion from the arm in predicting the location of a thrown ball. In three experiments, participants were classified as being skilled and less skilled based on their actual performance on the task (i.e., using a within-task criterion). We then presented participants with a range of stick figure representations and required them to predict throw direction. In Experiment 1, we presented stick figure movies of a full body throwing action, right throwing arm plus left shoulder and throwing arm only. Participants were able to anticipate throw direction above chance under all conditions irrespective of perceptual skill level, with the perceptually skilled participants excelling under full body conditions. In Experiment 2, we neutralized dynamical differences in motion to opposing throw directions from the shoulder, elbow and wrist of the throwing arm. Neutralizing the wrist location negatively affected anticipation performance in all participants reducing accuracy to below chance. In Experiment 3, we presented movies of the motion wrist location alone and the upper section of the throwing arm (shoulder-elbow). Participants were able to successfully anticipate above chance in these latter two conditions. Our findings suggest that motion of the throwing arm contains multiple sources of information that can help facilitate the anticipation of goal-directed action. Perceptually skilled participants were superior in extracting informational value from motion at both the local and global levels when compared to less skilled counterparts.     

Robots that imitate humans

The study of social learning in robotics has been motivated by both scientific interest in the learning process and practical desires to produce machines that are useful, flexible, and easy to use. In this review, we introduce the social and task-oriented aspects of robot imitation. We focus on methodologies for addressing two fundamental problems. First, how does the robot know what to imitate? And second, how does the robot map that perception onto its own action repertoire to replicate it? In the future, programming humanoid robots to perform new tasks might be as simple as showing them.     

Temporal perception is enhanced for goal-directed biological actions

ABSTRACT

Research into the visual perception of goal-directed human action indicates that human action perception makes use of specialized processing systems, similar to those that operate in visual expertise. Against this background, the current research investigated whether perception of temporal information in goal-directed human action is enhanced relative to similar motion stimuli. Experiment 1 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in upright human action to a kinematic control (an animation yoked to the motion of the human hand), and also to inverted human action. Experiment 2 compared human action to a non-human motion control (a tool moved the object). In both experiments observers’ sensitivity to detecting the speed changes was higher for the human stimuli relative to the control stimuli, and inversion in Experiment 1 did not alter observers’ sensitivity. Experiment 3 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in goal-directed human and dog actions, in order to determine if enhanced temporal perception is unique to human actions. Results revealed no difference between human and dog stimuli, indicating that enhanced speed perception may exist for any biological motion. Results are discussed with reference to theories of biological motion perception and perception in visual expertise.