Development of Inhibition as a Function of the Presence of a Supernatural Agent

In this study the author examined the developmental differences in inhibition and cognition of 4–8-year-old children as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. Previous evolutionarily-relevant research has suggested that humans are naturally primed to think in terms of supernatural agents and that, given the correct context, individuals readily accept novel supernatural entities and alter their behavior accordingly. All children in this study played 4 games designed to assess their present level of inhibitory and cognitive development. Children in the experimental condition were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task. Results revealed that cognitively advanced children were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were less cognitively advanced children. This research provides support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents.     

Development of inhibition as a function of the presence of a supernatural agent

In this study the author examined the developmental differences in inhibition and cognition of 4-8-year-old children as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. Previous evolutionarily-relevant research has suggested that humans are naturally primed to think in terms of supernatural agents and that, given the correct context, individuals readily accept novel supernatural entities and alter their behavior accordingly. All children in this study played 4 games designed to assess their present level of inhibitory and cognitive development. Children in the experimental condition were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task. Results revealed that cognitively advanced children were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were less cognitively advanced children. This research provides support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents.     

自闭症儿童非言语错误信念任务的实验研究

心理理论是指对自己和他人心理状态(如需要、信念、意图、动机、感觉等)的认识,并由此对相应行为做出因果性的预测和解释。国内外心理理论研究较多关注一般儿童的心理理论能力,而对自闭症儿童领域的心理理论的研究不够。本研究在原有的错误信念任务的基础上,对任务进行完全“非言语”改进,以意外内容任务为主要测试内容,将智力落后儿童作为对照组纳入到实验当中,进一步探索自闭症儿童心理理论发展情况。研究结果表明：改编后的非言语意外内容任务适用于自闭症和智力落后儿童;包括低言语能力个体在内的所有自闭症儿童的心理理论能力显著低于智力落后儿童;智力落后儿童的心理理论能力与以往研究结果相一致;相对于智力落后儿童,自闭症儿童在物品转移和调换的注意方面存在更大障碍。     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Cognitive effects of language on human navigation

Language has been linked to spatial representation and behavior in humans, but the nature of this effect is debated. Here, we test whether simple verbal expressions improve 4-year-old children’s performance in a disoriented search task in a small rectangular room with a single red landmark wall. Disoriented children’s landmark-guided search for a hidden object was dramatically enhanced when the experimenter used certain verbal expressions to designate the landmark during the hiding event. Both a spatial expression (“I’m hiding the sticker at the red/white wall”) and a non-spatial but task-relevant expression (“The red/white wall can help you get the sticker”) enhanced children’s search, relative to uncued controls. By contrast, a verbal expression that drew attention to the landmark in a task-irrelevant manner (“Look at this pretty red/white wall”) produced no such enhancement. These findings provide further evidence that language changes spatial behavior in children and illuminate one mechanism through which language exerts its effect: by helping children understand the relevance of landmarks for encoding locations.     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

Number-knower levels in young children: insights from Bayesian modeling

Lee and Sarnecka (2010) developed a Bayesian model of young children’s behavior on the Give-N test of number knowledge. This paper presents two new extensions of the model, and applies the model to new data. In the first extension, the model is used to evaluate competing theories about the conceptual knowledge underlying children’s behavior. One, the knower-levels theory, is basically a “stage” theory involving real conceptual change. The other, the approximate-meanings theory, assumes that the child’s conceptual knowledge is relatively constant, although performance improves over time. In the second extension, the model is used to ask whether the same latent psychological variable (a child’s number-knower level) can simultaneously account for behavior on two tasks (the Give-N task and the Fast-Cards task) with different performance demands. Together, these two demonstrations show the potential of the Bayesian modeling approach to improve our understanding of the development of human cognition.     

Folkbiology meets microbiology: a study of conceptual and behavioral change

Health education can offer a valuable window onto conceptual and behavioral change. In Study 1, we mapped out 3rd-grade Chinese children’s beliefs about causes of colds and flu and ways they can be prevented. We also explored older adults’ beliefs as a possible source of the children’s ideas. In Study 2, we gave 3rd- and 4th-grade Chinese children either a conventional cold/flu education program or an experimental “Think Biology” program that focused on a biological causal mechanism for cold/flu transmission. The “Think Biology” program led children to reason about cold/flu causation and prevention more scientifically than the conventional program, and their reasoning abilities dovetailed with their mastery of the causal mechanism. Study 3, a modified replication of Study 2, found useful behavioral change as well as conceptual change among children who received the “Think Biology” program and documented coherence among knowledge enrichment, conceptual change, and behavioral change.     

公正世界信念对记忆偏差的影响

公正世界信念指人们需要相信他们所处的世界是一个公正有序的世界。本研究考察的是公正世界信念是否影响人们的记忆,让人产生记忆偏差。实验一中,被试首先阅读一则彩票中奖的新闻,然后阅读关于中奖者人品的描述,最后被试需要回忆中奖金额。结果发现,中奖者的个性品质影响对奖金数额的记忆。实验二中,两组被试分别阅读一则维护公正世界信念或威胁公正世界信念的无关故事,接下来程序与实验一相同。结果发现,预先激活的公正世界信念状态与中奖者个性品质在记忆结果上存在显著的交互效应。结果表明,公正世界信念能够导致记忆偏差。     

Cues that trigger social transmission of disinhibition in young children

Previous studies have shown that observing a human model’s actions, but not a robot’s actions, could induce young children’s perseverative behaviors and suggested that children’s sociocognitive abilities can lead to perseverative errors (“social transmission of disinhibition”). This study investigated how the social transmission of disinhibition would occur. Specifically, the authors examined whether a robot with human appearance (an android) triggered young children’s perseveration and compared the effects of the android with those of a human model. The results revealed that the android induced the social transmission of disinhibition. Also, children were more likely to be affected by the human model than by the android. The results suggested that behavioral cues (biological movement) may be important for the social transmission of disinhibition.     

Exploring children’s face-space: A multidimensional scaling analysis of the mental representation of facial identity

We explored differences in the mental representation of facial identity between 8-year-olds and adults. The 8-year-olds and adults made similarity judgments of a homogeneous set of faces (individual hair cues removed) using an “odd-man-out” paradigm. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses were performed to represent perceived similarity of faces in a multidimensional space. Five dimensions accounted optimally for the judgments of both children and adults, with similar local clustering of faces. However, the fit of the MDS solutions was better for adults, in part because children’s responses were more variable. More children relied predominantly on a single dimension, namely eye color, whereas adults appeared to use multiple dimensions for each judgment. The pattern of findings suggests that children’s mental representation of faces has a structure similar to that of adults but that children’s judgments are influenced less consistently by that overall structure.     

Children’s scientific curiosity: In search of an operational definition of an elusive concept

Although curiosity is an undeniably important aspect of children’s cognitive development, a universally accepted operational definition of children’s curiosity does not exist. Almost all of the research on measuring curiosity has focused on adults, and has used predominately questionnaire-type measures that are not appropriate for young children. In this review we (a) synthesize the range of definitions and measures of children’s curiosity and (b) propose a new operational definition and measurement procedure for assessing and advancing scientific curiosity in young children. In the first part of the paper, we summarize Loewenstein’s (1994) review of theoretical perspectives on adult curiosity, and critically evaluate a wide range of efforts to create and implement operational measures of curiosity, focusing mainly on behavioral measures of curiosity in children. In the second part, we return to Loewenstein’s theory and present an argument for adopting his “information-gap” theory of curiosity as a framework for reviewing various procedures that have been suggested for measuring children’s exploratory curiosity. Finally, we describe a new paradigm for measuring exploratory curiosity in preschool children, defining curiosity as the threshold of desired uncertainty in the environment that leads to exploratory behavior. We present data demonstrating the reliability and validity of this measure, discuss initial results on developmental differences in young children’s curiosity, and conclude with a general summary and suggestions for future research.     

Observational learning of tool use in children: Investigating cultural spread through diffusion chains and learning mechanisms through ghost displays

In the first of two experiments, we demonstrate the spread of a novel form of tool use across 20 “cultural generations” of child-to-child transmission. An experimentally seeded technique spread with 100% fidelity along twice as many “generations” as has been investigated in recent exploratory “diffusion” experiments of this type. This contrasted with only a single child discovering the technique spontaneously in a comparable group tested individually without any model. This study accordingly documents children’s social learning of tool use on a new, population-level scale that characterizes real-world cultural phenomena. In a second experiment, underlying social learning processes were investigated with a focus on the contrast between imitation (defined as copying actions) and emulation (defined as learning from the results of actions only). In two different “ghost” conditions, children were presented with the task used in the first experiment but now operated without sight of an agent performing the task, thereby presenting only the information used in emulation. Children in ghost conditions were less successful than those who had watched a model in action and showed variable matching to what they had seen. These findings suggest the importance of observational learning of complex tool use through imitation rather than only through emulation. Results of the two experiments are compared with those of similar experiments conducted previously with chimpanzees and are discussed in relation to the wider perspective of human culture and the influence of task complexity on social learning.     

Young children’s acquisition of knowledge about the Earth: A longitudinal study

This longitudinal study examined the acquisition of early knowledge of astronomy to determine whether children’s knowledge at any point in time is consistent with a naive “mental model.” Children were first assessed by means of open questions and drawing tasks at 2 and 3 years of age (N = 143). The knowledge was reassessed over the course of the following 3 years. The results showed that although a few indications of naive mental models were found, in most cases young children’s knowledge was fragmented and accurate knowledge was often expressed alongside inaccurate/synthetic ideas. Furthermore, it was shown that children need to know scientific facts before they start taking the global perspective when describing the world and, when faced with ambiguous open questions, children often experience difficulties that can induce them to change the types of answers they provide.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children’s explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N = 24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant “explanation advantage” for children’s reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Children’s sequential information search is sensitive to environmental probabilities

We investigated 4th-grade children’s search strategies on sequential search tasks in which the goal is to identify an unknown target object by asking yes–no questions about its features. We used exhaustive search to identify the most efficient question strategies and evaluated the usefulness of children’s questions accordingly. Results show that children have good intuitions regarding questions’ usefulness and search adaptively, relative to the statistical structure of the task environment. Search was especially efficient in a task environment that was representative of real-world experiences. This suggests that children may use their knowledge of real-world environmental statistics to guide their search behavior. We also compared different related search tasks. We found positive transfer effects from first doing a number search task on a later person search task.     

Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent

Children ages 3-9 years were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help them play a forced-choice game by "telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box," whereas a matched control group of children were not given this supernatural prime. On 2 unexpected event trials, an experimenter triggered a simulated unexpected event (i.e., a light turning on/off; a picture falling), and children's behavioral response to these events (i.e., moving their hand to the opposite box) was coded. Results showed a significant Age GroupxExperimental Condition interaction; the only children to reliably alter their behavior in response to the unexpected events were the oldest children (M=7 years 4 months), who were primed with the invisible agent concept. For children's posttest verbal explanations, also, only these children saw the unexpected events as being referential and declarative (e.g., "Princess Alice did it because I chose the wrong box"). Together, these data suggest that children may not regularly begin to see communicative signs as embedded in unexpected events until they are around 7 years of age.     

Revealing the invisible hand: The role of teachers in children's peer experiences

To introduce this special issue, the concept of the teacher as an “invisible hand” is presented as a metaphor to describe the potentially influential but relatively understudied contribution that educators are likely to have on children’s peer relationships and their broader interpersonal growth. Building from conceptual work distinguishing between the role of adults and peers in children’s social development, we summarize empirical support for the view that teachers are in a position to develop and guide the classroom as a society by simultaneously directing institutional expectations while also providing students with opportunities to collectively construct their own peer culture. Key social development constructs are reviewed from this lens, and the four articles and two commentaries that constitute this special issue are discussed in relation to their contributions to clarifying and extending current views of the role of teachers in school social dynamics. We conclude by considering intervention implications of this work, and we argue that teachers are the one professional in a child’s life who have the opportunity to view the whole child in relation to the social ecology in which he or she is embedded.     

Loss of emotional insight in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia or "frontal anosodiaphoria"

Loss of insight is a prominent clinical manifestation of behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), but its characteristics are poorly understood. Twelve bvFTD patients were compared with 12 Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients on a structured insight interview of cognitive insight (awareness of having a disorder) and emotional insight (concern over having a disorder). Compared to the AD patients, the bvFTD patients were less aware and less concerned about their disorder, and they had less appreciation of its effects on themselves and on others. After corrective feedback (“updating”), the bvFTD patients were just as aware of their disorder as the AD patients but remained unconcerned and unappreciative of its effects. These findings suggest that lack of insight in bvFTD is not due to “anosognosia,” or impaired cognitive and executive awareness of disease, but to “frontal anosodiaphoria,” or lack of emotional concern over having bvFTD and its impact on themselves and others.